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ABSTRACT 
 
SOCIAL ENTERPRISES AND THE POOR:   
ENRICHING STAKEHOLDER AND SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY 
 
This thesis develops a framework for understanding how social enterprises engage the 
poor and address poverty, a pressing global problem of the 21st century.  Using case-
based theory building, it studies a theoretical sample of three pairs of Philippine-based 
social enterprises, where the poor were suppliers, workers, and customers. In half of 
the cases, the poor were also owners.  The research studies the roles and role changes 
of the poor in these social enterprises, how and why these roles changed, or did not 
change, and the impact of the roles and role changes, if any, on the social enterprises 
and the poor.  Data for the research was gathered mainly from key informant 
interviews, published and unpublished organizational documents as well as previous 
studies done by external consultants on the case subjects.  Based on a cross case 
analysis of the data from the theoretical sample, the thesis develops three models of 
stakeholder engagement among social enterprises with the poor as primary 
stakeholders or SEPPS, namely: control, collaboration and empowerment. This thesis 
provides insights and develops propositions about the importance of stakeholder 
engagement and the power and limitations of these three models in bringing about 
social inclusion and poverty reduction. These propositions are suggested to be 
applicable in countries in the South other than the Philippines where systemic poverty 
and inequality are exacerbated by the failure of state and market institutions to 
address the needs of the poor. This thesis makes a contribution to social 
entrepreneurship and stakeholder theory. It does so by sharing a perspective from the 
South and giving a voice to the poor as stakeholders. The researcher notes that 
overall, the poor and the South are under-represented in these discourses. On the 
whole, social entrepreneurship theorizing has been characterized as embryonic as a 
topic of academic inquiry.  Stakeholder engagement is considered an under-theorized 
area in stakeholder theory. In developing a framework for understanding stakeholder 
engagement models involving the poor, this thesis makes a first step towards applying 
and extending stakeholder theory in SEPPS. The thesis likewise enriches social 
entrepreneurship theory by conceiving of SEPPS as a global social enterprise model 
that catalyzes South-North cooperation to address poverty and inequality.    
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CHAPTER 1 – BACKGROUND AND REVIEW OF 
LITERATURE 
 
Poverty is one of the most pressing social problems of the 21st century. An 
estimated 1.2 billion people, representing a fifth of the world’s population, live on 
less than a dollar a day.  It was in this context that the world’s leaders, who gathered 
in the Millennium Summit of 2000, declared a war against poverty. The Millennium 
Development Goals, derived from the Millennium Declaration of the summit, are a 
set of minimum commitments that 189 Member States of the United Nations agreed 
to achieve by 2015. The first of these goals is the eradication of extreme poverty and 
hunger, with a target to reduce by half the proportion of people living on less than a 
dollar a day, and who suffer from hunger (UNDP, 2003).  
Despite rapid economic growth in the Asian region over the past decades, large 
numbers of people are being excluded in terms of economic and social benefits. While 
Asia boasts of a significant number of billionaires, the Asian region is home to two 
thirds of the worlds’ poorest (World Bank, 2008).  
Even with Asian states committing to the Millennium Development Goal of 
cutting in half their respective countries’ absolute poor by 2015, the poverty situation 
in the region looks bleak.  In 2008, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) raised Asia’s 
poverty line from US$ 1 per day to US$ 1.35 per day based on a survey of poor 
households in 16 Asian countries. This redrawing of Asia’s poverty situation suggests 
that the number of Asians that are barely surviving, technically defined as being able 
to procure the 2,100 calories a day deemed necessary for human health, is far larger 
than previously thought.  ADB’s chief economist, Ifzal Ali aptly summed it up:   
 
“What makes headlines are (Asia’s high) growth numbers…. But there are two 
faces of Asia: an Asia that is shimmering and an Asia that is shivering”. (Ali in 
Wehrfritz, 2008) 
 
The global economic crisis has made matters worse for the poor. While the crisis 
presents many threats, it lends urgency to the search for effective approaches to 
address poverty as a pressing social problem of the 21st century. 
This thesis explores how social entrepreneurship and stakeholder theorizing could 
add value to the discourse on social enterprises as vehicles for poverty reduction. The 
researcher’s literature review in this context looked at various approaches to poverty 
and poverty reduction, social entrepreneurship and stakeholder theory. The author 
also found it relevant to review literature on business and society particularly the 
writings of scholars exploring the role of business in poverty reduction. This was 
done to explore alternative perspectives from which rival explanations (Yin, 2003) 
could emanate.    
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1.1. A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Poverty and 
Poverty Reduction 
 
Historically, poverty research has been dominated by studies on economic well-
being as indicated by low levels of income and consumption. Poverty has been 
equated to an inability to maintain basic living standards, often related to a monetary 
estimate (Citro and Michael, 1995; MacPherson and Silburn, 1998; Orshansky, 1965; 
International Labor Organization, 1976).  
Over the past two decades however, discourse on poverty has explored its other 
dimensions. Linking poverty with the concepts of freedom, human rights and justice, 
the works of Amartya Sen (1987, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1995, 1999, 2000, 2005, 2009) 
and Martha Nussbaum (1988, 1992, 1995, 2000, 2003, 2004) evolved what came to 
be called the capability approach to poverty analysis.   
The capability approach characterizes poverty as a deprivation of capabilities to 
achieve well-being. Well-being is defined as the ‘ends’ and capability as the ‘means’ 
to achieve it. Development is seen as a process of expanding real freedoms that 
people enjoy (Sen, 1999; United Nations Development Programme, 2000a, b). Sen 
explained: 
 
“There are good reasons for seeing poverty as a deprivation of basic capabilities, 
rather than merely as low income…. The instrumental role of freedom concerns 
the way different kinds of rights, opportunities and entitlements contribute to the 
expansion of human freedom in general, and thus to promoting development. …. 
With adequate social opportunities, individuals can effectively shape their own 
destiny and help each other.  They need not be seen primarily as passive recipients 
of the benefits of cunning development programs”. (Sen, 1999, pp. 20, 37, 11)  
 
Sen identified five distinct types of freedoms that are critical in the process of 
poverty reduction and development:  (1) political freedoms, (2) economic facilities, 
(3) social opportunities, (4) transparency guarantees, and (5) protective security.  
These are explained in Box 1.1. (Sen, 1999).  
It was the capability approach to poverty analysis that provided the theoretical 
foundations of the human development paradigm (Fukuda-Parr, 2003; Fukuda-Parr 
and Kumar, 2003).  It became the inspiration for crafting and enhancing the human 
development index (HDI), which apart from income per capita, includes education 
and health as enabling factors, in measuring the extent of a country’s human 
development (UNDP, 1990-2010). 
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Another measure of non-income based poverty, inspired by Sen’s capability 
approach has been developed by Social Watch, an international network of citizens’ 
organizations committed to the eradication of poverty. The Basic Capability Index 
(BCI) is a composite indicator based on child health, education and reproductive 
health, to measure the level of poverty that is not based on income (Social Watch, 
2008). 
The human development paradigm and the application of the human development 
index to characterize conditions across countries have helped to give attention to the 
problem of inequality across nations. This condition of inequality in human 
development substantiates what has been called the North-South Divide: a socio-
economic and political division that exists between the wealthy developed countries, 
known collectively as "the North", and the poorer developing and least developed 
countries or "the South" (Reuveny, 2007). 
The role of the global economic system in causing and exacerbating poverty 
amidst growth in the Philippines and other countries in the South has been 
documented and analyzed by a number of scholars. Elements of the global economic 
system that have been identified as contributing to the great divide between the North 
and South are unequal trade and unregulated markets as well as tied aid and structural 
indebtedness. There is a general consensus that local, national, regional and global 
actions are needed to solve poverty (Stiglitz, 2002; Bello, 2004; Broad and Cavanagh, 
2009).  
Box 1.1. Types of Freedoms Critical to Poverty Reduction and Development (Sen, 1999) 
 
Political freedoms: entitlements and civil rights associated with democracies including the 
right to free speech, to organize or associate, to dialogue, dissent and critique and to vote or 
participate in the selection of government officials.   
 
Economic facilities: opportunities and entitlements for the purpose of consumption, 
production or exchange including access to finance, to land, technology, and infrastructure 
like irrigation and farm to market roads.   
 
Social opportunities: arrangements that society makes for education, health care, 
rehabilitation and other basic services to allow the conduct of private lives and effective 
participation in political and economic activities.   
 
Transparency guarantees: entitlements to allow people to operate on the basis of trust 
including the right to disclosure. These are important to prevent corruption, financial 
irresponsibility and underhand dealings.   
 
Protective security: provisions for social safety nets to vulnerable segments of the 
population that prevent them from being reduced to abject misery, starvation and death. 
These include fixed institutional arrangements such as unemployment benefits and ad hoc 
arrangements such as famine relief or emergency public employment.    
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The United Nations has articulated its role in addressing the divide between the 
North and South through its Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In addition to 
eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, the goals seek to achieve universal primary 
education; promote gender equality and empower women; reduce child mortality; 
improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; ensure 
environmental sustainability; and develop a global partnership for development all by 
the year 2015 (UNDP, 2003). 
The Millennium Declaration1 of the United Nations General Assembly recognized 
the importance of the business sector and civil society in achieving the MDGs.  States 
committed “to develop strong partnerships with the private sector and with civil 
society organisations in pursuit of development and poverty eradication” and “to give 
greater opportunities to the private sector, non-governmental organisations and civil 
society2, in general, to contribute to the realization of the Organisation’s goals and 
programmes” (Bissio, 2003). 
This thesis explores a multidimensional approach to poverty, through the lens of 
actors who are engaged in the process of poverty reduction, including the poor 
themselves.    
 
1.2.  Social Entrepreneurship  
 
From the various perspectives presented during the first International Social 
Entrepreneurship Research Conference held in Barcelona, Spain in 2005, scholars 
characterized initiatives in the field as wide-ranging:  
 
“The concept of social entrepreneurship is, in practice, recognized as 
encompassing a wide range of initiatives: enterprising individuals devoted to 
making a difference; social purpose business ventures dedicated to adding for-
profit motivations to the non-profit sector; new types of philanthropists supporting 
venture capital-like investment portfolios; and non-profit organizations that are 
reinventing themselves by drawing lessons learned from the business world”. 
(Mair, Robinson and Hockerts, 2006, p.1)                                                                              
 
Social entrepreneurship has also been characterized as creating new business 
models to serve the poor (Seelos and Mair, 2005).  A number of scholars have 
                                                 
1 See http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm.(downloaded 7 July 2011) 
2 Civil society, sometimes called the third sector or voluntary sector, refer to a wide array of non-governmental and not-
for-profit organizations with a presence in public life.  Linz and Stepan (1996, p. 3) broadly define it this way:  "By civil 
society we refer to that arena... where self-organizing groups, movements, and individuals, relatively autonomous from 
the state, attempt to articulate values, create associations and solidarities, and advance their interests. Civil society can 
include manifold social movements (women's groups, neighbourhood associations, religious groupings, and intellectual 
organizations) and civic associations from all strata (such as trade unions, entrepreneurial groups, journalists, or 
lawyers).” 
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recognized the impact that social enterprises have in contributing to the achievement 
of the Millennium Development Goals, particularly in the alleviation of poverty, 
disease and death, and in increasing the overall quality of life by expanding human 
capabilities and chances in the poorest of countries (Seelos et al., 2006).  In a recent 
paper on Social Entrepreneurship Between Market and Mission, Hockerts (2010, p. 
178) characterized “social entrepreneurship as the discovery of opportunities to 
generate social impact and the identification of a mechanism to do so in a financially 
sustainable way”.   
Drawing from a review of literature towards defining boundaries for the domain 
of social entrepreneurship research, Perrini (2006) proposed the following definition:    
 
“Social entrepreneurship entails innovations designed to explicitly improve 
societal well-being, housed within entrepreneurial organizations, which initiate, 
guide or contribute to change in society”. (Perrini, 2006, p. 24)   
 
As an evolving field of study in different regions of the world, social entrepreneurship 
may be better understood as having many schools of thought. The author identified at 
least three schools of thought, based on her review of literature: the social innovation 
school, (Dees and Anderson, 2006), the social enterprise school (Dees and Anderson, 
2006), which is also referred to as the earned income school (Defourny & Nyssens, 
2010), and the social economy school (Defourny & Nyssens, 2010; Hulgaard, 2008). 
A proponent of the social innovation school captured its essence as “creating large 
scale, lasting, and systemic change through the introduction of new ideas, 
methodologies, and changes in attitude” (Kramer, 2005, p 6).  Dees and Anderson 
(2006) further characterized this school as dealing with innovations that have the 
potential for major societal impact by addressing the root causes of a social problem, 
reducing particular social needs, and preventing undesirable outcomes. The social 
innovation school emphasizes the important role of individual social entrepreneurs 
setting up for profit or non-profit organizations in the pursuit of innovative solutions 
to social problems (Hoogendoorn, 2009). 
On the other hand, the social enterprise or earned income school deals with 
market-based solutions to social problems, aligning economic with social value 
creation (Dees and Anderson, 2006). The main subject of study is the enterprise, a 
non-profit venture serving a social mission that ensures the continuity of service 
provision through generating income streams independent from subsidies and grants. 
This school promotes the idea that business methods are an effective way to improve 
non-profit organizations (Hoogendoorn, 2009).  
These first two schools of thought are considered to be part of the American 
tradition, which arose out of the economic downturn in the 1970s and 1980s when 
large cutbacks in U.S. federal funding severely affected non-profit organizations 
conducting poverty alleviation programs, through education, health care, the 
27 
 
environment and community services.  The social economy school emanated from the 
European tradition, evolving amidst the crisis in the 1980s when the welfare state 
retreated from public services (Kerlin, 2006; Nyssens, 2006).    
The emergence of the social economy school is linked to the European Research 
Network (EMES) that began in 1996 as a group of scholars cooperating to investigate 
the social enterprise phenomenon and established a broad definition that allows for 
the national differences within the European Union. The EMES definition of social 
enterprise includes associations, cooperatives, mutual organizations and foundations.  
The unit of analysis is the enterprise, producing goods or services with a minimum 
amount of paid work; with the explicit aim to benefit the community; launched by a 
group of citizens who bear a significant amount of economic risk and enjoy a high 
degree of autonomy; and where decision making power is participatory and not based 
on capital ownership (Defourny, 2001). Defourny and Nyssens (2008, 2010) gave the 
following summary definition:  
 
“Social enterprises are not-for-profit private organizations providing goods and 
services directly related to their explicit aim to benefit the community. They rely 
on a collective dynamics involving various types of stakeholders in their 
governing bodies, they place a high value on their autonomy and they bear 
economic risks linked to this activity”.  (Defourny and Nyssens 2008, p. 202) 
 
Some scholars identify the United Kingdom (U.K.) as having a distinct approach 
within the social economy school (Hoogendoorn, 2009). The Blair government in the 
1990s launched the Social Enterprise Coalition with the creation of the Social 
Enterprise Unit under the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) to promote and 
support them. DTI’s definition of social enterprise is “businesses with primarily social 
objectives whose surpluses are principally reinvested for that purpose in the business 
or the community, rather than being driven by the need to maximize profits for 
shareholders and owners” (DTI, 2002).  Spear, et al., (2010, p. 179) consider social 
enterprises as “the trading part of the third sector, which, in the U.K. definition, is 
equivalent to the social economy”.  
Some scholars of the social economy school link social entrepreneurship to the 
issue of democracy and participation and locate social enterprises in the intersection 
of the public, private and civil society sectors (Hulgaard, 2008). The multi-
stakeholder nature of social enterprises is also emphasized by the social economy 
school (Vidal, 2010, pp. 112-114):   
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“Multi-stakeholder refers to an organization in which different interest groups –
each one which has different aspirations and hopes related to what it can expect 
from the organization’s activity – are involved… When…. multi-stakeholder 
dialogue is consolidated via commitments to be met by the organization 
because they have been approved by the different stakeholders in the Board, 
then it can be said that the organization is in a situation of multi-stakeholder 
governance”.  
 
Social economy school scholars as exemplified by Vidal (2010) refer to the following 
as stakeholder categories in social enterprises: shareholders, directors, workers, 
volunteers, users and providers; customers in public administration; and future 
generations (if the organization has an impact on the environment).  
A framework for understanding governance issues and challenges among social 
enterprises has been developed by Spear, Cornforth and Aiken (2010, p. 199). These 
scholars identified four types of social enterprises: mutuals that include cooperatives 
and credit unions; trading charities; public sector spin-offs; and new-start social 
enterprises. Common governance issues faced by all types include  “finding and 
developing board members with the necessary business, financial and entrepreneurial 
skills; managing diverse stakeholder interests in increasingly multi-stakeholder 
governance systems; balancing business decisions with the social mission of the 
organizations”. A specific challenge faced by charities is managing a multi-level 
governance structure required by the setting up of trading subsidiaries. Mutual social 
enterprises are confronted with the challenge of maintaining an active membership 
and developing a competent board.     
In managing the tension between perceived market pressures and their social 
mission, Hockerts (2010, p. 160) noted two archetypal responses by social enterprises 
interested in the transformation of a sector:  “retreat towards the philanthropic core or 
a partial abandoning of the social objectives in favor of a business oriented approach”.  
He notes the possibility of a third way: 
 
“A possible third way could be one of continuous innovation whereby social 
ventures keep innovating their way out of the tension between market and 
mission”. (Hockerts, 2010, p. 177) 
 
     Some scholars, notably Huybrechts and Defourny (2008) have studied fair trade 
organizations as social enterprises. In their empirical study covering four European 
countries, they noted that fair trade organizations combine in some way economic and 
social, and sometimes also political goals. The political dimension is an attribute of 
some social enterprises that distinguishes them even more sharply from traditional 
businesses (Nyssens, 2006). Distinct from the economic (trade) and social (producer 
support) dimensions, political goals pertain to education and advocacy initiatives 
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where there is an intent of acting in the wider system in order to change the context in 
which the social enterprise operates (Martin and Osberg, 2007). Such a political goal 
is captured by the most widely accepted definition of fair trade used by field actors 
and academics (Moore, 2004) as cited by Huybrechts and Defourny (2008, p.190): 
 
“Fair trade is a trading partnership, based on dialogue transparency and respect, 
that seeks greater equity in international trade. It contributes to sustainable 
development by offering better trading conditions to, and securing the rights of 
marginalized producers and workers - especially in the South. Fair trade 
organizations (backed by consumers) are engaged actively in supporting 
producers, awareness raising and in campaigning for changes in the rules and 
practice of conventional international trade”.3 
 
An interesting theme emerging from scholars studying fair trade as a type of social 
entrepreneurship is strategic innovation. Hockerts (2006a) discussed the role of 
entrepreneurial innovation in the success of CaféDirect: seizing the opportunities of 
direct trade on the producer and consumer through better quality, and introducing a 
new business model by building its own brand rather than just depending on labeling. 
In a later comparative study that looked at CafeDirect and the Oxfam Fairtrade 
Company as part of a larger study on social entrepreneurship, Hockerts (2010) noted 
how both cases manifested archetypal responses to manage the tension between their 
social mission and the perceived market requirements in the process of growth. Café 
Direct chose a partial abandoning of social objectives in favor of a business-oriented 
approach, while the Oxfam Fairtrade Company retreated towards the philanthropic 
core.   
Within the social economy school of social entrepreneurship, a specific type of 
social enterprise called WISE or work integration social enterprises, has gained 
prominence. Such prominence may be attributed to increasing unemployment amidst 
the crisis of welfare states in Europe. WISE have evolved to provide employment 
opportunities to minority groups, persons with disabilities and other vulnerable 
sectors who could not find work or have been displaced from the mainstream 
economy (Nyssens, 2006; Defourny and Nyssens, 2010). 
A European Commission-supported project study called ELEXIES (L'entreprise 
sociale: lutte contre l'exclusion par l'insertion économique et sociale or The social 
enterprise - a tool to fight against exclusion) involving the EMES European Research 
Network scanned existing WISE models in 12 member states of the European Union 
(Spear and Bidet, 2005; Davister, et al., 2004). Nearly one-third of the covered WISE  
                                                 
3 This is a definition by FINE, an informal network gathering the four main global Fair Trade umbrella organs: European 
Fair Trade Association or EFTA, NEWS or Network of European Workshops, Fair Trade Labeling Organization or FLO 
and International Fair Trade Association or IFAT, now known as WFTO or World Fair Trade Organization. 
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cases exclusively focused their work on the integration of persons with disability 
(PWD) and all the countries covered had at least one type of organisation belonging 
to this category. The study noted four main modes of integration of PWDs:  
transitional occupation; creation of self-financed jobs; professional integration with 
permanent subsidies through sheltered workshops and adapted social enterprises; and 
socialization through a productive work activity. The study noted a minority of WISE 
involving the participation of workers or users in the decision making process of the 
enterprise. They attributed such partly to the nature of employment in a number of 
WISE as transitional in nature. They also considered that various handicaps or 
disabilities might make the practice of democratic principles espoused in the social 
economy as somewhat utopian (Davister et al, 2004). Based on the same study, Spear 
and Bidet (2005) argued that WISE were particularly suited towards a ‘participation’ 
approach, drawing on the strengths of their social economy roots. They noted the 
spread of some effective WISE models in the form of social cooperatives and multi-
stakeholder organizations  despite under-resourced and fragmented support structures 
in the countries studied. In many of these countries, the state provided policy and 
financial support conducive to the development of WISE.   
There have also been studies to understand the trends and challenges faced by 
cooperatives as social enterprises. A major research involving the EMES Network 
studied cooperatives as social enterprises from 10 developed and transition countries.  
From these studies, Borzaga and Spear (2004) noted trends towards the revival of the 
communitarian tradition, cooperative involvement in the provision of social services, 
a shift from single stakeholder to multi-stakeholder models and the convergence of 
associative and cooperative forms.  
Borzaga and Spear (2004) explored the evolutionary dynamics of cooperatives to 
provide working materials and new research paths to researchers and practitioners 
interested in studying and promoting the development of social economy 
organizations. Their study draws from reports presented and discussed by contributors 
at the International Seminar – From Cooperatives to Social Enterprise, jointly 
organized by ISSAN (Institute for the Development Non-Profit Organisations) and 
the EMES Network that took place in December 2003 in Trento, Italy.  The country 
experiences presented at the international seminar covered Canada and 9 European 
countries.  
In studying developments among cooperatives in these developed and transition 
economies, Borzaga and Spear (2004) examined them as social enterprises within the 
cooperative framework.  In general, the country experiences provided evidence that 
the orientation of the international cooperative movement is moving in the direction 
of revitalizing the communitarian tradition. The study also noted “Co-operatives’ 
increasing involvement in the provision of social services is to be noticed in some non 
European countries, such as the United States, Japan, Canada, Philippines and Latin 
America” (Borzaga and Spear, 2004, p.30).   
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The study discussed three main changes relative to cooperative models 
investigated in recent decades:   
 
“.... (1) the social orientation has overwhelmed the mutuality orientation in a 
number of countries; (2) a general evolution towards the production of general-
interest services has become evident; and (3) co-operative attributes towards the 
provision of general-interest services have been increasingly incorporated into the 
new co-operative forms.... More specifically, it is the widening of the traditionally 
homogeneous social structure (single stakeholder model), that is responsible for 
both the gradual fading of the mutualistic purpose and the enhancing of the self-
help dimension embracing the community as a whole (multi-stakeholder model). 
Considering more generally the evolution of organisations pursuing goals other 
than profit (the so called “third sector”) as a whole, particular emphasis is put on 
the convergence of the organisational forms, specifically the associative and co-
operative. While the associative form has become more productive, the co-
operative form has gradually reduced its traditional goal of mutuality”. (Borzaga 
and Spear, 2004, p. 5) 
The authors noted the extremely different situations in developed and transition 
economies. In developed economies, a number of features are covered by new 
cooperative organisations,  such as multi-stakeholder governance and the pursuit of an 
explicit social aim. Notwithstanding the differences in context, the trend towards 
communitarianism among cooperatives as social enterprises has many implications 
for practitioners and researchers. Foremost of these is the need to rethink the concept 
of democracy towards establishing new modes of stakeholder participation, new ways 
of harmonizing different interests in the community, and new ways to keep the 
balance between productive and social aims. As explained by the authors:  
“The community interest needs to be harnessed into the governance structures. 
The concept of democracy, as traditionally understood by the co-operative 
tradition, has to be rethought in consideration of co-operatives’ broadening social 
commitment. Workable mechanisms of interest harmonization, aimed at 
motivating the different partners and contributories to work together for the 
common goal, are required. Moreover, new ways aimed at keeping the difficult 
balance between productive and social aims have to be specified and new social 
accounting and reporting tools have to be developed”.  (Borzaga and Spear, 2004, 
pp. 11 – 14) 
Scholars of the social economy school, notably Laville (2010) are critical of locating 
social enterprises in the market economy, emphasizing that cooperatives, mutual 
insurance schemes and social protection by public rules are not governed by market 
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principles. Building on the earlier works of Polanyi (1977) and citing Mauss (1997), 
Laville advanced the concept of a plural economy where the principles of reciprocity 
(voluntary collective actions of citizens) and redistribution (state efforts to redress 
inequalities) co-exist with market principles.   
The earliest literature on social entrepreneurship in the Asian region appeared in 
the Philippines in 1994. A group of professors and researchers from the Asian 
Institute of Management (AIM) authored a book, mainly drawing from case research 
in the Philippines and India, entitled Social Entrepreneurship and Enterprise 
Development (Morato, 1994). The book contains readings and cases that showed how 
business tools might be applied to effectively and efficiently manage social 
enterprises.  Morato (1994) articulated:  
 
“The social enterprise exists for a community of worker-owners who seek to 
jointly improve their lot through collaborative, cooperative and prosperity-
creating and prosperity-sharing mechanisms…. Some examples of social 
enterprises are cooperatives, livelihood associations and corporatives, a term…. to 
describe corporations that operate like cooperatives”. (Morato, 1994, p. 2)     
 
Several years later from 2002-2004 a collaborative research, covering the Philippines, 
Indonesia, Thailand and India and involving faculty from the Asian Institute of 
Management  (AIM) and practitioners in the Conference of Asian Foundations and 
Organizations (CAFO), defined social enterprises as wealth-creating organizations 
that serve the poor and marginalized sectors as primary stakeholders, adhere to at least 
a double bottom line (social and financial) and have a distributive enterprise 
philosophy. This definition of social enterprises is linked to social entrepreneurship as 
a process of creating spaces and transforming markets to serve the goal of poverty 
reduction and sustainable development. This tradition continues to be pursued by 
Asian scholars and practitioners, and was the inspiration behind the setting up of the 
Institute for Social Entrepreneurship in Asia (ISEA) based in the Philippines in 2008 
(Dacanay, 2004; 2009b). Some scholars have appreciated this perspective of social 
enterprise and social entrepreneurship as context-specific to Asia (Robinson, Mair and 
Hockerts, 2009), a region where poverty and social inequity are stark realities. 
Robinson, et al., (2009) have noted that context matters in social entrepreneurship 
research, citing how the phenomenon has unfolded in different ways outside of 
Europe and the United States, not only in Asia but also in Latin America and the 
Middle East.   
Regional and sub-regional conferences and dialogues on social entrepreneurship 
involving scholars, practitioners, and resource institutions have been held in Asia 
since 2005. Some of these notable initiatives include the Asian Social 
Entrepreneurship Forum held in Taiwan (2005), the International Workshop on Social 
Entrepreneurship in Asia held in the Philippines (2006), the Asian Social 
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Entrepreneurs Summit held in South Korea (2008), the Global Social Venture 
Research Conference in China (2009) and the International Conference on Social 
Enterprises in Eastern Asia: Dynamics and Variations held in Taiwan (2010).   
Overall, these conferences provided arenas for sharing of perspectives and 
experiences among practitioners and scholars across developed, transition and 
developing country contexts in Asia.   
In developed country contexts, the most dominant and visible forms of social 
enterprises studied have been work integration social enterprises.  These were noted 
in Hong Kong (Chan, 2008; Chan and Sit, 2009; Po-ying & Kitajima, 2010); Taiwan 
(Kuan and Wang, 2009); South Korea (Bidet, 2009; Work Together Foundation, 
2008); Singapore (Teo, 2008) and Japan (Sakurai, 2010). Legislation, government 
programs and subsidies have driven the growth of work integration social enterprises 
in Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea. 
In developing countries, notably the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia and India, 
four types of strategies were noted among social enterprises that served the poor or 
marginalized as primary stakeholders: intermediation strategies that provided the poor 
access to markets, technologies and financial services; empowerment strategies that 
enabled the poor to reap maximum benefits from owning and controlling the social 
enterprise; social inclusion strategies that assisted disadvantaged groups with access 
to employment and/or basic social services; and resource mobilization strategies 
where non-profit organizations ventured into market-based earned income strategies 
to support their development programs (Dacanay, 2004; 2009b).  
In some countries such as Bangladesh and the Philippines, practitioners and 
scholars have advanced the concept of ‘social business enterprise’. Yunus (2007) 
drew from his successful experience of developing and scaling up the Grameen Bank 
in Bangladesh to conceive of such. He defined a social business enterprise, as a new 
type of business that pursues goals other than making personal profit – a business that 
is totally dedicated to solving social and environmental problems. A social business 
has to recover its full costs while achieving its social objective. Sebastian (2010) drew 
from five Philippine cases to define the challenges faced by social business 
enterprises: maintaining the enterprise’s social mission as the next generation of 
entrepreneurs takes over; assessing and measuring social impact; risk management 
given the vulnerabilities of the poor; and engaging the business sector and 
government to build meaningful partnerships.  
In China, Yu and Zhang (2009) identified interrelated forces contributing to the 
rise of social enterprises. During the market transition, the state’s efforts to privatize 
public services; the civil society or third sector’s endeavors to overcome their fiscal 
crisis; and the private sector’s growing interest in corporate social responsibility have 
interacted with the legacy from the country’s socialist tradition. In this context, they 
noted that efficiency-centered market competition was aligned with justice-oriented 
social redistribution and reproduction. However, the regulatory framework and 
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institutional context for social enterprises is not well defined in China.  
Organizationally, social enterprises are of 3 types – nonprofit organizations with legal 
status; for profit and non-profit hybrids; and a third category that have no clear status. 
In terms of operations, there are 4 categories: provision of services for a fee; 
manufacture and trading of goods; service contracting by the state; and internal profits 
allocation. The social mission is wide ranging, and includes provision of specialized 
social services, poverty alleviation and rural development, education and employment 
promotion.  Challenges faced are the lack of an enabling and supportive environment 
including access to funding, the lack of a democratic governance structure and 
achievement of financial sustainability. Fan and Tse (2010) characterized social 
entrepreneurs from various sectors as important actors in undertaking innovative and 
sustainable solutions to the social and environmental problems in China’s transition.  
Amidst a weak civil society or third sector, social entrepreneurs are seen as catalysts’ 
in an emerging movement towards the elimination or mitigation of inequality, as 
China adopts market principles.    
Despite having been a topic of academic inquiry for almost 20 years, social 
entrepreneurship has been characterized as being in an embryonic stage by Short, 
Moss and Lumpkin (2009).  In their review of literature, these scholars found that 
conceptual articles outnumber empirical studies, and empirical efforts often lacked 
formal hypotheses and rigorous methods. 
Scholars studying social entrepreneurship are interested “to move the conversation 
beyond the discussion of definitions toward a discussion of constructs, concepts, 
frameworks and theories” (Robinson, Mair and Hockerts, 2009, p. 3). In the process 
of theory building, one can use existing theory to explain the phenomenon of creating 
and sustaining social enterprises, or consider how the phenomenon brings to light 
practices, themes and concepts where existing theories do not explain what we see on 
the ground (Robinson, 2006).   
An increasing number of scholars in social entrepreneurship have entered this 
theory building mode. Robinson, Mair and Hockerts (2009) described notable social 
entrepreneurship research that utilized existing theory focused on identifying actors 
and measuring performance and sustainability of social entrepreneurial ventures using 
social-psychology, institutional theory and sociology (Simms and Robinson, 2009; 
Nicholls, 2009; Sharir et al., 2009).  Beyond applying existing theory, a few scholars 
have explored the extension of existing theories in their study of social 
entrepreneurship.  Noteworthy examples are Mair and Marti’s (2009) exploration of 
the concept of institutional voids as an extension of institutional theory; the study of 
Krueger et al., (2009) on how social dimensions of opportunities could enrich 
literature on entrepreneurial intentions and entrepreneurship and Haugh’s (2009) 
exploration into new dimensions offered by social enterprise cases to the resource-
based view of the firm. 
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One way of describing this research project therefore is, as an effort to contribute 
to theory building in this evolving field of social entrepreneurship. It utilizes what 
may be relevant and applicable from the three aforementioned schools of thought in 
social entrepreneurship and builds on the research that has been done on the subject in 
Asia. Of particular interest is exploring how the experience of social enterprises may 
be explained by and may enrich stakeholder theory.   
 
1.3.  Stakeholder Theory  
 
Stakeholder theory has its origins in management literature of the 1960s at the 
Stanford Research Institute (SRI). ‘Stakeholder’ was defined as ‘those groups without 
whose support the organization would cease to exist’. The list of stakeholders 
originally included shareowners, employees, customers, suppliers, lenders, and 
society. From the 1960s, the stakeholder concept was further evolved in strategy 
literature by the work of Russell Ackoff, C., West Churchman, and other systems 
theorists; the literature on corporate social responsibility; and the work of Eric 
Rhenman and other organization theorists (Freeman, et al., 2010, pp. 30-31).   
In 1984, Freeman’s landmark book, ‘Strategic Management: A Stakeholder 
Approach’ defined stakeholders as “any group or individual that can affect or is 
affected by the achievement of the corporation’s purpose” or more generally “the 
organization’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984, p. vi and 46).  In conceiving a stakeholder 
approach, Freeman provided a conceptual map for corporations to interpret the 
changes that had occurred in their external environment so that “… managers can 
begin to respond in a more effective way to the demands that these changes have 
wrought”.  He specified “… the emergence of the consumer, environmental and other 
activist groups; an increase in the scope of government; a global marketplace and the 
resulting strength of foreign competitors; an increasingly hostile media; and a general 
decline in the level of confidence which members of our society place in the business 
corporation and its managers” as part of the turbulent environment needing to be 
strategically managed for corporate survival (Freeman, 1994, p. 246-247).  He held 
the view that enterprise level strategy should answer the question “what do we stand 
for?”, and involve tradeoffs about the relative importance of stakeholder concerns, 
values and social issues. Freeman argued that organizations that do not have an 
appropriate enterprise strategy over time are not socially viable and experience a great 
deal of internal and external stress. In this context, he defined a typology of enterprise 
strategy: specific stakeholder strategy; stockholder strategy; utilitarian strategy; 
Rawlsian strategy; and social harmony strategy (Freeman, 1984, p. 101).  
Since Freeman, many articles and books on the stakeholder concept have been 
published. A number of scholars have done reviews of stakeholder literature and have 
defined various ways of understanding stakeholder theory. Donaldson and Preston 
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(1995) defined three aspects of stakeholder theory: descriptive; instrumental; and 
normative.  The descriptive aspect reflects and explains past, present and future states 
of affairs of corporations and their stakeholders. The instrumental aspect makes a 
connection between stakeholder approaches and commonly desired objectives such as 
profitability. The normative aspect interprets the functions of the corporation, 
including the identification of moral or philosophical guidelines for the operation and 
management of corporations. Donaldson and Preston (1995) argued that stakeholder 
theory is ‘managerial’ and recommends the attitudes, structures and practices that, 
taken together, constitute a stakeholder management philosophy with its ultimate 
justification found in its normative base (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). 
Jones and Wicks (1999) described two divergent approaches to the stakeholder 
theory – a social science approach and a normative ethics approach, and proposed a 
convergent approach to stakeholder theory development. These scholars argued for 
stakeholder theory to have a well-defended normative core and supporting 
instrumental arguments to demonstrate its practicability. They proposed that the 
normative core be about morally desirable relationships characterized by mutual trust 
and cooperation (Jones and Wicks, 1999).  
Pragmatic philosophy has been offered by Buchholz and Rosenthal (2005) as a 
way of providing the theoretical basis for a relational understanding of the firm and its 
stakeholders. They argue that the corporation is not isolatable from its stakeholders 
but is in fact constituted by the multiple relationships in which it is embedded and 
which give it its being. The major function of the corporation is therefore the 
enrichment of these multiple relationships (Buchholz and Rosenthal, 2005). 
The connection of stakeholder theory with strategic management had been made 
by many scholars with a number of them providing stakeholder-based strategic 
management tools. Freeman (1984) introduced a model of strategic management that 
dealt with an evaluation of stakeholders; managing stakeholders to achieve 
organizational objectives; and measurement of stakeholder satisfaction with 
organizational outcomes.   
This stakeholder approach to strategic management was further developed by 
Harrison and St. John (1994, 1998). They introduced the stakeholder approach as an 
overarching framework within which traditional approaches such as industrial 
organization economics and the resource-based view operated as strategic tools.  
These scholars divided the stakeholder environment into three regions: the broad 
environment; the operating environment; and the internal organization. The broad 
environment (society, technology, economy and political/legal) forms the context in 
which the firm and its operating environment exist. The operating environment 
consists of external stakeholders that influence the firm and over which the firm has 
some influence.  The internal organization is made up of stakeholders with formal ties 
to the firm. This is shown in Figure 1.1. 
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Figure 1.1. The organization and its primary stakeholders.  
Source:  J.S. Harrison and C.H. St. John (1998). Strategic Management of Organizations and 
Stakeholders: Concepts and Cases. 2nd edn. Cincinnati, OH:  Southwestern College Publishing. p. 8.  
  
The model of Harrison and St. John considered the resource-based view as a tool 
to help managers determine how internal stakeholders may be used to create 
competitive advantage. Porter’s (1985) five forces are integrated into an analysis of 
external stakeholders, and traditional economic approaches are used to analyze the 
remote environment (Harrison and St. John, 1994; 1998). Freeman, et al., (2007; 
2010) later clarified the basic idea of managing stakeholders as essentially one of 
creating value for them. Business is understood as a set of relationships among groups 
that have a stake in the activities that make up the business. They defined “primary or 
definitional stakeholders” as part of an inner circle composed of financiers, 
customers, suppliers, employees and communities. They are “those groups without 
whose support the business would cease to be viable”. Those who affect primary 
stakeholders, the special interest groups, consumer advocate groups, competitors, 
government and media, comprise the “secondary or instrumental stakeholders” 
(Freeman et al., 2010. pp. 25-26).   
Another group of scholars later defined three broad categories of stakeholders, 
which were similar to Harrison and St. John’s (1994; 1998) three regions of the 
stakeholder environment: the resource base; industry structure; and social-political.  
Each group is characterized as being situated in a set of concentric circles with those 
belonging to the resource base closest and those belonging to the socio-political the 
most distant (Post et al., 2002a; 2002b). This is shown in Figure 1.2. 
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Figure 1.2.  Broad categories of stakeholders  
Source: Post et al., 2002a; 2002b 
 
The issue of understanding stakeholders, how firms relate to them and how to 
prioritize them has been a recurring issue in stakeholder theory. This has sometimes 
been referred to as ‘stakeholder legitimacy’ and answers the question of who among 
the many stakeholders deserve consideration. Kaler (2002) noted several streams of 
definitions such as claimant (stakeholders are groups who make a claim on the firm); 
influencer (stakeholders are those who can influence, or may be influenced by the 
firm); or a combinatory definition. He argued for the claimant definition as superior 
(Kaler, 2002). Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997) suggested the criteria of power, 
legitimacy and urgency as principles for defining who really count as stakeholders.  
Phillips (2003a) proposed the principle of fairness as a basis, arguing that 
stakeholders who voluntarily accept the benefits of a mutually beneficial scheme of 
cooperation are the groups who have legitimacy and a claim on the firm, as well as 
duties owed to it.   
Clarkson’s (1998) distinction between primary and secondary stakeholders 
emphasized the role that the former group has in making the firm a going concern, 
and that the latter group has a more indirect relationship with the firm and is not 
critical to its survival. Other scholars have also made this distinction between primary 
and secondary stakeholders. Primary stakeholders are groups whom the firm is 
closely, formally or officially tied, and may have special duties that are similar to 
what is owed to shareholders. Secondary stakeholders have more distant ties and to 
whom management has no special duties, but to whom they may have regular moral 
duties such as not harming (Carroll, 1993; Gibson, 2000).   
A key area of inquiry in stakeholder theory is stakeholder engagement defined 
broadly as the process of involving individuals and groups that either affect or are 
affected by the activities of the firm. Stakeholder engagement as a theme has been 
characterized as an under-theorized area of research (Greenwood, 2007; Sloan, 2009; 
Freeman et al., 2010). Greenwood argued that stakeholder engagement may be 
understood in a variety of different theoretical perspectives, and may or may not 
involve a moral dimension. He offers a model of stakeholder engagement that allowed 
Social-Political 
Industry Structure 
Resource Base 
Industry Structure 
Social-Political 
Resource Base 
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for corporate responsibility or corporate irresponsibility (Greenwood, 2007). A 
recently concluded research involving key European corporations characterized two 
models of stakeholder engagement: the control model and the collaboration model.  
The control model is focused on managing risk and ensuring survival of the company, 
while the collaboration model is oriented at partnering with stakeholders towards 
contributing to the strength and sustainability of the company. The research 
emphasized the importance of shifting models of stakeholder engagement from 
control to collaboration (Sloan, 2009). The salient dimensions characterizing these 
models are in Table 1.1.  
 
 Table 1.1. Models of Stakeholder Engagement  
Dimension Control Model Collaboration Model 
Corporate focus Arm’s length engagement Inclusive engagement 
Manager orientation to 
stakeholders 
Stakeholders are a source of 
risk 
Stakeholders are a source of 
opportunity 
Key engagement processes Monitoring, listening, telling Collaborating, partnering, learning 
Relationship to core 
business process 
‘Bolted on’ to core business 
and strategic processes 
Integrated into core business and 
strategic process  
Potential for corporate 
change 
Limited change Transformative change  
Likely performance  Good  Great  
Source: Sloan, 2009 
 
Much earlier, stakeholder management scholars defined two basic postures for 
managing stakeholders, which have parallels with Sloan’s (2009) control and 
collaboration models of stakeholder engagement: buffering and bridging (Daft, 1992; 
Harrison and St. John, 1994). Buffering is described as a low-interaction stakeholder 
management approach. It involves monitoring activities with the purpose of 
containing the effects of stakeholders on a firm. Bridging lowers organizational 
barriers, builds on interdependencies, recognizes common goals and includes the 
formation of longer-term relationships (Freeman et al., 2010). In a study about 
businesses playing an active role in the protection of human rights, an empowerment 
and constructive engagement perspective was also developed (Mena et al., 2010).  
The non-profit and public sectors have a great affinity to the concept of 
stakeholders and stakeholder engagement/management. A review of literature, 
exploring the foothold of stakeholder theory beyond the corporate context, has 
yielded various perspectives related to law, public administration, health care and 
environmental policy. Neugebauer (2003) proposed stakeholder theory as providing a 
useful strategy for indigenous peoples to protect their interests better. Poindexter 
(1995) saw stakeholder theory as providing a process for decision-making that can be 
used to resolve conflicts over environmental issues. De Lopez (2001) provided a 
review of a stakeholder management framework in the Ream National Park, 
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Cambodia, in the context of resolving trade-offs between conservation and 
development. Jamal and Eyre (2003) offered a detailed study of a multi-stakeholder 
process that resolved conflicts towards developing a new plan for a protected area in 
Canada. In fisheries management, Mikalsen and Jentoft (2001) distinguished different 
classes of stakeholders and separated primary from secondary groups, noting that 
stakeholder theory makes normative (duties to honor the legitimate claims of 
stakeholders), managerial (designing proper structures) and instrumental (positive 
outcomes) claims upon managers. They emphasized that managers need to consider 
groups that have been overlooked in the past as legitimate stakeholders, including 
local communities, environmental agencies, consumers and future generations. In 
water management, Beutler (2005) among others, made reference to methods of the 
International Association for Public Participation (IAP2) that relate degrees of 
involvement, increasing level of impact, goals of outreach, public expectations, and 
tools and methods to forms of stakeholder engagement that span inform, consult, 
involve, collaborate, and empower. Beutler (2005) identified eleven prerequisites to 
stakeholder collaboration, with the need for stakeholders to represent organized 
constituencies as an important condition. Grimble and Wellard (1997) studied the 
relevance of stakeholder analysis as a tool for natural resource management (NRM).  
They argued that for strategic approaches to be efficient, equitable, and sustainable, 
there is a need to differentiate stakeholders, as primary and secondary, active and 
passive, according to level of importance, and capacity to exert influence. These 
scholars noted that subsistence farmers and other small-scale resource users are 
critical stakeholders, though often overlooked and under-appreciated. They raised 
market failure as well as poverty and under-representation as specific issues that need 
to be addressed in stakeholder analysis in NRM (Grimble and Wellard, 1997).   
On the whole, much of the literature on stakeholder theory within law, public 
policy, health care and the environment explore the descriptive and instrumental 
dimensions of stakeholder theory, although there are some notable references to 
normative stakeholder theory. Many of them provide empirical tools for stakeholder 
analysis, management, and engagement. In health care literature, there is much 
emphasis on stakeholder analysis with the purpose of trying to attain advantage for 
the organization, or developing the best strategy to manage each stakeholder. This is 
in contrast to the stakeholder literature in public/environmental policy and natural 
resource management where there is a strong emphasis on engagement with 
stakeholders and a belief that the larger normative goals to guide organizations 
emerge from the give and take of stakeholder dialogue (Freeman, et al., 2010).  
In social entrepreneurship literature, stakeholder theory has been cited by scholars 
of the social economy school, notably Spear et al., (2010) as a theoretical perspective 
for understanding social enterprises as organizations where stakeholder groups with 
differing interests, beyond owners and members, are given consideration and 
representation in boards to respond to broader social interests. Vidal (2010) takes it 
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further by providing a theoretical introduction to social enterprises as multi-
stakeholder organizations. She proposes multi-stakeholder dialogue (giving a voice to 
stakeholders) and multi-stakeholder administration (giving a vote to stakeholders in 
decision making bodies) as means for achieving multi-stakeholder governance (a state 
where commitments approved by different stakeholder groups define organizational 
direction) in social enterprises. Vidal (2010) defined a multi-stakeholder organization 
as one that promotes the interests of several stakeholder groups, no matter how 
unequal. By giving them a voice and a vote in decision-making structures, the multi-
stakeholder organization is assumed to be better equipped to address society’s general 
interests. The emphasis on multi-stakeholder organization and governance in literature 
from the social economy school of social entrepreneurship is explained by scholars 
such as Defourny (2001) as an innovation from the more traditional social economy 
organizations composed of homogeneous groups such as workers’ cooperatives or 
mutual societies of civil servants.        
While not explicitly locating their work in extending stakeholder theory, social 
entrepreneurship scholars from the social economy school include features of what 
may be considered a different stakeholder engagement model as part of the social 
dimensions of their working definition of an ideal type of social enterprise. Specific 
features such as decision making based on “the principle of ‘one member, one vote’ 
or at least a voting power not distributed according to capital shares on the governing 
body…. but the decision making rights are shared with other stakeholders” 
(Defourny, 2001. p. 20) go beyond the corporate stakeholder engagement strategies of 
control and collaboration defined by Sloan (2009). Corporate collaboration models 
may promote inclusive engagement but decision-making in their governance 
structures is still distributed to stakeholders according to capital shares. Social 
enterprises having a “democratic management style” and in many cases aiming to 
“further democracy at local level through economic activity” (Defourny, 2001. p. 20) 
also go beyond the features of these corporate models of stakeholder engagement. 
Using Vidal’s (2010) framework of multi-stakeholder governance in social 
enterprises, Sloan’s (2009) corporate collaboration models may be characterized as 
promoting stakeholder dialogue (giving stakeholders a voice) but not multi-
stakeholder administration (giving stakeholders a vote).           
Even as stakeholder theory has had a growing foothold beyond the corporate 
context, Bevan and Werhane (2010) raised an issue about the corporate centricity of 
stakeholder theorizing and the need to give a face to the different categories of 
stakeholders.   
Leading scholars on the stakeholder theory, in concluding their book, Stakeholder 
Theory: The State of the Art, have called for a “richer description” of stakeholder 
engagement strategies or models, a “redescription” of organizations other than 
corporations in stakeholder terms and “relating descriptions” or contributing to the 
conception of stakeholder theory for different types of organizations (Freeman, et al., 
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2010. p. 286).  It is in this context, that this thesis contributes to the conception of a 
stakeholder theory for social enterprises with the poor as primary stakeholders 
(SEPPS), a dominant type of social enterprise in the South.  
 
1.4.  Business and Society: Exploring the Role of Business 
in Poverty Reduction  
 
In characterizing globalization and poverty, Blowfield (2007) examined four 
dimensions of the business-poverty relationship: While companies could view poverty 
as a business opportunity, business could also be a cause or a victim of poverty, or it 
could remain neutral.    
During the past decade, the proposition that businesses have reason to be 
concerned and could contribute to poverty alleviation/reduction and development has 
gained both supporters and critics (Blowfield and Frynas, 2005; Jenkins, 2005; 
Singer, 2006; Davidson, 2009; Jeppesen and Lund-Thomsen, 2010). A specific 
proposition that has gained the most prominence, and generated much debate is for 
corporations to learn to profitably serve the poor at the Bottom or Base of the Pyramid 
(BOP)4 as customers (Prahalad and Hammond, 2002; Prahalad, 2004; Prahalad, 
2005). Similar models called ‘sustainable livelihood business’ (SLB) and 
‘development through enterprise’ that looked at poverty as an economic opportunity 
for multi-national corporations (MNCs) or emphasize business models driven by a 
profit motive to engage the poor as producers and consumers were also advanced by 
the World Business Council for Sustainable Development and the World Bank 
(WBCSD, 2002, 2004; World Bank, 2003).   
The BOP platform gained strength as successful microfinance initiatives such as 
the Grameen Bank (Yunus, 1999) became the basis for a worldwide movement to 
provide financial services for the poor as a strategy to fight poverty. This was linked 
to global efforts to reach the Millennium Development Goals, with the United Nations 
declaring 2005 as International Year of Microcredit.5  
From the time it was first conceived in 2002, Paton and Halme (2007) 
characterized the BOP debate as having progressed, referring to the results of two 
major conferences as basis. The Greening of Industry Network (GIN) Conference in 
June 2007 in Waterloo, Ontario devoted three sessions on the BOP. The BOP 
approaches in the empirical examples and discussions during the conference indicated 
many types of entrepreneurial activity not only by MNCs, but also by small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs), social enterprises and NGOs. Scholars who synthesized 
                                                 
4 Proponents of the BOP later changed ‘Bottom of the Pyramid’ to ‘Base of the Pyramid’ in response to criticisms that 
‘Bottom’ was derogatory.    
5 http://www.yearofmicrocredit.org/, (accessed 26 October 2010) 
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the results of the GIN Conference6 framed the varied approaches as ‘eradicating 
poverty in an economically feasible way’ (Kandachar and Halme, 2007). Another 
conference titled ‘Business with Four Billion’, hosted by the University of Michigan 
in September 2007, called for a reframing of the BOP perspective as a hypothesis that 
private sector efforts to address the needs of the poor can create mutual benefit for the 
poor and the businesses involved7. Taking off from this proposition of mutual value 
creation, London, et al., (2010) discussed how business ventures serving BOP 
producers addressed local constraints and created mutual value. London and Hart 
(2011) also explained the importance of shifting BOP business strategies from 
‘finding a fortune at the base of the pyramid’ to ‘creating a fortune with the base of 
the pyramid’. 
 
Despite such progress, Paton and Halme (2007) have noted:  
 
“Our theories about how business can help address the needs of the poor have to 
date been presented largely as stories about what the businesses have done. The 
poor themselves have largely appeared in our drama like movie extras, in the 
background, while our stories focus on the central business characters…. The 
BOP research community can raise the value of its contributions to the BOP 
debates by shedding light on the effects of the businesses from the perspective of 
the poor and their unmet needs”.  (Paton and Halme, 2007. p. 585)  
 
The BOP proposition has had its share of criticisms. One stream of the critique 
against the BOP and other market models for poverty reduction is outright rejection, 
calling the ‘Fortune’ at the BOP as a ‘Mirage of a Fortune’ and emphasizing the 
critical role and responsibility of the state in poverty reduction (Karnani, 2010).  
Another stream calls for a more holistic perspective of engaging the poor as 
customers, suppliers and employees, emphasizing the need to inject corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) and cooperation between companies practicing CSR, 
government and non-government organizations (NGOs) with a joint explicit mission 
of reducing poverty (Singer, 2006; Davidson, 2009; Habib and Zurawicki, 2010).   
An evolving body of literature concerning business and society provides critical 
perspectives on CSR in the developing world (Blowfield and Frynas, 2005; Prieto-
Carron, et al., 2006; Jeppesen and Lund-Thomsen, 2010). In the business and poverty 
reduction debate, scholars from this perspective point out that the evidence that 
business can help reduce poverty is not particularly strong. Taking off from the 
experience of tea farmers involved in fair trade in Kenya, Blowfield and Dolan (2010) 
                                                 
6 http://www.greeningofindustry.org (accessed 26 October 2010). 
7 http://www.nextbillion.net/research (accessed 26 October 2010).   
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revealed gaps between well-intentioned fair trade policies and the actual experiences 
of their intended beneficiaries.    
Jeppesen and Lund-Thomsen (2010. p. 140) studied the “tension that exists 
between pressures to adopt Western-style CSR initiatives in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America and the search for locally appropriate solutions to these pressures”. To create 
greater chances for CSR to deliver impact on its intended beneficiaries in the 
developing world, they advocate democratizing CSR. For practitioners, this means 
instituting measures for greater accountability and giving the intended beneficiaries 
such as local firms, farmers and workers a bigger say in formulating and executing 
CSR policies affecting their operations and lives. For researchers, they assert the need 
to take a bottom-up approach by putting local firms, farmers, workers and 
communities at the center of future analyses of CSR interventions in the developing 
world (Jeppesen and Lund-Thomsen, 2010). 
This thesis explores how social enterprises are serving the poor and addressing 
poverty in the developing world from the perspective of key actors, especially the 
poor. By giving attention to the voices of the poor as key actors, this thesis hopes to 
contribute to enriching the evolving BOP discourse and the broader debate on 
business and poverty reduction. Social enterprises serving the poor as primary 
stakeholders (SEPPS) that could be shown to have meaningful contribution to poverty 
reduction may provide new vistas and benchmarks for BOP enterprises. SEPPS may 
also be seen as local actors that could potentially interface with both local and multi-
national companies in search of innovative ways of pursuing CSR in the developing 
world. In this context, this study on SEPPS may be seen as an indirect contribution to 
the literature on critical perspectives on CSR and BOP enterprises in developing 
countries.  
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CHAPTER 2 – RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This thesis develops a framework for understanding how social enterprises serve 
the poor and address poverty. It sheds light on the effects that social enterprises have 
on poverty in a developing country context, from the perspective of the poor as 
stakeholders.   
 
2.1.  Theory Building on Social Enterprises Engaging the 
Poor as Stakeholders   
 
From Chapter 1, poverty has been identified as one of the most pressing social 
problems in the 21st century. Governments and practitioners have recognized the 
importance of the business sector and civil society (or the third sector) in contributing 
to poverty eradication (UNDP, 2000; Bissio, 2003). Whether seen from the 
perspective of being part of the third sector (Spear, et al., 2010), in the intersection of 
the public, private and civil society sectors (Hulgaard, 2008), or creating new business 
models involving corporations and civil society (Seelos and Mair, 2005), social 
enterprises have been recognized as important actors in serving the poor and making 
an impact on the alleviation of poverty in the poorest countries (Seelos et al., 2006).  
In this context, the relevance of this research in the real world is in providing policy 
makers and practitioners a better understanding of the strengths and limitations of the 
various ways in which social enterprises engage the poor as stakeholders.  
The researcher has been engaged in action research on this theme in the 
Philippines and other developing countries in Asia for a number of years (Dacanay, 
2004; 2009). In this regard, she saw the thesis as an opportunity to build on the results 
of her action research and contribute to theory building in the evolving field of social 
entrepreneurship.  
The importance of social entrepreneurship theory building in general, and theory 
building on her area of inquiry (i.e. how social enterprises serve the poor as 
stakeholders in a developing country context) as a research gap was validated by her 
review of literature, as discussed in Chapter 1:  
 
 Based on a scanning of social entrepreneurship literature in major academic 
journals, social entrepreneurship as a topic of academic inquiry over the past 20 
years has been characterized as being in an embryonic stage, needing more 
empirical studies with formal hypotheses and rigorous methods (Short, et al., 
2009); 
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 Synthesizing their scanning of the state of social entrepreneurship research at 
the international level, Robinson, Mair and Hockerts (2009, p. 3) have pointed 
to the need to move social entrepreneurship discourse to a “discussion of 
constructs, concepts, frameworks and theories”; 
 Social entrepreneurship discourse is currently dominated by European and 
American schools of thought emanating from developed country contexts (Dees 
and Anderson, 2006; Defourny and Nyssens, 2008 and 2010) and could benefit 
from perspectives from a developing country context;   
 Major cross country research scanning work integration social enterprises and 
studying trends and challenges faced by cooperatives as social enterprises have 
mainly covered experiences in developed and transition country contexts in 
Europe and Canada (Borzaga and Spear, 2004; Davister et al., 2004, Spear and 
Bidet, 2005);  
 As detailed in Chapter 1, there are an increasing number of scholars who have 
engaged in theory building research. However, social entrepreneurship theory 
building research dealing with stakeholders is focused on social enterprise 
governance and multi-stakeholder governance systems (Spear, et al., 2010; 
Vidal, 2010). While they refer to stakeholder theory, they are not focused on 
applying or extending stakeholder theory; and   
 A significant percentage of social entrepreneurship literature in Asia has been 
on the rise of work integration social enterprises in developed country contexts 
(Chan, 2008; Chan and Sit, 2009; Po-ying, & Kitajima, 2010; Kuan and Wang, 
2009; Bidet, 2009; Teo, 2008; Sakurai, 2010). There is also literature evolving 
that provides frameworks for understanding the rise of social enterprises in 
developing (Dacanay, 2004; 2009) and transition countries (Yu and Zhang, 
2009). On the whole, however, social entrepreneurship theory building research 
has not really taken off in Asia.   
 
The researcher’s review of social entrepreneurship literature clearly validated the 
relevance of pursuing theory building research focused on how social enterprises 
serve the poor as stakeholders in a developing country context. However, it does not 
adequately provide the basis of whether the way to go is theory building rather than 
theory testing. Applying what Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) proposed as a sound 
basis for justifying theory building, the question the researcher needed to answer was, 
does existing theory provide feasible answers?   
Based on the researcher’s review of literature on stakeholder theory discussed in 
Chapter 1, there are four major reasons why theory building is the more appropriate 
option: 
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 Much of stakeholder theory is based on corporate experience. Stakeholder 
literature outside the corporate context, in the non-profit and public sectors, 
mainly discuss perspectives on the usefulness of stakeholder theory and provide 
empirical tools for stakeholder analysis, management and engagement 
(Freeman, et al., 2010); 
 Stakeholder theory scholars have pointed out that stakeholder engagement is an 
under-theorized area of research (Greenwood, 2007; Sloan, 2009; Freeman et 
al., 2010). Stakeholder engagement is broadly defined as the process of 
involving individuals and groups that affect or are affected by the activities of 
the firm. Answering how social enterprises serve the poor as stakeholders is 
within the purview of stakeholder engagement;  
 In assessing the state of the art of stakeholder theory, Freeman, et al., (2010) 
have called for a “richer description” of stakeholder engagement strategies or 
models, a “redescription” of organizations other than corporations in 
stakeholder terms and “relating descriptions” or contributing to the conception 
of stakeholder theory for different types of organizations (Freeman, et al., 2010. 
p. 286).  
 Social entrepreneurship scholars from the social economy school are engaged 
in research on social enterprises as multi-stakeholder organizations that foster 
democracy and participation among various stakeholder groups (Defourny, 
2001; Borzaga and Spear, 2004; Spear and Bidet, 2005; Davister et al., 2004; 
Defourny and Nyssens, 2008; Spear et al., 2010; Vidal, 2010).  Such may be 
broadly appreciated as exploring stakeholder engagement models beyond the 
corporate context.  However, much of their empirical studies have focused on 
social enterprises in developed and transition countries.   
 
These observations from the researcher’s review of literature on stakeholder theory 
completes the justification for theory building - that there is a strong basis for 
contributing to the development of a stakeholder theory for social enterprises in 
general, and to the development of a theory on stakeholder engagement among social 
enterprises that serve the poor in a Southern country context in particular.  
Interestingly, Paton and Halme (2007) have also noted that theories on how 
business address the needs of the poor treat the poor “like movie extras” and would 
benefit from contributions that shed light on the “effects of the businesses from the 
perspective of the poor and their unmet needs”. This weakness opens the possibility 
for this thesis to also contribute, though indirectly, to the discourse on business and 
poverty.   
Having explained the basis for a theory building research on how social 
enterprises serve the poor as stakeholders in a developing country context, the next 
sections clarify the research questions, the research setting, and the chosen 
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methodology of case-based theory building (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007).     
 
2.2.  Definition of the Research Question 
 
Towards building theory on how social enterprises serve the poor as stakeholders 
in a developing country context, the researcher pursued the following research 
question: 
 
In those cases where social enterprises serve the poor as stakeholders in a 
developing country context, how have they engaged the poor, and why have they 
been effective in terms of their impact? 
  
To answer these questions, the researcher tracked the roles and role changes among 
the poor in the social enterprises studied to serve as indicators of the way the poor 
were involved or engaged as stakeholders of the social enterprise over time. Studying 
why and how their roles changed over time gave indications about the elements or 
dimensions that mattered in bringing about role changes. Studying how these 
elements or dimensions relate to impact on the poor in turn indicated patterns of 
effective or ineffective ways that social enterprises engaged the poor and addressed 
poverty.         
In terms of process, the general theme of how social enterprises serve the poor as 
stakeholders was clear from the start but the research questions evolved over time. As 
the researcher was undertaking field research on the first case, which as would be 
explained later became the centerpiece case, the research question took the following 
more operational forms:  
 
What roles do the poor play as stakeholders in social enterprises?  Do these roles 
change over time?  How and why do they change? What impact do these role 
changes have on the poor, the social enterprise and poverty? 
 
The formulation of the research question was further refined during the theory 
building and monograph writing phase. This was in response to the need to better 
align the research question with the theory building goal.   
2.3.  Overall Methodology 
  
The researcher decided to pursue case-based theory building (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) as the methodology. Given that the broad theme was 
how social enterprises serve the poor as stakeholders in a developing country context, 
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an unexplored area of research – the strategy of building theory from multiple cases 
was deemed the most suitable.  The researcher chose multiple cases rather than a 
single case to enable comparisons towards yielding a relatively more robust and 
testable theory (Yin, 1994; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). 
Multiple cases were to serve as replications, contrasts and extensions of the 
emerging theory (Yin, 1994). Theoretical sampling, or choosing the cases for 
theoretical, not statistical reasons (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), was central to the 
chosen methodology. In designing the theoretical sample, the researcher decided to 
define theoretical categories (Eisenhardt, 1989) based on the usual roles enacted by 
the poor in social enterprises: the poor as workers, the poor as clients, the poor as 
suppliers, and the poor as owners. On application of the categories, it became evident 
that the poor as owners tended not to be a distinct category but cut across categories. 
Therefore, three categories (poor as worker, poor as client, and poor as supplier) were 
chosen for this research with the provision that about 50% of the theoretical sample 
should also represent the poor as owners. A matched pair for each of the categories of 
social enterprises (Hockerts, 2006b) was deemed a reasonable number within the 
timeframe of the thesis.   
    
2.4.  Research Setting 
 
The research setting was the Philippines, providing the developing country 
context that was required to answer the research question. Like other developing 
countries in Asia, the Philippines manifests the phenomenon of worsening poverty 
despite economic growth. Data from the National Statistics Office (NSO) and the 
National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB) show that from a baseline of 45.3% 
(28.1 million people) in 1991, poverty incidence in the country, measured in terms of 
income poverty, stopped declining at 30% in 2003 and from that point on proceeded 
to rise steadily up to 32.9%  (27.6 million people) in 2006. Considering the impacts of 
the global crisis in 2008-2009 and the natural disasters of 2009, the poverty situation 
could only have gotten worse (Serrano, 2010). When the Philippines registered 
worsening poverty in 2006, Forbes magazine listed 3 Filipinos in its annual list of 
billionaires with their net worth ranging from US$ 2.3-2.6 billion each (Kroll, 2006).  
The 2008 National Nutrition Survey (NNS) revealed that 3 out of 10 children were 
undernourished, with the percentage of underweight children less than 5 years of age 
comparable to the United Nations Children Fund’s (UNICEF’s) 2006 estimates for 
Sub-Saharan Africa.   
Between 1980 and 2010, the Philippines’ Human Development Index (HDI) rose 
by 0.7% annually from 0.523 to 0.638, which gives the country a rank of 97 out of 
169 countries with comparable data. This places the country in the medium human 
development category. The HDI of East Asia and the Pacific as a region increased 
50 
 
from 0.391 in 1980 to 0.650 in 2010, placing the Philippines below the regional 
average. Not only has the Philippines been lagging behind its neighbors in terms of 
human development, it may just mean there have been more countries that have been 
worse off. While its GDP per capita was US$ 3,600 in 2010, Philippine indicators for 
education and health were not encouraging. Public health spending was placed at 
1.3% of GDP, which was very low compared to the 5% World Health Organization 
recommendation. On average, there were 32 children who died before age 5 per 1,000 
live births. Public spending on education was 2.6% of GDP. About 80% of the 
population has had some form of schooling. The average number of years of adult 
enrollment was 8.7 in contrast to 11 years of expected schooling. Only 62 per 1,000 
people had access to the Internet (UNDP, 2010).8 
In terms of the Basic Capability Index (BCI), the Philippines scored 77 out of a 
perfect score of 100, belonging to the group of countries with a very low BCI 
category. These countries were characterized as having a very low level of 
achievement in terms of meeting the basic needs and facing very significant obstacles 
in achieving the well being of their population (Social Watch, 2008). 
Despite the trend towards urbanization, poverty in the Philippines is still largely a 
rural phenomenon. In 2006, 75% of the poor were still found in the rural areas, up 
from 71% in 1991 (Balisacan et al., 2008). The poor are the landless, homeless, 
jobless, underemployed, uneducated, sick, malnourished, discriminated Filipinos.  
Many of them are women, Muslims, Indigenous Peoples, and tribal Filipinos 
(Serrano, 2010). 
A 2005 study commissioned by the Asian Development Bank on Poverty in the 
Philippines: Income, Assets and Access detailed how poverty in the country was a 
deprivation of and lack of access to essential assets falling under the categories of 
human capital, physical capital, natural capital, financial capital, and social capital.  
The same study identified seven factors that were seen to be direct causes of poverty 
(Schelzig, 2005): 
 
 Macroeconomic policies that have resulted to economic growth but have not 
reduced poverty;  
 Unemployment and underemployment especially in agriculture, forestry and 
fishery;  
 Unchecked population growth;  
 Structural issues in the agricultural sector including a problematic agrarian 
reform program and ineffective policy and service support to small farmers;  
 Governance concerns including corruption and an ineffective state that is 
unable to deliver basic services;  
                                                 
8See http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/ for details on the 2010 Human Development Report 
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 Armed conflict especially in the poorest areas of Muslim Mindanao; and 
 Disability caused by malnutrition, unsanitary living conditions, accidents and 
injuries, with most persons with disabilities living in poverty. 
 
A fundamental cause of rural poverty in the Philippines is the distribution of land 
(World Bank, 1988; Balisacan and Pernia, 2002). Land reform, the main asset reform 
program of government, remains a major bottleneck with a large amount of land (1.4 
million hectares) left that still needed to be distributed by the end of the government’s 
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) in 2008.  Despite CARP being 
adopted by various Philippine administrations, not much has been achieved. Bello et 
al., (2004) have assailed CARP as having failed to change the feudal landscape and to 
address the roots of land concentration in the hands of a few rural and urban elites.  
CARP has suffered from problems such as lack of funds, opposition from a landlord-
dominated Congress, lackluster performance by the Department of Agrarian Reform 
(DAR), intense resistance from landlords, and legal hurdles (Schelzig, 2005). 
The Philippine state’s failure to address poverty has created a robust civil society 
sector engaged in development work and advocacy over the years (Serrano, 2010).  
Within the business sector, most corporations and small and medium enterprises 
continue to do business as usual even as a growing number have started to practice 
various forms of corporate social responsibility. However, the dominant orientation of 
corporate social responsibility practice in the Philippines, especially among business 
firms in the agricultural sector, remains at the level of charity and public relations, 
rather than the integration of social objectives into company philosophy and strategy 
(Dacanay and Roy, 2007). In this context, social enterprises that have been set up to 
serve the poor have become important actors in poverty reduction and sustainable 
development.  
 
2.5.  Defining SEPPS as Target Population 
 
The following working definition of social enterprises with the poor as primary 
stakeholders or SEPPS was used by this research in the beginning: 
 
‘SEPPS are social mission driven wealth creating organizations that have at least 
a double bottom line (social and financial), explicitly have as principal objective 
poverty reduction/ alleviation or improving the quality of life of specific segments 
of the poor, and have a distributive enterprise philosophy’. 
 
This definition was adapted from the results of the author’s earlier action research on 
social enterprises in Asia (Dacanay, 2004; 2009). Defining this specific type of social 
enterprise (SEPPS) as population is a refinement from the researcher’s earlier 
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research, where social enterprises in general was deemed the population (Dacanay, 
2004; 2009).  Conceiving of SEPPS as a specific type of social enterprise to serve as 
target population for this study overcomes the difficulty of unintentionally excluding 
within the social entrepreneurship (SE) domain, social enterprises that may not 
necessarily serve the poor as primary stakeholders. For example, some scholars, 
notably Hockerts (2006) have pointed to the importance of including initiatives in the 
realm of sustainability and ecological entrepreneurship as topics within the SE 
domain. More importantly, conceiving of SEPPS as a specific type of social 
enterprise serving as population for this research better clarifies the domain of the 
findings (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
There are three aspects to the working definition of SEPPS as target population: 
 
Firstly, SEPPS are social mission driven organizations explicitly pursuing poverty 
reduction/alleviation or improving the quality of life of specific segments of the poor 
as primary objective. This social dimension is a tradition that SEPPS shares with third 
sector or civil society organizations.  They are engaged not only as workers, clients or  
suppliers, but more importantly as partners in their own poverty reduction.  In the 
thesis, this dimension was demonstrated to mean engaging the poor as transactional 
and transformational partners:  as transactional partners, they are engaged to 
participate in social enterprise and value chain management;  as transformational 
partners, they are engaged to effectively participate in social enterprise governance 
and to enact roles as change agents in their community, sector or society as a whole.  
Secondly, SEPPS are wealth-creating organizations that have at least a double 
bottom line (social and financial). Just like business or private enterprises, and unlike 
the traditional non-profit organizations that are dependent on grants or public 
subsidies - or wealth created somewhere else - SEPPS are engaged in the 
production/provision and sale of goods and services. However, unlike business or 
private enterprises that principally produce/provide and sell goods and services to 
create profit for shareholders, SEPPS do so with the objective of financial 
sustainability. They create wealth to partially or fully cover their operations and to 
invest in other activities related to their social mission. Their financial bottom line 
plays a supportive role to their social bottom line of poverty reduction/alleviation or 
improving the quality of life of specific segments of the poor.   
Thirdly, SEPPS have a distributive enterprise philosophy.  Unlike in a business or 
private enterprise where payments or wages made to the poor are considered as 
financial costs to be minimized, these are considered as social benefits for primary 
stakeholders that need to be optimized.  Moreover, the distributive philosophy is 
expressed in the surplus or profits accruing to the poor as dividends  as well as being 
reinvested back to the enterprise to sustain the fulfillment of its social mission or in 
activities that benefit and assist the poor in overcoming poverty or improving their 
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quality of life. In the thesis, this dimension was elaborated to mean the provision by 
the social enterprise of transactional and transformational services for the poor to 
overcome poverty and capability deprivation.  This is directly related to the first 
element in the definition, as it is the combination of transactional and transformational 
services provided by SEPPS that enable the poor to participate in social enterprise 
management, governance as well as community, sectoral and societal change.   
The aforementioned definition of SEPPS adopted by this research may be 
considered a ‘strong’ definition relative to what may be considered a ‘weak’ 
definition from the perspective of Freeman et al., (2007; 2010). Using Donaldson and 
Preston’s (1995) aspects of stakeholder theory, the ‘weak’ definition of SEPPS 
considers the poor as primary stakeholders from a descriptive and instrumental 
perspective. As primary stakeholders, they are part of an inner circle of “groups 
without whose support the business would cease to be viable” (Freeman et al., 2010. 
pp. 25-26). This perspective is shared by many other scholars of stakeholder theory 
(Carrol, 1993; Clarkson, 1998; Gibson, 2000). The strong definition adopted by this 
research on the other hand has a normative perspective (Donaldson and Preston, 
1995) of the poor as primary stakeholders in an enterprise principally governed by its 
social bottom line and distributive philosophy.   
This research enhanced this strong definition and normative perspective by  
clarifying that SEPPS are responses to pervasive state and market failures to serve the 
needs of the poor in developing country contexts.  As such, SEPPS provide a 
combination of services (transactional and transformational) aimed at assisting the 
poor overcome capability deprivation to enact both transactional and transformational 
roles. On one hand, the poor are assisted to enact transactional roles as workers, 
suppliers and clients, as well as partners in social enterprise or value chain 
management.  On the other hand, the poor are assisted to enact transformational roles 
as full fledged owners of social enterprises and as organized partners practicing 
democracy not only in social enterprise governance but also in the pursuit of 
community, sectoral, and societal transformation.  
These enhancements in appreciating the context and elements that define SEPPS 
are the subject of discussion in the cross case analysis, propositions and conclusions 
(Chapters 9-11) of the thesis.    
 
2.6. Rapid Appraisal of Significant Segments of SEPPS in   
       the Philippines   
 
The target population is Philippine social enterprises with the poor as primary 
stakeholders or SEPPS. These social enterprises should have existed for at least 5 
years, preferably longer, to allow studying possible changes in the way these social 
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enterprises engaged the poor and the corresponding impact of such on the poor over 
time.     
There have been no systematic studies and surveys in the Philippines to establish a 
comprehensive profile of social enterprises in general, and SEPPS in particular. The 
researcher, therefore, did a rapid appraisal using secondary data and interviews with 
key informants from national networks of social enterprises, social entrepreneurship 
resource institutions and regulatory government agencies. The results of the rapid 
appraisal are contained in a monograph authored by the researcher (Dacanay, 2007). 
The results of the rapid appraisal became the basis for defining significant segments 
of SEPPS, identifying a shortlist of potential networks for consideration and making a  
long list of social enterprises from which to identify and choose the matched pairs for 
study.   
Social enterprises with the poor as primary stakeholders, or SEPPS, have a long 
history, with development trends that occurred at different junctures, giving rise to 
various segments (Dacanay, 2007):   
 
 Cooperatives; 
 Fair trade organizations; 
 Microfinance institutions;  
 NGO-initiated earned income enterprises;   
 Sector or area-based enterprises serving specific poverty groups; and 
 Small entrepreneur-initiated enterprises with a clear social agenda.  
 
While these segments are not mutually exclusive, they have been identified as 
significant because groupings of these social enterprises belong to identifiable 
networks. Sometimes, they are clustered together as partners of specific government 
agencies or resource institutions that support their agenda.   
The number of SEPPS in the country is difficult to establish. There are conflicting 
statistics from secondary sources especially involving cooperatives. Many 
cooperatives also mirror the trend towards communitarianism and exist as multi-
stakeholder cooperatives where the poor may or may not be the majority members.  
Many of those that involve the poor as majority owners, part of what we may call 
SEPPS, are agricultural cooperatives (including cooperatives of agrarian reform 
beneficiaries or small holders who acquired lands under the government’s land to the 
tiller program), savings and credit cooperatives that have gotten engaged in 
microfinance operations, and cooperatives providing various forms of social 
protection schemes (e.g. health insurance) (Dacanay, 2007).  
The researcher came up with an informed estimate of 30,000 SEPPS based on the 
rapid appraisal. About 28,000 of these are cooperatives registered with the 
Cooperative Development Authority (CDA). About 500 are microfinance institutions 
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that are not cooperatives. The rest of the 1,500 are shared by the 26 fair trade 
organizations organized in one network, NGO-initiated and small entrepreneur 
initiated social enterprises, as well as sector or area-based enterprises serving specific 
poverty groups of farmers, fishers, indigenous communities and persons with 
disability (Dacanay, 2007).    
 
2.7. Choosing the Theoretical Sample 
 
Among the various segments, the author chose 3 networks or clusters of social 
enterprises that would correspond to the 3 theoretical categories for the sample: the 
poor as workers, the poor as suppliers, and the poor as clients. It was from these 
chosen networks or clusters that the matched pairs were chosen.   
To choose the pairs within each of the networks or clusters, the added criteria used 
to ensure variability of the cases were relative social and financial performance of the 
social enterprise pairs, in addition to achieving an overall balance in terms of social 
enterprises owned and not owned by the poor.    
Relative social and financial performance was deemed important given that the 
research problem entailed examining the impact of how social enterprises engaged the 
poor on the poor themselves, the social enterprise and poverty. Ownership and non-
ownership of the poor as additional consideration for choosing actual pairs became 
feasible only in the case of one pair, as would be evident in the actual results of the 
theoretical sampling process.  However, the balance in terms of ownership and non-
ownership of the poor as part of the criteria was achieved overall.   
From the rapid appraisal of social enterprise networks or clusters (Dacanay, 
2007), the following were identified as distinct sources of the pairs of social 
enterprises for study: 
 
 For social enterprises where the poor were suppliers, the lone network of fair 
trade organizations in the country was identified as a distinct source;      
 For social enterprises where the poor were workers, an identifiable cluster of 
social enterprises serving persons with disability (PWD) was identified as a 
distinct source; and 
 For social enterprises where the poor were clients, microfinance institution 
networks or cooperative networks were identified as possible distinct sources. 
 
For the poor as suppliers, there was only one national network of fair trade 
organizations with 26 members – the Philippine Fair Trade Forum, which at the time 
of the research was being renamed as World Fair Trade Organization-Philippines 
(Lagazo, 2009). 
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For the poor as workers, there was a network of cooperatives serving PWDs, but 
there were other social enterprises that served this segment that were not cooperatives. 
While no formal network of all these PWD social enterprises (PWD SE’s) existed, 
there was a dedicated government agency, the National Council on Disability Affairs 
(NCDA), where they were known, and there were non-government organizations that 
knew and had assisted them. There were at least 20 PWD SE’s known to key 
informants from the NCDA and NGOs assisting PWDs (Labanon, 2009).  
For the poor as clients, a choice needed to be made between cooperative or 
microfinance institution networks. The researcher made a choice in favor of 
cooperative networks to give due importance to social enterprises owned by the poor, 
and noting that most cooperatives that served the poor were also undertaking 
microfinance.   
Among cooperatives, a number of networks existed, but VICTO National (with 
218 members) was chosen because they were the recognized pioneer in the conduct of 
cooperative social audits in the country (Castillo, 2009). 
 
2.8.  Use of Panel of Experts   
 
A panel of at least 3 experts from each of the networks or clusters identified, 
capable of making an informed judgment of the relative social and financial 
performance of the social enterprises within these networks or clusters, was organized 
to assist in identifying potential pairs for study.   
For the fair trade cluster, the panel of experts was composed of the Convenor of 
the Asia Fair Trade Forum, the Executive Director of the Advocates for Philippine 
Fair Trade Inc., and the Coordinator of the Philippine Fair Trade Forum.   
For the PWD SE cluster, the National Program Coordinator as well as the 
Regional Program Coordinator of the National Council on Disability Affairs and the 
Chairperson of a foundation serving PWDs comprised the panel.   
For the cooperative cluster, the Chief Executive Officer of VICTO National, 
VICTO National’s Social Development and Advocacy Head, VICTO National’s 
Sector Network Building Head, as well as a Senior Consultant and an Executive 
Officer in charge of relating to their member cooperatives composed the panel of 
experts.  
The members of the panel of experts for each of the networks or clusters 
identified are listed in Appendix 12.1. While the intention was to convene the three 
panels of experts, it became difficult to bring together members coming from different 
organizations at a common place and time. The researcher therefore resorted to 
undertaking separate interviews for panel members who belonged to different 
organizations. The panel members for the ‘poor as clients’ category, who were all 
from VICTO National, were convened together on August 3, 2009. The panel 
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members for the ‘poor as workers’ and ‘poor as suppliers’ categories were 
interviewed separately.   
A panel of experts was resorted to because there was no sustained practice for 
objectively evaluating the levels of social enterprise performance (integrating both 
social and financial performance) within each of the networks or clusters concerned.  
However, since the panels of experts were knowledgeable about the relative 
performance of the social enterprises in their sector, subsector, cluster or network, 
they were in a good position to identify shortlists of social enterprises and discern a 
level of variability in terms of their social and financial performance.      
 
2.9. Theoretical Sample Defined   
 
The panel of experts first assisted in defining a shortlist of potential pairs of high 
performing and average performing social enterprises within their respective networks 
or cluster. From the shortlist, the researcher chose a preferred pair and an alternate 
pair. The pairs chosen by the researcher were what seemed the most similar, and 
hence comparable, in terms of their nature of products or services, the nature of the 
poor served, age and size in terms of assets or revenues. In all three pairs, the 
preferred pair was validated by the panel of experts as an appropriate set of cases for 
the theoretical sample given the basis used by the researcher. Table 2.1. shows the 
matched pairs of social enterprises that were identified for the theoretical sample.   
The 3 cooperatives among the 6 case subjects, such as Lamac MPC, Cordova 
MPC and the PWD Fed, by their nature also featured the poor as owners of the social 
enterprises. The 3 others, Alter Trade, Upland Marketing, and Tahanan, were not 
owned by the poor in the beginning. However, in both Alter Trade and Upland 
Marketing, the social enterprise system that evolved over time included people’s 
organizations, cooperatives or community-based enterprises owned by the poor by 
virtue of partnerships with these entities (in the case of Upland Marketing) or as a 
direct result of organizing and capacity development services provided by the social 
enterprise (in the case of Alter Trade)   
 
  Table 2.1. Matched Pairs of SEPPS in Theoretical Sample 
 
 
 
Fair Trade  Network 
(Poor as Suppliers) 
PWD SE Cluster 
(Poor as Workers) 
Coop Cluster 
(Poor as Clients) 
Alter Trade Group  
(Alter Trade) 
National Federation of 
Cooperatives of Persons with 
Disability (PWD Fed) 
Lamac Multi Purpose 
Cooperative (Lamac MPC) 
Upland Marketing Foundation 
Inc. 
(Upland Marketing) 
Tahanang Walang Hagdanan 
(Tahanan)   
Cordova Multi Purpose 
Cooperative (Cordova MPC) 
 
 
Table 2.2. shows the poverty sectors served by the three pairs of cases chosen. 
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Table 2.2. Poverty Sectors Served by SEPPS in Theoretical Sample 
Name of Social Enterprise Description of Poverty Sector(s) 
Served 
Scale of Reach 
Alter Trade 
 
 
 
Agrarian reform beneficiary-sugar 
farmers; 9   
Backyard growers of bananas 
(naturally grown Balangon variety) 
820 sugar farmers in 1 province 
(Negros Occidental) and 3,493 
banana growers spread 
nationwide 
Upland Marketing Community-based producers of 
food: majority are muscovado 
sugar producers and organic rice 
farmers 
60 community-based 
enterprises with 3,000 poor 
producers as members/partners 
in upland, lowland and coastal 
communities nationwide 
 
PWD Fed Unemployed persons with 
disability (PWD) trained to 
manufacture school chairs  
1,250 PWDs organized in 15 
cooperatives nationwide 
Tahanan  Unemployed persons with 
disability trained in metal craft, 
woodwork, needlecraft  
273 PWD employees, workers, 
producers and students  
Lamac MPC In Lamac: upland farmers and 
livestock raisers, construction, 
domestic and migrant workers and 
entrepreneurial poor 
In other areas: entrepreneurial poor 
35,040 poor representing 90% 
of 38,933 members in various 
provinces located in the 
Visayan region10 
Cordova MPC Artisanal fishers, handicraft 
makers, tricycle and trisikad 
drivers, workers, entrepreneurial 
poor 
5,694 or 90% of 6,327 
members spread in 1 
municipality (Cordova) and in 
1 city (Lapu-Lapu) in Cebu 
province11 
  
In terms of age, the social enterprises have been in existence for a period ranging from 
15-38 years and have annual revenues ranging from PhP 24.0 million to PhP 202.8 
million. Details of the age and annual revenues of the SEPPS in the theoretical sample 
are contained in Table 2.3. 
The researcher noted the diversity and complexity of organizational forms 
between and among the social enterprise pairs chosen. Table 2.4. provides details of 
these diversities and complexities.  
Alter Trade and Upland Marketing (as one pair) were both multiple 
organizations, while the pair comprising of Lamac MPC and Cordova MPC were 
single organizations.  Only the pair of PWD Fed (multiple organization) and Tahanan 
(single organization) exhibited a marked difference in terms of complexity of 
                                                 
9 Former workers of big lands called haciendas that used to be owned by sugar barons or landlords, who were awarded 
part of the land they were tilling under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program of government. 
10 The other 10% of members are professionals and salaried employees like teachers, and government employees 
11 The other 10% of members are professionals and salaried employees like teachers, and government employees 
59 
 
organization. The most complex of the social enterprise cases in terms of organization 
was Alter Trade as it exhibited the most variety of organizational forms, and the only 
one that utilized a stock-for-profit corporation (e.g. Alter Trade Corporation) as a 
subsidiary of the Alter Trade Foundation.   
 
Table 2.3. Age and Revenues of SEPPS in the Theoretical Sample 
Name of Social Enterprise Years in existence (year 
established) 
Annual Revenues 
(M means millions of pesos)12 
Alter Trade 21 (1988) PhP 202.8 M (2007) 
Upland Marketing 17 (1992)13 PhP  32.0 M (2007) 
PWD Fed 15 (1994) PhP  48.0 M (2007) 
Tahanan  36 (1973) PhP  24.0 M (2007) 
Lamac MPC 17(1992)14 PhP 101.4 M (2008) 
Cordova MPC 38 (1971) PhP  25.8M (2008) 
  
The researcher noted that the organizational diversity and complexity of the social 
enterprises was unavoidable. The researcher observed that the multiple organizational 
cases (Alter Trade, Upland Marketing and PWD Fed), without exception, involved 
cooperatives or associations of the poor that were intentionally organized and linked 
to the core social enterprise at the onset (in the case of PWD Fed) or over time (in the 
case of Alter Trade and Upland Marketing). This indicated that the diversity of 
organizational forms might have represented different ways that the social enterprises 
engaged the poor, the main area of inquiry of the dissertation. 
 
Table 2.4. Diversity and Complexity of Organizational Forms in Theoretical Sample 
Name of Social Enterprise Organizational Form(s) Organizational Complexity 
Alter Trade Corporations, foundation, 
cooperatives/associations 
Multiple organizations 
Upland Marketing Foundation, cooperatives/ 
associations  
Multiple organizations 
PWD Fed Primary cooperatives, 
cooperative federation, 
foundation 
Multiple organizations 
Tahanan Foundation Single organization 
Lamac MPC Cooperative Single organization, with area-
based chapters 
Cordova MPC Cooperative Single organization, with area-
based branches 
  
                                                 
12 PhP stands for Philippine pesos, the local currency. Exchange rate is about Php 46 to 1USD  
13 The Foundation was set up in 2000 but it evolved from an Upland Marketing Program set up in 1992 
14Lamac MPC has its roots in the Lamac Samahang Nayon composed of farmers set up in 1973. After experiencing 
management and leadership problems resulting to its financial decline, the Lamac Samahang Nayon was reconstituted in 
1992 into a multisectoral and multipurpose cooperative called the Lamac MPC with a local professional group taking 
over the management.  
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The relationship between organizational complexity and the nature of stakeholder 
engagement among the poor was explored during the analysis phase and became the 
subject of one of the propositions (Proposition 6) and conclusions.   
  
2.10. Methods of Data Collection and Analysis 
 
After the matched pairs of SEPPS were chosen, the researcher designed a set of 
guidelines for field research defining the guide questions for field interviews and 
documents to be requested from the case subjects. This 2-page document entitled 
Guidelines for Field Research is attached in Appendix 12.2.   
A formal letter introducing the research, containing the aforementioned guidelines 
and a Memorandum of Understanding between the Case Subject and Researcher 
(attached as Appendix 12.3.) was then sent to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of 
each of the case subjects. Field research dates were set based on the mutual 
availability of the case subjects and the researcher. Follow-up research activities were 
undertaken as needed.   
As required, multiple data collection methods were used. Key informant 
interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) together with a study of internal 
organizational documents and a review of previous studies on the case subjects was 
undertaken to gather data. Key informant interviews with a minimum of 10 to a 
maximum of 30 people were conducted for each of the cases. For all cases, these key 
informants included: 
 
 Top management  (current and past); 
 Middle managers or senior staff; 
 Chair or representative from the Board of Directors or Trustees;  
 Representatives of key program and/or funding partners; 
 Purposively selected partners among poverty sectors served; and 
 Experts from the concerned subsector, sector or industry. 
 
A list of the key informants per case subject is contained in Appendix 12.6.  
Triangulation of perspectives among key informants and data sources was used to 
establish the reliability and validity of case study results (Yin, 2003). Case study notes 
were in the form of hand-written field notes, tape recorded interviews, and narratives 
written by the researcher on various aspects of the research. Case study drafts were 
written and submitted to the case subjects for data validation.   
A dialogue ensued between the case subjects and the researcher leading to the 
finalization of the case studies. In four of the cases, substantive dialogue ensued with 
some key informants based on their comments on the case study drafts. The dialogue,  
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taking off from the comments of some of the key informants, generally improved the 
quality of data contained in the final case study. In two of the cases, the changes 
introduced substantively altered the researcher’s analysis. However, in the other two, 
the changes introduced did not. This may be because the researcher had done research 
and consultancies with the latter two case subjects in the past and her familiarity with 
their external and internal environment facilitated a more accurate interpretation of 
the data.  
With the last two cases, no substantive dialogue ensued after the case study drafts 
were submitted to them for data validation. This may have been due in part to the 
unexpected departure of staff that had played key roles in facilitating the case 
research. The researcher notes this as a limitation that may or may not have affected 
the quality of the data on these cases. Notwithstanding such, the researcher believes 
the minimum data required for their inclusion in the thesis was met, and they still 
have valid contributions to the overall analysis.         
Within the theoretical sample, the first pair that was identified and studied was 
Alter Trade Group and Upland Marketing Foundation Inc. The panel of experts was 
interviewed in February 2008 and the field research for Alter Trade Group started 
shortly after. Field research for the Alter Trade Group was completed in January 
2010, although follow-up interviews and email exchanges continued up to the time 
that the case study was finalized in May 2011. It was through studying the Alter 
Trade Group that the research question evolved from one that explored enterprise 
strategy content and strategy formation processes among social enterprises to finally 
focusing on stakeholder engagement strategies. It was for this reason that the level of 
case research done on Alter Trade Group was the most intensive. Alter Trade Group 
proved to be a very rich case as well in terms of content. This is because it is a story 
of distinct but interrelated cases on stakeholder engagement with two segments of the 
poor: one in relation to their experience with organic sugar farmers and the other in 
relation to their experience with Balangon banana growers. Given these reasons, the 
Alter Trade Group has been considered by the researcher as a centerpiece case for the 
thesis. As such, the chapter on Alter Trade has been deliberately given double the 
usual number of pages allotted for a case.     
The panels of experts for the other two pairs were convened and interviewed in 
July 2009 (for the cluster of social enterprises serving persons with disability or PWD 
SE cluster) and August 2009 (for the cooperatives in the VICTO National network).  
By then, refinements on the research questions had already been made, facilitating the 
conduct of more focused research activities. Field research was conducted for these 
two pairs of cases from November 2009-February 2010, although some follow up 
interviews were conducted after. In one of the cases, a research associate assisted the 
conduct of follow up interviews.     
From the database generated for each of the social enterprises in the theoretical 
sample, case descriptions were made with the aid of chronologies of the most 
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important events. Patterns and relationships were established with the help of tables 
and diagrams. The focus was to establish patterns and relationships about roles and 
changes in the roles enacted by the poor as primary stakeholders of the social 
enterprise, how and why these changed, and the impact of these role changes on the 
poor, poverty and the social enterprise.  
Using the inductive method, within-case and cross-case data analysis (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) between each of the three pairs and across all 
six case subjects was done towards contributing to building a framework for 
understanding how social enterprises engage the poor and address poverty.   
 
2.11.  Mintzberg’s Theory of Strategy Formation as Major  
          Analytical Tool 
     
To establish patterns within and between the social enterprise cases in terms of 
how they engaged the poor over time (what was later called primary stakeholder 
engagement strategies),  Mintzberg’s (1978, 2007) theory of strategy formation was 
used by the author as a major analytical tool.     
Mintzberg (2007) defined strategy simply as ‘patterns in actions’ or consistency in 
behavior over time.  He conceived of realized strategy as an  interplay of deliberate 
and emergent, intended and unrealized strategies across the three organizational 
stages of initiation, development, and renewal.  The initiation stage refers to the 
establishment years when vision is defined, learned or imported by the founders; the 
development stage refers to the period when the organization grows, experiments or 
pursues its vision programmatically; and the renewal stage refers to a period of 
change, oftentimes following a crisis. Deliberate strategies are planned strategies that 
are actually implemented while emergent strategies are not planned but arise 
spontaneously during the implementation phase. Intended strategies are planned 
strategies but during the implementation phase, they may or may not be implemented, 
in part or in full (Mintzberg, 2007). 
The interplay of deliberate, emergent, intended and unrealized stakeholder 
engagement strategies (illustrated in Figure 2.1.) across the organizational stages of 
initiation, development and renewal did not only prove useful in establishing patterns 
on how the social enterprises involved or engaged the poor over time, they also 
helped in exploring rival explanations (Yin, 2003) to answer how and why changes in 
stakeholder engagement strategies among the poor happened or did not happen.   
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                                       Deliberate Stakeholder Engagement 
                                                                Strategy Process 
                                                    
 
 
                            Unrealized                                      
   Stakeholder Engagement Strategy                           
                                                                                            Emergent Stakeholder  
                                                                                                                     Engagement Strategy Process 
                
 
Figure 2.1. Stakeholder Engagement Strategy Formation Process  
(Adapted by the author from Mintzberg, 2007)    
 
2.12. Research Scope, Limitations and Ethical 
Considerations  
 
The researcher intends to make a contribution to developing a theory on social 
enterprises with the poor as primary stakeholders or SEPPS. She locates her theory 
building research within the realms of social entrepreneurship and stakeholder theory.  
In particular, she develops a framework for understanding stakeholder engagement 
strategies vis-à-vis the poor among SEPPS. The researcher notes that a future study 
exploring theories relevant to poverty reduction, development, empowerment and 
participation, would further ground the theory building presented here. 
The research is clearly focused on SEPPS and their stakeholder engagement 
strategies vis-à-vis the poor. In this context, she would only study the roles enacted by 
other stakeholders in so far as they help explain the hows and whys of the primary 
stakeholder engagement strategy. The researcher refers to the primary stakeholder 
engagement strategy as stakeholder engagement strategy because of the nature of 
SEPPS: they are social enterprises that engage the poor as primary stakeholders from 
a normative perspective (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). As was earlier discussed, the 
researcher does not intend to make a direct contribution to the discourse on business 
and poverty reduction in this thesis. The indirect contribution is alluded to given the 
expressed limitation of business theories in terms of their impact on the poor (Paton 
and Halme, 2007). The indirect contribution is also in reference to the potential for the 
thesis to provide perspectives on the interface between social entrepreneurship and 
corporate social responsibility. Such is explored in relation to the case of Upland 
Marketing Foundation, Inc. The researcher however notes the potential for her to do 
collaborative research with business and society scholars to pursue some of the 
themes relevant to business and poverty reduction generated by this research.  
Intended 
Stakeholder.
Engagement
.Strategy Realized Stakeholder 
Engagement Strategy 
64 
 
The researcher endeavored to keep to the rigour required by multiple case study 
research and case-based theory building given limitations of time and resources. She 
made a conscious decision to delimit her research on Upland Marketing, even as 
going in the direction of pursuing a case on the network of NGOs that set up Upland 
Marketing became an interesting option. She also made a conscious decision to 
delimit her comparative analysis of the qualitative impact of Alter Trade’s 
intervention within Negros Island, rather than including Alter Trade-banana’s impact 
outside of Negros Island. These were calculated decisions to manage the limitations 
of time and resources in completing the field research in both cases. These conscious 
delimitations were fully considered in the analytical section of the cases and in 
considering what the two cases could offer during the process of cross case analysis. 
The researcher endeavored to effectively manage the process of actively engaging 
the case subjects to provide as complete a set of data and perspectives as possible for 
the research. In managing the process, the researcher also endeavored to take full 
consideration of the ethical issues pertinent to undertaking a PhD dissertation.  Many 
of these ethical issues arise from managing sensitive data gathered from organizations 
and respondents who may be vulnerable and unduly exposed to risks. The researcher 
took special note of not divulging data that were requested to be kept confidential.  
She endeavored to respect such without affecting the integrity of the within case and 
cross case analysis. Where the data was critical to the integrity of the case study, due 
care was made to protect the identity of the respondents. The case subjects were given 
an opportunity to review and give clearance to the case drafts for inclusion in the 
dissertation and publication.  The case subjects were also made aware of the option of 
not using their real identity in the final case study chapter, if deemed necessary.   
All these were fully discussed and introduced in a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) during the start of the research process. The MOU was meant to address these 
issues and to develop a mutual understanding of the requirements of what it meant to 
be a case subject. A sample of this MOU is contained in Appendix 12.3.   
The researcher established rapport by presenting the mutually beneficial objective 
of the research in contributing to the evolving body of knowledge on social 
entrepreneurship useful for education and training programs on social 
entrepreneurship and social enterprises. The Memorandum of Understanding also 
committed the researcher to do the following: 
 
 Give due care in handling internal data and reports that the case subject shares, 
and commit to respect the confidentiality of sensitive information and 
documents identified as such; 
 Get the clearance of the designated officer for all research outputs emanating 
from the research on the case subject to be included in the dissertation report 
and other publications; 
65 
 
 Allow the case subject use of any research findings and outputs for its internal 
and organizational purposes; 
 Give the case subject and key informants the option to be anonymous, or their 
identities confidential as may be agreed upon; and 
 Utilize the findings of the case research only for education, publication and 
other purposes consistent with the objectives of the research.    
The researcher endeavored to observe these commitments during the 4-year research 
process. In this sense, the research outputs are a negotiated outcome of the dialogue 
between the researcher and the case subjects, subject to these provisions.   
Even as she had a written, formal endorsement of the leadership of the social 
enterprises studied, the researcher was still dependent on the actual willingness and 
capacity of the key officers among the case subjects to prioritize accommodating her 
requests for follow-up interviews and additional data, given the other demands on 
their time. In this regard, the researcher points to the possibility that the richness of 
the analysis she generated on two of the cooperative cases (Lamac MPC and Cordova 
MPC) may have been affected by her inability to gather additional data and 
substantive feedback on the case study drafts she presented to them for validation. 
Notwithstanding this limitation, she still believes that the cases as written and 
analyzed present a partial but adequate reality of the experience of Lamac MPC and 
Cordova MPC, to merit inclusion in the thesis.   
The researcher has obtained clearances for inclusion in the thesis and the 
publication of outputs from designated representatives of the six case subjects.  
 
2.13. Presentation of Research Results 
 
The results of this thesis are presented in the next two parts of this monograph.   
Part II, composed of Chapters 3-8 present the empirical cases in the following order: 
 
 Chapter 3  – Alter Trade Group:  
Enabling Suppliers as Transactional and Transformational Partners 
 Chapter 4 – Upland Marketing Foundation Inc: 
Suppliers as Transactional Partners in Value Chain Management  
 Chapter 5 – National Federation of Cooperatives of Persons with Disability: 
Enabling Owner-Workers as Transformational Partners 
 Chapter 6 – Tahanang Walang Hagdanan: 
           Workers as Transactional Partners in Social Enterprise Management 
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 Chapter 7 – Lamac Multi Purpose Cooperative: 
           Owner-Clients as Transactional Partners 
 Chapter 8 – Cordova Multi Purpose Cooperative: 
Owner-Clients as Transactional Partners   
 
Part III, composed of Chapters 9-11 contain the chapters on theory building and cover 
the following: 
 
 Chapter 9 – Cross Case Analysis:  Social Enterprises with the Poor as Primary 
Stakeholders 
 Chapter 10 – Propositions and Contributions to Social Entrepreneurship and 
Stakeholder Theory  
 Chapter 11 – Conclusions   
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CHAPTER 3 – ALTER TRADE GROUP: ENABLING 
SUPPLIERS AS TRANSACTIONAL AND 
TRANSFORMATIONAL PARTNERS 
 
This chapter discusses how the Alter Trade Group, as SEPPS, pursued two 
different ways of engaging the poor, with dramatically different outcomes. On 
one hand, the case demonstrates a stakeholder engagement strategy of 
empowerment: the Alter Trade Group engaged assetless and powerless sugar 
plantation workers cum beneficiaries of the state’s land redistribution 
program, as transformational partners not only in the organic muscovado 
sugar value chain but in the broader social-political stakeholder environment.  
On the other hand, the case demonstrates a stakeholder engagement strategy of 
collaboration: the Alter Trade Group engaged upland farmers mainly as 
transactional partners within the Balangon banana value chain. The case 
shows that the qualitative difference in impact on the poverty situation of their 
partner producers could be attributed in a major way to their realized 
stakeholder engagement strategies. Through its organizational stages of 
initiation, development and renewal, enabling stakeholders and solidarity 
markets in Europe and Japan had provided comprehensive support, serving as 
countervailing forces to the failures of state and market institutions in the Alter 
Trade Group’s operating and broader social-political stakeholder 
environment. As a SEPPS entering its renewal stage, the Alter Trade Group is 
poised to bring the empowerment of their sugar partners to a higher level in 
partnership with the Negros Organic Fair Trade Association (NOFTA), an 
independent federation of these producers. NOFTA was serving not only as a 
vehicle for representing the voice and vote of the poor in Alter Trade’s multi-
organizational social enterprise system, it also served as the poor’s vehicle for 
self-governance and empowerment beyond their primary cooperatives and 
associations. This narrative of the Alter Trade Group presents a case for 
developing a stakeholder theory for social enterprises with the poor as primary 
stakeholders or SEPPS. Current constructs from stakeholder theory, especially 
in the undertheorized area of stakeholder engagement emanating mainly from 
for profit literature could not adequately explain how the Alter Trade Group is 
engaging the poor and addressing poverty. This narrative also provides a 
Southern perspective to literature on social enterprises as multi-stakeholder 
organizations, where the poor are not only given a voice and vote, but are 
enabled to overcome their capability deprivation towards becoming 
empowered stakeholders in their own poverty reduction process and in 
contributing to community and societal transformation.    
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3.1.  Introduction  
 
The Alter Trade Group (Alter Trade) began as an initiative between Filipino and 
Japanese social activists in the 1980s. It grew out of a ‘Trade not Aid’ or people-to-
people trade concept amidst a sugar crisis that hit the Island of Negros in the central 
Philippines in the mid-1980s.   
Alter Trade’s main products were organic muscovado or unrefined brown sugar, 
and naturally grown native bananas of the Balangon variety. For the most part of their 
existence, they had exported these products to partners mainly in Japan and Europe.   
Alter Trade’s primary stakeholders were backyard producers of naturally grown 
Balangon bananas among indigenous and upland communities in various parts of the 
country, and former landless sugar plantation workers in Negros Occidental province.  
The latter were beneficiaries of the government’s land reform program and were 
assisted by Alter Trade to become farmer-partners producing organic sugar cane.  
Before Alter Trade’s intervention, muscovado sugar was no longer being produced in 
large quantities in the province, and Balangon bananas did not have commercial value 
in Negros Island or elsewhere in the country.   
In 1993, Alter Trade became a member of the International Federation of 
Alternative Trade (IFAT), now the World Fair Trade Organization (WFTO). These 
fair trade organizations (FTOs) provided marginalized producers sustained access to 
global markets. These FTOs also enabled the marginalized producers to be part of 
their own development. FTOs in the Philippines adhered to international Fair Trade 
Standards that had been codified into 76 indicators adapted to Philippine conditions 
(Advocate of Philippine Fair Trade, Inc. (APFTI), 2005). The standards included the 
provision of fair prices to producers, fair wages to workers, production pre-financing, 
prompt payment of deliveries, and an assurance of a long term relationship (Gomez, 
2004).     
Among the 20 major fair trade organizations (FTOs) in the Philippines, Alter 
Trade Group was recognized by leaders of the Philippine fair trade movement as the 
biggest in terms of sales (reaching PhP 200.7 million in 2008) and outreach among 
poverty sectors served (820 sugar farmers and 3,493 banana growers as of end 2007). 
It was one of two Philippine FTOs carrying Fair Trade Labeling Organizations 
International (FLO)15 certification (Agustin, 2008; Lagazo, 2008; David, 2008).   
Alter Trade was also considered by the big players within the sugar industry as 
“the market leader in terms of volume and quality of product in the muscovado 
subsector” (Bennet, 2008). Department of Trade and Industry officials affirmed this:    
 
                                                 
15Fairtrade Labeling Organizations (FLO) International is a non-profit, multi-stakeholder association with 23 member 
organizations (Labeling Initiatives and Producer Networks), traders, and external experts. FLO develops and reviews 
fair trade standards and supports fair trade-certified producers by assisting them in gaining and maintaining fair trade 
certification and capitalizing on market opportunities. 
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“Alter Trade is the most competitive in terms of quality and volume and is a 
model for organic muscovado, being the only company in the Philippines that is 
Institute for Market Ecology (IMO) -certified using European and US standards. 
Alter Trade has virtually no competitors because it is at a level above the rest of 
the players in the subsector.”16 (Borje, 2008)  
 
There were 4 entities that made up the Alter Trade Group: Alter Trade Corporation 
(ATC, set up in 1988) – which handled marketing of organic muscovado sugar, 
natural Balangon banana, and other products; the Alter Trade Manufacturing 
Corporation (ATMC, set up in 1992) – which handled purchasing and processing of 
organic sugarcane; the Alter Trade Foundation, Inc., (ATFI, set up in 1997) – which 
was in charge of the development of partner producers; and the Diversified Organic 
Enterprise, Inc., (DOEI, set up in 1997 ) – which produced organic fertilizer for use 
by partner growers.   
These core and allied partner organizations making up the Alter Trade Group as a 
multi-organizational social enterprise system that were covered by the study are listed 
in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1. Alter Trade Group (ATG) Core and Allied Organizations 
Name of Organization Role/Description 
A.  Core Organizations  
Alter Trade Foundation Inc., (ATFI) Mother organization of the Alter Trade Group 
(ATG) and responsible for the development of 
partner producers 
Alter Trade Corporation (ATC) Marketing arm of ATG; subsidiary of ATFI  
Alter Trade Manufacturing Corporation 
(ATMC) 
Purchasing and processing arm for organic sugar 
cane of ATG; subsidiary of ATFI  
Diversified Organic Enterprise Inc., (DOEI) Organic fertilizer production arm of ATG; 
subsidiary of ATFI 
B.  Allied Organizations  
Alter Trade Japan  Exclusive trading partner for the Japanese market 
and shareholder of ATC 
                                                 
16 At the international level, ATG’s four entities have received a Certificate for Organic Agriculture Production and for 
the Processing and Marketing of Organic Products from the Institute for Market Ecology (IMO) for its muscovado 
sugar, banana, and coconut products that are valid for 2007-2008 (Certificate # 9732 IMO). A similar Certificate was 
awarded by the US Department of Agriculture’s National Organic Program (NOP) to ATG (Certificate # 23008 NOP). 
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Name of Organization Role/Description 
Negros Organic Fair Trade  
Association (NOFTA) 
    
    
   
Independent federation of producers with 17 
partner sugar farmer organizations of ATG as 
founding members.  These 17 organizations 
included:  
     AMANO      
     DAFWARBA 
     HCATRIFWO 
     MIARBA 
     NAPFWA 
     NARB-MPC 
     STARFA 
     SIPFAWA 
     STC-MPC 
Banana Grower Organizations in Negros Island 
(Negros Occidental and Oriental) 
PIBFA      
 
 
One of 33 partner banana grower’s organizations 
of ATG 
Partner Organizations Engaged in Banana 
Trading with ATC outside Negros Island  
PFTAC in Bohol 
CORDEV in Northern Luzon 
PARTNERS in Panay Island 
 
3.1.1.  Poverty and Hunger amidst Sugar Crisis   
 
The sugar crisis that hit Negros Island in the mid-1980s was a direct result of the 
lowering by the US of its sugar imports in general, and the share of the Philippines in 
the US quota system for this commodity, in particular. Philippine sugar exports to the 
US averaged 1.3 million tons per year from 1968-71 but reached a low average of 
284,000 tons from 1983-1988, plummeting to 161,000 tons in 1988 (Dolan, 1991).   
The economy of the island was almost completely dependent on sugar, with large 
tracts of land owned by an elite few who also controlled the sugar mills. In these 
sugar estates, farm workers were paid meager wages for slave-like labor and were 
prohibited by their landlords from planting crops other than sugarcane. As the few 
owners of land and capital, the Negrense elite, who also controlled the decision-
making in government, had benefited disproportionately from the export-oriented 
monocrop economy, at the expense of the area, its people and their life support 
system (Dacanay, 1996). 
In 1984, landless sugar workers, numbering 62,500 households, were the poorest 
among the poverty groups in Negros Occidental, followed by diversified shifting 
cultivators and upland farmers with 1 hectare or less of land, lowland farmers in non-
irrigated lands, artisanal or municipal fishers, and coconut farmers (Aguilar, 1984). 
Poverty incidence in Region VI, where Negros Occidental was located, was placed at 
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65%, with 227,096 families living below the monthly income threshold of PhP 2,654 
(Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES), 1988).  
As the price of sugar plummeted in the world market, many landlords in the sugar 
estates abandoned their farms, causing hunger among thousands of sugar workers.  
Land occupations by members of sugar worker unions became rampant, in an effort to 
transform the crisis into an opportunity for agrarian reform. Cooperatives and 
people’s organizations (POs) were set up and became conduits for relief, livelihood 
and income-generating projects.   
 
3.1.2.  Call for International Assistance  
 
A call for international assistance was issued as the crisis deepened. In response to 
the call, the Japan Committee for Negros Campaign (JCNC) was launched on 
February 25, 198617. The Campaign came in with relief goods, tools and agricultural 
inputs. However, they wanted to develop a more long-term relationship of solidarity 
and suggested the setting up of an alternative trading system. As a manifestation of 
this idea, Filipino and Japanese social activists established the Alter Trade 
Corporation and further developed this concept in a conference sponsored by 
Japanese consumer cooperatives.  
 
3.1.3.  ‘Land to the Tiller’ in Sugar Lands  
 
With the end of the dictatorial regime of President Ferdinand Marcos in 1986, a 
new Philippine constitution was put in place. Agrarian reform, carrying the principle 
of ‘land to the tiller’ beyond rice and corn lands18, became an urgent agenda. The 
passage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) in 1986 opened up the 
opportunity for sugar workers to own the lands that they were already tilling. The law, 
and its implementing Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), also helped 
the process of legitimizing land occupations by sugar worker union members that 
were already widespread in Negros Occidental.  
A study of the Negros Occidental Provincial Government some 20 years after, 
showed that 78,770 tillers became agrarian reform beneficiaries in the province 
(Provincial Government of Negros Occidental, 2007).  
 
 
                                                 
17 The people behind JCNC were Japanese activists who were part of the Japan Committee for Philippine Concerns.  
They were part of a campaign against the Japanese government’s aid policy towards the dictatorial regime of President 
Ferdinand Marcos, whom they accused of anti-labor policies and human rights abuses. The JCNC was organized the day 
after Marcos fled the country amidst a peaceful people’s uprising that installed President Cory Aquino in power.  
18 The Marcos government initiated land reform which covered rice and corn lands, but did not include large agricultural 
lands planted to cash crops such as sugar.  
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3.1.4.  Lack of Agricultural Support Services amidst Domination 
of Usurer-Traders  
 
This shift from being farm workers to small land owners required the 
development of new capabilities. These new capabilities, in turn, created the need for 
organizations that could provide a package of assistance to these agrarian reform 
beneficiaries or ARBs. Such needs were made urgent by an agricultural trading 
system in the Philippines that had historically been dominated by usurer-traders.  
These usurer-traders lent production capital at very high interest rates and dictated 
farm gate prices. The idea of Alter Trade became even more compelling as the 
government’s Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) did not have the 
resources to offer much-needed agricultural support services to a majority of the 
ARBs. A 2007 study of the Negros Occidental Provincial Government cited that 
CARP, since its inception in the 1980s, had failed to reach 97% of agrarian reform 
beneficiaries in the province, with 41% of them unable to till their lands because of 
lack of capital and support services (Provincial Government of Negros Occidental, 
2007).        
 
3.1.5.  MIARBA’s Story before Alter Trade 
 
The story of the Minoro Isabel Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association 
(MIARBA), one of Alter Trade’s partner sugar producers, mirrored the squalor and 
struggle among a large segment of the poor in Negros Island in the 1980s. It also 
mirrored the opportunity created by agrarian reform, and the sad reality of an 
ineffective government program to support and move farmers out of poverty. These 
provided the rich historical context giving birth to Alter Trade as a social enterprise. 
(See Box 3.1) 
 
3.2.  Initiation Stage (1987-1993): Venturing into People-
to-People and Fair Trade  
 
Alter Trade Corporation was formally registered with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission in July 27, 1988, but was set up a year earlier to facilitate people-to-
people trade. Their first effort in 1987 was to provide markets to small producers by 
assisting urban poor groups sell farm products using pushcarts in local 
neighborhoods. Such did not prosper. The founders then ventured into people-to-
people and fair trade with solidarity markets in the North. Unlike the mainstream 
markets that pushed farm gate prices to the lowest levels possible, solidarity markets 
were concerned about uplifting the lives of producers through trade. Naturally grown 
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Balangon bananas became the main product with Japanese cooperatives believing in 
people-to-people trade.  Organic muscovado sugar became the main product with fair 
trade organizations mainly in Europe.  
 
 
 
Box 3.1. MIARBA’s Story Before Alter Trade 
Sources: MIARBA FGD, 2008; ATG, 2008; Roy, 2009 
 
The Minoro Isabel Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association or MIARBA 
had 132 members, 57 women and 75 men. They used to be agricultural workers in a 
sugar estate called Hacienda Isabel, with a land area of 224.24 hectares, located in a 
village called Minoro in the town of La Castellana, Negros Occidental. They were 
organized as a workers’ cooperative in the 1980s. MIARBA leader Imelda 
Cervantes related:   
 
“During the time when we were still under the hacienda system, we worked 
like slaves, we did not have command of our time nor did we have the right to 
demand for the landlord to pay us rightfully”. (Cervantes as cited by ATG, 2008) 
 
The members of MIARBA echoed her sentiment:  
 
“Our day would start at 4:00 a.m. when we were given work assignments.  
Wages were in the form of a weekly rice supply that was barely enough to feed 
our families”. 
 
Under these conditions, families were living below subsistence level, with parents 
and children alike having little or no opportunity to finish grade school. Among the 
members present in the FGD, none of them had finished grade school.  
The situation went from bad to worse during the sugar crisis. The hacienda 
stopped operations and the workers were left to fend for themselves. The workers 
then occupied and planted rice and corn in 48 hectares of idle land. In 1988, the 
landlord re-asserted ownership, and an initial agreement was reached for the 
workers to continue controlling the rice-growing areas, while the owner would 
again take charge of the sugarcane areas. 
The workers’ cooperative pushed for the implementation of the Comprehensive 
Agrarian Reform Law, and a long-drawn struggle to possess the land ensued. It was 
only by 2002 that they finally gained ownership of 57 hectares of sugar land 
(managed communally) and 20 hectares of rice land (under individual cultivation). 
Their claim for another 50 hectares of land was still pending with the Registry of 
Deeds. It was in 2001-2002, as they were installed as agrarian reform beneficiaries, 
that MIARBA’s partnership with Alter Trade flourished.    
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3.2.1. People-to-People Trade with Japan: From Mascobado to 
Balangon 
3.2.1.1.  Trading ‘Sugar of the Masses’ 
Through the persuasive efforts of Yukioka Yoshiharu, then chairman of the 
Kyoseisha Cooperative, people-to-people trade between Negros and Japan was started 
with Mascobado. Muscovado, or raw sugar processed using a Spanish colonial era 
technology, was largely seen then as the ‘poor man’s sugar’. As the first product 
identified by Alter Trade, it served as a counterpoint to the refined white sugar 
produced in sugar centrals, mostly landlord-owned sugar mills that had exploitative 
relationships with agrarian reform beneficiaries. Alter Trade adopted the name 
Mascobado, to signify it was the “sugar of the masses”, a symbol of the people’s 
struggle to achieve a better life. Mascobado was first shipped to Japan in 1987 and 
sold to organized consumers’ cooperatives. Since muscovado was no longer produced 
in Negros, in large quantities by then, the first shipment came from the nearby 
province of Antique. This first shipment had very high impurities and moisture 
content, and could not be sold in the Japanese market. To address this problem, the 
Green Coop Consumers’ Cooperative Union (Green Coop), one of the consumers’ 
cooperatives in Japan, processed the sugar into candies. Green Coop also sent its 
leaders to Negros to help improve the quality of Mascobado. In October 1987, a 
traditional muscovado mill was built in San Enrique, Negros Occidental to control the 
milling process and ensure compliance with basic quality and food safety standards. 
 
3.2.1.2.  Balangon as Counterpoint to MNC Bananas  
 
In 1988, the Green Coop suggested the trading of bananas given the observation 
that muscovado had a limited market in Japan. As they sent representatives to explore 
the varieties of bananas growing in Negros, they chose the naturally grown Balangon 
variety for its sweet-sour (koku) taste, which was pleasing to the Japanese palate. The 
Japanese saw the naturally grown Balangon as a counterpoint to Philippine bananas 
commercially exported to Japan by multi-national corporations (MNCs). These MNC 
bananas were produced by multi-national corporations with the use of harmful 
chemicals in an exploitative plantation environment. 
Alter Trade sought out upland communities in the province where Balangon 
bananas were naturally grown as a supplemental crop in backyards of households. At 
that time, bananas of the Balangon variety had no commercial value. Alter Trade 
worked out arrangements with individual growers willing to serve as partner 
suppliers.   
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The first four shipments of Balangon to Japan were a disaster as a majority of the 
fruits were already black when they reached the port of entry. Japan’s Quarantine Act 
required that bananas reaching Japanese ports were green. Ripe bananas were seen as 
carriers of harmful insects. It became obvious to Alter Trade and its Japanese partners 
that a complex system of cultivating, harvesting, washing, packing and shipping by a 
very capable and dedicated organization, needed to be put in place. Alter Trade and its 
Japanese partners made a commitment to develop a system to address these needs in 
cooperation with local grower communities.  
 
3.2.1.3.  Alter Trade Japan as Intermediary Organization   
 
In 1989, Alter Trade Japan (ATJ) was established to serve as the marketing arm of 
the people’s products from Negros in Japan, with Masahiko Hotta as President. Since 
then, the Balangon bananas and Mascobado from the Alter Trade Corporation that 
reached the Japanese cooperatives and consumers had all been coursed through ATJ. 
ATJ was also a shareholder of Alter Trade Corporation. 
 
3.2.2.  Fair Trade of Mascobado with Europe 
 
While muscovado did not have much appeal in the Japanese market, the European 
market proved promising. In 1987, OS3 was the first European company to import 
Mascobado from Negros, using it to manufacture “Mascao Chocolate”, a mixture with 
fair trade cocoa from Bolivia. Later in 1989, the European Fair Trade Association 
(EFTA), GEPA (a fair trade company in Germany), and OS3 (now Claro Fair Trade) 
formally introduced the idea of Fair Trade to Alter Trade during their visits to Negros.  
With the growing demand for Mascobado, Alter Trade Manufacturing 
Corporation (ATMC) was set up in 1992 and a modern muscovado plant capable of 
crushing 30 tons of sugar cane per day with juice extraction at about 70%19 was 
constructed. With this, Mascobado production reached 500 tons per year. The ATMC 
mill provided a market for the cane of the sugar workers who already owned their 
lands as agrarian reform beneficiaries.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Traditional mills have a crushing capacity of less than one ton of cane per day and an extraction rate of less than 50%. 
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3.3.  Development Stage: Visioning, Learning and Planning 
with Solidarity Markets (1993-2008) 
 
3.3.1. Clarifying Alter Trade’s Vision  
Alter Trade conducted what it considered as its 1st strategic planning workshop in 
1994-95. Alter Trade came out with a mission statement founded on its commitment 
to people’s empowerment at the grassroots, and the development of Alternative 
Trading and Marketing. An Alternative Economic System that was just and friendly 
to Mother Earth was envisioned.   
With the concept of “Save the Land, Save the Production with Agriculture as 
Core”, it advanced a framework for agrarian reform and rural development for the 
whole Negros Island. To Alter Trade, Alternative Trading and Marketing involved an 
integrated system of enterprises – from production, procurement, selling, distribution, 
promotion, research and development, banking and financing, and transportation. This 
system of enterprises was to address the demands for goods and services of basic 
sectors, organized into grassroots and people’s organizations, interlinked and 
interdependent as producers and consumers.    
 
3.3.2. Shift to Organic Mascobado with Assistance of German 
Partners  
 
In 1993, prompted by the growing demand for organic agricultural products in the 
European market, the German fair trade company GEPA encouraged Alter Trade to 
produce organic muscovado sugar. That year, Alter Trade started to conduct 
experiments and trials on organic sugarcane production.   
With support from Bread for the World, a Protestant church-based development 
agency from Germany, Alter Trade started its Bio-Organic Conversion Program in 
1994. It was in this year that the first certified organic Mascobado sugar was sold to 
GEPA.  
 
3.3.3. Certification and Membership in International Organic and 
Fair Trade Bodies   
 
In 1993, the same year that it decided to shift to organic muscovado, Alter Trade 
also joined the International Fair Trade Association (IFAT) to widen its network 
among European fair trade organizations. In 1994-1995, with its Bio-Organic 
Conversion Program in place, it became a member of the International Federation of 
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Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM). Its membership in both international 
bodies enhanced its standing in the fair trade and organic niche markets, translating 
into increased revenues and support in the years that followed.  
Under the Bio-Organic Conversion Program (1995-2000), Alter Trade was further 
assisted to open its farms, milling and packing facilities to annual inspection and 
control procedures from the Institute for Market Ecology (IMO), based in 
Switzerland. Its Mascobado was certified organic by the European Economic 
Community, Naturland and Bio Suisse standards and by 2002, the United States 
Department of Agriculture standards.   
 
3.3.4. Setting Up of Organic Fertilizer Plant and Expansion of 
Sugar Mill  
 
In 1997, the Diversified Organic Enterprise Inc. (DOEI) was established to 
respond to the farmers’ need for organic fertilizer. The DOEI organic fertilizer plant 
was later expanded to double its annual fertilizer output in 2004.  
Also, in 2004, in response to the growing market for Mascobado, largely in the 
European fair trade market, a new Mascobado mill was built. The new mill had the 
capacity to produce up to 2,000 metric tons of muscovado per year.   
 
3.3.5. Partnership with Balangon Growing Communities Beyond 
Negros  
 
As the demand for naturally grown Balangon bananas grew among Japanese 
consumers, production in Negros fell short of demand, and prompted Alter Trade to 
establish partnerships with small grower communities outside of the island. It 
expanded to the province of Bohol in 1993, to Panay Island in 1994, and to the 
Northern Luzon region in 1997. Subsequently, Alter Trade helped to establish the 
People’s Fair Trade Assistance Center or PFTAC in Bohol in 1995, the Center for 
Organic Farming and Integrated Rural Development or CORDEV in Northern Luzon 
in 1999, and the Partnership for Rural Transformation and Ecological Renewal Inc. or 
PARTNERS in Panay in 2003. These organizations had since become Alter Trade’s 
partners in Balangon trading, managing the value chains in their respective areas of 
operation.  
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3.3.6. Establishment of a Foundation Dedicated to Marginalized 
Producers  
 
Alter Trade Foundation Inc., (ATFI) was created in 1997 to invest the proceeds of 
the people-to-people and fair trade initiatives into programs for marginalized 
producers. At the same time, the Alter Trade Corporation started to have a positive 
net income.  
Alter Trade staff recalled that in the beginning, there were expectations that the 
Negros Council for People’s Development, a local NGO engaged in agrarian reform 
advocacy and community development, would serve as an institutional partner in 
providing comprehensive development services to partner communities. Alter Trade 
decided to set up its own foundation after this expected partnership arrangement did 
not materialize.  
ATFI Executive Director Edwin Lopez explained the beginnings of Alter Trade’s 
social development program for its partner producers: 
 
“Alter Trade started in 1989-90 providing credit for sugarcane production. The 
Bio-Organic Conversion Program in 1993 paved the way for conversion to 
organic farming in addition to credit. This developed the capability of members of 
what used to be sugar worker unions fighting for land, to make their lands 
productive in a sustainable way, as agrarian reform beneficiaries. The foundation 
was set up in 1997 as the programs and services of the corporation for partner 
producers became more complex and the need for Alter Trade to undertake 
comprehensive development intervention among them was felt”.  (Lopez, 2010) 
 
1997-2001 was a period of needs assessment and program development for 
capacity building. Around 1999-2000, some efforts at management capacity building 
were initiated. Around 2000, a study was made on the state and needs of partner 
agrarian reform beneficiaries (ARBs). These efforts paved the way for evolving a 
Sustainable Agriculture for Sustainable Community (SASC) program framework.  
The Sustainable Agriculture for Sustainable Communities (SASC) framework became 
an input to Alter Trade’s strategic planning in 2001-2002 and the basis for evolving 
integrated programs for partners. Under SASC, Alter Trade was to set up or enhance 
existing organizations of farmers with service programs on credit and savings, bio-
organic conversion, sustainable farming technologies, gender mainstreaming, rural 
enterprise development, and sustainable management systems for farmers’ 
organizations (details can be found in Box 3.2.; 3.3.; and Section 3.3.12.). These 
programs were integrated in individual Community Development Plans, which 
represented their partner producer organizations’ own road maps towards 
empowerment and sustainability. It was in 2002 after the strategic planning process of 
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2000-2001 that the foundation, as Alter Trade’s development arm, pursued a 
comprehensive process of capacity development using the SASC program framework 
(Lopez, 2010).      
At the time of this 2nd strategic planning process, there were already four entities 
of Alter Trade: the corporation or ATC, tasked with product development and 
marketing; the foundation or ATFI, tasked with development of producers’ groups 
and communities; the manufacturing company for procuring sugar cane and 
processing Mascobado or ATMC; and the organic fertilizer company or DOEI. 
 
3.3.7. 10-Year Strategic Plan and Strategy Adjustments  
 
Alter Trade had a ten-year strategic plan that was a product of what the group 
considered their second strategic planning exercise held in 2000-2001 and completed 
in 2002. Unlike the first plan that was facilitated internally, this second exercise was 
assisted by their partner German development agency, Bread for the World with the 
help of external facilitators. The strategic plan articulated the following vision:   
 
“We envision our organization as a professional, innovative, and socially 
responsible business organization in partnership with self-reliant and self-
determining communities responding to the demands of customers in the 
Philippines and the world for quality produce from sustainable agriculture, 
operating in a viable, socially-just economic system that is in harmony with the 
environment and the society”.  (Alter Trade Corporation, 2002)  
 
The strategic plan for 2003-2013 articulated the principles of Fair Trade and 
Sustainable Agriculture/Organic Farming as foundations for the interventions of Alter 
Trade. It also adopted the core values of Fairness, Integrity, Teamwork, Pro-
Environment, Excellence, Competence, and Commitment to People’s Development.  
Unlike the previous plan that was mostly just descriptive of the vision and general 
direction that Alter Trade was committed to, the 2003-2013 strategic plan articulated 
a set of goals, key result areas, performance indicators and strategies.  
The plan developed in 2000-2002 was hinged on a diversification strategy of 
working with Alter Trade sugar farmer partners. The centerpiece of the diversification 
strategy was to set up Balangon plantations in selected areas of sugar farmer 
partners20. The plan also included the commercialization of other organic crops (herbs 
and spices, coffee, rice, and corn) to be sold to the domestic and export markets. 
Mango and pineapple trading (which could be non-organic in the beginning) were 
                                                 
20 In 1998, Alter Trade Corporation faced its first crisis with armed rebel groups burning their trucks for trading 
Balangon. This partly explains why they were trying to shift their efforts from the uplands, the natural habitat of 
Balangon, to the lowlands.   
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identified to support efforts towards achieving financial stability. By-products of 
Balangon (e.g. chips, catsup) and muscovado (e.g. syrup, wine, and masco blocks) 
were defined as new products for introduction.    
However, Alter Trade realized during the implementation stage that the 
diversification strategy as defined was based on flawed assumptions. Among these 
flawed assumptions were the non-suitability of lowland sugar areas for Balangon; 
insufficient preparedness and capacity of Alter Trade and its partners to scale up 
production of non-sugar crops for trading; and lack of market demand for mango and 
pineapple.   
In the years that followed, Alter Trade shifted to increasing organic muscovado 
production with sugar producing partners in Negros Occidental with sustained 
producer development processes in Alter Trade sugar areas only. Alter Trade through 
Alter Trade Corporation started organizing its banana growers in Negros Island only 
in 2006, although it had assisted the formation of banana growers and their support 
institutions outside of Negros Island since 1993. Alter Trade also expanded its 
Balangon trading partnerships with indigenous and upland communities outside of the 
province, mainly in Panay and Mindanao (Alter Trade Group FGD, 2008).  
 
3.3.8. Learning the Hard Way: Failed Balangon Plantation 
Experiments     
 
In August 2000, Alter Trade, ATJ, JCNC, CORDEV and other partners, jointly 
launched a Balangon Renewal Program. This was intended to develop the production 
of Balangon in new areas outside its natural upland habitat. Alter Trade conceived 
this in 1999 in response to various concerns – the bunchy top virus that was starting to 
infest Balangon producing areas, the threat of armed rebel groups in the uplands, the 
need to improve access to production sites, and the need to lower the reject rates. The 
idea was to cultivate Balangon in plantations; this was especially attractive as a 
diversification strategy involving Alter Trade’s partners who were already engaged in 
organic sugar production.  
With PhP 10 million from the Japanese cooperatives, 100 hectares were 
committed for this experiment in Negros, and another 100 hectares in Northern 
Luzon. Unfortunately, the experiment failed in 95% of the areas. Alter Trade learned 
the hard way that lowland areas, which were open with no windbreaks and had clay 
rather than sandy loam soil, were not suitable for Balangon. In addition, as plantation 
technologies were introduced, there was a tendency for the kuko or sweet sour taste of 
Balangon, so important to the Japanese palate, to get diluted. 
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3.3.9. Growers’ Development to Manage Threats in Balangon 
Trading 
 
Alter Trade learned from this costly mistake. Realizing that the natural habitat of 
Balangon could not be replicated just anywhere, they developed the concept of 
Balangon Cultural Management (BCM) for introduction in both old sites (called Old 
Balangon) and new sites (called Improved Balangon). BCM promoted what were 
observed as effective cultural practices involving entire communities and local 
government units, not just immediate Alter Trade partner growers, in preventing and 
controlling the spread of plant diseases.     
Alter Trade also realized how critical it was for the growers to own and manage 
the community enterprises that handled the post harvest facilities and processes for 
Balangon trading. It was seen that this would not only strengthen BCM but would 
also improve the quality of Balangon products for trading, as the growers and their 
communities were assisted to have greater stakes in Alter Trade. At the same time, 
with the growers owning and managing the community enterprises it would 
effectively neutralize the threat of armed rebel groups who were active in the same 
upland areas as the natural habitat of Balangon. 
Emerging from the failed Balangon experiment, Alter Trade Corporation initiated 
the Growers’ Development Program in 2003 for the individual Balangon producers. 
That year, it also introduced Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP) and Hazard 
Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP) principles in the packing centers.21  
 
3.3.10. Organizing Balangon Growers in Negros Island as a Crisis 
Response  
 
While the Balangon Renewal Program (BRP) was supposed to include organizing 
growers, the failure of the program created tensions between, and confusion in the 
roles played by Alter Trade Corporation and Alter Trade Foundation. Under the BRP, 
from 2000-2002, all Balangon areas and their growers were to be assisted by the 
foundation in terms of application of Balangon technology. On the other hand, the 
corporation was tasked with research and training of agriculturists on the technology 
of growing Balangon. When the delineation of roles did not materialize according to 
plan (resulting in confusion on both sides), along with the failure of the program and 
subsequent non-payment of loans by participating farmers, the corporation and 
foundation decided to segregate their areas of assignment altogether, with the 
corporation tasked with partner development for Balangon. However, the pressure to 
produce the volume, quality and price (VQP) requirements for Balangon trading 
                                                 
21 GMP and HACCP were also implemented in Alter Trade’s sugar mill. 
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became the preoccupation of the corporation in the years that followed. The 
corporation was unable to give attention to growers’ development in a broader sense 
until a truck burning incident that served as its wake-up call in 2006.   
In 2006, an armed rebel group burned a delivery truck owned by Alter Trade after 
the latter did not pay a ‘revolutionary tax’ on demand. Alter Trade Corporation 
transformed the truck-burning crisis into an opportunity to strengthen their 
relationship with the Balangon growers who wanted to ensure that their trading 
activities with Alter Trade continued. The corporation started to organize the 
Balangon growers into cooperatives or associations. To sustain efforts at organizing 
partner banana growers, one staff from Alter Trade Corporation was assigned to focus 
on this task in 2007.  
Alter Trade also facilitated the transfer of ownership and management of the 
delivery truck business to partners. At that time, Balangon growers’ organizations 
were deemed unprepared to immediately own and manage group enterprises. Thus, 
the sugar farmers’ organizations, which were evaluated to be in a better position, were 
given the opportunity. Alter Trade Corporation issued soft loans to enable the 
farmers’ organizations to purchase the trucks, and then rented the trucks from them.22  
No truck burning incident had happened since then.  
 
3.3.11. Japanese Second Party Audit for Quality Assurance and 
Learning 
 
In 2005, the first Second Party Audit by Japanese consumers of Alter Trade’s 
Balangon operations, initiated by the PAL System Consumers’ Cooperative Union of 
Japan, was conducted. This helped resolve issues on the integrity and traceability of 
Alter Trade’s Balangon banana exports. Earlier, questions on whether or not bananas 
being exported were all indeed naturally grown by small grower partners of Alter 
Trade had been raised. At one time, Alter Trade failed to promptly report one of its 
areas of expansion, before shipments that included bananas were made from this area. 
The issue reached crisis proportions when a label of a commercial company that grew 
and exported chemically grown plantation bananas was found in one of the shipments 
of Balangon by a Japanese cooperative. Alter Trade vouched for their shipments and 
pointed to the possibility that the label may have accidentally entered the shipment 
during the long shipping phase from Negros to Manila, then to Japan. Issues of 
integrity and traceability of shipments persisted. To resolve these issues, the two 
parties conceived and implemented a second party audit by Japanese consumers.        
Another Second Party Audit by PAL System transpired in 2007. As shown by the 
results of the 2005 and 2007 Second Party Audits, they were not only important as a 
quality assurance measure for the Balangon bananas being traded, they also provided 
                                                 
22 As of 2008, 6 partners owned 8 trucks - all of them partner sugar farmers’ organizations.   
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a much-appreciated venue for mutual learning among Japanese consumers, Alter 
Trade and Balangon growers about people-to-people trade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 3.2.  Sustainable Agriculture for Sustainable Community Program Components 
(supported by Bread for the World, Germany) 
Source:  ATFI (2003-2009). Annual Reports for 2002-2008. 
 
 Sustainable Production and Area Development Enterprises (SPADE): bio-organic 
conversion; sustainable agriculture and organic farming technology development; crop, 
livestock and income diversification; and capability building in marketing and enterprise 
development; 
 Capability Building and Support Services (CBSS)/Credit Access and Savings Program 
(CRASP): savings and capital build-up; credit extension for production and diversification; 
and capacity building in project proposal making, finance management and loan repayment; 
and 
 Holistic Organizational Empowerment (HOE): capacity building in community 
development planning; land resource and development planning; organizational, project and 
enterprise management including participatory monitoring and assessment processes; 
leadership development, gender mainstreaming; and producer partners’ conferences to share 
experiences and knowledge  
 
Enhancing Projects 
 
 Land Tenure Recovery Project: redemption of ARBs who were about to lose their lands to 
leaseholders or financiers, 2005-2008 (ATFI-financed); 
 Farm Equipment Services/Integrated Rural Enterprise Development Program: provision of 
tractor, irrigation and postharvest truck services, 2004-present (supported by Oikocredit 
International, the Netherlands since 2005);   
 Enhancing Productivity and Women Participation: farmers’ and rural women’s needs for 
farm equipment, crop diversification, livestock and poultry raising and community service 
facilities, 2006-present (supported by APNET or Alternative People’s Network for Peace 
and Life; and Dure Producers and Consumers’ Cooperative, South Korea); and 
 Nurturing Learning Communities on Organic Agriculture for Exports to European Markets:  
establishment of facilities and resource centers for multi-media instructional materials on 
organic farming and fair trade; 12 Farmers’ Field Schools (FFS) for sugarcane, rice and 
Balangon; Lakbay Aral or study tours to organic and diversified farms in 18 sites 
nationwide; production and showing of documentary film on the Alter Trade story; local 
weekly radio program featuring organic farming, FFS sites and Lakbay Aral results, 2006 
(supported by European Commission Small Projects Facility)   
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3.3.12. SASC I and II: Program for Transforming Sugar   
Farmer Partners  
 
ATFI Executive Director Edwin Lopez characterized how SASC went beyond 
transactional services or making their sugar farmer partners’ effective suppliers of 
organic sugar cane for Mascobado trading: 
 
“SASC I and II provided management capacity building services in addition to 
credit and sustainable technology. We assisted the partners to develop their 
capacity to manage themselves and their organizations to achieve food security 
and community development”. (Lopez, 2010) 
 
SASC I, covering 2002-2004, centered on the strengthening of local partner 
communities on basic sustainable agriculture and organic farming technologies and 
management of their production, credit and finance, and community resources. The 
evaluation results of SASC I can be found in Box 3.3. SASC II, covering 2005-2007, 
centered on boosting capacities of local communities on sustainable agriculture, fair 
trading practices, management and development of own resources and strengthening 
inter-community cooperation through cluster organizations. The main funding partner 
of Alter Trade for SASC I and II was Bread for the World, a German development 
agency, providing close to 50% of their program budget since 2002.     
 
 
Box 3.3.  SASC External Evaluation Results, 2004 
Source: Ibus and Basilio (2004), Sustainable Agriculture for Sustainable Communities: An 
Impact Evaluation 
 
“The Bio-Organic Conversion Program (BOCP) and Sustainable Agriculture for 
Sustainable Communities (SASC) projects provided the much-needed interventions to the 
agrarian reform beneficiaries (ARBs) at the most critical time – upon installation by the 
Department of Agrarian Reform. Without the loan, technology, market, and organizational 
capacity building assistance, many ARBs would have run back to the land owners or to local 
financiers”.   
 
“…. ATFI has carved a niche in the development community in Negros Occidental. Over the 
past 5 years, it has developed a credibility of delivering affordable credit, assured market, 
appropriate technology and processes for sustainable agricultural production and 
organizational capacity building of farmer organizations. The combination of these services 
makes ATFI program effective and unique in the development sector in the province. Many 
development organizations are not able to assure their parties of a market for their key 
products. ATFI has done it for sugarcane, bananas and lately on a trial basis, for rice…” 
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3.3.13. Sugar Farmer Partners: Self-Governance Through 
Experiential Learning   
 
Since 2005, Alter Trade Foundation Inc. had started to convene an Annual PO 
(People’s Organization) Conference among partner producers, usually for 2 days 
within December. The purposes of the PO Conferences were to provide a venue for 
consultation and decision making about Alter Trade plans that directly affected the 
POs, and to likewise provide a venue for discussion, learning, and sharing of 
perspectives and experiences between Alter Trade and POs and among POs. The 
following provides insights to some of the major areas of discussion and decision 
making that had transpired from 2005-2007, and their implications from the 
perspective of the POs (FGD with Alter Trade Partner PO Leaders, 2010): 
 
 2005: Sustainable agriculture and diversification of crops and income was a 
main theme of the first PO Conference. While diversification as a strategy to 
ensure food security, increase income, and manage financial risks was 
discussed by Alter Trade, the POs were asked to define their particular 
strategies based on land and climate suitability, and the preferences of the 
producers themselves. Dama Farm Workers Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries 
Association (DAFWARBA) Chairperson Daniel Diamante related how, from 
their monocrop practice as sugar workers until 2002, their organization decided 
on and pursued the collective allocation of the 78 hectares awarded to their 29 
agrarian reform beneficiary members as follows: sugarcane (35 hectares), forest 
(30 hectares), rice (10 hectares), rock pile (2 hectares), residential (0.6 hectares) 
and hacienda road (0.4 hectares). They also invested in 2 carabaos, 2 bull carts, 
1 hand tractor, 2 threshers, 2 irrigation pumps, 1 rice mill, 100 heads of native 
chicken, and PhP 216,000 for rice trading. Diamante explained:  “As workers, 
we were only concerned with benefits. Alter Trade taught us that as owners, we 
needed to make sure our capital generated profits so we could reap benefits in 
addition to fulfilling our obligations to pay our land tax and amortization. It 
was from Alter Trade that we learned to manage our land and to have a good 
harvest with diversified products and projects to have food sufficiency, 
education for our children, housing and medical services. Alter Trade also 
taught us the value of capital build-up and how to manage our finances well.  
These were in our Community Development Plans, and from 2003-2010, many 
of these plans have materialized”. (Diamante, 2010)     
 2006: Sharing and assessment of diversification efforts pursued by POs, 
reasons for failure, and alternative efforts were discussed. Torino Tamaro, 
Chairman of Sta. Rita Farmers’ Association (STARFA), Alter Trade’s partner 
for 14 years, remembered their unsuccessful experiment of going into raising 8 
87 
 
cows as part of their diversification efforts. “The project went bankrupt as 
expenses exceeded our income from selling the cows.  We shifted to setting up 
a piggery which is working better”. (Tamaro, 2010). Jaime Hilarbo, Chairman 
of STC-MPC shared: “Our Balangon project failed because the land and 
climate were not suitable. We even lost in our initial production of sugarcane.  
However, Alter Trade helped us with the technology to improve soil fertility 
and increase productivity. Although we experienced failures, we have learned 
from our mistakes. Now we have overcome our losses and have achieved 
diversification with coffee, fruits, vegetables, chicken, piggery and goat 
raising”. (Hilarbo, 2010)   
 2007:  The ruling by the Fair Trade Labeling Organization (FLO) to transform 
ATFI into a producers’ foundation was discussed following the 2006 
recommendation by the FLO inspector/consultant. It was here where 16 of the 
partner sugar POs became members of ATFI and 4 PO leaders were elected to 
be formally part of the ATFI Board. The PO leaders present in the FGD were 
unanimous in expressing: “We have a direct voice in the decision-making 
processes of ATFI, through our representatives in the board. That is in addition 
to the day-to-day engagement we have with ATFI staff. This is different from 
our mainly business relationship with ATMC and ATC, where we have 
transactions (e.g. selling our sugar cane) and negotiations (e.g. about quantity 
and price), and our influence is less”. (FGD with Alter Trade Partner POs, 
2010)  
 
Romy Noble, Chairman of Asosasyon Sang Mamumugon sa Nolan (AMANO), 
explained their influence on the negotiation of sugar cane pricing with ATMC: 
 
“For the pricing of sugarcane, it’s 50-50 in terms of our participation and 
influence. Before every milling season, Alter Trade calls for a consultation so we 
can study and agree on a price. We also have a provision for special meetings in 
case we experience crop damage or there are changes in the global market. Since 
we started, it’s only now that a special consultation is being called. The POs are 
asking for PhP 2003 - PhP 2008/ton, from the PhP 1,700/ton agreed upon before 
the milling season. This is important because at the sugar centrals now, they are 
buying non-organic sugarcane at PhP 1,900/ton”. (Noble, 2010) 
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3.3.14. Resources for Transformational Programs and Services 
 
Financial resources of ATFI, the foundation, that allowed them to undertake 
transformational programs and services, from 2002-2008, are shown below in Table 
3.2. 
    
Table 3.2. ATFI Staffing and Program Expenditures, 2002-2008 (in PhP million) 
Year Actual Program Expenditures Actual Loans Released 
2002 No data 3.5 
2003 10.4 6.1 
2004 9.02 8.3 
2005 9.47 13.5 
2006 17.9323 15.7 
2007 8.11 18.0 
2008 9.98 23.1 
Source: ATFI 2003-2009. Annual Reports, 2002-2008 
 
ATFI’s credit fund portfolio started with PhP 6.8 million in 2002 and grew to PhP 
18.0 million in 2008. 
Alter Trade Corporation (ATC) provided a total contribution of PhP 8.48 million 
from 1999-2003 or 20% of the total resources generated by ATFI (Ibus and Basilio, 
2004). Contributions to ATFI operations from ATC in succeeding years amounted to 
PhP 1.97 million (2004), PhP 1.9 million (2005), PhP 1.805 million (2006), PhP 1.5 
million (2007) and PhP 1.825 million (2008). These totaled PhP 9.025 million over a 
5-year period, averaging PhP 1.8 million annually, which represented 17% of ATFI’s 
program expenditures (ATFI Annual Reports, 2004-2008). From 1999-2008, ATC 
had made a contribution of PhP 17.505 million to Alter Trade Foundation Inc., 
averaging PhP 1.75 million a year.   
In terms of staffing, ATFI had a total of 27 staff, 8 management positions and 19 
technical, front line and administrative support positions as follows: 
  
o Executive Director 
o Deputy Executive Director/HOE Director 
o SPADE Director 
o Administrative and Finance Officer/CRASP Director 
o Human Resource Development and Internal Systems Officer 
o CRASP Coordinator 
o Cluster Team A Head 
                                                 
23 PhP 10.576 million of this was spent for the special project funded by the European Union, including the organization 
and hosting of an International Conference, “Opening Windows for Organic Trade with Europe and the World” on 
November 14-16, 2006 participated by 240 delegates; mounting of a weekly radio program; and the production and 
showing of the documentary film, “No More Tiempos Muertos” among Negros rural communities.    
89 
 
o Cluster Team B Head 
o SPADE Staff: 5 agriculturists, 1 Farm Equipment Services In-charge, 2 tractor 
operators 
o HOE Staff:  3 Community Organizers 
o CRASP Staff:  4 Credit Staff 
o Administration and Finance Staff: 4 including 1 driver 
 
An Officer-in-Charge for ATFI was initially appointed in 2000, and later became 
Executive Director until 2002. The current Executive Director had held his position 
since 2002. Credit staff, agriculturists and community organizers composed the core 
staffing since 2002. Cluster Heads were put in place in 2005. The full staffing was 
realized in 2007, and remained the same for 2008.24 (Jakosalem, 2008; Lopez, 2010; 
ATFI 2003-2009) 
 
3.4.  Evaluation, Planning and Renewal: Closing the Gap 
between Vision and Action (2008-2010) 
 
The period starting 2008 pointed to a new phase of renewal on the part of the 
Alter Trade Group. Unlike the 2nd Strategic Planning process that was driven by 
external partners, this 3rd Strategic Planning process was clearly internally driven with 
the external consultants they hired chosen by them. This renewal stage put 
empowerment of the poverty sectors they served at the center of their deliberate 
strategy process, even as they continued to face the challenges of building a domestic 
market and better serving their solidarity markets in Europe, Japan and other parts of 
Asia, markets that were then expected to continue to grow in the next 10 years.      
 
3.4.1. Mid Term Evaluation and Planning  
 
Upon completion of the first five years (2003-2007) of the strategic plan they 
formulated in 2000-2002, the Alter Trade Group hired external consultants to assess 
their implementation of the plan, and used the studies as input to define/refine their 
plan for the succeeding five years (2009-2013) (Box 3.3.). Following strategic 
planning workshops in 2008-2009, Alter Trade made some major strategic decisions.     
It was decided that while Alter Trade would continue to serve the growing export 
market for its products, it would make the development of partner farmers and 
growers and their organizations and communities a more conscious objective, 
complete with the development of measures to quantify their progress. There were no 
clear indicators of progress for the development of farmer and grower communities in 
                                                 
24 No data on staffing of ATFI could be found in organizational documents before 2007.   
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the past. In this respect, Alter Trade realized the need to catch up on its organizing 
and development program for its banana growers. Relative to the sugar farmers, they 
had been left behind.   
Alter Trade was also poised to more fully develop its Philippine market, and in 
the process go back to their original intent of setting up an alternative trading system 
between local communities. Consistent with these, they decided to make Alter Trade 
Foundation Inc. (ATFI) as the mother organization, and make the three enterprises 
subsidiaries of ATFI. Historically, ATFI was considered the development arm of the 
group, with Alter Trade Corporation, the marketing entity, as the mother organization 
(Parreno, 2009).  
 
3.4.2.  Sustainable Agriculture for Sustainable Community  
           Phase III 
  
As has been pointed out, the SASC program, supplemented by other special 
projects, provided the transformational services, on top of the transactional services, 
to assist the process of developing self-reliant and self determining producer 
communities, as enshrined in Alter Trade’s vision.  
ATFI Executive Director Edwin Lopez characterized how SASC III, the follow up 
program to SASC I and II, that covered the period from 2008 and was on going up to 
the time of the research:   
 
 “By SASC III, building on the gains of the previous programs, we systematically 
introduced crop and income diversification and capacity building in processing 
and marketing, as well as federation building. In 2009, the Negros Organic Fair 
Trade Association (NOFTA) was born”. (Lopez, 2010) 
 
SASC III was centered on developing diversified farming to reach commercial 
volumes and quality; developing links of farming communities with domestic 
consumers and markets; and establishing a micro-finance people’s bank that would 
propel ATFI to become self-sustainable. The main funding partner of Alter Trade for 
SASC III, who also funded SASC I and II was Bread for the World, a German 
development agency.  
SASC III, like SASC I and II and funded by Bread for the World, was a project 
meant for sugar farming communities of Alter Trade.   
However, efforts had been made to transfer the development of banana grower 
communities as a responsibility and program under the foundation. SASC as a 
program framework was to guide the development of banana grower communities as 
well.  
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3.4.3. Sugar Partners Decide on Fair Trade Premiums    
 
During the 2008 PO Leaders’ Conference, the sugar farmer partners discussed 
such topics as PO asset management; assessing the inflow and outflow of products in 
the community; and defining products that are being produced or could be produced 
within the community.   
It was also within this year that a Fairtrade Subgroup composed of PO 
representatives was set up within the ATFI structure and decisions on the use of the 
fair trade premium were discussed.  
Alipio Torio, Vice Chairman of Hacienda Cahilamunan-Trinio Farm Workers 
Organization-Multi-Purpose Cooperative (HCATRIFWO-MPC) explained the 
discussion and decision on the fair trade premium: 
 
“We had PhP 1.6 million as fair trade premiums25. Alter Trade proposed that the 
PO share be 20%. We proposed to increase that to 30% and it was carried. So we 
agreed that 60% be allocated to a common project, 30% to POs and 10% for 
administrative expenses. We also made a decision on how to allocate the 30% for 
POs: that 50% be allocated for the PO, 40% for a business project and 10% for 
administration”. (Torio, 2010) 
 
The Fairtrade Subgroup (FTSG) within ATFI became the training and testing ground 
for the preparedness of the PO partners of Alter Trade to independently plan and 
implement a Collective Business Project using their share of the fair trade premiums 
from Mascobado trading. The FTSG organized and delegated this task to a Collective 
Business Project Committee (CBPC) on July 31, 2009. The Committee that was 
headed by Imelda Cervantes of MIARBA had as members Reynaldo Canoy 
(Chairman, C-92), Romy Noble (Chairman, AMANO) and Lito Estama (Project 
Manager, NARB-MPC), with Sally Aguirre representing the ATFI Management 
Committee. The CBPC decided to invest PhP 650,000 to provide postharvest services.   
Imelda Cervantes explained the project as addressing the needs of small farmers 
who milled their canes in conventional sugar mills. As payment for their cane 
deliveries, small farmers received their share of sugar volume stipulated in ‘quedans’.  
These were negotiable documents that represented the volume of sugar produced from 
the delivered canes and entitled to the farmers. ‘Quedans’ were bought by sugar 
trading cooperatives from the farmers and they were paid in checks. Small farmers did 
not want to go to the city to encash their checks because of the travel time and 
additional expenses. However, they needed immediate cash to pay the harvesters and 
truckers as soon as they returned to their farms. Because of this, they sold their checks 
                                                 
25 The Fairtrade Labeling Organization (FLO) facilitates fair trade premiums from the sale of organic muscovado among 
socially oriented consumers.     
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to financiers at 1% service charge right there at the mill gates. The FTSG-CBPC 
decided to replace the role of the financiers by engaging in this post-harvest financial 
service to small farmers, so the service charge would not be lost to private financiers, 
and instead would be accumulated to generate capital to be reinvested in farm 
production and enterprises of agrarian reform beneficiaries (Cervantes, 2010). 
The CBPC had deposited the amount of PhP 669,545.00 at the Bank of 
Commerce branch in Bacolod City. They chose this bank, as it is was the same bank 
of the La Carlota Central that issued the check payments to their target farmer-clients.  
Imelda Cervantes herself negotiated with the bank manager to accept second-endorsed 
checks. The CBPC was intending to operate every Friday during the annual milling 
season of eight months from September-April.  
The Collective Business Project Committee of the FTSG was transformed into the 
Business Development Committee of NOFTA when it was founded later in the year.      
 
3.4.4. NOFTA: Birth of Independent Federation of Producers  
 
In 2009, the setting up of an all producers organization distinct from Alter Trade 
was discussed at the PO Conference, following a recommendation from the FLO 
inspector the year before, and to implement a decision of the ATFI General Assembly 
in August 2009 to spin off the Fairtrade Subgroup into a full blown organization 
composed of primary producer organizations of Alter Trade26.  It was during what the 
PO leaders considered to be their 5th PO conference that the Negros Organic Fair 
Trade Organization or NOFTA was established.  
The Negros Organic Fair Trade Organization or NOFTA (refer to Box 3.4. for 
details) was established during a Founding General Assembly on December 14-15, 
2009, attended by 109 voting delegates from 16 primary producer organizations of 
Alter Trade, at the Congregation of the Immaculate Conception of Mary (CICM) 
Retreat House in Talisay City, Negros Occidental.         
The following were decisions highlighted in the minutes27 of the NOFTA 
Founding General Assembly: 
 
 The Chairperson of the Assembly was Imelda Cervantes from MIARBA who 
was the Chairperson of the ATFI Fairtrade Subgroup (FTSG); 
 The drafters of the organizational documents who met earlier on December 5, 
and the people who took turns explaining the vision, mission and goals of 
NOFTA during the Assembly, came from the FTSG and were all PO leaders, 
namely Imelda Cervantes (MIARBA), Romy Noble (AMANO), Lito Estama 
                                                 
26 With this decision came the reorganization of ATFI into an organization of individual advocates, intellectuals and 
selected PO leaders  
27 The original was in the local language but an English translation was made available to partners. The researcher used 
the English translation  
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(NARB-MPC), Ramir Rivera (Sitio Paho Farm Workers Association or 
SIPFAWA) and Torino Tomaro (STARFA); 
 Changes on the draft constitution and by-laws were made after a spirited 
discussion, many times dividing the house, with the majority position being 
carried. These changes included the following: 
 
o For membership to include not only agrarian reform beneficiaries but 
also small producers, as long as they subscribed to sustainable 
agriculture-organic farming and fair trade;  
o For membership to include small producers’ organizations in the whole 
of Negros Island, and not just from Negros Occidental, opening the 
possibility of recruiting those not present in the Assembly from the 
neighboring province of Negros Oriental; and 
o The inclusion of non-government organizations (NGOs) and private 
institutions as potential partners, not just government agencies. 
 
 It was agreed that NOFTA would “develop a successful inter-PO production 
and trading system that will open new and rewarding opportunities for the next 
generation”; 
 The discussion on how they were to elect their first set of officers was spirited, 
with a majority opting for the appointment by each PO of 2 representatives to a 
Council of Leaders, direct election by the General Assembly of the officers of 
NOFTA (versus a proposal for the Council of Leaders to elect them), and a 
decision to vote by secret balloting;  
 With the exception of the position of treasurer where only Imelda Cervantes of 
MIARBA was nominated and unanimously elected, and the 2 cluster-based 
positions each of Public Information Officers and Environmental Officers that 
were also filled unanimously, the election process was lively with 6 
nominations for President, 6 for Vice President, 4 for Secretary General and 4 
for Auditor; 
 The body unanimously approved and accepted the plans for the post-harvest 
financial service initiated by the CBPC, and agreed to transform the CBPC into 
NOFTA’s Business Development Committee. With ATFI as proponent and 
guarantor, NOFTA also endorsed a PhP 2 million loan proposal to the 
Alternative Fund for Mutual Benefit28 as additional capital for this project.  
Terms of the loan included a 5% interest per annum with payments of PhP 
                                                 
28 This is a solidarity fund set up by the Alternative People’s Linkage in Asia (APLA), established on May 17, 2008 as 
the successor organization of the Japan Committee for Negros Campaign (JCNC).  APLA is a mechanism to link up and 
work together to advance community building based on sustainable agriculture and fishery and to build face to face 
solidarity and mutual trust to fight against globalization that is causing inequity, poverty and conflicts among ordinary 
people. 
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200,000 per year starting the second to the fourth year, and would be fully paid 
with PhP 1.4 million on the fifth year. Project net income in 5 years was 
expected to amount to PhP 3,736,000; and 
 The body agreed to conduct participatory workshops involving each producer 
organization on Fairtrade orientation and standards, Usage of the Fairtrade 
Premium, Fairtrade Policies especially for Small Producer Organizations, 
Internal Control System on Fairtrade and the Environment, and an assessment 
of compliance to standards.  The participating leaders synchronized schedules 
per PO from February 24-April 26, 2010, and agreed that each PO together 
with NOFTA would shoulder the food expenses while ATFI would share with 
transport expenses and facilities. The officers of each PO designated an 
Environment Officer.  
 
PO leaders present during a focus group discussion were unanimous in expressing:  
 
“The leaders we voted for in NOFTA are those who have had a good experience 
in leading their local organizations.” (Alter Trade Partner PO FGD, 2010)  
 
Romualdo Noble, Chairman of AMANO and elected Vice President of NOFTA 
during the Assembly, noted: 
 
“There was 100% participation in decision making among all the leaders of POs 
present during the General Assembly. We elected our officers and made decisions 
about our 5-year business plan. In addition to organic sugar, we will be trading 
organic rice, vegetables and livestock. We need to ensure clean food to protect our 
health and we also need to make sure that the price of organic food remains 
reasonable. Alter Trade will help us develop a local market in Negros for these 
products”. (Noble, 2010)     
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Box 3.4. Negros Organic and Fair Trade Association (NOFTA) 
Source: Negros Organic and Fair Trade Association Inc., translated into English by Alter 
Trade Foundation Inc as annex to a report to partners in 2010 
 
VISION: 
We dream that our group will be known as producers who produce and sell organic 
and fair trade harvests from the land we own. We will ensure food security, and establish 
our financial capability by setting up our own funds, capital and implements of 
productions. We are for the protection of the environment as we are dependent on its 
bounty and both women and men equally work for its preservation. 
We will establish a bond with consumers to establish a guaranteed market both locally 
and abroad. We will responsively address the needs and convince small producers and the 
community to take part in the organic and fair trade movement. We will do this to ensure a 
more prosperous future for our succeeding generation. 
 
MISSION: 
We are committed in the propagation of organic farming and fair trade principles and 
practice by organizing agrarian reform beneficiaries (ARBs) and small producers to 
progressively own and develop resources to make them productive, comprehensively own 
the land, ensure food for all, link up and establish a fruitful cooperation among producers 
and consumers here and abroad. 
 
GOALS: 
In five years we intend to: 
o Organize and strengthen organizations who propagate organic farming and fair 
trade; 
o Build up resources and financial institutions that are supported by sectors who trust 
and have faith in organic farming and fair trade movement; 
o Join in the effort to protect the environment and engage in solid waste management 
systems; 
o Women and men are in the forefront in setting up programs, projects and policies; 
o Establish links with the Government, NGOs and other institutions locally and 
abroad who assist organic farming and fair trade movements; 
o Train the youth as successor of the sustainable agriculture practice and who will 
continue and improve the projects and work started using organic farming-fair 
trade practice; and 
o Ensure the education of the youth to further enhance and improve the projects 
started and help in securing the sources of revenue of every family. 
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3.5.  Financial and Social Outcomes 
3.5.1.   Financial Outcomes  
 
From an initial capital of PhP 55.0 thousand in 1988, Alter Trade Corporation’s 
assets had consistently grown, reaching PhP 25.456 million in 1997 and PhP 135.347 
million in 2008. Its sales, mainly from its export markets, had grown through the 
years, reaching PhP 64.930 million on 1997 and PhP 200.723 million in 2008. Asset 
turnover (sales over assets) averaged 1.94 over the ten-year period from 1999 to 2008, 
ranging from a high of 2.45 in 2007, but dipping to 1.48 in 2008, the lowest level in 
the ten-year period.  
 
Figure 3.1. shows gross sales and assets from 1997-2008, in millions of pesos.29   
 
Figure 3.1. Alter Trade Corporation, Gross Sales and Assets, 1997, 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008 
Sources: Audited Financial Statements, 1997, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008 
 
The crisis that Alter Trade experienced with its Balangon banana production and 
trading resulting from disease infestation and the failed experiment of growing them 
outside their natural habitat from 2000-2004 adversely affected their sales, leading to 
slow growth until the mid-2000s. However, the negative impact on their revenues was 
                                                 
29 Financial statements before 1997 were not audited, and it was relatively difficult to reconstruct and validate figures 
from various data sources. The financial statements for 1998 were not available. 
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cushioned by the significant increase in Mascobado production and trading with 
European partners and a favorable foreign exchange climate. Alter Trade Japan also 
assisted Alter Trade in managing their losses and expanding the sources of naturally 
grown Balangon bananas beyond Negros Island.  
ATC’s net income had not grown much, although it had managed to stay in the 
black over the years, earning PhP 92.437 thousand in 1997 and PhP 1.128 million by 
2008 (ATC Audited Financial Statements, 1997-2008).   
Figure 3.2. shows ATCs’ net income during the 1997-2008 period, in thousands 
of pesos: 
 
Figure 3.2. Alter Trade Corporation, Net Income, 1997, 1999 - 2008 
Sources: Audited Financial Statements, 1997, 1999 to 2008 
 
Alter Trade had operated slightly above break-even over the years. Net income as 
a percentage of sales was at a mere 1% all throughout the 1999 to 2008 period.  
Return on assets (net income over average total assets) was at 1 to 2% over the same 
period. Contributing to the low percentage of income over sales were high levels of 
variable costs, particularly for direct materials and direct labor. Over the past few 
years, Alter Trade had tried to negotiate for higher prices with its main buyers to 
cover these costs, as it did not want to depress buying prices at the farm gate level.  
Alter Trade had also looked at its overhead and operating expenses and had had some 
success in managing these expenses. 
On the whole, Alter Trade management believed that they could also have done 
better financially from better and more strategic investment decisions, earlier efforts 
to negotiate and implement price adjustments for their products, and more efficient 
operations.  (Alter Trade Group FGD, 2008) 
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Within the Alter Trade Group, it was the Alter Trade Foundation Inc. that 
received grants from partner agencies mainly to finance the development programs 
for its partner producers (detailed in Section 3.3.14.). During the period 1999-2008, 
ATFI generated a total of PhP 77.98 million worth of grants from Bread for the 
World, Germany and other partner development agencies to cover the Sustainable 
Agriculture for Sustainable Community Programs and other projects detailed in Box 
3.2. This included a grant in 2006 of PhP 10.576 million from the European 
Commission Small Projects Facility for its Nurturing Learning Communities on 
Organic Agriculture for Exports to European Markets.  (Ibus and Basilio, 2004; ATFI 
Annual Reports, 2004-2008)   
 
3.5.2.  Social Outcomes 
 
This section draws heavily from the results of an evaluative study conducted by 
the researcher that was commissioned by Alter Trade Corporation covering the period 
2002-2007. The study was part of a consultancy project to undertake internal and 
external assessment in preparation for Alter Trade Corporation’s Strategic Planning 
Workshop in 2008-2009. The results of the evaluation were contained in a document 
written by the researcher entitled ‘Alter Trade Corporation: External and Internal 
Assessment’ (Dacanay, 2008). The study utilized a stratified random survey involving 
99 respondents each among the partner sugar farmers and banana growers of Alter 
Trade as well as key informant interviews and focus group discussions involving key 
stakeholders.30  
 
3.5.2.1.  Outreach among Sugar Farmers and Banana Growers 
 
The outreach of Alter Trade operations among sugar farmers and banana growers 
is shown in Table 3.3. 
 
Table 3.3. Alter Trade Outreach among Sugar Farmers and Banana Growers (2002-2007).  
Total number of sugar farmers reached 820 in 18 people’s organizations (POs) in Negros 
Occidental (589 in 2002) 
Total number of banana growers reached:  
 Negros Island 
 Northern Mindanao 
 Other areas 
3,493 
1,052 in 33 POs (783 in 2002) 
   404 
2,037 
Source: Dacanay, M. L. (2008). Alter Trade Corporation, External and Internal Assessment Report. 
 
                                                 
30 The study was done with the assistance of Rosalinda Roy and Rosario Espino and submitted to Alter Trade 
Corporation on October 5, 2008.     
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The number of sugar farmers reached by 2007 had increased by 39% relative to 
2002. The 820 sugar farmers were mainly agrarian reform beneficiaries (ARBs), 
representing about 1% of the 78,470 ARBs in Negros Occidental (Provincial 
Government of Negros Occidental, 2007). 
Outreach among banana grower partners in Negros Island (i.e. Negros Occidental 
and the adjacent province of Negros Oriental) had increased by 34% within the same 
period of 2002-2007. By 2008, partners in Negros Island accounted for 30.1% of the 
total banana grower partners. ATC also dealt directly, through a satellite office, with 
partner growers in Northern Mindanao, who accounted for 11.6% of total. Partner 
growers in all other areas, who were engaged with through local marketing 
intermediation NGOs (most of which Alter Trade had helped to establish), accounted 
for 58.3% of total. 
 
3.5.2.2.  Impact / Outcome on Sugar Farmers 
 
The 2008 survey, led by the researcher, among 99 of Alter Trade’s sugar 
grower-partners in Negros Occidental revealed that credit, marketing support, 
training/coaching, and animal/input dispersal were the top four forms of 
assistance from Alter Trade used by sugar grower-partners, with levels of use 
ranging from 72% to 89% as shown in Table 3.3. Among those who used the 
service, the average rating they gave ATC in terms of quality of service ranged 
from 89 to 96%, as also shown in the table.   
 
Table 3.3. Level of Use and Quality Rating for Different Forms of Assistance among Sugar Farmers 
(2002-2007).  
Form of Assistance Level of Use Quality of Service Rating 
Credit 89% 70 to 100% (Ave. 96%) 
Marketing support 86% 50 to 100% (Ave. 93%) 
Training/coaching 83% 69 to 100% (Ave. 93%) 
Animal/input dispersal 72% 50 to 100% (Ave. 89%) 
Source: Dacanay, M. L. (2008). Alter Trade Corporation, External and Internal Assessment Report. 
 
Around half of the respondents gave ATC the maximum rating of 100 percent in 
terms of quality of service. 
In terms of impact on household income, the income of sugar farmers typically 
came from a variety of sources. Income streams that could be attributed mainly to 
Alter Trade interventions include those from sugar farming, both individually-farmed 
and under group management (due to improved cultivation and farm management 
practices, plus marketing support in the case of group-managed farms); income from 
other farming activities (crop diversification); and income from group farming and 
other group enterprise activities that were reflected in increases in capital build-up 
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(CBU), and payment/allocation for land tax and land amortization. Figures from the 
survey on these items are shown in Table 3.4. 
 
Table 3.4. Average Annual Income Increase of Individual Sugar Farmers (PhP) Directly Linked to 
Alter Trade Interventions (2002-2007).  
 Average 
Income  
(2002) 
Average Annual 
Income  
(2003-2007) 
Average Incremental 
Income Per Year (2003-
2007 vs. 2002) 
% 
Average 
Income 
Increase 
Sugar Farming 16,364 32,016 15,652    96%  
Farming Other Crops 2,690 9,498 6,808  253% 
Provision for Capital 
Build-Up, Land Tax 
and Land Amortization  
1,209 4,754 3,545  293% 
Total  20,263 46,268 26,005  128% 
Source: Dacanay, M. L. (2008). Alter Trade Corporation, External and Internal Assessment Report. 
 
In terms of average annual income from sugar, the sugar growers started with PhP 
16,364 in 2002. For the period 2003-2007, the average annual income had doubled to 
PhP 32,016 with an average incremental increase of PhP 15,652 over the base average 
income in 2002. Farming other crops accounted for an average of only PhP 2,690 in 
2002, but grew to PhP 6,808 per year on the average within the 2003-2007 period. 
Lastly, each farmer’s provision for capital build-up, land tax and land amortization 
(directly deducted and credited to each farmer) almost quadrupled from a mere PhP 
1,209 in 2002 to an annual average of PhP 4,754 within the 2003 – 2007 period. All 
of these made for an average increase in annual income of PhP 26,005 per farmer that 
could be directly attributed to Alter Trade’s intervention. It is noteworthy that 26% of 
the income increase – i.e. for farming of other crops – was not directly linked to the 
value chain for Mascobado, the main marketable product for the Alter Trade 
enterprise.   
In the meantime, average income from other sources like employment also 
increased. From a base of PhP 8,638 in 2002, income from other sources accounted 
for PhP 26,341 per year during the 2003-2007 period. Hence, from an average total 
income of PhP 28,901 from all sources in 2002, there was a hefty increase of PhP 
43,707 (151%) to an average total income per farmer of PhP 72,608 per year for the 
period from 2003-2007.     
If we compare these figures to the average annual income of ARBs in Negros 
Occidental amounting to PhP 18,285.23, based on a provincial government-
commissioned study in December 2007, the sugar farmer-partners of Alter Trade were 
already much better off even in 2002 and were clearly far better off by 2007. The 
average annual income achieved by Alter Trade’s sugar farmers amounting to PhP 72, 
608 came close to the annual national poverty threshold for a family of 5, based on 
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the 2006 Family Income and Expenditure Survey, which was pegged at PhP 75,288.   
In addition, it is worth noting that 64% of the average incomes of the sugar farmers 
during the period resulted directly from their relationship with Alter Trade. 
A study commissioned by Bread for the World indicated that Alter Trade’s 
intervention had directly moved 32% of their sugar partners above the poverty 
threshold from a baseline of 93.5% below the threshold before their partnership with 
Alter Trade. Thirteen per cent (13%) were now at the poverty threshold while the rest 
– 55% – had moved from deep poverty to food sufficiency (Panganiban, 2008).   
A social return on investment (SROI) study, commissioned by Oikocredit, also 
indicated significant average increases in income of about PhP 52,450/year for 
participating sugar farmers and gains in many other non-income indicators of 
empowerment such as improved self-image, increased self-esteem, and group level 
capacities for self-management with a blended value of PhP 13 for every PhP 1 
invested (Roy, 2009).   
In determining the level of development attained by the partner PO sugar growers 
towards becoming self-reliant and self determining producer groups, a tool called the 
Partner PO Development Index, which was developed for the Alter Trade Group 
under an Oikocredit-sponsored research project supervised by the researcher, can be 
used as a tool for measurement. The Development Index used three levels in 
classifying the level of development attained by a partner PO: Level 1 (Self-Help 
Groups), Level 2 (Entrepreneurial Farmers’ Organization), and Level 3 (Organization 
Practicing Social Entrepreneurship).  
The results of the Oikocredit-sponsored study indicated that, using these 
classifications, 12 of the 18 partner POs were in Level 1, four were in Level 2, while 
two were in Level 3 (Table 3.5.). 
    
Table 3.5. Level of Development of Sugar Farmer Partner Organizations (POs) Using Partner PO 
Development Index (2008).  
                           Level of Development 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 
Total No. 
of POs 
No. of  
members 
(proxy for 
Households or 
HHs) 
No. 
of 
POs 
No. of 
members 
(proxy for 
HHs) 
No. 
of 
POs 
No. of 
members 
(proxy for 
HHs) 
No. 
of 
POs 
No. of members 
(proxy for 
HHs) 
18 820 12 515 4 147 2 158 
Source: Dacanay, M. L. (2008). Alter Trade Corporation, External and Internal Assessment Report. 
 
The Index had five basic elements by which a partner PO’s level of development 
was measured/evaluated, i.e. Organizational Cohesion and Development, Capacity to 
Engage the Market, Income Diversification Among Members, Contribution to 
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Community and/or Sector Development, and, Financial Growth and Sustainability. 
(Please see Appendix 12.4 for the full instrument.31)   
If the results of this study were to be used as an indicator of qualitative progress 
for Alter Trade’s impact in developing self-reliant, self-determining producer 
communities, one may say that after about one and a half decades of trading organic 
muscovado sugar (which started in 1994), and eight years of systematic 
organizational capacity development (which started in 2000), there had been a 
relatively slow progress in this area. However, the 2 POs in level 3 and 4 POs in level 
2 may also be seen as an indication of Alter Trade having developed a model for 
progressively transforming unorganized sugar workers into Self Help Groups, 
Entrepreneurial Farmers’ Organizations, and Organizations Practicing Social 
Entrepreneurship.   
Qualitative results of Alter Trade’s intervention among its sugar farmer partners 
could best be illustrated by the story of the Minoro Isabel Agrarian Reform 
Beneficiaries Association or MIARBA (See MIARBA’s Story of Partnership with 
Alter Trade – Box 3.5).  Similar stories, with their own peculiarities, were articulated 
by leaders of Alter Trade’s other partner agrarian reform beneficiary organizations in 
various areas, although MIARBA was admittedly the most advanced (FGD with Alter 
Trade Partner POs, 2010). 
Alipio Torio, Vice Chairman of HCATRIFWO-MPC, a partner for 4 years, 
explained Alter Trade’s role: 
 
“Alter Trade plans were based on their assessment of our needs and then they 
consulted us, so their plans fit us. They also serve as our guide. We were able to 
rise up with their assistance”.  (Torio, 2010) 
 
Other sentiments expressed by the group of PO leaders interviewed were:  
 
“Other NGOs like the Negros Council for People’s Development helped us with 
land tenure issues, land struggle and advocacy but had no capability for 
development services like Alter Trade”. (FGD with Alter Trade Partner POs, 
2010) 
  
“Alter Trade has been a big help and played a big role for us producers and our 
organizations to stand on our own and have the capacity to make our own 
decisions”. (FGD with Alter Trade Partner POs, 2010)      
 
                                                 
31 The instrument, shown in Appendix 12.4, has since been enhanced following the Alter Trade’s strategic planning 
sessions in December 2008. 
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Daniel Diamante, Chairman of DAFWARBA, a partner of Alter Trade for 7 years, 
elaborated, 
 
“Alter Trade has taught us how to manage our land, how to get a good harvest, 
how to manage finances, how to manage projects, and how to relate with 
government for our needs such as education for our children…. Other ARB 
cooperatives that I know, who did not have a partner like Alter Trade, died after 5 
years. They did not have marketing support. They were not assisted to do effective 
financial and project management”. (Diamante, 2010)   
 
Beyond these self-governing cooperatives and associations of sugar farmers, an 
indication of the quality of impact of Alter Trade’s transactional and transformational 
services among the sugar farmers could also be seen in NOFTA. NOFTA was set up 
in 2009 as an independent federation of organic and fair trade producers initiated by 
the sugar farmer partners of Alter Trade, and it was meant to include all small 
producers advocating organic farming and fair trade in Negros Island. Cornelio 
Sandrico, Chairman of NAPFWA added: 
 
“There is a big difference in the role that people’s organizations (POs) play as 
evidenced by the setting up of NOFTA. NOFTA could even deal with 
international partners directly, including contracting of loans”.  (Sandrico, 2010) 
 
Commenting on the role played by Alter Trade and the partner producers in the 
beginning and at the time of the study, ATFI Executive Director Edwin Lopez 
concluded: 
 
“With NOFTA, the POs have graduated from facilitated decision making to 
independent decision making”. (Lopez, 2010) 
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Box 3.5.  MIARBA’s Story of Partnership with Alter Trade  
Sources: MIARBA FGD, 2008; Roy, 2009 
 
MIARBA, deemed as being in Level 3 using the Partner PO Development Index, credited 
Alter Trade with helping it in terms of visioning, community development planning and 
organizational development. It also credited Alter Trade for helping members improve crop 
production practices and diversifying their production and income sources. This was on top of 
Alter Trade’s role in providing machinery and equipment for production, and in extending 
capital for livelihood and other concerns like health services. MIARBA members were 
unanimous in expressing that much of what they were and had now was a product of their own 
collective efforts, but they could not have done so without Alter Trade’s help.  
The partnership substantially started in 2001-2002. With Alter Trade’s assistance, MIARBA 
crafted a 6-point Community Development Plan featuring: 
 
 Ownership of land as source of livelihood for themselves and their children; 
 Increased production and diversification including planting of trees as protection from 
natural disasters and source of additional income;  
 Acquisition of their own machinery for production;  
 Raising of sufficient capital for the projects of men and women;  
 Provision of education for children to become effective heirs and managers of the land, to 
have broader employment opportunities and to prevent them from experiencing hardship; 
and 
 Improved health services and facilities to ensure health for everyone.   
 
MIARBA had successfully managed their 57 hectare communal farm. In the process, they put in 
place production, financial and organizational systems. It was considered as the best supplier of 
organic sugar cane among Alter Trade’s partner organizations. Agricultural diversification had 
taken root with the planting of fruit and forest trees, setting up of fish ponds in rice farms, 
intercropping, and goat raising. 
MIARBA’s assets had reached PhP 1.58 million in 2005-2006. They had successfully 
negotiated for a loan of PhP 5 million in 2008 direct with Oikocredit International, for sugar 
production and acquisition of farm machinery. MIARBA now owned 2 farm tractors, one truck, 
a health clinic and a storage facility for rice. Net income had grown from PhP 788,417 in 2003-
2004 to PhP 2.4 million in 2005-2006, mainly from sugarcane sales. Dividends and labor 
incentives of MIARBA in 2005-2006 averaged PhP 12,744 for each of the 132 members. By the 
time of the FGD in February 2008, MIARBA representatives estimated that in the latest crop 
year, dividends and labor incentives had reached PhP 55,000 per member. Twelve members of 
MIARBA covered in a survey cited that they received an average of PhP 20,000 per year in 
annual wages from MIARBA and another PhP 20,000 per year in terms of dividends from the 
past 5 years.    
MIARBA had helped install facilities like water systems in the community and played a lead 
role in reforestation and health services delivery. It was recognized by the local government as a 
significant contributor to the economy and a leader in the promotion of sustainable agriculture, 
and was paying a land tax for members of PhP 244,000 per year. One of MIARBA’s leaders sat 
in the ATFI Board. MIARBA was also a founding member of the Negros Organic Fair Trade 
Association.   
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3.5.2.3.  Impact / Outcome on Banana Growers 
 
The 2008 survey led by the researcher among 99 of ATC’s banana grower-
partners in Negros Occidental and the adjacent province of Negros Oriental revealed 
that the top three forms of assistance from Alter Trade used by them were 
training/coaching on Balangon Cultural Management (BCM); crop disease 
management and organizational development; marketing support; and credit 
provision.  
Training and coaching as well as marketing support were used by more than 90% 
of the growers but only 33% used credit. The respondents also rated ATC at 84-86%, 
on average, as far as quality of service was concerned. The results are detailed in 
Table 3.6.   
 
Table 3.6. Level of Use and Quality Rating of Forms of Assistance among Balangon Growers 
(2002-2007).  
Form of Assistance Level of Use Quality of Service Rating 
Training/coaching 95% 60 to 100% (Ave. 86%) 
Marketing support 92% 45 to 100% (Ave. 84%) 
Credit  33% 50 to 100% (Ave. 85%) 
Source: Dacanay, M. L. (2008). Alter Trade Corporation, External and Internal Assessment Report. 
 
Notably, the survey results among the Balangon growers generally showed lower 
‘quality of service’ ratings compared to the ratings given by the sugar farmers. In 
terms of form of assistance, though, a much higher percentage utilized 
training/coaching. This could be attributed to two reasons. For one, commercial 
production of Balangon, requiring improved cultural management practices, was 
relatively new to the partner Balangon growers. Second, the associations of Balangon 
farmers were still comparatively new. All in all, the figures indicated that there was 
significant room for improving ATC’s quantity and quality of service among its 
Balangon producers.    
BCM was deemed critical by ATC for growers to achieve the highest farm 
productivity in a sustainable way. Although the level of use was high, some farmers 
noted ATC’s lack of verification for BCM compliance among the farmers’ ranks on a 
sustained basis. This observation was validated by Alter Trade management staff, 
who acknowledged that the last audit for BCM compliance was conducted in April 
2005. Before that, regular audits had been conducted every two months since the 
BCM started.32 Growers also indicated the need for ATC to provide more interaction 
in the form of on-farm coaching. 
                                                 
32 Response to question posed by Ms. Mihara Fumiyo of L Coop during the open forum for the PAL System Consumers’ 
Cooperative Union Auditors’ visit to ATC Packing Centers on March 10-14, 2007.  
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While the farmers were generally appreciative of ATC’s providing a market for 
Balangon, with 44 percent of respondents citing it as the form of assistance with the 
biggest impact, their comments related to the marketing support revolving around 
three themes: the need to provide more effective assistance in dealing with and 
managing the effects of disease infestation (disease eradication, crop rehabilitation, 
setting up a calamity/emergency fund, crop insurance); the need to be more holistic in 
providing marketing support for Balangon (grading to allow for what were rejects to 
be bought at a lower price and sold in the local market; assistance in processing what 
were rejects and marketing the end products); and the need for providing marketing 
assistance for other farm products.    
In terms of average annual income, the banana growers in Negros Island started 
with PhP 7,426 in 2002 as their income from Balangon. From 2003-2007, the average 
income was PhP 10,117 per year, for an increase of PhP 2,691 (36%). The average 
annual income from all sources (inclusive of Balangon) was PhP 19,495 in 2002 and 
PhP 25,207 in 2003-2007, for an increase of PhP 5,712 in annual income (29%). 
Again, comparing these figures with the average annual income of PhP 18,285.23 
among ARBs in Negros Occidental based on a provincial government-commissioned 
study in December 2007, we could conclude that the Balangon grower-partners of 
ATC were better off, with their income from Balangon trading with Alter Trade 
making a 47% contribution to their income increase during the period 2003-2007.  
Although the average income of PhP 25,207 during the period 2003-2007 was 
still way below the FIES poverty threshold of PhP 75,285 for a family of 5 in 2006, it 
was also observed by ATFI Executive Director Edwin Lopez that PhP 25,207 was 
above the PhP 24,000 cash income requirement articulated by farmer households 
during an ATFI study in 2004-2005. 
A result of the survey among Balangon banana growers worth noting were the 
highest annual incomes achieved by some respondents: 
 
 Improved Balangon/Old Balangon (IBOB) Farmer A had no income from 
banana in 2002. Since his linking with ATC in 2004, he realized an income of 
PhP 100,800 from banana in 2005, although this tapered to PhP 28,800 two 
years later in 2007.  
 IBOB Farmer B started linking with ATC in 1999 and since then had been 
generating a fluctuating annual income: PhP 43,200 in 2000, which dipped to 
PhP 9,600 in 2002, then rose to PhP 86,400 in 2003 and 2004, then dipped 
again to PhP 43,200 in 2006.  
 New Balangon (NB) Farmer C, whose Old Balangon (OB) income was PhP 
2,000 in year 2000, realized an income of PhP 80,000 in 2004 and PhP 50,000 
in 2005.    
 
107 
 
These significant income increases experienced by some of the Balangon growers 
showed that there was a high potential for Balangon trading to improve the incomes 
and status of many grower-partners of ATC, if only ATC were to find more effective 
ways of managing, if not eradicating the bunchy top and other diseases that had 
caused the marked decreases and fluctuations in incomes among Balangon partner 
growers over the past 5 years.   
It was also interesting to note that among the Balangon survey respondents, 15 
percent specified food security and sufficiency as the specific area of impact they 
experienced directly resulting from ATC’s marketing support. This indicated a 
potentially significant non-income impact area worth monitoring.  
To gauge the level of development attained by the partner POs in the Balangon 
subsector in Negros, the Partner PO Development Index may also be used as a tool 
for measurement. The results from the Oikocredit-sponsored study among Balangon 
grower partner organizations indicated that all 33 POs were still in Level 1 (Self-Help 
Groups). This was expected given that organizing partner POs became a conscious 
strategy of ATC only by 2006, and community development services became a 
program, with the deployment of 1 staff, only in 2007.   
A social return on investment (SROI) study of Alter Trade’s impact on its 
Balangon banana partners in Negros Island showed that for every PhP 1 invested from 
2002-2007, a blended value of PhP 26 was generated, representing incremental 
income, proxy indicators of increased self esteem and self-image among members and 
leaders of partner people’s organizations, increased group assets, and increased 
capacity for self management.  (Roy, 2009)    
As to the impact on banana growers and NGO/PO trading partners outside of 
Negros, the survey conducted among the NGO/PO trading partners cited marketing 
services as the most significant assistance extended by ATC to them, getting a rating 
of “10” from a scale of 1 to 10. However, one respondent rated ATC “5” for 
marketing services as it cited the need for diversification. Greg Lasigan from 
CORDEV articulated the need for ATC to assist in processing and marketing what 
could not be absorbed by the export market, and in providing marketing assistance for 
other farm products compatible for intercropping with Balangon such as pineapple 
and cacao.   
Except for CORDEV, all the rest said that ATC absorbed their Balangon 
production by a hundred percent, with some indicating that they had been unable to 
produce enough to cover ATC’s requirements. The main problem articulated by Greg 
Lasigan of CORDEV was the mismatch between CORDEV’s peak season in terms of 
production (May-September) and the peak season in terms of demand (October-
April). Mr. Lasigan believed that there needed to be a sustainable way of rationalizing 
supply and demand so that during the peak seasons of production, all that was 
produced was absorbed by the market. Some of the promising products that Mr. 
Lasigan suggested should be further explored for processing excess production or 
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rejects were frozen puree, banana chips, fresh or banana powder for cake making 
(Balangon was reputed to be a variety that was most suited for banana cake) and 
banana wine. Mr. Lasigan pointed out that one of their partner cooperatives, the 
Ambaguio Fruits and Vegetables Multipurpose Cooperative, had an existing tie up 
with a bakery for the production of banana cake.     
Other potential products included Arabica coffee and mango. The need for 
diversification was a recurring theme among the partners.  
Other services extended by ATC mentioned by the respondents as having 
significant impact on them were training, technology transfer, financial support, 
assistance in establishing packing centers, and installation of operating systems. 
The impact of the trading relationship with ATC included increased incomes, 
provision of livelihood and employment, formation/sustenance of PO or NGO 
services in the community, enhancement of image and recognition as development 
players by the local government unit or LGU, and even peace and community 
building. The latter was manifested by the inclusion of MILF33 members as Balangon 
growers and workers in Tupi, South Cotabato. Palo Siete Village was formed in 
Upper Allah Valley as a direct result of Balangon trading operations. Also cited, as a 
significant impact, was the achievement of family and community cohesion since 
Balangon growing proved to be a viable alternative to migrant labor. Qualitative 
impact was felt the most among indigenous people’s communities in Mindanao 
(among the Ubo and T’boli communities) and the Cordillera region. 
 
3.6. Alter Trade and Social Entrepreneurship  
3.6.1.  Alter Trade as SEPPS                                                                       
The Alter Trade story validates the definition of SEPPS in Section 2.5.   
Firstly, Alter Trade was a social mission driven group of organizations that for 
over 20 years explicitly pursued poverty reduction/alleviation and improving the 
quality of life of two segments of the poor as primary objective:   
 
 Landless sugar plantation workers turned sugar farmer-agrarian reform 
beneficiaries, who were organized into and/or assisted as partner producer 
cooperatives or associations, in Negros Occidental province; and 
 Backyard producers of naturally grown Balangon bananas in indigenous and 
upland communities in various parts of the country, who were initially partners as 
individual growers and later organized into cooperatives or associations.   
                                                 
33 MILF stands for Moro Islamic Liberation Front, an armed group fighting for the self determination of the Moro 
people in southern Philippines 
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As shown in Section 3.5.2 Alter Trade had demonstrated positive impact in 
empowering and improving the quality of life of these poor stakeholders. 
 Secondly, Alter Trade was a wealth-creating group of organizations that pursued a 
triple bottom line (social, financial and environmental) in the provision and 
production of goods and services. Alter Trade created wealth by producing and 
trading organic muscovado sugar and naturally grown Balangon bananas mainly to 
solidarity markets in Japan and Europe. By engaging the poor as partner producers 
using the principles of fair trade and sustainable agriculture, its wealth creation 
activities and the achievement of its financial bottom line was framed as supportive to 
its social and environmental bottom lines.   
Thirdly, Alter Trade had a distributive enterprise philosophy. By engaging the 
sugar farmers and banana growers as partner producers using the principles of fair 
trade and sustainable agriculture, Alter Trade served not as a mechanism for 
accumulating profit for share holders, but as a mechanism for distributing wealth to 
partner producers. The buying price of the organic sugar cane from the farmers were 
negotiated and governed by fair trade principles, usually higher than the prevailing 
market price of sugar cane. The partner producers also received fair trade premiums, 
the uses of which were subject to their decision. Alter Trade also served as 
mechanism to direct surplus wealth created to finance investments or activities related 
to their social mission. As shown in Section 3.5.1, the wealth that Alter Trade created 
was just adequate (i.e. slightly above breakeven) to cover its operations for the past 
years. As discussed in Section 3.3.14, the wealth created by Alter Trade also 
consistently provided the core funding, representing 17-20%, of the requirements for 
its transformational program for producers.    
  
A legitimate question to ask is, how can this be ensured in the future in the event that 
Alter Trade Corporation starts to become more profitable? Given that Alter Trade 
Foundation Inc had been made the mother company and owner of the three subsidiary 
enterprises (Alter Trade Corporation, Alter Trade Manufacturing Corporation and 
Diversified Organic Enterprise Inc.) during its reorganization in 2010, the 
organizational and governance system in place seemed to have problematized and 
resolved this concern. 
3.6.2.  SEPPS in a Developing Country Context 
While the Alter Trade story validates the definition of SEPPS in Section 2.5, it is 
important to explore how the developing country context of the Philippines relates to 
or interacts with the concept of SEPPS. An emerging theme dramatized by the Alter 
Trade story is the conception of SEPPS as a response to the failure of market and state 
institutions to serve the needs of the poor in the Philippines.   
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The entire conception of Alter Trade emerged as a response to the sugar crisis that 
hit Negros in the 1980s. The sugar crisis resulted from the abandonment by landlords 
of sugar lands as a reaction to the lowering by the US of the Philippine sugar import 
quota. With the local economy being almost completely dependent on sugar with the 
US as the main market, this led to the collapse of the local economy, particularly the 
sugar industry, which in turn led to a hunger crisis among sugar workers in Negros 
Occidental. 
The agrarian reform program opened up opportunities for the landless sugar 
workers to own and manage their land. However, the government failed to provide 
sufficient financial, technical and other support services to 97% of Negros 
Occidental’s agrarian reform beneficiaries (ARBs), the majority of them former sugar 
workers, to make the lands awarded to them productive. The implementation of the 
agrarian reform law has also been characterized by prolonged, unresolved land cases 
in agrarian courts and inability of ARBs to pay amortizations. The experiences of 
Alter Trade’s partners’ bear this out.  
The Philippine government had played a minor and passive role in the Alter Trade 
story. Given the reality of land occupations by sugar workers that had already become 
widespread in the mid-80s, it was still critical that they enacted and implemented 
agrarian reform to provide the legal basis for transforming the landless sugar workers 
to become small owner cultivators of land.     
In the process of transforming the poor, key stakeholders who may be 
characterized as having played enabling and supportive roles were solidarity markets 
in Japan (such as Green Consumers Cooperative Union and PAL System Consumers’ 
Cooperative Union) and Europe (such as GEPA and OS3) and international 
development-oriented organizations (such as Bread for the World, Alter Trade Japan 
and Oikocredit). These solidarity markets and enabling institutions played four critical 
roles: 
 
 They served as intermediary marketing organizations for people-to-people and 
fair trade consumers in Japan and Europe;   
 They provided critical financial and technical resources to develop Alter 
Trade’s capability to effectively deliver quality products;  
 They provided critical financial and technical resources to transform partner 
producers into owners, decision-makers and managers of their own community 
enterprises; and  
 They pro-actively participated in strategy formation: from venturing into 
organic muscovado and naturally grown Balangon bananas; to providing 
expertise and resources for strategic planning, evaluation and audit; to bearing 
the financial costs of piloting and learning from failed experiments; and to 
ensuring the continuing organizational development of partner producers.  
 
111 
 
An important reason for such a big role played by these stakeholders in Alter Trade’s 
development, including their pro-active participation in strategy formation, was their 
shared vision, values, and bias for small producers and social transformation. This 
included their belief that countries in the North had a direct responsibility in 
exploiting the South, and that fair trade or people-to-people trade was an expression 
of international solidarity action to address poverty.      
 
Ayado Yoshida, Chairperson of Green Coop Consumers’ Cooperative Union 
expressed: 
 
“We are greatly encouraged to learn that the people’s trade we have been engaged 
in for the past twenty years has definitely promoted the Green Coop principles:  
living together between nature and human beings, between south and north, 
between women and men, and between peoples.... In 1987 when a group of Green 
Coop members embraced small children suffering hunger in Negros Island, they 
were determined to take action to save them. They realized that our daily life in 
Japan in the North is supported by exploitation of people in the South that caused 
the hunger…. At the trial import, we had to see the blackened banana at the port 
in Japan. Although we were disappointed, someone said, “It was a great success.  
Next time we will receive banana that we can eat!” When the Negros banana 
suffered from disease, we learned that “the weevil is also suffering”, unless nature 
and mankind live together…. We are deeply grateful for ATC who have shared 
difficulty and joy with us, and strengthened international solidarity together”. 
(Yoshida, 2008) 
 
Masahiko Hotta, President of Alter Trade Japan, articulated his personal appreciation 
of the shared vision and values: 
 
“We started 20 years ago with a unique effort to support landless farmers in 
Negros. We had a vision to organize a people’s economy in cooperation with 
Japanese consumers’ cooperatives. The problem was the farmers had no land, no 
money, and no power. Our theory (sic) model was to organize them to have power 
and independent resources through alternative people-to-people trade. Japanese 
consumers’ cooperatives would assure markets for chemical free and natural 
products, make voluntary contributions and provide working capital, with Alter 
Trade Corporation and Alter Trade Japan serving as intermediaries. Unlike the 
context of capitalism, the support from Japanese consumers is a goodwill gift in 
exchange for the chemical free and natural products of small farmers against 
multi-national plantation bananas”. (Hotta, 2008) 
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This shared bias for small producers and the pro-active relationship was validated by 
GEPA Fair Trade Company’s Claudia Grozinger:  
 
“As GEPA – the Fair Trade Company, we are cooperating with ATC since 1988. 
In the early nineties, we came to the conclusion that only organic Mascobado will 
have a chance on the European market in the future…. We discussed this together 
in GEPA’s office and in ATC office in Bacolod and finally agreed on it. We at 
GEPA knew that we asked a lot from your side. And that it is not easy at all to 
convince small farmers to start with it, knowing the situation in Negros. And 
besides that, you had to invest into a new sugar mill too, in order to guarantee a 
higher quality product. But we reached that goal together in 1996!... In the 
meantime, we do not only offer organic Mascobado in consumer packs, but also 
lovely organic chocolates, organic biscuits and organic syrup for coffee – all with 
your organic Mascobado. And GEPA customers just love it.... Afterwards, I 
visited ATC a couple of times and could see, how fair trade grows and how the 
situations of the small producers have changed dramatically. And when small 
farmers cooperating with ATC tell me that they are able to send their children to 
high school or even college and have dreams for the future…. what more can you 
expect…. I am personally very proud of the organic Mascobado, the result of our 
joint efforts, but even more of the changes for the people of Negros through ATC 
and GEPA’s Fair Trade!” (Grozinger, 2008)  
3.6.3.   SEPPS and Social Entrepreneurship  
Among the various schools of thought in social entrepreneurship, the Alter Trade 
Group story resonates with the social economy school (Defourny and Nyssens, 2008; 
Laville, 2010), with some particularities arising from the context of failed state and 
market institutions in underdeveloped economies. This resonance is particularly 
strong in relation to SEPPS as multi-stakeholder organizations, the importance given 
to the role of the state and the evolving role of third sector organizations in promoting 
a plural economy governed not only by market principles but also the principles of 
redistribution and reciprocity (Defourny, 2001; Vidal, 2010; Laville, 2010).  
 
 Alter Trade may be characterized as a multi-stakeholder organization that has 
evolved over time into a multi-organizational system where the poor were 
empowered partners. Such evolved not only to more effectively serve the poor 
and their markets, but also to give the poor a voice and vote. Beyond 
organizing the producers as a supplier base, Alter Trade assisted the sugar 
farmers to have a voice (through NOFTA) and vote (through their elected 
representatives in Alter Trade Foundation Inc.) in their governance system. 
Table 3.7.a. details the participation of Alter Trade’s primary stakeholders in 
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the governance and management of Alter Trade as a multi-organizational multi-
stakeholder SEPPS; 
 The main stakeholders,  including the main market channels for its products, 
are civil society or third sector players in the North and South, who share a 
vision of empowerment of the poor through people-to-people and fair trade and 
transforming the global trading system as a whole; 
 The Alter Trade Group story shows the development of an alternative system of 
trade involving organized producers and consumers in the North and South, 
that is governed by non-capitalist principles of reciprocity and redistribution, 
characteristic of a social economy; and 
 Government played a redistributive role in the whole story, in a minimal but 
critical way, in the sense that the transformation of the landless sugar workers 
as partner producers of organic sugar cane and as owners, decision-makers and 
managers of their own community enterprises would not have been possible 
without the enactment and implementation of the agrarian reform law that 
legitimized their claim over the lands they occupied.   
 
The social economy school of social entrepreneurship in Europe has been 
characterized by scholars as embedded or contextualized in the crisis of welfare states 
that gave birth to autonomous initiatives within the third sector to provide for social 
services and employment among marginalized sectors. State support in the form of 
legal frameworks, public subsidies, fiscal exemptions and the like has been 
instrumental to their scaling up and institutionalization (Defourny and Nyssens, 2010; 
Hoogendoorn, 2009). This context, that gave rise to the social economy school of 
social entrepreneurship in Europe, is very different from the Philippine context of 
under-development and poverty as explained in Section 2.4, and what the case of 
Alter Trade exemplifies in terms of state and market failures as explained in 3.6.2.   
    As discussed in Section 2.4 and validated by the Alter Trade case, structural 
poverty and under-development in the Philippines, exacerbated by state and market 
failures, provides the context and has fueled the rise of social enterprises with the 
poor as primary stakeholders (SEPPS). The case of Alter Trade as SEPPS 
demonstrates the central role assumed by third sector actors in the North and South 
sharing a mission to transform the poor, to overcome market and state failures, and in 
the process pushing government to play a legitimizing, though minor role.   
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3.7.  Alter Trade from a Stakeholder Perspective                           
3.7.1.  The Poor as Alter Trade’s Primary Stakeholders 
Based on the articulation of its mission in 1994 up to the time of the research in 
2010, and its 20-year practice of sustainable agriculture and fair trade, Alter Trade’s 
primary stakeholders were the poor. Alter Trade considers the poor as primary 
stakeholders using a normative approach (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). To reiterate 
what was explained in Section 3.6.1, Alter Trade as a social enterprise with the poor 
as primary stakeholders (SEPPS) adheres to a distributive enterprise philosophy and 
pursues poverty reduction as principal goal.   
Since initiation, the specific poverty groups that Alter Trade had served as 
primary stakeholders were:    
 
 Landless sugar plantation workers turned sugar farmer-agrarian reform 
beneficiaries in one province, Negros Occidental; and  
 Backyard producers of naturally grown Balangon bananas in indigenous and 
upland communities in various parts of the country 
3.7.2. Roles and Role Changes: Transactional and 
Transformational Roles  
 
Using Mintzberg’s (2007) organizational stages of initiation, development and 
renewal, tracking the roles and role changes enacted by Alter Trade’s primary 
stakeholders showed contrasting stories. Common to both sugar farmers and banana 
growers was their enactment of the role of supplier-partners of Alter Trade from the 
initiation to renewal stages.  
However, the sugar farmers manifested dramatic role changes as self-determining 
producers’ organizations in their communities during the development stage and as a 
federation of producers’ groups at the provincial level during the renewal stage. As 
shown in Table 3.5. the 18 farmer organizations were at various stages of 
development as self-help groups, entrepreneurial farmers’ organizations and as 
organizations practicing social entrepreneurship, using as measure the People’s 
Organization Development Index (PO-DI). As shown in Appendix 12.4, the PO-DI 
considered organizational cohesion and development, capacity to engage the market, 
income diversification among members, contribution to community and/or sector 
development, and financial growth and sustainability, as demonstrated by the 132-
member Minoro Isabel Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association (MIARBA) which 
had become a partner organization practicing social entrepreneurship. As such, not 
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only was MIARBA initiating income diversification efforts to increase farmer 
members’ incomes beyond their participation as suppliers of organic sugar cane to 
Alter Trade, they were likewise leading efforts in water systems development, 
reforestation and health services delivery in their community. By the renewal stage, 
MIARBA and the other sugar farmer groups had federated themselves into the Negros 
Organic and Fair Trade Association. With NOFTA, the partner sugar farmers had 
collectively become an independent and co-equal partner of Alter Trade in the local 
and global organic and fair trade movement. In its first year of existence, NOFTA set 
up a post-harvest financial service for sugar farmers and was planning a local 
production and trading system for organic rice, vegetables and livestock, to provide 
healthy food for their communities and beyond.   
The roles that the sugar farmer partners of Alter Trade enacted at the development 
and renewal stages as self-determining producer organizations and as an independent 
federation engaged in the practice and advocacy of organic agriculture and fair trade 
are clearly of a different nature. They may be characterized as transformational roles 
in the sense that the sugar farmers had collectively become conscious agents of 
change to move themselves out of poverty, in the process also participating in 
improving the quality of life of their community, sector and society at large.  
These dramatic role changes did not happen among the banana grower partners of 
Alter Trade in the province. By the end of the development stage, the banana grower 
partners had just been organized into cooperatives and associations, manifesting 
capacities as self-help supplier groups. By the renewal stage, the associations were 
just starting to make and implement their first 5-year community development plans.  
For example, one of the banana grower associations, PIBFA was starting to 
implement their first enterprise project of capitalizing and managing a banana packing 
center in their town that would be linked to Alter Trade’s Balangon banana trading. 
Some leaders of two of the banana growers’ associations became observers during the 
founding conference of NOFTA but felt they were not yet in a position to become 
members.   
The roles enacted by both the sugar farmers and banana growers of Alter Trade as 
supplier partners from initiation to renewal may be characterized as transactional in 
nature. As suppliers of organic sugar cane and naturally grown Balangon bananas, 
their relationship involved the exchange of a volume of agricultural produce of 
acceptable quality, delivered at specified times, for money. Even as the price was 
transparently negotiated between the supplier (sugar farmers and banana growers) and 
buyer (Alter Trade), the monetary exchange involved defined the transactional role 
enacted by the former. 
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Table 3.7. traces the evolution of roles of the sugar farmers and banana growers 
across Mintzberg’s (2007) organizational stages of initiation, development and 
renewal of Alter Trade. 
 
 
3.7.3.  Roots and Routes of Role Changes:   Understanding    
           Transactional and Transformational Services  
 
While the intention of Alter Trade in engaging both the sugar farmers and banana 
growers was, to use Alter Trade’s own words, to ‘empower’ them, what unfolded was 
different for the two primary stakeholders. As has been expounded in Section 3.7.2., 
the sugar farmers manifested dramatic role changes consistent with Alter Trade’s 
intent of empowerment while the banana growers did not, at least by the time of the 
research. The why’s (the roots) and the how’s (the routes) of these contrasting 
phenomena within the same time frame and organizational context are interesting to 
pursue.   
One explanation provided by Alter Trade management (Lopez, 2011; Parreno, 
2011), and supported by data presented in Section 3.3., point to the different start-up 
conditions of the stakeholder groups: the sugar farmers had already been organized as 
sugar worker union members engaged in a struggle for land reform while the banana 
growers had no prior experience of being organized. However, the differentiated 
experience of Philippine rural development agencies working with communities that 
have been organized may prove such explanation to be inadequate.  Isagani Serrano, 
President of the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM), explains that in 
social enterprise and development programs, assisting the empowerment of groups 
that have in the past been organized for advocacy and political mobilization may 
sometimes prove more difficult relative to working with unorganized communities: 
“It cuts both ways – organized groups have to grapple with hard-to-break mindsets 
and habits and need to do some unlearning which could be more difficult than a fresh 
start”. (Serrano, 2011) 
What may also be a possible explanation from an analysis of the data presented in 
Section 3.3.8. was that Alter Trade faced setbacks in organizing Balangon growers as 
they encountered problems of disease infestation and a failed experiment, in their 
pioneering effort to commercialize and export Balangon bananas. Following this line 
of argument, disease infestation and the failed Balangon experiment would have 
prevented or discouraged the sustained participation of Balangon growers as supplier-
partners of Alter Trade, thus making organizing and capacity development among 
them more difficult.  
However, Alter Trade’s own realization of the need to organize the Balangon 
growers as vehicles for undertaking the more effective community-based approaches 
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for managing disease infestation provides a counter argument: that the threat of 
disease infestation could have been an opportunity rather than a dis-incentive for 
organizing the banana growers at that time. At the same time, the failed Balangon 
experiment also involved the sugar farmer partners. It was actually an effort to assist 
their crop and income diversification. In this sense, the failed Balangon experiment 
should have negatively affected the process of empowerment of the sugar farmers, 
which it did not. Section 3.3.13. provides perspectives from sugar farmer leaders 
looking at their participation in the failed Balangon experiment and other 
diversification efforts as part of their learning and development process (Hilarbo, 
2010; Tamaro, 2010).  
Without discounting that the aforementioned explanations may be borne out by 
specific examples, they are inadequate explanations for the pattern of significant and 
no essential role change among Alter Trade’s primary stakeholders.  So, what may be 
an alternative explanation for the significant role changes among the sugar farmers on 
one hand, and no essential role change among the banana growers on the other? A 
closer analysis of the data shows that it may have been the differentiated nature of 
programs and services provided by Alter Trade to its primary stakeholders that made 
the big difference.  
Both stakeholder groups participated in programs and received services to make 
them better supplier-partners in the fair trade of organic muscovado sugar and the 
people-to-people trade of Balangon bananas. Among others, the Bio-Organic 
Conversion Program services aimed at shifting sugar farms from conventional to 
organic farming and the training and technical assistance involving Balangon Cultural 
Management that built the capability of banana growers to manage disease infestation 
were part of these services. These may be considered transactional services that Alter 
Trade provided its primary stakeholders. They were geared towards meeting the 
volume, quality and price specifications of their respective markets in Europe and 
Japan.   
However, as was expounded in Sections 3.3.6. and 3.3.12, it was only the sugar 
farmer partners who participated in the Sustainable Agriculture for Sustainable 
Community (SASC) Program during the development up to the initial years of the 
renewal stage. SASC had a Holistic Organizational Empowerment (HOE) component.  
There was no equivalent program that provided systematic organizing and capacity 
development services to the Balangon banana growers.   
SASC provided not only knowledge and skills on sustainable agriculture and fair 
trade, but included community visioning and value formation, upgrading capabilities 
in organizational, project and enterprise management as well as leadership 
development. SASC also assisted the sugar farmer groups plan and implement crop 
and income diversification efforts involving their members. It was the services 
provided under the SASC program framework that systematically developed the 
producer organizations as vehicles for change, not only for themselves, but 
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progressively, also for their community and their sector. Distinct from transactional 
services, these may be considered as transformational services: they transformed the 
sugar farmer supplier partners of Alter Trade into the self-determining organized 
producer groups as exemplified by MIARBA. During the development stage, these 
transformational services also directly assisted the creation of the Fair Trade Sub 
Group that provided a venue for the sugar farmer partners to share experiences and 
build a common platform for change. The Fair Trade Sub Group prepared the sugar 
farmer partners for the setting up of NOFTA at the renewal stage. As explained in 
Section 3.4.4., NOFTA became the collective expression of their independent and co-
equal status vis-à-vis Alter Trade as advocates and practitioners of organic agriculture 
and fair trade at the local and global levels.  
The various transactional and transformational services that Alter Trade provided 
its partner sugar farmers and Balangon banana growers as they relate to key 
organizational developments and roles played by these primary stakeholder groups are 
detailed in Table 3.7.  
As shown in Box 3.3 and Sections 3.3.12 to 3.3.13, key to the delivery of these 
transformational services was Alter Trade Foundation Inc (ATFI) that was set up in 
1997 and took on the development and implementation of the SASC Program. Before 
ATFI, Alter Trade Corporation or ATC (set up in 1988) and Alter Trade 
Manufacturing Corporation or ATMC (set up in 1992), were providing transactional 
services, or what was necessary to directly ensure that their partner sugar farmers and 
Balangon banana growers met the quality, volume and delivery requirements of their 
solidarity markets. While there were attempts to make ATFI also cover the banana 
growers, these did not prosper for reasons explained in Section 3.3.10. As ATFI 
developed and implemented the SASC program among the sugar farmer partners, 
ATC remained the main delivery system for serving the Balangon banana growers 
during the development stage.  
Gilda Caduya, Alter Trade Corporation’s Operations Manager summarized their 
experience of engagement with the Balangon banana growers:    
 
“We were very much focused on the day to day challenges of meeting the volume, 
quality and price requirements of our markets. But as we studied solutions to our 
problems with bunchy top and other diseases, high reject rates and improving the 
efficiency of our production, packing and delivery system, we realized we can 
only solve them with strong growers’ organizations, which could lead in Balangon 
Cultural Management and run community-based production, packing and trucking 
enterprises”. (Caduya, 2008) 
 
This realization re-invigorated efforts towards organizing their Balangon banana 
grower partners in 2007, towards the end of the development stage, but still within 
ATC, that on a day to day basis was oriented towards meeting market requirements.  
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The renewal stage that followed was called such by the researcher as it ushered in a 
period where Alter Trade resolved and deployed resources to provide sustained 
transformational services to partner banana growers through ATFI. As indicated in 
Section 3.5.2, the beginnings of these transformational services were evident during 
the field research: the Balangon banana growers’ associations were already being 
assisted to develop and implement their community development plans, a hallmark of 
the SASC program framework.  
 
3.7.4.  Impact of Role Changes   
 
It is noteworthy that distinctions between the two stakeholder groups were also 
apparent in terms of impact on their poverty situation. In terms of the number of poor 
people, there were over 800 sugar farmers within one province reached, while the 
outreach among banana growers was greater by more than 4 times this amount, 
numbering almost 3,500 banana growers spread across many provinces.   
Using both income and Sen’s (1999; 2009) capability approach to poverty 
analysis, more significant impact is observable among the sugar farmer partners of 
Alter Trade.  
As discussed in Section 3.5, the banana farmers manifested improved access to 
technologies and markets bringing about increased income. However, their income 
increases coming mainly from banana trading remained unstable, supplemental, and 
dependent on the services of Alter Trade.   
In contrast, and as discussed in Section 3.5, the sugar farmer partners of Alter 
Trade may be characterized as being in various stages of overcoming not only income 
poverty but more so capability deprivation. Their overcoming capability deprivation, 
or the individual and collective power they have acquired to create ‘actual 
opportunities’ to improve their ‘means of living’ (Sen, 1999; 2009) is directly related 
to the transformational roles they are enacting, which in turn is directly attributable to 
the transformational services provided by Alter Trade from the development to the 
renewal stages.  
The self-determining producer cooperatives and NOFTA are the symbols and 
embodiment not only of enacting transformational roles but also of their overcoming 
capability deprivation. They are serving not only as organized supplier-partners and 
vehicles for participating in the organic muscovado sugar value chain linked to Alter 
Trade, but they have also become vehicles for poverty reduction and engagement, not 
only with Alter Trade, but also, with other actors to contribute to community, sector 
and sustainable development. MIARBA’s story featured in Section 3.5.2 and Box 
3.5., and NOFTA’s story featured in Section 3.4.4 and Box 3.4. demonstrate these.   
There was one other important trend that could serve as an indicator of impact on 
Alter Trade as a social enterprise that may be directly attributable to the enactment of 
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transformational roles by the sugar farmers: that the more developed cooperatives or 
associations of sugar farmer partners were generally the better suppliers of organic 
sugar cane.  MIARBA, rated the most empowered using the People’s Organization 
Development Index, had the best track record as supplier of organic sugar cane in 
terms of volume, quality and timeliness (Alter Trade FGD, 2008).   
Given that systematic organizing and capacity development among Balangon 
banana growers had just begun, it may be too early to see the actual impact of strong 
growers’ organizations on enterprise viability.  But the initial analysis to give more 
focus on organizing banana growers to more effectively manage quality and delivery 
issues are consistent with the expectation that poverty groups enacting 
transformational roles would have a positive impact on social enterprise viability.      
  
3.7.5.  Intended and Realized Stakeholder Engagement Strategies 
 
From Sections 1.3 and 2.11., stakeholder engagement strategies may be broadly 
defined as patterns of action in the process of involving individuals or groups that 
either affect or are affected by the activities of the enterprise (Mintzberg, 2007; 
Greenwood, 2007; Sloan, 2009; Freeman et al., 2010).  Because Alter Trade is an 
enterprise that considers the poor as its primary stakeholders, patterns in Alter Trade’s 
process of involving the poor may be referred to as its primary stakeholder 
engagement strategy.     
The combination and changes in transactional and transformational roles enacted 
by Alter Trade’s primary stakeholders over time may be appreciated as indications of 
stakeholder engagement strategies and strategy shifts.  
Applying Mintzberg’s (2007) theory of strategy formation, Alter Trade’s 
stakeholder engagement strategies with its two primary stakeholder groups may be 
better appreciated and analyzed using the concepts of ‘intended’ and ‘realized’ 
stakeholder engagement strategies.   
Their intended stakeholder engagement strategy, using Alter Trade’s own words 
may be called ‘empowerment’. Here, the key stakeholder engagement processes may 
be characterized as enabling them to become, again in Alter Trade’s own words, 
“self-reliant, self-sufficient, and self-determining” (Alter Trade Group, 2010). As 
shown by the experience of Alter Trade with the sugar farmer partners, the 
stakeholder engagement strategy of empowerment provides both transactional and 
transformational services towards the enactment of transactional and transformational 
roles by the poor. The expected social impact is overcoming income poverty and 
capability deprivation. With the sugar farmer partners of Alter Trade, the intended 
stakeholder engagement strategy of empowerment materialized during the 
development and renewal stages.   
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However, the intended stakeholder engagement strategy of empowerment did not 
materialize with the Balangon banana partners of Alter Trade. With the Balangon 
banana partners, the ‘realized’ stakeholder engagement strategy may be characterized 
as providing transactional services to effectively enact transactional roles as suppliers 
of Alter Trade. This realized stakeholder engagement strategy among banana growers 
may be further characterized as one based on the processes of learning, partnership 
building and collaboration. The expected social impact, as shown by the engagement 
of Alter Trade with its Balangon banana growers, is the provision of access to 
services and markets among the poor.    
The key engagement processes characterizing the collaboration model of 
stakeholder engagement of Sloan (2009) may be similar to the realized strategy of 
stakeholder engagement among Balangon banana growers. However, Sloan’s models 
of stakeholder engagement, which she called ‘control’ and ‘collaboration’, could not 
adequately explain the intended and realized stakeholder engagement strategy of 
empowerment with the sugar farmer partners, and the other aspects of the realized 
stakeholder engagement strategy involving the Balangon banana growers.  
 
3.8.  Discussion 
 
As stated in Chapter 2, Alter Trade is the centerpiece case for this dissertation. It 
was the first and most complicated among the six case subjects. As discussed in 
Chapter 2 in the section on research methodology, the case research on Alter Trade 
took more time and yielded much more data, relative to the other cases. It was 
through studying Alter Trade that the research focus significantly evolved from one 
that broadly explored enterprise strategy content and strategy formation processes 
among social enterprises to one that explored stakeholder engagement strategies 
among the poor. In the end, Alter Trade presented a rich narrative of two distinct but 
interrelated cases of stakeholder engagement involving the poor as primary 
stakeholders: one in relation to their engagement with sugar farmers (also referred to 
as Alter Trade-sugar) and the other in relation to their engagement with Balangon 
banana growers (also referred to as Alter Trade-banana). This allowed the researcher 
to undertake a robust within case analysis that had the characteristics of a cross case 
analysis from which to start her case-based theory building (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).   
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As a case on fair trade, it contributes to the literature that critically analyzes the 
participation of the poor as well as the economic and social benefits derived by the 
poor in fair trade systems. At face value, the Alter Trade case may be likened to the 
studies made by Macdonald (2007) on the Starbucks fair trade system; by Blowfield 
and Dolan (2010) on Kenyan Fair Trade Tea; and by Benzecon (2011) who made a 
comparative study of mainstream and alternative models of fair trade. However, the 
Alter Trade case goes beyond these studies in two ways. First, the sugar farmers in the 
Alter Trade case had reached a level of capacity and participation in value chain 
governance and socio-economic development that was much further than those 
covered in the previous studies. Second, the Alter Trade case analyzes and draws 
relationships between the nature and combination of services provided to the poor, the 
evolution of transactional and transformational roles that the poor enact in and out of 
the system, and the corresponding depth and breadth of impact of such services and 
roles on the poor and poverty. The differentiated impact of Alter Trade among sugar 
farmers whom they engaged as transformational partners in multiple development 
arenas, and among banana growers, whom they engaged mainly as transactional 
partners within an economic value chain provides a powerful narrative about how fair 
trade organizations as social enterprises with the poor as primary stakeholders or 
SEPPS may or may not empower producers in the South.   
The dimensions of empowerment, highlighted in the Alter Trade case, are 
consistent with Sen’s (1999; 2009) capability approach. Poverty reduction is 
demonstrated as a process of enabling the sugar farmers to develop their individual 
and collective capabilities to improve their quality of life, as well as to contribute to 
improving the life of their respective communities and the sector of small producers 
that they see themselves to be a part of. The Alter Trade case also resonates with 
empowerment as a fundamental element of fair trade identified by Moore (2004).  The 
case makes an important contribution to fair trade literature from a Southern 
perspective by responding to a key issue identified by Moore (2004) of effectively 
monitoring the impact of fair trade, including the degree of empowerment of producer 
organizations. The case provides an example (see Appendix 12.4) of an evolving 
practitioner-oriented tool for measuring the level of empowerment of the partner 
producers of an alternative trading organization.  
In the field of social entrepreneurship, the Alter Trade case complements case-
based fair trade studies by scholars such as Hockerts (2003; 2006; 2010) that focus on 
strategic innovation in developing models, growing markets, managing resources as 
well managing tensions between social mission, and perceived market requirements. 
More broadly, as a case on social entrepreneurship, the Alter Trade study contributes 
to exploring the application of stakeholder theory (Freeman, et al., 2010) among 
social enterprises with the poor as primary stakeholders (SEPPS). The case builds on 
the earlier research of the author on social enterprises in Asia. In particular, the Alter 
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Trade case refines what were conceived as social enterprise strategies in general and 
the empowerment strategy in particular (Dacanay, 2004; Dacanay, 2009). The case 
notes the relevance and initiates the exploration of the social economy school of 
social entrepreneurship (Defourny and Nyssens, 2010; Hulgaard, 2008; Vidal, 2010; 
Laville, 2010) in a country context characterized by structural poverty, under-
development and the failure of state and market institutions to serve the needs of the 
majority who are poor. Such context is very different from Europe where the social 
economy school originated.    
The researcher noted the inadequacy of existing models of stakeholder 
engagement based on corporate experience (Sloan, 2009) in explaining Alter Trade’s 
intended and realized stakeholder engagement strategies. Non-profit stakeholder 
literature provides some starting points with their emphasis on engagement and 
dialogue with stakeholders towards larger normative goals (Grimble and Wellard, 
1997; Mikalsen and Jentoft, 2001; Beutler, 2005; Freeman et al., 2010). However, 
these are not framed in an enterprise setting. Given such inadequacy, the case has 
started exploring elements that may define two models of stakeholder engagement 
among SEPPS: collaboration (where the poor are engaged as transactional partners) 
and empowerment (where the poor are engaged as transformational partners). This is 
particularly important given that stakeholder engagement is considered an under-
theorized area of research. (Greenwood, 2007; Sloan, 2009; Freeman, et al., 2010). 
However, the researcher noted that social economy literature as well as the concept 
and definition of social enterprises as multistakeholder organizations by scholars of 
the social economy school of social entrepreneurship (Defourny, 2001; Spear et al., 
2010; Defourny and Nyssens, 2008 and 2010; Vidal, 2010) may feature elements of 
the collaboration and empowerment models being explored. Overall, the Alter Trade 
case study validates the potential for this thesis to make a significant contribution to 
social entrepreneurship and stakeholder literature.   
The Alter Trade-sugar story showed that the producers’ cooperatives did not just 
become a vehicle for transforming assetless, powerless sugar workers who had just 
acquired small plots of land from government’s land reform program into an 
organized supplier base for organic sugar. Alter Trade enabled these sugar farmers to 
enact transactional and transformational roles in what Harrison and St. John (1998) 
and Post, et al., (2002a; 2002b) call the three regions of their stakeholder 
environment. Alter Trade enabled the sugar farmers to govern themselves in 
cooperatives that initiated crop and income diversification efforts to achieve food 
security and overcome income poverty; that served as vehicles for community 
development planning and implementation; and that co-created an independent 
federation of small producers to strengthen their participation in issues and concerns 
in the broad social-political stakeholder environment. This, together with the Alter 
Trade-banana story of transactional partnership in the Balangon value chain, point to 
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some critical insights for SEPPS to effectively realize a stakeholder engagement 
strategy of empowerment. First, the delivery of transactional services to meet the 
quality and volume requirements of markets needs to be complemented by 
transformational services to organize and capacitate the poor to enact transformational 
roles. Second, process-oriented, group-directed transformational services are best 
provided through a distinct delivery system (exemplified by the Alter Trade 
Foundation’s SASC program) parallel to market-oriented enterprise operations 
(exemplified by Alter Trade Corporation and its 2 other subsidiaries). Third, a distinct 
delivery system for transformational services needs to be complemented with the 
setting up of self-governed structures for the poor to enact transformational roles 
(exemplified by the producers’ cooperatives or associations at the grassroots, and 
NOFTA, the federation of small producers initiated by the sugar partners). 
Alter Trade is now in a renewal phase where it is poised to engage its sugar 
farmer partners to reach an even higher level of empowerment while closing the gap 
between its intended strategy of empowerment and its realized strategy of 
collaboration among its banana growers. In the years to come, it would be interesting 
to make a follow-up case study to explore what Spear, et al., (2010) have identified as 
major challenges of governance among social enterprises especially in managing the 
tension between social and enterprise objectives. In this regard, Alter Trade would be 
an interesting case study to test what Hockerts (2010) proposed to be the two types of 
archetypal responses by social entrepreneurship initiatives engaged in sector 
transformation: a retreat to its philanthropic core or a partial abandoning of its social 
objectives. The researcher sees an opportunity for Alter Trade and its solidarity 
partners in Europe and Japan to undertake a creative multi-stakeholder initiative of 
going beyond these archetypal responses. This was alluded to by Hockerts (2010, p. 
18) as “A possible third way.... of continuous innovation whereby social ventures 
keep innovating their way out of the tension between market and mission”. Such 
would be a fitting response to the daunting challenge of not only pursuing a 
positioning that Fichtl (2007) described as being both in and against the market, but 
more appropriately what Walton (2010) characterized as part of the emerging 
conception of fair trade to establish interim global market justice in a non-ideal world.  
Beyond transforming global markets, Alter Trade’s unfolding story may be explored 
as contributing to what scholars in the social economy school of social 
entrepreneurship call a plural economy, governed not only by market principles but 
by the principles of reciprocity and redistribution (Laville, 2010).   
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CHAPTER 4 – UPLAND MARKETING 
FOUNDATION INC: FROM SUPPLIERS TO 
TRANSACTIONAL PARTNERS IN VALUE CHAIN 
MANAGEMENT 
 
This chapter demonstrates how the Upland Marketing Foundation, Inc. (Upland 
Marketing or UMFI), as SEPPS pursued an intended stakeholder engagement 
strategy of collaboration as a mandate from Upland NGOs Assistance Committee 
(UNAC), a network needing a marketing arm for its comprehensive development 
agenda. Its intended strategy of collaboration was realized by providing small 
producers of food a combination of fee-based and non-fee based transactional 
services to deliver the quantity and quality of products required by local 
mainstream markets. The case showed that a regular flow of income for a 
significant number of small producers in multiple sites was achieved by engaging 
them as transactional partners in value chain management for champion products 
with growing markets. However, as demonstrated by Upland Marketing’s 
producers of organic rice, one of their two champion products, it was the 
diversified sources of income from practicing sustainable agriculture, not just the 
trading of organic rice, that moved them out of income poverty. The farmers’ 
practice of sustainable agriculture was also a product of years of comprehensive 
partnership with other non-government organizations (NGOs). Such partnerships 
between these farmers and NGOs had created self-governing farmers’ 
cooperatives that later became the organized supplier-partners of Upland 
Marketing. In this sense, Upland Marketing’s provision of transactional services 
to small producers was deliberately complemented by the provision of 
transformational services by these NGOs. Upland Marketing’s viability as SEPPS 
has been undermined by practices of ‘unfair trade’ by supermarket chains serving 
as their distribution channels. As a major market intermediation initiative 
pursuing fair trade and exploring engagements with mainstream markets to serve 
the goal of poverty reduction, Upland Marketing’s crisis may be positively 
characterized as the precursor to a renewal stage. In this context, fair trade as 
corporate social responsibility (CSR), may be a way forward as a complementary 
stakeholder engagement strategy vis-à-vis the supermarket chains. If successfully 
pursued, it may become a case in the South for the interface of social 
entrepreneurship and CSR.  
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4.1.  Introduction 
 
Upland Marketing Foundation Inc. (Upland Marketing or UMFI) had its roots in 
the Upland Marketing Program of the Upland NGOs Assistance Committee (UNAC), 
composed of eight agencies from civil society, academe and the business sector, all of 
whom were concerned with the development of poor upland communities in the 
Philippines.36  
About three quarters of the poor in the country live in rural areas (Balisacan, et al., 
2008). It was generally recognized that illiteracy, unemployment and the incidence of 
poverty was gravest in upland and indigenous communities (Guarin, 2004; Serrano, 
2010). 
Upland Marketing was set up to provide financial, technological and market 
access to marginalized community-based producers. They acted as an intermediary 
organization between these community-based enterprises and local mainstream 
markets, using large supermarket chains as distribution channels. They were initially 
concerned with assisting upland producers but decided to extend their services to 
lowland and coastal communities to make their operations more sustainable.    
While they distributed a range of processed and semi-processed food items from 
community-based enterprises, what had become dominant as ‘champion products’ by 
virtue of volume and level of sales were muscovado sugar and organic rice.  
The founders of Upland Marketing had been explicit that the social objective of 
the enterprise was its primary reason for being. Ramon Derige, Chairperson of UNAC 
and founding President of Upland marketing explained:   
 
“We believe our existence is really based on social objectives.  For sustainability, 
we have to earn profits”. (Derige, 2010) 
 
While they were committed to practice fair trade with partner producers, Upland 
Marketing was faced with the challenge of dealing with mainstream market practices.  
Because of their dominant position, supermarkets could exact terms and conditions 
that generally lowered their procurement prices, prolonged payment terms and put the 
burden of shouldering potential losses to their suppliers.   
     The core and partner organizations of the Upland Marketing Foundation Inc. that 
were covered by this case study are listed in Table 4.1.   
 
                                                 
36 The 8 organizations were the Institute for Philippine Culture, Ateneo de Manila University, Institute of Agroforestry, 
University of the Philippines in Los Banos, Kalahan Educational Foundation (KEF), Philippine Association for Inter-
cultural Development  (PAFID), Philippine Business for Social Progress (PBSP), Philippine Partnership for the 
Development of Human Resources in Rural Areas (PhilDHRRA), Social Development Resource Center, La Salle 
University and Tanggol Kalikasan.  
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Table 4.1. Core and Partner Organizations of the Upland Marketing Foundation Inc.  
Name Role 
Upland NGO Assistance Committee 
(UNAC) 
Network that founded UMFI to provide market 
access to marginalized community-based producers 
Upland Marketing Foundation Inc (UMFI) Core organization serving as intermediary 
marketing organization to partner community-
based enterprises (CBEs) 
Community-Based Enterprises (CBEs) 
     
Cooperatives or associations serving as partner 
suppliers of UMFI.  In the organic rice value chain, 
these included: 
      Kooperatibang Likas ng Nueva Ecija  
        (KOOL-NE)    
     Pecuaria Development Cooperative Inc. (PDCI) 
     Samahang Likas Kayang Pagsaka 
     Coop Sto. Nino 
 
4.2.  Pre-Inception (1992-2000): Experimenting as 
Intermediary of the Poor with Mainstream Markets 
   
4.2.1.  Upland Marketing Program Initiative37 
 
The need for an upland marketing initiative first came from a National 
Consultative Conference of Non-Government and People’s Organizations in Upland 
Development in the 1980s. This idea was pursued with development agencies from 
the North, particularly the United States and Europe, serving as pro-active partners. 
Derige recalled the setting up of UNAC and the Upland Marketing Program and the 
critical role of development agencies in the North:   
 
“Ford Foundation pushed and funded the setting up of UNAC as a national 
network that would work with the Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources to pursue a social forestry approach. They funded the Upland 
Marketing Program for upland communities to gain economic benefits. It was the 
savings of PhP 800,000 from the Ford Foundation – funded program of UNAC 
that served as a start-up fund to spin off the Upland Marketing Program into the 
Upland Marketing Foundation Inc.” (Derige, 2010) 
 
                                                 
37 This section was based mainly on the documentation and recollection of UMFI’s history and experience by the 
Founding Executive Director of UMFI (Guarin, 2004; 2009) and validated by interviews made by Marie Lisa Dacanay 
with UMFI’s former Deputy Executive Director (Tacuyog, 2010) and the Founding Chair of the Board (Derige, 2010).   
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The Upland Marketing Program (UMP) that ran from 1992-2000 was part of UNAC’s 
concerted efforts towards community-based resource management and upland 
development. It was part of a three-pronged approach featuring land tenure 
acquisition; increasing area productivity through agro-forestry and reforestation; and 
opening access to markets to sell the surplus production of communities.   
 
4.2.2.   Experience with ‘Heartless Traders’  
 
Community-based enterprises (CBEs) were organized and assisted with market 
information, training, and then linked to mainstream traders. Neither the CBEs nor the 
traders were happy with the results. For example, in the trading of vegetables, the 
CBEs were not able to keep up with the volume, quality and delivery requirements of 
the buyers. The CBEs also expected the buyers to understand and forgive their 
difficulties, and give them a price that would enable them to recover their costs and 
earn a profit. The buyers, on the other hand, could not relate to what the CBEs wanted 
and refused to give them consideration. The CBEs felt the traders were heartless and 
were only concerned with profit. Both parties refused to transact with each other for a 
second time.  
 
4.2.3.  Unsustainability of Commodity Trading 
 
This failure surfaced the need for an intermediary entity that would mediate 
expectations and serve as a buffer between the CBEs and the market. The Upland 
Marketing Program was then conceived of as being that intermediary. They started 
trading rattan, but the CBEs faced a dilemma in trying to keep up with the growing 
demand for rattan and they felt they were being forced to harvest more rattan than the 
forest could sustainably support. This experience made UMP realize the dangers and 
inappropriateness of commodity trading. Commodity trading did not only have the 
tendency to over extract valuable forest resources but also in most cases did not 
provide fair economic returns for the communities or households engaged in the 
activity. The low market value of the products, the distance to the markets, and the 
bad infrastructure made trading costs expensive, thus eroding further whatever 
margins might be earned. In their effort to increase income, the communities resorted 
to increasing volumes, resulting in over-extraction. This negated the very essence of 
UMP’s reason for being – to assist upland communities market their products while 
ensuring sustainable forest use.  
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4.2.4.  Processed Food Products: Better Prospects  
 
UMP’s experience in providing marketing assistance to groups dealing with 
forest-based processed food products proved to be more beneficial to CBEs. 
Economic returns were better and the pressure on the forest resource was not as great.  
A smaller volume was needed to engage in viable production. This was demonstrated 
by the Mountain Fresh jams and jellies of the Kalahan Educational Foundation (KEF), 
a member of UNAC working with the Kalahan people in the uplands of Nueva 
Vizcaya. As a rule, KEF only used 10% of harvestable fruits in the forest to ensure 
that they did not over-extract. By processing the fruits into jams and jellies, they 
could generate more income even as they kept their harvests at sustainable levels. For 
example, a kilo of raw guava fruit could be sold for PhP 25/kilo. But when converted 
to jams and jellies, a kilo of guava fruit made 5 bottles and could be sold at PhP 35 
each for a total gross income that is 700% more than selling the fresh fruit. 
This and other similar experiences made UMP conclude that processing and 
marketing edible forest products was a better intervention compared to raw material 
trading. However, this also had its challenges. As shown by the experience of KEF in 
trying to market their products, even with relatively low volumes, the local market 
was either too small to absorb the communities’ production or was not the appropriate 
market for the product. The more stable markets were found in the urban centers and 
Metro Manila remained the main market. This mode of engaging the market posed 
new challenges. This was characterized by Rene Guarin, founding Executive Director 
of UMFI:  
 
“The new situation shifted the problem from poor economic returns to 
affordability of market access for the communities. Because access to the market 
required establishing frequent transactions with the retailers and supermarket 
chains were located in urban centers, marketing became expensive for 
communities that were located far from these urban centers”. (Guarin, 2004) 
 
Aside from the distance, the communities also had problems specific to the transport 
and transportation facilities in their areas. The small volume they traded could not 
cover the cost of marketing even if the margins were high. Aside from the costs, the 
skills and orientation or attitude needed to effectively manage the retail chains proved 
very hard to find or instill in the communities’ representatives. Selling through the 
retail stores entailed waiting in line with other sellers before being entertained by the 
buyer. Deliveries of products, pick-up of returns, or bad stocks needed to follow 
specific schedules. Products delivered must be displayed properly, and cleaned 
regularly. Collections of payments were done on specific days and time schedules 
only. There was also the need to maintain good rapport with the buyers. Finally, there 
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was what the industry called the battle for shelf space in the supermarket outlets, 
entailing regular visits to ensure that one’s products were occupying shelf spaces that 
were adequate and visible – not on the lowest shelves or hidden behind other 
products. While a distributor would normally be tasked to do these functions, 
commercial distributors were not interested to carry CBE products to the mainstream 
markets. The small volumes, the distance of the producers from the markets, the 
uniqueness of the products coupled with the absence of promotional and advertising 
support, made the products unattractive to regular distributors. They did not see 
carrying these products as a profitable venture and neither would these distributors be 
in a position or have the inclination to provide the CBEs market information to 
enhance their products. UMFI was conceived to be this intermediary between the 
community-suppliers and the urban mainstream retail markets.  
 
4.3.  Inception Stage (2001-2003): Birth of a Market 
Intermediary Organization38 
 
With support from the Ford Foundation, US Agency for International 
Development (USAID), German Catholic Bishops’ Organisation for Development 
Cooperation (MISERIOR) and Interchurch Organisation for Development 
Cooperation (ICCO)39, the Upland Marketing Foundation Inc. (Upland Marketing or 
UMFI) was born in 2001 as the marketing arm-distributor of processed products from 
upland communities (please see Box 4.1 for full list of partners). 
 
4.3.1.  Supermarkets as Distribution Channel 
 
To make this a reality, UMFI invested in product development with its CBE 
partners and evolved a distribution system involving the major supermarkets all over 
the country. UMFI hired people from the consumer trade industry, made investments 
in delivery trucks and computerized their financial system. Their market outlets grew 
from 45 in the year 2000 to over 150 outlets in Metro Manila, Central Luzon and 
Southern Tagalog areas by 2003.  
Upland Marketing’s primary thrust for market development was towards the 
‘modern trade’ segment, given the observed shift by consumers to supermarkets 
versus the traditional wet markets, especially in the urban areas. It thus sought to 
                                                 
38Unless otherwise specified, this section was based on the documentation and recollection of UMFI’s experience by its 
founding Executive Director (Guarin 2004; 2009); interviews made by Marie Lisa Dacanay with the UMFI Chair 
(Derige, 2010); and interviews made by Rosalinda Roy with the UMFI Executive Director (Evangelista, 2011) and 
senior management staff (Fonollera, 2011).   
39 ICCO, the Interchurch Organization for Development Cooperation, is a Protestant church agency based in Holland. 
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develop relationships with the big retail chains in the country. These retail chains 
included SM, Shopwise, Robinson’s, Puregold, Landmark and Cherry Foodarama.40   
 
4.3.2.  Sustainability Strategies   
 
At first, the products of CBEs could not meet the volume that was needed to make 
the extensive distribution system profitable. Upland marketing then expanded its 
assistance to include lowland and coastal communities, exploring new products and 
assisting CBEs to produce the required quality for distribution in the supermarkets.   
 
Ramon Derige, Chairperson of UNAC and founding President of UMFI explained:  
 
“There have been no major changes in our orientation. In the beginning, it was to 
help poor upland communities develop and market their products. We expanded 
partner producers from upland to include lowland and coastal to maintain our 
market hold in supermarkets. We needed more quality products and bigger 
volumes, which could not be supplied solely by upland communities”. (Derige, 
2010)      
 
UMFI felt that it had to further expand the range and volume of products that it could 
offer to the retail chains and, in the process, realize economies of scale for its 
distribution system. It thus turned to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) as 
temporary partners. Products of partner SMEs included canned laing41, burong hipon 
(fermented shrimp), pancit canton (fried noodles) and organic vinegar. From 2001-
2003, the proportion of products from SMEs to CBEs was 80:20. Every year, UMFI 
also looked for a champion product to increase sales. In 2003, canned laing from an 
SME partner comprised 42% of its sales, effectively making it the champion product 
for the year. By that year, UMFI’s products from CBEs included organic rice, jams 
and jellies, bottled sardines, muscovado sugar, calamansi (local lemon) concentrate, 
and kaong/nata de coco42 from CBEs (Canlas, et al., 2007). 
However, Upland Marketing eventually encountered problems in marketing these 
SME products. Weak sales were observed for some products. There were also cases 
where the supplier was unable to produce enough to meet sales demand. For canned 
                                                 
40 The top three supermarket chains in the country were ShoeMart (SM) Supermarket, Robinsons Supermarket and 
Rustan Supermarket. These three accounted for 71% of the gross revenues of the leading supermarkets in 2006 as listed 
in the Philippines' Top 1000 Corporations (Macabasco, 2009).  Rustan’s also operated Shopwise. Puregold and Cherry 
Foodarama were relatively smaller chains. As of March 2010, Landmark had only two outlets. 
41 Laing is a special dish made of yam leaves sauted with meat or fish and cooked in coconut milk  
42 Kaong is sugar palm. Nata de coco is a jelly-like food product made from fermented coconut water. Both are 
commonly used for desserts and fruit salads. 
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laing over-ordering, and substantial sales returns led to misunderstandings and an 
eventual break down of Upland Marketing’s relationship with the supplier.  
Around this time, sales staff noticed an emerging trend in the retail outlets. Small 
sizes, i.e. 2-kilogram packs of commercial rice were selling well in the supermarkets.  
This gave UMFI the idea of marketing its partners’ organic rice in such sizes. Upland 
Marketing piloted the effort with the Pecuaria Development Cooperative, with 
assistance from the Philippine Development Assistance Program (PDAP). Upland 
Marketing sold the product to the chains under the brand name Healthy Rice.  
 
4.4.  Development Stage (2004-2010): CBE Development 
and Value Chain Management in Key Economic 
Subsectors  
 
4.4.1.  Repositioning UMFI  
 
In 2003-2004, UMFI’s Executive Director participated in a masteral course on 
social entrepreneurship where he enrolled Upland Marketing as his laboratory and 
developed a 5-year social enterprise plan. He led a change of perspective by 
introducing a new vision and strategy. The old and the new vision statements are 
shown below:  (Guarin, 2004) 
 
Old Vision:   
 
The leading organization in product and market development, distribution and 
marketing of processed food products from community-based enterprises. 
 
New Vision:   
 
Community-based enterprises as mechanisms for local economic development in 
marginalized communities through the generation of income and employment 
opportunities that are anchored on the processing/value-addition and marketing of 
local raw materials into high value and marketable products in local and mainstream 
markets.  
To help reach this vision, UMFI defined a three-pronged role (mission statement), as 
follows: 
 Provider of affordable access to appropriate technology, stable financial 
resources and growing markets to community-based enterprises; 
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 Provider of high-quality and healthy products to consumers; and 
 Advocate of Fair Trade in the mainstream markets. 
The shifts in strategies are shown in Table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2. Shifts in UMFI Strategies, 2004.  
 Old (2001-2003) New (2004-2010) 
Strategy-Capability and 
Competency 
Focused on product 
development, distribution 
oriented, and use of 
conventional sales 
Community-Based Ventures 
Sector-Industry focus for local 
area economic development 
Key Competency Ability to get new products and 
introduce these to outlets; 
Ability to manage and grow the 
enterprise; and 
Ability to deal with distribution 
channels. 
Ability to develop community 
ventures that are within a 
growing industry; and 
Ability to manage and harness 
local resources and potentials to 
effect local economic 
development. 
Strategy-Resources Focused on developing product 
quality, recipes, business 
systems and product specific 
promotion advertising 
Focus on developing specific 
industry sectors like markets 
for “healthy” consumer 
products 
 Ability to obtain and manage 
funds and activities to market 
products. 
Ability to obtain and manage 
data on industry-wide or sector-
focused business opportunities; 
and 
Ability to obtain and manage 
investment funds for CBEs. 
Source: Guarin, 2004 
 
The intention was to refocus UMFI efforts towards  
 
 Positioning on “healthy” products given its market study showing growth in 
demand for products that were fresh, safe to eat, did not contain chemicals or 
synthetic additives or products that had all natural ingredients and were 
naturally grown; 
 Looking for industries or sectors that had growth potential that would impact 
on helping CBEs in many communities grow, in the process identifying rice 
and muscovado sugar as meeting such criteria; and 
 Providing services covering the 3 critical components of market, technology 
and finance to effectively manage the whole value chain in these growth 
industries.    
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4.4.2. Organic Rice and Muscovado Sugar as Champion Products 
 
In line with the new set of strategies, UMFI conducted a product review. Kaong 
and nata de coco (see footnote 48) were assessed as having no ‘healthy features and 
attributes’. All other products were assessed to have varying levels of healthy features 
and attributes, mainly in terms of being organically grown and non-usage of 
preservatives in food processing. UMFI decided to focus on the products deemed as 
‘healthy’. At the same time, the growing local market for organic produce had 
boosted the share of organic rice, collectively marketed as “Healthy Rice”, from 22% 
of total sales in 2003 to 49% in 2004. The share of muscovado sugar, seen as a 
healthy alternative to white refined sugar, had risen from 3% of sales in 2003 to 9% in 
2004 (Guarin, 2004). 
These trends led to organic rice and muscovado sugar becoming entrenched as 
‘champion products’. UMFI was also able to increase the number of partner CBEs for 
the two products. By 2006, sales of the two products were accounting for 95% of total 
sales. In the meantime, sales of other products had declined. Sales of sardines had 
reached more than PhP 1 million in 2005, but growth or maintenance at this level was 
hampered by inconsistent supply. Canned laing and nata de coco/ kaong (see footnote 
47 and 48) were completely discontinued. Total sales more than doubled from PhP 
9.25 million in 2003 to PhP 25.6 million in 2006.  Within 2007 to 2009, the champion 
products, Muscovado and Healthy Rice, plus a new addition, High-Fiber Rice 
(unpolished rice), accounted for almost 100% of UMFI’s sales.43  
 
4.4.3.  Services to Community-Based Enterprises44 
 
UMFI’s primary relationship with CBEs was on technical assistance for 
enhancing market access through improvement in the product (production process, 
packaging, and labeling) and the marketing and distribution of products, mainly to 
Metro Manila. It had defined a set of strategies/services, consisting of the following:   
 
 CBE development: UMFI assisted partner CBEs in systems development 
product and research development, together with market development; 
 Re-packing/packaging of CBE products to make them ready for the market 
outlets; 
 Facilitating access to financing; and 
                                                 
43 Data on sales were taken from UMFI evaluation reports in 2007 and 2010. 
44 Unless otherwise specified, this section was based on the documentation and recollection of UMFI’s experience by its 
former Deputy Executive Director (Tacuyog, 2007; 2010); and interviews by Rosalinda Roy with UMFI Executive 
Director (Evangelista, 2011) and senior management staff (Fonollera, 2011).  
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 Value chain management, i.e. providing value-added inputs and activities along 
the chain. 
 
To systematically define the package of assistance necessary for each CBE, UMFI 
established a classification scheme for its partner CBEs. Based on various 
organizational, systems, product, and financial factors, CBEs were classified into 
three stages: start-up, build-up, and take-off or commercial scale.    
Assistance to CBEs on systems development was geared mainly towards 
improving their operations systems to ensure that products were of the quality 
required by the market. To assist product development, UMFI also ran a Research and 
Development (R&D) unit that developed an assortment of new products based on raw 
materials available in the CBEs’ communities. This included such items as various 
types of coffee mixes, red rice energy drink, and black rice noodles. However, by 
2010, the R&D had been largely put on hold because of the poor market performance 
of the new products as well as UMFI’s financial difficulties. One exception was coco 
sugar, which had generated market inquiries from abroad. 
Aside from distribution to the mainstream market, UMFI also started a strategy to 
supply the local markets, meaning the markets that were within reach of the CBEs 
themselves. This approach was developed based on observations that it would not be 
possible for all CBE products to gain access to supermarkets in Metro Manila, and 
that transport costs of products to Metro Manila were very expensive. The idea was 
for UMFI to “provide market outlets in key nodal points where there were sufficient 
CBE products which could be traded locally” (Canlas, et al., 2007). The main vehicle 
for this was the Enterprise Development Center or EDC. The EDC was intended to 
provide capacity building, and linkaging assistance to CBEs, and featured a 
store/display center for products. Two EDCs, one in Mindoro and another in Nueva 
Vizcaya, were operating in 2010 (External Evaluation Report, 2010). While the EDCs 
and the local markets were being developed, the emphasis was still on the mainstream 
market. 
Financing was a major concern for UMFI and its partner CBEs, particularly since 
the supermarkets had payment terms ranging from 45 days (but with goods on 
consignment) to 90 days. To resolve this problem, UMFI tried to install financing 
mechanisms. The Social Enterprise Finance Facility (SEFF) was introduced in 2008 
as an in-house mechanism for providing financing to CBEs. However, this 
mechanism – which involved UMFI’s contracting loans itself and engaging directly in 
financing to CBEs – did not prove to be financially viable, at least within the short 
term. Another scheme involved a partnership with the Federation of Peoples’ 
Sustainable Development Cooperative (FPSDC). Under this agreement, FPSDC 
released advances to selected CBEs in the form of loans, and UMFI directly paid back 
FPSDC for the amount owed by the CBEs after the orders had been delivered to 
 140 
UMFI. Still, timely financing remained a major concern towards meeting the delivery 
and price requirements of the market. 
Value chain development was a major strategy for the champion products – 
organic rice and muscovado sugar – and was expected to be a concern for coco sugar 
as well. Aside from interventions illustrated in the Kooperatibang Likas ng Nueva 
Ecija (KOOL – NE) and Pecuaria Development Cooperative cases (please see Box 
4.2. and 4.3. respectively), UMFI was involved in a collective effort to develop the 
value chains for muscovado sugar and organic rice in the Philippines. This effort was 
spearheaded by the Interchurch Organisation for Development Cooperation (ICCO), 
whose Value Chain Development Program Coordinator was Rene Guarin, former 
Executive Director of UMFI. The organic rice group for Luzon, for instance, was 
awaiting the results of a research that could possibly provide insights for growing the 
market for organic rice in the country.   
UMFI also provided services to development organizations, both non-
governmental and governmental, in product development, distribution and marketing.   
One major partner was the Department of Agrarian Reform – Bureau of Agrarian 
Reform Beneficiaries Development (DAR – BARBD), which it assisted in the 
development of agrarian reform communities. 
 
4.4.4.  Upland Marketing’s Role and Development Model   
 
Upland Marketing was conceived to play a specific, rather than a comprehensive 
role in promoting development in the uplands and other rural poor communities.  
Upland Marketing worked with intermediary organizations, many of them UNAC 
members who had established programs that were directly organizing and capacitating 
target groups within the framework of sustainable area development. The partnership 
engagement called for Upland Marketing’s input to improve production-marketing 
linkages mainly through technology/production enhancement and market access.  
This partnership was formalized through a memorandum of agreement where UMFI’s 
role to improve market access was defined (Canlas, et al., 2007).  
Upland Marketing’s conception of its role was best captured by what it considered 
to be its development model. This development model aimed at “bridging the market 
divide” (Upland Marketing Foundation Inc., 2010). The model proceeded from an 
analysis of what community-based enterprises (CBEs) faced as primary barriers for 
entry to mainstream markets. These barriers included the following: 
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 In relation to CBE capacity, difficulties in: determining and meeting quality 
standards for product marketability, supply capacity, product pricing, and permits/ 
licenses/taxes;  
 In terms of distribution infrastructure, logistics support: lack of access to 
affordable product transport, product warehousing/redistribution/tracking, and 
trade maintenance; and  
 In relation to the market: trade policies, practices and perception: terms and 
conditions (payments, delivery, pull-outs), market entry costs and fees, and 
inability to meet quality and supply regularity requirements. 
 
At the initiation stage, Upland Marketing conceived of a development model whereby 
community-based enterprises (CBEs) were assisted in terms of technology 
development (product development, business/management systems), financial 
services (for working capital and equipment/facilities upgrade), and market services  
(market information, distribution of products).   
This model was refined at the start of the development stage, clarifying that the 
assistance to CBEs was directed at their becoming vehicles for local economic 
development. During the latter part of the development stage, this was further refined 
to focus resources not only in assisting individual CBEs but assisting clusters of CBEs 
in selected economic subsectors with growth potential. This would entail assistance to 
facilitate the participation of these clusters of CBEs in value chain management.  
Assistance in value chain management would include relevant aspects of research and 
development; input sourcing, production, distribution, and sales and marketing 
inclusive of access to customer service/market feedback. 
Community-based enterprises or CBEs took a variety of organizational forms.  
CBEs at their early stage of development were usually self-help or producers’ groups 
that later evolved to become associations or cooperatives as they matured.   
The stories of KOOL-NE and the Pecuaria Development Cooperative contained in 
Boxes 4.2., and 4.3., respectively, illustrate UMFI’s partnership with CBEs in the 
organic rice subsector. Both of these stories underscore the roles of other development 
organizations in comprehensively assisting UMFI partner CBEs, specifically in 
organizational development and the practice of organic farming or sustainable 
agriculture. The Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM), and the 
Philippine Partnership for the Development of Human Resources in Rural Areas 
(PhilDHRRA), both non-government development organizations, were responsible 
for organizing and enabling the development of KOOL-NE and Pecuaria, 
respectively, while UMFI mainly provided the CBEs access to markets. The various 
services they delivered to CBEs were geared towards ensuring market access.   
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    Box 4.1: UMFI Partners During Development Stage 
    Sources:  Guarin, 2009; Derige, 2010; www.umfi.org 
 Interchurch Organisation for Development Cooperation (ICCO): one of the six Dutch co-financing 
organizations with funds from the Dutch government and the European Union organizations; funding 
partner of UMFI; also spearheaded value chain development for organic rice and muscovado sugar. 
 OIKO Credit: a pioneer in the field of development financing with a network of Regional Offices 
globally including in Asia; supported organizations that promote fair trade, sustainable agriculture and 
community development; provided working capital loan for UMFI marketing activities and the SEFF. 
 DOEN Foundation: Netherlands-based foundation which provided capital fund for the Social 
Enterprise Finance Facility or SEFF; the link was made through the Non-Timber Forest Products 
(NTFP) Exchange Programme. 
 Federation of Peoples’ Sustainable Development Cooperative: used to be the Central Loan Fund (CLF) 
under the Philippine Development Assistance Program (PDAP), which grew to a network of PDAP’s 
affiliate organizations providing financial and non-financial services to marginalized sectors; acted as a 
major source of financing for UMFI’s partner CBEs. 
 Peace and Equity Foundation: Philippine-based funder of development programs; provided funds for 
program support. 
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Box 4.2. KOOL – NE 
Sources: PRRM, 2011; PHILCOMDEV, 2009; Palomo, 2011; UMFI, 2011 
 
The Kooperatibang Likas ng Nueva Ecija (KOOL-NE) is a cooperative established in 2002 
as a joint venture of the Kalipunan ng mga Magsasaka para sa Likas-Kayang Sakahan sa Nueva 
Ecija (KALIKASAN-NE), and the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM) to 
support sustainable rice production and marketing. KOOL-NE, and KALIKASAN-NE had grown 
within PRRM’s community development work with small farmers in Nueva Ecija since the late 
1980s. PRRM, a non-government development organization, had implemented the Sustainable 
Rural District Development Program, which encompassed community organizing, livelihood and 
enterprise development, community-based natural resource management, basic social services 
systems development, and local development advocacy.   
Work with the farmers had started with organizing and the introduction of low external input 
sustainable agriculture (LEISA). As the farmers’ organizations grew stronger, they decided to 
organize the KALIKASAN-NE, a provincial federation of sustainable agriculture practitioners 
and advocates. LEISA eventually progressed to organic farming, and in later years, the adoption 
of diversified and integrated farming systems. Marlon Palomo, chair of KOOL – NE, estimated 
that the farmer’s gain from the shift from conventional to organic farming alone was around PhP 
6,000 to 8,000 per hectare. 
KALIKASAN–NE eventually decided that it needed an enterprise arm, which led to the birth 
of KOOL–NE. It grew to 130 members, and has been recognized as one of the outstanding 
cooperatives of Nueva Ecija. KOOL-NE offered micro-finance services to both members and 
non-members alike, and provided support services to its farmer members. These included 
alternative trading and marketing, specifically the procurement and trading of organically grown 
rice.   
KOOL–NE had been a partner of UMFI since 2003. According to Marlon Palomo, chair of 
KOOL-NE, UMFI had assisted the former in various aspects, as follows: 
 
 Facilitation of capital both for agricultural loans and for the trading and milling 
operations (either from UMFI or, in later years, from UMFI’s partner, the Federation of 
Peoples’ Sustainable Development Cooperative or FPSDC); 
 Assistance in organic certification of farms; 
 Oversight in the milling process to ensure product quality;  
 Repacking of rice for retail; and 
 Marketing to the retail chains, as part of the “Healthy Rice” line under the “Farms and 
Cottages” brand. 
 
There was a tripartite financing agreement among KOOL-NE, UMFI and FPSDC. FPSDC 
released advances to KOOL-NE in the form of loans. KOOL-NE then provided organic rice to 
UMFI valued at agreed-on prices. Payments to FPSDC for the amount owed by KOOL-NE were 
made by UMFI. There were times when UMFI’s payments to FPSDC would be delayed, creating 
complications down the line. (Palomo, 2011)   
UMFI, KOOL-NE and other social enterprises and social enterprise resource institutions 
were involved in an effort to develop the organic rice value chain in Luzon, led by the 
Interchurch Organisation for Development Cooperation (ICCO), whose Value Chain 
Development Program Coordinator was Rene Guarin, former Executive Director of UMFI.    
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Box 4.3: Pecuaria Development Cooperative, Inc. 
Sources:  PDAP, 2010; UMFI, 2010, 2011; Canlas et. al., 2007  
 
The Pecuaria Development Cooperative, Inc. (PDCI), UMFI’s largest single supplier for 
organic rice, was based in the province of Camarines Sur. The farmer members of PDCI were 
agrarian reform beneficiaries who had been awarded 817 hectares of what used to be an estate in 
1991. As vividly described in an article on the website of the Philippine Development Assistance 
Programme (or PDAP – a consortium of NGOs promoting rural enterprise development for poverty 
reduction), PDCI’s development from its inception to the stable organization that it eventually 
became, was “touch and go” and “trial and error”. Along the way, PDCI was able to obtain 
assistance from several development organizations. 
The farmers were organized by an NGO, PhilDHRRA (Philippine Partnership for the 
Development of Human Resources in Rural Areas) under its TriPARRD (Tripartite Partnership for 
Agrarian Reform and Rural Development) Program. This opened the doors for government 
agricultural support, so much so that “the farmers found themselves at the receiving end of projects 
that they did not have a clue about then; a loan for a rice enterprise and warehouse in 1993; a loan 
for cattle raising in 1995 that got restructured into a reforestation scheme and is now due for write-
off; a bamboo project; and a nursery site” (PDAP, 2010). Most of the projects did not prosper. As 
assessed by the farmers, they lacked experience and careful study on these projects, plus some 
projects were not appropriate (e.g. the cattle raising project where it turned out that the cows from 
Australia could not adapt to the environment at the site). 
In 1994, the farmers ventured into organic rice farming with the assistance of MASIPAG, an 
NGO promoting organic rice technology, and KOSOG, another NGO that provided training to an 
initial group of seven farmer-leaders. These groups were instrumental in facilitating PDAP’s support 
through Magsaka-Ka, a farmers’ federation. To upscale MASIPAG, 86 farmers who were on various 
levels of shifting to organic farming were provided with credit assistance worth PhP 10,000 per 
hectare. From 1998 to 1999, PDAP provided financial support for the procurement of facilities and 
equipment, coursed technical assistance for the production of bio-organic fertilizer, and extended a 
PhP 2 million grant to help PDCI establish its Agri-Credit scheme which provided a revolving loan 
fund for farmers’ organic rice production. These boosted the PDCI farmers’ capacity to increase the 
coverage of organic rice. The demonstration of benefits from organic farming in turn encouraged 
other farmers to adopt the technology.    
PDAP also provided assistance to facilitate research, training and technical assistance to the 
farmers. Agriculturists were hired as staff members and soon, PDCI developed its own white and 
‘sampaguita red’ organic rice varieties called ‘Pecuaria selections’. PDAP then linked PDCI to 
UMFI, which facilitated PDCI’s identification and development of the primary products, and its 
positioning as a player in the industry. Exposure to trade fairs helped improve the products’ 
packaging, and allowed the farmers to know the buying and eating preferences of the clientele, 
which they put into what they later dubbed as ‘value-added marketing’. By the late 2000s, PDCI was 
delivering 80% of its rice stock to UMFI, with the balance of 20% sold in the local area. In 2009, 
UMFI purchased PhP 8.5 million worth of rice from PDCI. From 2003 to 2009, purchases from 
PDCI had totaled PhP 46.75 million.  
By 2010, PDCI had a total membership of 766 farmers. By the end of December 2009, it had an 
asset base of PhP 34.2 million. 
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4.5.  Financial and Social Outcomes 
 
4.5.1.  Financial Outcomes 
 
Starting with annual sales of PhP 1.8 million in 2001, UMFI had experienced 
sustained growth, reaching PhP 37 million in 2009. However, gross income from 
sales had only been at 17 to 20% of sales from 200445 until 2008. In 2008, the cost of 
sales was brought down to 75% (hence gross income was 25%) when UMFI was able 
to institute higher selling prices at the height of the rice crisis. The year 2008 was also 
the first year that a positive income (amounting to PhP 189,000) was registered for 
business operations (UMFI, 2008; 2010). 
The gross margin percentage was sustained for 2009, and UMFI had managed to 
keep expenses at around 25% of sales since 2006. However, interest, general and 
administrative expenses rose significantly, leading to a net loss in business operations 
of PhP 1.8 million for the year (based on UMFI data, 2008, 2010). An evaluation 
report in 2010 noted that other factors for the loss were damages to stocks due to a 
strong typhoon, as well as the “docking system of some supermarkets impacted 
negatively on UMFI operations46” (External Evaluation Report, 2010).   
Figure 4.1. shows UMFI’s sales and gross income for 2004-2009. Figure 4.2. 
shows UMFI’s total revenues and net income for the same period. Total revenues 
were mainly from sales with some interest income and income from miscellaneous 
sources such as consultancy services.  
UMFI, up to the time of the research, was financially unstable, and except for 
2008, had a negative net income from 2001-2009. While it had generally sustained 
growth in sales, it had not grown optimally because of not having enough capital to 
finance purchases of products from partners. This was to a large extent a function of 
the payment terms dictated by the supermarkets. Despite their setting up an Enterprise 
Financing Facility in 2007, and having contracted a substantial volume of loans, they 
had not generated enough social investments to fully finance their purchases from 
partner CBEs to ensure no stock-outs and to meet the growing demand especially of 
muscovado and organic rice. For the past few years, UMFI had in fact paid penalties, 
as they could not make deliveries to supermarkets due to financial difficulties.  
While UMFI could have done more in terms of achieving more efficient 
operations, the negative impact of what was considered as normal industry practice of 
                                                 
45 Details of financial statements for the business operations are only available for 2004 to 2009. Complete audited 
financial statements are only available for 2006 to 2009. 
46 The ‘docking system’ referred to the delivery and internal distribution system of the supermarket. This problem 
referred specifically to SM. UMFI had previously been able to deliver goods directly to the SM branches. SM changed 
its system such that deliveries had to be made to a central site, i.e. a ‘dock’, with SM itself taking care of the delivery to 
its branches. UMFI observed that returns increased during this period. To address this problem, UMFI had deployed 
merchandisers in the branches who would ensure that the branches were receiving adequate supplies (Fonollera, 2011) 
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supermarkets - paying their suppliers late while penalizing them for lack of deliveries, 
were major issues from a stakeholder management perspective. As stakeholders, 
supermarkets recognized UMFI as a reliable supplier of organic and healthy products.  
However, supermarkets, as distribution channels in the mainstream market, treated 
UMFI no differently from the way they treated their other suppliers.    
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. UMFI, Sales and Gross Income, 2004 – 2009.  
Sources:  UMFI Audited Financial Statements, 2007, 2009; UMFI unpublished documents: financial 
statement worksheets, 2004 – 2006; 2007 Evaluation Report; 2010 Evaluation Report. 
 
As a development institution, UMFI also generated funds from grants and other 
support funds, and used such funds for various program support activities including 
product development, market development, CBE, and value chain development. Grant 
funds also supported institutional management and some administrative costs of the 
business operations, especially during the inception and early development stages.  
From 2006 to 2009, UMFI had access to grant funds averaging approximately PhP 5.4 
million per year (consisting of both restricted and unrestricted funds) (UMFI, 2008, 
2010). 
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Figure 4.2. UMFI, Total Revenues and Net Income, 2004 – 2009. Sources:  UMFI Audited 
Financial Statements, 2009, 2007; UMFI unpublished documents:  financial statement worksheets, 
2004 – 2006; 2007 Evaluation Report; 2010 Evaluation Report. 
 
In terms of the market, UMFI’s Healthy Rice had been recognized as a leading 
brand in supermarkets, although it had experienced intense competition from other 
social and commercial enterprises in recent years. However, it still had to optimize its 
extensive distribution system (involving 300 outlets at the time of the research) in 
major supermarkets nationwide to ensure that it reached financial sustainability.   
 
4.5.2.  Social Outcomes 
An External Review commissioned by ICCO in May-June 2007 confirmed that 
UMFI’s target groups for its development interventions consisted of various segments 
of the poor such as small farmers (mostly agrarian reform beneficiaries), indigenous 
peoples and fishers. These target groups were organized into community-based 
enterprises usually taking the form of cooperatives (Canlas, et al., 2007). 
As of June 2010, there were 23 community-based enterprises (CBEs) that 
regularly supplied organic rice, muscovado sugar and other products to UMFI for 
distribution to the mainstream supermarket outlets. In addition, there were 21 CBEs 
that supplied products to local markets through UMFI’s Enterprise Development 
Centers in Oriental Mindoro and Nueva Vizcaya. The combined total of 44 CBEs 
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UMFI did not monitor their impact at the household level mainly because of the 
assumption that the primary development organizations, i.e. the community-based 
enterprises, working at the target group level were already doing that (Canlas, et al., 
2007).    
The former Deputy Executive Director in 2010, who was in charge of the 
financing facility and capacity development programs for CBEs at the time, estimated 
their impact on household incomes:    
 
“Among our partner producers and suppliers, about 1/3 have experienced 
substantive increases in incomes through their participation in their respective 
CBEs. The incomes derived by the other 2/3 from their respective CBEs have 
not been regularized”. (Tacuyog, 2010)    
 
The sectors who had experienced substantive increases in incomes were mainly 
partners in the organic rice and muscovado value chains. Interviews with UMFI 
partners in the organic rice subsector provide an indication of the extent and sources 
of such income increases:  
 
 Angel Albo of the Samahang Likas Kayang Pagsaka, in Calapan Oriental 
Mindoro, used to make PhP 10,000/season before partnership with UMFI but 
now made PhP 25,000/season. This was in addition to what he set aside for 
food from his harvest and the additional income he got from their sari-sari 
store, poultry raising, vegetable production and fish pond culture. (Albo, 2010) 
 Jethel Kapunan of the Coop Sto Nino in South Cotabato used to make PhP 
10,000 - PhP 12,000/hectare from conventional farming but now made PhP 
60,000/hectare from organic farming (Capunan, 2010) 
 Miller Bicaldo of Pecuaria Development Cooperative used to make PhP 
30,000/cropping from organic farming but with UMFI support, now made PhP 
50,000/cropping in addition to the 15 bags he regularly set aside for the family.  
He also made PhP 65,000/harvest 3X a year from his poultry in addition to 
making PhP 97,500 from chicken dung (Bicaldo, 2010). 
 
Much of the impact attributed to UMFI related to increased access to technology and 
markets leading to increased incomes. This was because UMFI’s role, in the overall 
strategy of development among UNAC members, was in the area of market access.  
Within UNAC, different members were supposed to play different roles. UMFI was 
envisioned to focus on the marketing intermediation aspect of intervention in the 
context of advancing a holistic development strategy for partner communities.          
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4.6.  Upland Marketing and Social Entrepreneurship 
 
4.6.1.  Upland Marketing as SEPPS 
 
Upland Marketing manifests the characteristics of a SEPPS as defined in Section 
2.5, using a Donaldson and Preston’s (1995) normative approach. Firstly, Upland 
Marketing’s primary stakeholders are poor producers from upland, lowland and 
coastal communities. Its main mandate is to assist these marginalized producers 
develop their products and provide them access to markets. Secondly, Upland 
Marketing generates wealth from the sale of the products of its partner community-
based enterprise (CBE) suppliers. Much of the wealth generated is from the sale of 
what it calls its champion products - organic rice and muscovado sugar. The wealth it 
generates from selling organic rice and muscovado sugar seeks to make its product 
development and marketing service to its marginalized producer partners financially 
viable. As the President of Upland Marketing articulated, “We believe our existence is 
really based on social objectives. For sustainability, we have to earn profits” (Derige, 
2010). Thirdly, a significant part of the wealth Upland Marketing generates is 
distributed to its producer partners through the payment of a fair price transparently 
negotiated between them. As a non-stock, non-profit organization, it is bound by law 
to use all its income from operations for the fulfillment of its social mission. It also 
generates other resources in the form of grants and loans to provide its supplier 
partners’ technical and financial services.   
Supermarkets as mainstream market channels impose many unfavorable industry 
practices that have had a grave impact on Upland Marketing’s financial viability. So 
at most, Upland Marketing has just managed to partially cover its costs, while relying 
on grants to finance its value chain services to its partner CBEs. Upland Marketing’s 
problem dramatizes a major issue faced by SEPPS serving mainstream markets in the 
Philippines.  
 
4.6.2.   SEPPS in a Developing Country Context 
 
How does the developing country context of the Philippines affect or shape 
Upland Marketing as SEPPS? The theme of SEPPS as a response to the failure of 
market and state institutions to serve the needs of the poor in the Philippines is echoed 
by the story of Upland Marketing.     
Tracing the history of Upland Marketing as discussed in Sections 4.2 to 4.4, it has 
been the failure of the mainstream market and state institutions to provide market 
access and sustainable livelihoods to poor producers that have been the driving force 
for Upland Marketing’s existence. The failure of state institutions could be seen in the 
policy-action gap in social forestry and agrarian reform related to building sustainable 
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livelihoods of upland communities. The latter provided the context for UMFI’s 
interventions. 
Over time, government agencies played a legitimizing though minimal role in 
pursuing social enterprise development. Government’s social forestry and agrarian 
reform programs provided arenas for cooperation between UNAC, UMFI, the 
Department of Environment and Natural Resources as well as the Department of 
Agrarian Reform.   
The failure of market institutions to serve the needs of the poor was dramatized by 
Upland Marketing’s story in different ways: 
 
 Mainstream traders and upland communities refused to engage directly with each 
other in trading agricultural produce. Farmers considered traders ‘heartless’ with 
their unwillingness to give farmers consideration in meeting volume, quality and 
delivery requirements; and 
 Upland communities were unable to reconcile meeting volume requirements of 
commodity trading (e.g. rattan) and sustainable forest use. 
 
As an organization engaged in social entrepreneurship, a number of stakeholders 
played enabling roles through its initiation and development stages. Enabling 
stakeholders of UMFI included: 
 
 Development organizations comprising the Upland NGO Assistance 
Committee, the initiators who were represented in the governing board, and 
actively worked with UMFI as their marketing service NGO; 
 Partner organizations such as NGOs, cooperative federations and some 
government agencies like the Department of Agrarian Reform, who worked 
directly with the target group organizations, providing support in terms of 
production, organizational development, and advocacy; and 
 Enabling development agencies mainly from Europe, such as ICCO, 
Oikocredit, DOEN, which provided grants, loans and technical expertise; in the 
Philippines, these included the Peace and Equity Foundation and the FPSDC. 
 
Unlike the case of Alter Trade, where the market institutions in its stakeholder 
environment enacted enabling roles, the key market institutions in UMFI’s 
stakeholder environment had on balance served disabling roles. The prices and other 
terms offered by the supermarkets, combined with their inordinate power in the 
marketplace, have had a negative impact on UMFI. As shown by UMFI’s financial 
data in Section 4.5.1, these were already having an adverse effect on the liquidity, 
profitability, and overall sustainability of UMFI and its partner CBEs.   
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4.6.3.   SEPPS and Social Entrepreneurship  
 
The Upland Marketing story seems to demonstrate the limitations and dilemmas 
of the social enterprise or earned income school of social entrepreneurship (Dees and 
Anderson, 2006; Defourny and Nyssens, 2010) when pursued by a SEPPS in a 
developing country context. As explained in Section 1.2., this school of thought 
espouses market-based solutions to social  problems  (Dees and Anderson, 2006) and 
promotes the idea that business methods are an effective way to improve non-profit 
orgnanizations (Hoogendoorn, 2009). SEPPS would find it particularly difficult to 
pursue market-based solutions in developing country contexts when confronted with 
mainstream market practices that are imposed by dominant players or taken for 
granted as acceptable even if they are unethical or unfavorable to the poor. Unlike 
governments that are formally accountable and therefore subject to public pressure, 
private enterprise players or market channels may be more difficult to make 
accountable.   
The creation of Upland Marketing did help a number of CBEs to gain access to 
the modern trade segment of the mainstream market, i.e. supermarkets. However, 
Upland Marketing’s role as intermediary has become unsustainable and may continue 
to be so without a clear agenda for change. While UMFI sought to practice the fair 
trade principle of partial pre-financing of production and prompt payment on 
deliveries among partner suppliers, it has had to contend with the normal, accepted 
practice of supermarkets paying UMFI only after 60-120 days and/or accepting its 
products only on consignment.   
The continuing problems with the supermarket chains raise the issue of 
advocating for fair trade as an expression of corporate social responsibility. The 
Philippine Business for Social Progress (PBSP), as a founding institution of UNAC, 
was a recognized institution promoting corporate citizenship among businesses in the 
Philippines. PBSP, had in the past, facilitated dialogue between marginalized 
communities and corporations and in some cases, achieved success in improving the 
terms of trade in favor of small producers (Derige, 2010). Such a type of intervention, 
applied to UMFI, could evolve a model for the interface between a social enterprise 
and a business practicing corporate social responsibility in pursuit of poverty 
reduction. Unless such a model becomes reality or substantive increases in social 
investments are generated, UMFI’s financial health would remain a major problem.  If 
such is not given a solution, its financial health would continue to get in the way of 
effectively performing its role as marketing intermediary and service provider to 
CBEs, to the detriment of its intended social agenda among the poor.   
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4.7. Upland Marketing from a Stakeholder Perspective 
 
4.7.1.  The Poor as UMFI’s Primary Stakeholders  
 
As discussed in Section 4.2, Upland Marketing was principally set up to assist 
“poor upland communities develop and market their products” (Derige, 2010). When 
the UMFI was formally established in 2001, their poor stakeholders expanded to 
small producers in lowland and coastal communities. This was initially due to the 
need for a bigger pool of producers to “maintain our market hold in supermarkets. We 
needed more quality products and bigger volumes, which could not be supplied solely 
by upland communities” (Derige, 2010). This expansion was consistent with the 
UMFI’s aim to help marginalized communities. 
Upland Marketing’s direct partners were actually the community-based 
enterprises, the organizations of the poor and marginalized producers. Grace Tacuyog, 
former Deputy Executive Director of UMFI articulated:  
 
“Our main stakeholders are the cooperatives and people’s organizations from 
marginalized communities, who serve as our producers and suppliers”. (Tacuyog, 
2010) 
 
As discussed in Section 4.6.1, the poor may be considered UMFI’s primary 
stakeholders from a normative perspective (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). However, 
UMFI worked with these small producers through community-based enterprises 
(CBEs) that it did not directly organize, unlike Alter Trade in its base province of 
Negros Occidental. These CBEs, like KOOL-NE and Pecuaria Development 
Cooperative featured in Boxes 4.2. and 4.3. were usually organized and assisted by 
other non-government organizations (NGOs) implementing sustainable area 
development programs (Canlas, et al., 2010). From UMFI’s perspective, these CBEs 
were the embodiment of the poor as its primary stakeholders.   
 
4.7.2.  No Essential Role Change: The Poor as Transactional 
Partners 
 
Using Mintzberg’s (2007) framework of organizational stages in strategy 
formation, UMFI may be characterized as being in the development stage after a pre-
initiation and initiation stage from 1992-2000 and 2001-2003, respectively. Table 4.3. 
outlines the key organizational developments, the evolving roles of the CBEs as 
embodiment of the poor, and the nature of the services that UMFI delivered to the 
CBEs.   
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From the initiation to the development stage, the main role of partner CBEs had 
been as suppliers providing products to the market. From the initiation stage, partner 
CBEs had been assisted in terms of technology, financing and market access. These 
were geared towards improving their capacities to meet the quality, quantity and 
delivery requirements of the supermarkets and the customers in these supermarkets. 
The services provided by UMFI could be described as transactional services. Aside 
from product distribution, these services were mainly in terms of product 
development, organizational systems development related to generating the product 
(e.g. improvement of production systems), and financing mainly for working capital.    
During the development stage, the partners were engaged in transparent 
negotiations for fair prices, with the most advanced playing roles in value chain 
management. Examples of these advanced partners were the KOOL-NE and Pecuaria 
Development Cooperative featured in Box 4.2 and 4.3. These two cooperatives were 
directly involved in the organic rice cluster (spearheaded by Interchurch Organization 
for International Development Cooperation or ICCO), where UMFI was also a 
member. The cluster was organized to scale up the development of the organic rice 
subsector in the country. However, except for undertaking studies, no other cluster 
initiatives were evident by the time of the research.  
On the whole, one would note that there was no substantive role change among 
the poor, at least within the UMFI system. Still, even as the poor remained as 
transactional partners, there was an increase in their level of participation in planning 
and decision-making as supplier-partners over time. 
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Table 4.3. Evolution of Roles and Services Among the Poor: Upland Marketing Foundation, Inc. 
 Pre-Inception (1992-2000) to 
Inception Stage (2001-2003): 
Experimenting as Intermediary of 
the Poor with Mainstream Markets 
Development Stage (2004-2010): CBE 
Development and Value Chain 
Management in Key Economic 
Subsectors 
Key 
Organizational 
Developments 
Initiation of Upland Marketing 
Program by UNAC 
 Attempts to link producers to 
buyers, and later to act as active 
‘go-between’ or intermediary, 
ensuring that CBEs met market 
requirements and got fair returns 
from buyers; and 
 Commodity trading at the start of 
the program, shifting to product 
marketing with retail chains as 
primary distribution channels 
 
Establishment of UMFI 
 Installation of distribution system 
geared towards serving retail 
chains; 
 Expansion to include partners and 
products from lowland and coastal 
areas; and 
 Expansion to include products of 
privately-owned SMEs 
 
 Repositioning of UMFI 
o Re-affirmation of CBEs as 
primary stakeholders and 
suppliers; and 
o Focus on ‘healthy products’ 
 Emergence of Organic Rice and 
Muscovado Sugar as champion 
products 
 Provision of services to community-
based enterprises 
o From enterprise development 
(support to individual 
enterprises) to value chain 
development/management 
focused on champion products 
o Initiation of complementary 
strategy of local enterprise 
development 
 
Plans for 2011 – onwards: 
 Development of coco sugar as 
potential additional champion 
product 
 Exploration of institutional markets 
(e.g. hotel and restaurant industry) 
Roles of the 
poor - 
marginalized 
producers 
from upland, 
lowland and 
coastal areas 
organized into 
CBEs 
 Suppliers of products   Suppliers of products, engaged in 
transparent negotiations for fair terms 
of trade; and 
 Partners in value chain development 
and management, focused on 
champion products. 
Services to 
CBEs 
 Marketing access; 
 Technology development; and 
 Financing 
 
 Marketing, technology and financing 
access; and 
 Value chain development for 
champion products (see Box 4.2. and 
4.3. on KOOL-NE and Pecuaria 
Development Cooperative for 
examples) 
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Table 4.3.a.  Participation of the Poor in Governance and Management of Core and Allied 
Organizations of Upland Marketing Foundation Inc. 
 Initiation Stage Development Stage 
Participation  in core organization(s) 
 
Participation  in allied 
organization(s) 
None  
 
Members of General 
Assembly and Board of 
supplier cooperatives or 
associations 
None 
 
Members of General 
Assembly and Board of 
supplier cooperatives or 
associations 
 
4.7.3.  Roots of the Poor Remaining as Transactional Partners 
 
Increasing the level of participation of the supplier partners in the enterprise and 
the value chain may be directly attributable to UMFI’s program for capacitating 
supplier-partners in community-based enterprise and value chain management. This 
program had funding support from ICCO. 
The absence of a distinct role change for the poor from the initiation to 
development stages may be seen mainly as a function of the organizational mandate 
of UMFI as an intermediary marketing organization in the context of the broader 
network strategy of UNAC. Upland Marketing was consciously part of a more 
comprehensive strategy of a network of agencies pursuing sustainable development.  
The transactional services related to marketing intermediation were thus meant to be 
provided, not necessarily in isolation, but side by side with what may be called 
transformational services delivered by other partner agencies. This may be likened to 
Alter Trade’s assumption in its early years vis-à-vis the Negros Council for People’s 
Development – that other development organizations would assist, organize, and 
capacitate the poor, and that Alter Trade Corporation would concentrate on creating 
market access. In the case of UMFI, the other non-government development 
organizations in and beyond UNAC continue to assist partner CBEs in various aspects 
of organizational and sustainable development. This may be seen in the roles of 
PRRM for KOOL-NE; and PhilDHRRA, Masipag and PDAP for Pecuaria 
Development Corporation narrated in Boxes 4.2. and 4.3., respectively. In this sense, 
the increased capacities of KOOL-NE and Pecuaria Development Corporation, to be 
in a position to serve as engines for local economic development and co-managers in 
value chain management, may not be fully attributable to UMFI.  
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4.7.4.  Impact of No Role Change on the Poor 
 
In terms of outreach and qualitative impact on the poor, it can be observed that, 
similar to the Alter Trade Balangon system, UMFI had a substantial outreach of 
almost 3,000 households through their partner CBEs. However, the depth of impact 
was still unclear, and the number who had actually experienced sustainable income 
increases was only estimated at one-third of the total. In general, social impact among 
the poor may be assessed to have remained largely at the level of access to financial 
and market services.   
It is noteworthy that interviews with organic rice farmers from UMFI’s partner 
CBEs showed that it was the multiple sources of income from their pursuit of 
sustainable agriculture-related initiatives that moved them out of poverty, not just the 
trading of organic rice with Upland Marketing. These initiatives in sustainable 
agriculture resulted from the organic rice farmers’ partnership with other non-
government organizations or NGOs as exemplified by the other partnerships evident 
in the featured experiences of KOOL-NE and the Pecuaria Development Cooperative 
in Boxes 4.2. and 4.3, respectively. These other NGOs had integrated programs to 
organize farmers into cooperatives practicing sustainable agriculture. UMFI was 
actually asked by these NGOs and farmers cooperatives to assist specifically with 
marketing. The outcomes manifested by these organic rice partners therefore may be 
considered a special case resulting from a combination of the services provided by 
UMFI and the more comprehensive set of development services, including what may 
be considered transformational services, provided by the other NGOs. 
 
4.7.5.  Collaborative Stakeholder Engagement Strategy 
 
Using Mintzberg’s (2007) theory of strategy formation, UMFI’s intended and 
realized strategy of engagement with the producer groups as primary stakeholders can 
be likened to Alter Trade’s realized strategy of engagement with the Balangon 
farmers during the initiation to development stages. In both cases, the roles enacted by 
the poor as supplier partners were mainly transactional in nature. In both cases, the 
nature of services provided by Alter Trade and UMFI were essentially transactional in 
nature as they were geared mainly towards helping the supplier partners meet the 
quality and volume requirements of their prospective markets. In both cases, the key 
engagement processes were partnership building and collaboration. As in the case of 
Alter Trade with the Balangon banana growers, this type of stakeholder engagement 
strategy may be partially likened to the collaboration model of stakeholder 
engagement of Sloan (2009) but only in relation to key stakeholder engagement 
processes. The features of this collaborative stakeholder engagement strategy also 
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have similar features to the concept of managing stakeholders through bridging (Daft, 
1992; Harrison and St. John, 1994).     
Based on the common features of stakeholder engagement with Balangon banana 
growers on the part of Alter Trade and with the small producers on the part of UMFI, 
one could outline the following common features: 
 
 Managerial orientation towards the poor: poor as transactional partner; 
 Key engagement processes: collaborating, partnering, learning; 
 Nature of roles among the poor: Pro-active supplier-partners, partners in 
enterprise and value chain management; 
 Nature of programs and services: Provision of financial, market and 
technological services to make poor more effective supplier-partners; and 
 Impact on the poor: Access to markets; increases in income but may not be 
enough to overcome poverty. 
 
During the development stage, as discussed in Section 4.4, the marginalized groups as 
represented by the CBEs were affirmed as UMFI’s reason for being. This put an 
increased emphasis on helping the CBEs develop organizationally, though still mainly 
towards helping them satisfy market requirements. The inclusion of advanced CBEs 
in value chain management and development, as well as the assistance to smaller 
CBEs in local market development, did signify a deeper commitment to helping CBEs 
develop beyond being mere suppliers of products that could be sold to mainstream 
markets. 
UMFI’s financial difficulties, however, were limiting its ability to effectively 
assist CBEs beyond market access. In this respect, it expected to rely more on other 
partners in and beyond the UNAC, to help in the more holistic development of CBEs.  
Despite the financial difficulties though, UMFI management expressed a commitment 
to fair trade principles to guide their dealings with partner CBEs. 
 
4.8.  Discussion 
 
The Upland Marketing case presents another example of a social enterprise 
providing market access for the poor along fair trade principles. Upland Marketing’s 
experience is similar to the Alter Trade experience with the Balangon growers, 
although UMFI worked with organized CBEs, most of which were also being assisted 
by other development organizations.   
As in the case of Alter Trade with the Balangon growers, Upland Marketing’s 
realized stakeholder engagement strategy vis-à-vis its partner producers may be 
characterized as one based on partnership and collaboration. The common features of 
this collaborative stakeholder engagement strategy, as detailed in Section 4.7.5 
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include a managerial orientation of the poor as transactional partner; provision of 
transactional services to effectively perform transactional roles as supplier partners; 
and access to markets and increased incomes as impact on the poor.   
Upland Marketing’s perspective for community-based enterprises as engines of 
local economic development and as co-managers in value chain management provides 
a strategic framework for delivering transactional services among social enterprises.  
Using Harrison and St. John’s (1994; 1998) regions of the stakeholder environment as 
an analytical tool, such a strategic framework could direct transactional services 
towards progressively increasing the participation of the poor in the internal and 
operating regions of the social enterprise stakeholder environment.   
Again, similar to the Alter Trade experience with Balangon growers, Upland 
Marketing had been able to reach a relatively large number of the poor, almost 3,000, 
through CBEs as transactional partners. However, impact on either regularity or level 
of incomes did not yet appear to be significant among 2/3 of its partner producers. A 
common thread linked to a stakeholder engagement strategy of transactional 
partnership may be a relatively greater reach but not significant depth in terms of 
overcoming income poverty and capability deprivation.   
With the other 1/3, significant income increases above the poverty line as 
indicated by its organic rice producers could not be attributed solely to UMFI’s 
transactional services. Such significant income increases were noted to be the results 
of sustainable agriculture-linked diversification strategies and other interventions that 
may even include transformational services such as leadership and organizational 
development provided by other non-government development partners of its partner 
CBEs. In this sense, even the increased participation of the CBE partners in enterprise 
and value chain management, an indication of overcoming what Sen (1999; 2009) 
calls capability deprivation may not be solely attributable to Upland Marketing’s 
interventions.     
Upland Marketing’s serious financial problems directly resulting from its 
engagement with supermarket chains as distribution channels presents an interesting 
case in stakeholder engagement and social entrepreneurship. The contradiction of 
Upland marketing’s fair trade practice among its primary stakeholder groups and the 
mainstream industry practices of the supermarket chains in dealing with Upland 
Marketing would continue to take a toll on its viability as a social enterprise. If 
Upland Marketing continues to uncritically engage these supermarket chains, it may 
reach a point of no return where its unsustainability becomes a mirror of the market 
failures it was intending to overcome.  
In this context, fair trade as an advocacy position vis-à-vis the supermarket chains, 
as a complementary strategy in managing its stakeholder environment may be a 
relevant theme for discussion and debate. Upland Marketing would benefit from 
reviewing the studies that have been undertaken in evaluating fair trade as CSR 
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especially involving big companies as distribution channels. Of particular interest is 
the study by Bezencon and Blili (2009) that looked at companies’ motivations to 
distribute fair trade products, how companies organize the distribution of fair trade 
products, and an evaluation of the engagement of the distributors using Low and 
Davenport’s (2005) scale of retailer engagement with fair trade principles. Tucker’s 
(2006) emphasis on the need for an agenda for change to be developed in partnership 
with producers when working with big companies like transnationals and 
supermarkets to advance fair trade and Mukherjee and Reed’s (2009) study on the 
effect and development implications of corporate participation in fair trade are also 
informative.       
An in depth assessment of Upland Marketing’s current marketing strategy, and the 
probability and potentials that fair trade as CSR may be seriously considered by the 
supermarket chains that Upland Marketing is engaged with is a study that could move 
the process forward. Such a study could provide useful perspectives on whether 
promoting fair trade as CSR for mainstream market channels in the Philippines is a 
feasible and optimal mode for a marketing intermediation social enterprise with the 
poor as primary stakeholders (SEPPS). If Upland Marketing sees this as a feasible 
option, the resulting intervention could provide a case in the South for testing the 
reframed BOP proposition that private sector efforts to address the needs of the poor 
can create mutual benefit for both the poor and the businesses involved (London, 
2007). Alternatively, a successful pursuit of fair trade as CSR as a complementary 
strategy for Upland Marketing vis-à-vis the supermarket chains, may create a local 
case for testing what Jeppesen and Lund-Thomsen (2010) have called a bottom-up 
approach to democratize CSR in developing countries.       
Unlike Alter Trade, the pursuit of Upland Marketing of a stakeholder engagement 
strategy of collaboration was shown to be deliberate.  Its specific mandate of 
providing access to markets, focused on the provision of transactional services to 
CBEs, as part of a more comprehensive network strategy to address poverty, seems to 
be an important role for Upland Marketing in the Philippine context. As a major 
market intermediation initiative exploring engagements with mainstream markets to 
serve the goal of poverty reduction, Upland Marketing’s crisis may be positively 
characterized as the precursor to a renewal stage.  In this context, Upland Marketing 
may consider market channels other than supermarkets or serve other market 
segments. As SEPPS, it may opt to take on the challenge of building a model for the 
interface of social entrepreneurship and corporate social responsibility in pursuit of 
the normative goal of poverty reduction in the South.  
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CHAPTER 5 – NATIONAL FEDERATION OF 
COOPERATIVES OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITY: 
ENABLING WORKER-OWNERS AS 
TRANSFORMATIONAL PARTNERS 
 
This chapter presents a SEPPS that intended and realized a stakeholder 
engagement strategy of empowerment throughout the stages of initiation, 
development and renewal. With the support of enabling stakeholders from civil 
society in the Philippines and countries in the North, the National Federation of 
Cooperatives of Persons with Disability (NFCPD or PWD Fed) became an 
organizer and enabler of primary cooperatives of PWDs. Over time, PWD Fed 
provided a combination of transactional and transformational services to enable 
these primary cooperatives to serve as venues for employment and empowerment 
of PWDs. Engaging government as a market for its school chair venture proved to 
be a continuing challenge, necessitating PWD Fed’s sustained efforts to represent 
PWD interest in the broad social-political stakeholder environment. As a single 
stakeholder cooperative of PWD worker-owners, PWD Fed’s governing 
structures were composed purely of PWDs elected by the primary cooperative 
members and their representatives. At its renewal stage, PWD Fed was faced with 
governance issues of a mutual social enterprise such as sustaining an active 
membership, ensuring a competent board, and managing the tension between 
market requirements and its social mission in a harsh external environment of 
failed state and market institutions. This entailed simultaneously and creatively 
enacting both transactional and transformational roles in its internal, operating 
and broad social-political stakeholder environment. With the establishment of the 
Foundation for TheseAbled Persons Inc. (FTI) as a platform for empowered 
PWDs to work with able-bodied advocates and supporters, PWD Fed had co-
created an institutional partner to resolve these governance issues more 
effectively. In this multi-organizational set up, PWD Fed continued to serve as a 
necessary venue for self-governance and empowerment among the PWD worker-
owners while being represented in FTI to more effectively engage government and 
other stakeholders in a strategic effort for inclusive development that is equitable 
for PWDs.       
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5.1.  Introduction 
 
Disability had been identified as one of seven factors directly causing poverty in 
the Philippines by a study commissioned by the Asian Development Bank (Schelzig, 
2005). The National Council of Disability Affairs (NCDA) reported:  “The population 
of PWDs in the Philippines is about 940,000 people (1.23% of the population at large) 
according to the census executed in 2000. However, if the estimate ratio 10% of 
World Health Organization (WHO) is applied, about 9.2 million people are PWDs in 
the Philippines as of 201047”. A study by the Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA) found that in the Philippines, most persons with disabilities lived in poverty 
(JICA, 2002). The context of a huge gap in policy and action by the state and very 
few businesses willing to do affirmative action, that characterized the situation faced 
by PWDs then and at the time of the research is contained in Box 5.1.  
PWD Fed was established in the 1990s to initiate a process of helping the many 
persons with disability (PWD) to help themselves. PWD Fed, its member 
cooperatives and the partner foundation it co-founded that were covered by this case 
study are detailed in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1. NFCPWD (PWD Fed) Core and Allied Organizations 
Name Role/Description 
NFCPWD (PWD Fed) Core organization that ventured into the production of school 
chairs while serving as organizer and enabler of PWD 
cooperatives.    
Member cooperatives of PWD Fed 15 primary cooperatives composed of PWDs organized by 
PWD Fed. These included:   
     ADPI-MPC 
     NEAPWD-MPC 
     SIKAP-MPC 
     Mapalad MPC 
     SAFRA-ADAP MPC 
Foundation for TheseAbled (FTI) Partner foundation co-founded by PWD Fed  
 
PWD Fed started as a venture for school chair production to give employment to 
PWDs. As such, it negotiated and managed contracts mainly with the Department of 
Education (DepEd). After it was set up it 1998, it became an organizer and enabler of 
PWD primary cooperatives that participated in the school chair project. These 
cooperatives developed at various paces, initially serving as venues for providing 
employment opportunities but in succeeding stages, serving as vehicles for PWD 
empowerment in their localities. Throughout the years, PWD Fed and its members 
have represented the sector in lobby efforts to incorporate a special provision in the 
                                                 
47 www.ncda.gov.ph/non-handicapping-environment/, accessed May 2, 2011). 
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General Appropriations Act (GAA) allocating 10% of government procurement for 
school chairs to PWD cooperatives.  
 
 
 
PWD Fed had described government as an unreliable market. Among others, it had 
fallen victim to efforts of the DepEd officials to depress the procurement price of 
school chairs. As it entered a stage of renewal to play a bigger role in PWD 
empowerment in the Philippines, it was looking to the diversification of products and 
markets as well as job placement and self-employment through microenterprise 
development. Internally, PWD Fed was faced with governance and management 
Box 5.1. Policy-Action Gap in Promoting PWD Development  
 
Legislation promoting the rights of PWD was embodied in Republic Act 7277, the Magna 
Carta for Disabled Persons, enacted in 1992. The Magna Carta supported the rehabilitation, 
development and provision of opportunities for PWD and their integration into the mainstream 
of social and economic life in the country. However, implementation and enforcement remained 
weak. For example, of the 100,000 employable PWDs registered with the Department of Labor 
and Employment, less than 10% were in wage employment. This, despite the Magna Carta’s 
provision that 5% of the contractual personnel of the national government engaged in social 
development should be reserved for qualified PWD, and the encouragement of the private sector 
and LGUs to hire PWD. Reasons for their low employment rate included (Schelzig, 2005):  
 
 Poorly qualified PWDs as more than 90% were unable to complete basic schooling;     
 Costly and prohibitive transportation provisions in public utility vehicles, especially for 
wheel chair users; and 
 Inaccessible workplaces, which tended to be without ramps and appropriately designed 
toilets. 
 
In 1998, lobby efforts to incorporate a special provision in the General Appropriations Act 
for government to procure 10% of its school chair requirements from PWD cooperatives (or the 
GAA PWD procument policy) finally bore fruit. Further lobby efforts to regularize and to 
broaden the application of this special provision to cover other government departments were 
mounted in 2002. Government’s response was Executive Order 417, which up to the time of the 
research suffered from having no Implementing Rules and Regulations.    
The Medium Term Philippine Development Plan (2004-2010) called for expanded capacity 
building programs for PWDs, and set an ambitious target that by 2010, 10% of the national 
government workforce should be PWD. The government also declared 2003-2012 as the 
Philippine Decade of Persons with Disabilities. However, despite these commitments, progress 
remained slow. Education and job generation remained key areas for intervention (Schelzig, 
2005).   
The PWD Fed and their supporters had been key stakeholders in the lobby and 
implementation of the aforementioned policies. PWD Fed had been particularly active in 
serving as the representative body of PWDs in the enactment, implementation and expansion of 
coverage of the GAA PWD procurement policy. 
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challenges, foremost of which was resolving the tension between the demands of the 
market for enterprise efficiency and the pursuit of PWD empowerment.   
 
5.2.   Pre-Initiation (1993-1997) to Initiation Stages (1998-        
         1999): Birth of PWD Owned and Managed Venture  
 
 
The National Federation of Cooperatives of Persons with Disability (PWD Fed) 
grew out of an initial venture for school chair production supported by the Christoffel 
Blinden Mission (CBM) from 1993-1997. CBM was a German development agency 
supporting the rehabilitation of PWDs in countries in the South. The venture involved 
nongovernment organizations running sheltered workshops of PWDs, PWD 
associations, and what was then the only existing PWD cooperative in the country.  
The groups involved were the following: 
 
 Northern Luzon Association for the Disabled (NLAD) 
 Samahang Ikauunlad ng mga may Kapansanan Ating Palawakin48 (SIKAP) 
 Philippine Foundation for the Rehabilitation of the Disabled (PFRD) 
 Atlas Mining Community Handicapped Association49 (AMCHA) 
 Bigay Buhay Multi-purpose Cooperative (BBMC)50 
 Father Rafael Desmed Multi Purpose Cooperative51 (FARAD MPC) 
 Lingkod Banahaw in Candelaria52, Quezon  
 
Mr. Peter Hammerle, a German technical consultant sent by CBM to assist PWD 
initiatives in the country, was a carpenter by profession. Starting with NLAD, he 
proposed the venture into furniture production using steel and wood materials.   
 
From an initial order of 25 armchairs in August 1993 by one of the NLAD’s 
Board of Directors, Fr. John Pardon, contracts became bigger as other private schools 
                                                 
48 ‘Organization for Encouraging the Progress of Persons with Disability’, a group of PWDs in Pasig City within the 
National Capital Region  
49 This was composed of workers in the mining company, Atlas, who acquired their disability in the performance of their 
work as miners.  
50 Bigay Buhay means Giver of Life. BBMC was the first PWD cooperative in the country and became the formal holder 
and manager of the school chair project immediately before PWD Fed was set up. It was the only member of PWD Fed 
that was composed of college graduates. After the founding of PWD Fed, BBMC became inactive after a plan for it to 
continue to serve as secretariat of the school chair project did not push through. It formally left PWD Fed in 2009.  
51 This cooperative was named after a Congregation of the Immaculate Conception of Mary (CICM) priest, Father 
Desmed, who served as an inspiration for the group to become a cooperative. FARAD MPC founding members came 
from the ranks of the sheltered workshops of NLAD. NLAD stopped operations a few years later.     
52 This was an informal group of PWDs living in Quezon province where Mt. Banahaw, believed to be sacred by local 
folk, is located. Lingkod means service.     
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and the Department of Education (DepEd) came into the picture. In July 1994, the 
DepEd national office placed a trial order after Hammerle and Mr. Johnny Lantion 
(then a PWD worker in NLAD’s sheltered workshop) met with the Secretary of 
Education. DepEd promised to buy more if production could be duplicated in other 
parts of the country.   
As the DepEd contracts came in management of the school chair venture, that was 
increasingly involving PWDs in multiple sites, changed from NLAD (1993-1994) to 
PFRD (1995) then to BBMC (1996-1997). The DepEd orders reached 11,000 
armchairs worth PhP 5 million in 1996, followed by two successive orders worth PhP 
5 million and PhP 500,000 by 1997. 
From the start, Hammerle believed that the best set-up for the venture was through 
cooperatives of PWDs. At that time, the only existing PWD cooperative in the 
country, set up in 1991, was BBMC.  
Serving as Project Coordinator until 1998 with the support of CBM, Hammerle 
encouraged informal PWD groups and PWD associations to become cooperatives as 
they were trained and got involved in the school chair project through a community-
based rehabilitation approach. SIKAP became SIKAP MPC in 1995; FARAD MPC 
was set up by the PWDs involved in the sheltered workshop of NLAD in 1996, 
AMCHA became AMCHA MPC in 1998, and Lingkod Banahaw Multi-purpose 
Cooperative (LBMC) was set up in 1998.   
By 1996, the groups involved in the DepEd contract of 11,000 chairs, namely 
FARAD, AMCHA, SIKAP, and BBMC decided and started planning, to set up and 
register a cooperative federation. The National Federation of Cooperatives of Persons 
with Disability (PWD Fed) was officially registered with the Cooperative 
Development Authority (CDA) on July 10, 1998 with these four cooperatives, 
together with LBMC, as founders.53 The PWD Fed assumed responsibility for the 
school chair project, its funds and collectibles. Mr. Johnny Lantion54 became its 
founding General Manager, a position he occupied until mid-2009. Hammerle, whose 
role shifted from Project Coordinator to Consultant observed: 
 
“During the period 1998-1999, the federation had full ownership and 
responsibility over the growing school chair project and the member primary 
cooperatives were in the hands of PWD members and officers. I would say that 
almost all of the PWDs who became involved in the setting up of the PWD Fed 
were poor. About 70% were unemployed and started getting employed only 
through the cooperative venture. The other 30% were only a little better off - they 
had regular income but were still below the poverty line”.  (Hammerle, 2011) 
                                                 
53 The Association of Differently Abled Persons Multi Purpose Cooperative (ADAP MPC) was also a founding member 
but was not involved in the school chair project at that time. 
54 Mr Johnny Lantion unexpectedly passed away due to an illness in December 2009 before the researcher was able to 
interview him for this case. 
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The Pre-Membership Education Seminars, a pre-requisite to cooperative 
establishment, served as venues to orient members about their rights and 
responsibilities as owner-workers. The capital contributions also formalized the 
members as owners of the cooperatives and of the projects undertaken by the 
cooperatives, and by extension, by the PWD Fed. However, Peter Hammerle noted: 
 
“Given that the PWDs didn’t have access to funds, what usually happened was 
that capital build-up was made possible through deductions from earnings 
members made in the school chair project”. (Hammerle, 2011)  
 
Even as the federation was still being set up in 1997, the cooperatives and PWD 
advocates realized the importance of lobbying to institutionalize a special provision in 
the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of the Philippines to allocate 10 percent of 
DepEd’s school chair budget to cooperatives of PWDs. The provision was included 
for the first time in the 1998 budget of the DepEd. With the PWD Fed set up by 1998, 
lobbying to ensure the continuous insertion of the provision became part of its regular 
agenda. In 1999, PWD Fed received their first contract from DepEd implementing the 
GAA 10% special provision. The contract was worth over PhP 7 million pesos.         
Given the DepEd market, the PWD Fed was poised to expand the federation’s 
school chair venture to give employment to more PWDs.   
 
5.3.  Development Stage (2000-mid 2009): Venture 
Expansion and Strengthening of Primary Cooperative 
Members     
 
From 2000-2003, the DepEd awarded a number of contracts to the PWD Fed, with 
some implemented regionally. Some primary cooperatives also successfully got 
contracts from private institutions.   
From the 2003 DepEd budget, PWD Fed was not awarded a contract. All DepEd 
contracts for PWDs were given at the regional level. All participating cooperatives at 
the regional level reported substantial losses for 2003, almost causing their 
bankruptcy. This experience showed the vulnerability of PWD cooperatives in dealing 
with the DepEd as market. This vulnerability was most apparent when DepEd 
officials with vested interests would push contract prices too low and PWD 
cooperative leaders would wittingly or unwittingly accept the very low prices just to 
give PWDs employment. The experience also showed the importance of PWD Fed in 
representing the interest of PWD cooperatives in transparent negotiations with the 
DepEd at the national level.    
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In 2004, the PWD Fed successfully negotiated a contract of PhP 48 million for 
71,532 chairs, coming from the Dep Ed’s budget, enacted in 2004-2005. In 2007, the 
PWD Fed won another contract worth PhP 90 million; in 2008, PhP 90 million; and in 
2009, PhP 78 million.   
The scaling up of DepEd contracts, reaching PhP 90 million and PhP 78 million 
during the period 2006-2009 required a more sophisticated production and delivery 
system. The contracts entailed a nationwide delivery system to schools including 
those located in remote areas. PWD Fed management rose to the occasion and 
introduced a change in system from producing complete chairs (complete chair 
production) to the production of components (component production) for assembly at 
the schools. The first contract was at PhP 780 per armchair. The second contract was 
at PhP1000 per armchair. Given the high price of steel materials, 4 types of chairs 
from all-wood to a combination of steel and wood designs for elementary and 
secondary schools were developed. Component production involving four types of 
design made logistics complex.     
With the increasing market for school chairs at the national level, PWD Fed 
expanded its membership base of primary cooperatives. This was initially made 
possible with the support of CBM with an average of PhP 1.5 million per year 
organizational subsidy to the PWD Fed. Part of CBM’s support came in the form of 
supporting two additional staff in 2000-2003 to focus on lobby work to strengthen the 
legal framework for government’s affirmative action for PWDs. The effort was 
towards a Magna Carta for PWDs, a law enacted in 2002. Later, the Canadian 
Cooperative Association (CCA) gave PWD Fed a grant of PhP 18 million for 2007-
2009 to finance capacity building of member cooperatives. This covered the hiring of 
external consultants to develop and undertake training needs analysis, module and 
manual development. It also covered the conduct of trainings in cooperative and 
financial management as well as leadership development and organizational 
strengthening.      
Hammerle credited the PWD Fed’s school chair project for paving the way to the 
organization of new PWD cooperatives.   
 
“There were no ready-made organizations of PWDs when we set up satellite 
production sites in various parts of the country for the school chair project. So we 
focused on setting up PWD cooperatives in strategic places where there were 
groups of PWDs who were willing to join the project and become members of 
cooperatives, and where local government units showed willingness to support the 
initiative. Almost all, 10 to be exact, of the new PWD cooperatives who became 
members were federation-initiated”.  (Hammerle, 2011)   
Hammerle recalled the initial process of organizing and capacity development 
especially during the initial years when the federation budget for such was limited: 
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“In the beginning, there was not much money for organizing new cooperatives.  
During 2000-2003, maybe the whole budget for organizing and capacity 
development was only about PhP 2 million for the whole period. What usually 
happened was Johnny55 and I would go to a new area to give technical training for 
the school chair production project for about three weeks. We would get the 
assistance of the Cooperatives Development Authority to provide the Pre-
Membership Education Seminar. This was followed by an exposure visit of a 
promising leader of the new group to an existing cooperative for a week or two. 
Sometimes, members or leaders of existing PWD cooperatives would volunteer to 
be temporarily based in a new area for two to three months. Sometimes, they 
volunteered to transfer permanently like what happened with those who moved 
from Baguio City to Davao”.56 (Hammerle, 2011)          
 
PWD Fed’s 2003-2008 strategic plan gave attention to expanding the school chair 
venture to provide more employment to PWDs. It also gave more importance to 
support the development of strong primary cooperatives of PWDs. This helped not 
only to strengthen newly formed cooperatives but also the older ones that started to 
expand their membership.  
PWD Fed management staff Mayta Banday and Loi Maguigad, who were PWDs 
themselves, explained the impact of their program to develop strong primary 
cooperatives of PWDs that was put in place by 2004:  
 
“Most PWDs who become members of our primary cooperatives are poor and 
unemployed, with no college education. In fact, most would just have elementary 
schooling with only a few reaching high school. At the first instance, they become 
members and just want employment. It is over time, after going through pre-
membership education seminars and organizational development courses on the 
leadership and governance of cooperatives, that leaders and active members 
emerge. You can see marked changes in our member cooperatives after we started 
to provide these kinds of capacity building efforts at the primary cooperative 
level. Before 2004, when only one or two leaders per cooperative had the 
opportunity to undergo trainings we initiated in Manila and were exposed to other 
cooperatives, there was a strong tendency for new cooperatives to become one-
man shows. When we started to give more attention to trainings conducted at the 
level of the primary cooperatives, a significant percentage of the members started 
to speak up and act to change their situation – and a big improvement in their 
leadership and governance system became evident. A case in point is the Mapalad 
                                                 
55 Johnny Lantion, the General Manager of PWD Fed   
56 Baguio City is located in the northern part of the country while Davao is in the southern part of the country.   
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MPC57. When we visited the cooperative in 2000, members were very passive and 
it was a one-man show. Now, after the series of trainings we conducted at the 
primary level, you can really tell the difference”.  (Maguigad and Banday, 2010) 
 
With more dynamic leaders and pro-active members, the primary cooperatives also 
started to address the rights and welfare of PWDs in their communities. The more 
advanced cooperatives started to diversify their enterprise projects. They started to 
gain the recognition of their communities as role models. With their improved self-
image and self-esteem, some PWDs even started to run for public office.  
The program to strengthen primary cooperatives and develop leaders among their 
ranks created the conditions for the shift to a new governance and management 
system in mid-2009. This signaled what may be considered a renewal stage for PWD 
Fed.   
 
5.4.  Renewal Stage (mid 2009 – onwards) 
 
Since initiation, the governance and management system of PWD Fed may be 
characterized as one where elected representatives of primary cooperative members 
made policies and agreed on general directions of PWD Fed during the Board of 
Directors meetings. A strong management team led by a full time PWD General 
Manager complemented this. Management staff described the PWD General Manager 
then as exerting a strong influence in the Board. They recounted that the General 
Manager usually initiated plans, proposals and recommendations for discussion and 
decision at the level of the Board and the Assembly.  
A more pro-active Board that was directly involved in executive management 
characterized the shift in governance and management system by mid-2009. The 
Board did not only make policies and agree on general directions when they were 
convened in periodic meetings, but members also actively participated in developing 
plans, proposals and recommendations for consideration by the Board as a collective 
body. At first, the Board appointed one of its own members, the Vice Chair of PWD 
Fed and Manager of One Primary Cooperative, as part time Board Officer in Charge 
with no full time General Manager. This move to appoint a Board Officer in Charge 
was initially in response to the departure of the founding General Manager to take on 
a consultant position under CBM to assist PWDs in Paraguay. But even as they had 
already appointed a full time General Manager, the pro-activity of the Board in 
executive management and in preparatory activities to policy and decision making 
sessions remained.  
                                                 
57 The Mapalad MPC is featured in Box 5.2. of this Chapter 
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Under this system, 2009 ushered many changes for PWD Fed. After completion 
of the DepEd contract of PhP 78 million, a debate between the merits and demerits of 
‘complete chair’ and ‘component production’ brewed among the officers and 
members. In September 2009, the PWD Fed’s production facility and office was also 
severely affected by the unprecedented flooding that devastated Metro Manila. A 
decision to close the production facility of the PWD Fed was made. The PWD Fed 
office was moved to a smaller place in a residential area.   
In early 2010, the PWD Fed focused its attention on capacity and systems 
development for its Management Committee. As they underwent internal 
consolidation in early 2010, the PWD Fed made a decision not to accept a national 
contract for school chairs from the DepEd. The Dep Ed wanted to lower the 
procurement price from PhP 1000 per school chair to PhP 800 per school chair. In 
addition to increased costs of raw materials, there was also the factor of increased 
delivery costs as the contract was for 60 chairs per school compared to 170 chairs per 
school in the PWD Fed proposal. The price offered per school chair could no longer 
adequately cover operating and other costs of production. Hence, the terms being 
proposed by DepEd would no longer make the national contract feasible.  
Negotiations resulted to a PhP 13 million contract covering two regions only:  Region 
6 and Region 7.  
In November 2010, an additional contract was favorably negotiated in the amount 
of PhP 72 million. After a spirited debate and discussion, the Board and membership 
of the PWD Fed decided to shift systems back to producing complete chairs at the 
primary cooperative level only. Component production was eliminated. This resulted 
in a drastic decrease in productivity, relative to 2006-2009 when the PWD Fed 
experimented with component production. The PWD Fed Board and members seemed 
to accept the trade off in terms of a level of decrease in productivity in favor of giving 
member cooperatives full responsibility and power over the production of complete 
chairs.   
It was also in 2009 that a process of developing a 5-year strategic plan covering 
2010-2014 was initiated. Management staff noted the change in strategic planning 
practice    
 
“Although the 1998-2001 as well as the 2003-2008 plans were crafted with the 
participation of the management staff and the approval of the Board of 
Directors, our General Manager then played the most critical role of drafting it 
with the assistance of external consultants. With the strengthening of the 
primary cooperatives, the level of participation of a much bigger number of 
PWDs was evident in the process of developing the 2010-2014 PWD Fed 
strategic plan in 2009. This time, the 2010-2014 plan was a product of a 1-year 
process involving the membership of the cooperatives at the primary level, 
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aided by the management staff, the Board of Directors, and consultants”. 
(Maguigad and Banday, 2010)  
 
The strategic plan considered the market/enterprise conditions on one hand and 
organizational realities on the other. For one, it was recognized that the quality and 
efficiency of school chair production to meet nationwide orders could happen only 
with strong leadership and organization of their primary cooperative members. At the 
same time, it was also recognized that the Dep Ed was an unreliable market for PWD 
products, and the school chair production and other nationally initiated enterprise 
projects were not enough to provide for the employment needs of PWDs. Hence, there 
was a strong need to build self-propelling primary cooperatives, with the PWD Fed 
continuing to act as a promoter of economic empowerment and inclusion of PWDs 
nationwide. 
The overall objective of the resulting strategic plan was to “expand the coverage 
and further promote economic empowerment and inclusion of people with disabilities 
in Philippine society, including women”.  It featured the following (NFCPWD 5 Year 
Plan, 2010-2014): 
 
 Expansion of its strategies from purely building cooperative-owned enterprise 
ventures to providing employment to PWDs through training and 
networking/job placement;   
 Starting a savings and credit program to encourage and support PWDs 
interested to set up their own livelihood/enterprise ventures; and 
 Diversifying its enterprise ventures in terms of products and markets, with a 
focus on venturing into those that would encourage membership of women 
PWDs (e.g. organic lettuce production, prosthesis, accessible tourism), and 
going beyond DepEd contracts (e.g. securing contracts from local governments 
and expanding to private institutions).  
 
Towards assisting the process of making the 2010-2014 strategic plan a reality, Peter 
Hammerle, other abled persons supporting PWDs, and a sub-group within the 
Federation that they referred to as empowered PWDs organized a new foundation – 
the Foundation for TheseAbled Persons Inc. The PWD Fed was represented in the 
Board of the new foundation. Peter Hammerle, who was the foundation’s executive 
director, explained: 
 
“There is value to able-bodied persons helping PWDs – and that has happened 
through consultants like myself who have supported the PWD Fed through the 
years. This new foundation is an effort to systematize the assistance that able-
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bodied persons and empowered PWDs can do to help the PWD Fed”.  
(Hammerle, 2010)      
  
5.5. Financial and Social Outcomes 
 
5.5.1.  Financial Outcomes 
 
The school chair project of the PWD Fed generated economic impact at several 
levels: for the PWDs, the cooperatives, and the federation itself. 
In 200458 and 2007, when the federation received contracts from DepEd, the 
cooperatives earned about PhP 5 million and PhP 8.4 million, respectively. For the 
aforementioned contract in 2004, PhP 7 million was earned by the PWDs as direct 
labor. For the 2007 to 2009 period, the school chair contracts provided PhP 12-16 
million in terms of salaries of PWDs and officers, with 650 PWDs directly employed 
and another 500 employed by programs and activities of member cooperatives. 
The federation’s share from the project came via three sources: a share per school 
chair produced to cover contract management expenses (amounting to PhP 35 per 
chair in 2007), a 2% share of the cooperatives’ income, and interest earned on loans to 
cooperatives for production capital.  
In 2004, management fees for the school chair project totaled PhP 2.5 million, 
covering the 10% GAA allocation for DepEd’s 2002 budget. For 2007, the estimated 
revenue from management expenses was PhP 4.2 million or about 5 percent of the 
PhP 90 million contract. The share from the cooperatives’ income was estimated at 
PhP 2.016 million, while the interest earnings were estimated at PhP 649,002 (Pelejo, 
2009).59 
For the DepEd’s budget for 2003, the bidding of contracts for school furniture was 
done regionally. In effect, the 10 percent budget allocation to cooperatives of PWDs 
for the production of school furniture was not awarded to the PWD Fed but to PWD 
cooperatives in some regions. All participating cooperatives at the regional level 
however reported substantial losses for 2003, almost causing their bankruptcy. The 
10% GAA allocation for 2004 on the other hand was not implemented. Hence, neither 
the cooperatives nor the federation earned during these years. 
The PWD Fed suffered from low liquidity every year despite the revenues earned 
from the management fees and interest on loans from the school chair project. The 
shortfalls in the federation’s advocacy activities to promote the welfare of PWDs 
through institutional and capacity building activities were funded by CBM grants. 
From 2002 to 2006, these totaled PhP 13,548,471, for an average of PhP 2.71 million 
                                                 
58 DepEd’s 2002 budget for school furniture was enacted towards the end of 2004 up to early 2005. 
59 Financial statements were not available. 
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per year. The trend in funding from CBM over the five-year period is shown in Figure 
5.1. 
Starting 2006, CBM went beyond giving the federation a subsidy to making a loan 
available to the federation to finance the manufacturing of its school chair business. In 
2006, CBM’s loan to the PWD Fed was PhP 60 million, followed by PhP 40 million, 
then PhP 20 million. All these loans had been repaid.  
 
Figure 5.1. CBM Subsidy to NFCPWD from 2002 to 2006.   
Source: Pelejo, M. Unpublished working paper for SROI case. 2009. 
 
The Canadian Cooperative Association (CCA) also provided a PhP 18 million 
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provided a PhP 30 million loan as working capital and to improve the financial 
accounting system.   
 
5.5.2.  Social Outcomes 
 
The membership of the PWD Fed, through 15 primary cooperatives, was 
estimated at 1,250 PWDs nationwide. 
A 2009 study commissioned by Oikocredit International to determine the social 
impact of the PWD Fed’s school chair project identified three common issues that 
member primary cooperatives of the PWD Fed were confronted with (Pelejo, 2009):   
 
 The poverty of its members;  
 The problem of finding gainful employment due to the member’s disability; 
and  
 The lack of self-esteem as a result of their physical and economic dependence.   
 
The level of poverty among many PWDs involved prior to the school chair project 
was characterized by Hammerle: 
 
  “A usual story I would hear from participating PWDs is that before they  
 joined, they worried whether they would have a meal.  With the school chair  
 project, they were assured three meals a day”. (Hammerle, 2011) 
 
This is also exemplified in Box 5.2., that describes the Mapalad MPC experience. 
Direct testimonies during focus group discussions and key informant interviews with 
the officers and members of three primary cooperative members of the PWD Fed 
namely the Association of Disabled Persons Inc Multi Purpose Cooperative (ADPI-
MPC), Nueva Ecija Association of Persons with Disability Multipurpose Cooperative 
(NEAPWD-MPC) and SIKAP-MPC, revealed:   
 
“...Perceived as lacking the capacity for productive activity.... PWDs often 
endured ridicule, deprivation and discrimination.... and suffered from low self 
worth. Often viewed by their family, their neighbors, and their community as a 
whole as ‘useless’ or ‘burdens’, these PWDs tended to wallow in self-pity, 
leading them to isolate themselves from friends and neighbors…. when they 
were not yet employed, family members looked down on them. Their financial 
dependence prohibited them from participating in decision-making in the 
family”. (Pelejo, 2009) 
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A survey involving 66 PWD member respondents, that was part of the same impact 
study, revealed the following (Pelejo, 2009): 
 
 91% of the PWDs said their self-esteem increased and they socialized more 
after joining the cooperative’s school chair project;  
 64% of the PWDs said they earned more; and 
 23% of the PWDs were able to send their children to school or to provide for 
their children’s school allowance 
 
The social return on investment (SROI) calculations based on the same study showed 
that for every peso invested during the period 2003-2007, PhP 22 was realized. Of the 
total number of PWD members, 398 PWDs from 12 cooperatives and satellite groups 
were involved in the school chair project. The same SROI study showed that on 
average, the annual income of PWDs participating in the project increased from PhP 
30,323/year to PhP 54,467/year. Among some of the PWDs, involvement in the 
school chair projects was their only source of income. (Pelejo, 2009) 
Ironically, given the terms being offered by the DepEd for the school chair project 
in 2010, this same study showed that the government (i.e. DepEd) was 
disproportionately benefitting from buying relatively cheaper and more durable chairs 
from PWD Fed. It was estimated that the DepEd was generating savings at PhP 450 
per chair (vis-à-vis the budget allocation), or PhP 54 million on the 2007 contract 
alone. 
 
Box 5.2. Mapalad MPC: A PWD Fed Member’s Story 
 
Cristopher Dulay, manager of the Mapalad MPC recounted that they were first organized into an association 
with the help of the Department of Social Work and Development (DSWD) and then transformed into a 
cooperative in 2002. Projects ventured into included making of cassava pie and banana chips but they failed.  
Dulay recalled, “We got involved in the PWD Fed’s school chair project in 2002 but it wasn’t until 2004 
that we received trainings, were reorganized and became a member of the PWD Fed. I became a member in 
2004 and eventually became manager. I am a college graduate and took commerce but before I joined the 
cooperative, I was driving a passenger jeepney to make a living. My mother is a vegetable vendor and my 
father a retired policeman. We have more than 50 members and 31 are active – I would say that of the 31, 
70% are poor with many just reaching elementary or at most high school. In fact, apart from myself, there is 
only 1 other college graduate. The school chair project has provided a good source of livelihood for PWDs 
here. Without the school chair project, our members would make about PhP 200-300/week from planting 
vegetables, wall decoration and furniture making. With the school chair project, our members get PhP 800-
PhP 2,900/week over a period of 6-8 months of the year. Considering that an agricultural worker here gets a 
salary of PhP 150/day during harvest season, the employment from the school chair project really makes a 
big difference. Of the 31 members of Mapalad MPC who are active, about 14 belonging to the age range of 
20-47, or half, feel and act as full fledged cooperative members while the rest belonging to the age range of 
21-67 just have a worker mentality. I believe a large part of it has to do with their level of education”.  
(Dulay, 2010) 
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The overall results of the Oikocredit-commissioned impact study based on the 
focus group discussions, key informant interviews, and the survey, were synthesized  
by Pelejo (2009) this way: 
 
“PWDs had already become catalysts of transformation. Work not only 
empowered PWDs economically, allowing them to earn a decent income and 
support their family, but also transformed them from within. Their self-worth 
increased. As a result, they opened up and learned to integrate into the social 
network of their families, their neighborhood, and the larger community. They 
became self-reliant. In addition, they became sources of inspiration for both 
PWDs, and non-PWDs in their communities. Gradually, the communities where 
the cooperatives of PWDs were present also changed their perception of PWDs”.   
 
An important insight from the PWD Fed story of empowerment, consistent with Peter 
Hammerle’s observation, is that the individual PWDs went through different paces of 
development, depending on their own starting points and motivations. However, the 
cooperative framework allowed a critical mass of the best and most advanced in terms 
of personal development to assume leadership and conscious owner-worker and 
owner-decision maker roles.   
Rodolfo Mendoza, manager of the member cooperative (NEAPWD-MPC) in 
Nueva Ecija, affirmed such differentiation in terms of perception and roles among 
their cooperative members. “Of the 45 PWDs involved in the school chair project, 
40% are there just to work but the bigger percentage, about 60%, have already 
developed the awareness of being members and owners”.  (Mendoza, 2010) 
Acquilles Bayano, Vice Chair of the Board of Directors of the PWD Fed member 
in Agusan del Sur, Mindanao called the San Francisco Association of Differently 
Abled Persons Multi Purpose Cooperative (SAFRA-ADAP MPC), gave a brighter 
picture:  “Of the 45 members who are active, 10% are at that stage where they still 
just feel they are workers. This 10% are those who are new, and haven’t really been 
given orientation given the limited time that they have been members. When they 
attend meetings, they just listen and still don’t take the initiative. The majority or the 
other 90% are aware and act like worker-owners”. (Bayano, 2010) 
In the same way that individual PWD members of primary cooperatives had gone 
through a process of empowerment at different paces, PWD member cooperatives, as 
vehicles for PWD empowerment may also be characterized as having gone through 
such process at different paces. After twelve years (1998-2010) of organizing and 
assisting PWD cooperatives development, Hammerle noted that the PWD Fed 
members might be categorized according to at least four levels of development 
(Hammerle, 2011): 
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 Level 1: The cooperative would be relatively new and simply driven by the 
need to earn income. They had little technical and organizational skills. They 
were faced with issues of quality, organization, management and decision-
making. They had little access to funds. 
 Level 2: The cooperative would already be capable of managing their 
participation in the school chair project. They had reached a level of efficiency. 
They had developed ways of solving problems and decision making in a 
manner where no one member was dominating. 
 Level 3: The cooperative would already be looking for other programs to 
complement the school chair project. Individual members had reached a level 
of self-confidence, personality development and acquired management, 
technical, and other skills. Their main challenge was how to integrate and 
develop new members into what had become a cohesive organization 
comprising of the older members.  
 Level 4: The cooperative would be implementing multiple programs, with the 
school chair project as just one. They would have a strong leadership and 
would have developed links with a broad range of government, non-
government and even business organizations who could provide support to their 
many initiatives for PWDs 
 
Hammerle expressed that among the active members of PWD Fed, he would classify 
two of the cooperatives in Level 4; four of the cooperatives in Level 3; five of the 
cooperatives in Level 2; and three of the cooperatives in Level 1. He considered 
SAFRA-ADAP MPC to be in Level 4; NEAPWD-MPC to be in Level 3 and Mapalad 
MPC to be in Level 2. Explaining why SAFRA-ADAP MPC was already in Level 4, 
he explained that they were very active not only in the school chair project but were 
implementing multiple programs including assisting their members to get involved in 
developing other sources of livelihood with the assistance of TESDA, DOST60 and 
local businesses in their area. They were also involved in community programs such 
as reforestation to ensure their participation in assuring sustainable sources of raw 
materials. Above all, they had already gained the recognition and support of the 
municipal government (Hammerle, 2011).  
Levels 1 and 2 may be characterized as development phases where the 
cooperatives were serving mainly as vehicles for employment. Levels 3 and 4 already 
manifested development phases where the cooperatives were serving as vehicles not 
only for employment but more so for PWD holistic empowerment. Using Hammerle’s 
assessment by 2011, 43% of the members of PWD Fed may be characterized as 
                                                 
60 TESDA stands for the Technical Education and Skills Authority, a government agency mandated to provide 
vocational training while DOST stands for Department of Science and Technology mandated to develop technologies 
for commercialization. 
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having reached the stage of being ‘cooperatives for empowerment’ while 57% may be 
characterized as being at the stage of ‘cooperatives for employment’.   
 
5.6. The PWD Fed and Social Entrepreneurship 
5.6.1.   PWD Fed as SEPPS 
 
 PWD Fed manifests the characteristics of a SEPPS as defined in Section 2.5.  
 Firstly, its main reason for being is the social inclusion and economic 
empowerment of PWDs, its primary stakeholders among the poor. A majority of these 
PWDs were unemployed before their engagement with PWD Fed. The positive social 
outcomes that the PWD Fed has had on its PWD members were shown in Section 
5.5.2. 
 Secondly, it creates wealth through enterprise projects like the manufacture and 
sale of school chairs where it engages PWD cooperatives and its members as work 
teams. The wealth it creates partly supports the Federation’s services in organizing 
cooperatives as vehicles for PWD employment and empowerment.   
 Thirdly, it serves as a mechanism for distributing the economic and social benefits 
generated by its enterprise and other projects to PWDs as worker-owners and as 
members in a cooperative federation set up.  
 
5.6.2.   SEPPS in a Developing Country Context 
 
The PWD Fed story provides another narrative, like the Alter Trade and Upland 
Marketing cases, of a social enterprise with the poor as primary stakeholders (SEPPS) 
in a societal context that is quite different from the U.S. and Europe: a social context 
of massive poverty and under-development where state and market institutions have 
been unable to respond to the needs of the poor majority. The case of Alter Trade 
showed how the state only enacted a minor but critical legitimizing role in agrarian 
reform, with civil society actors in the Philippines and countries in the North serving 
as enabling stakeholders for the sugar farmers and banana growers to participate in a 
system of ‘fair trade’ or ‘people-to-people trade’. In the Upland Marketing case, the 
disabling role of corporations as market channels was demonstrated, even as civil 
society stakeholders in the Philippines and in the North worked together to assist 
small producers gain access to the urban consumer market through these corporate 
channels.   
The PWD Fed case, while again showing the role of enabling stakeholders from 
civil society in the Philippines and countries in the North provides an interesting case 
of government as a major stakeholder, but showed its dual character of being both an 
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enabler and a disabler. PWD Fed provided a combination of transactional and 
transformational services to enable members to serve as cooperatives for PWD 
employment and empowerment. The PWD Fed has played a key role as representative 
of the sector in lobbying for enabling legislation and pushing affirmative action in 
favor of PWDs. Despite a level of success in changing the policy environment in 
favor of PWDs, a huge policy-action gap continues to exist. As explained in Sections 
5.3 and 5.4, PWD Fed’s own assessment is that government was an unreliable market.  
Implementing rules and practices to what should be enabling legislation had created 
hurdles if they did not work directly against PWD cooperatives. Section 5.5.2 also 
showed how government (or individual government officials) may have   
disproportionately benefited from lowering the buying price of school chairs bought 
from PWD Fed. Without abandoning efforts to close the huge gap between state 
policy and action, the PWD Fed had put in place for 2010-2014, a three-pronged 
strategy of training and job placement, micro-enterprise development, and 
product/market diversification towards broadening PWD coverage for employment 
and livelihood. 
 
5.6.3.   SEPPS and Social Entrepreneurship  
 
The PWD Fed narrative resonates with the social economy school of social 
entrepreneurship. At first glance, it may be likened to a work integration social 
enterprise or WISE, a dominant type of social enterprise studied by scholars of the 
social economy school in Europe (Nyssens, 2006). As a response to structural 
unemployment, “the main objective of WISEs is to help low-qualified unemployed 
people, who are at risk of permanent exclusion from the labour market. WISEs 
integrate these people into work and society through a productive activity”. (Defourny 
and Nyssens, 2008, pp. 207-208; 2010, p. 37).                                                                           
The PWD Fed case enriches the discussion on WISE in Asia as it tackles poverty, 
social inclusion, and empowerment of PWDs applying a multidimensional 
perspective and Sen’s (1999, 2009) capability approach. It goes beyond the features of 
what Chan and Sit (2009) called the social cooperative model observed among WISE 
in Hong Kong that provides self-employment to target groups. The case overcomes 
what Bidet (2009) considers a limited WISE framework that tends to tackle poverty 
with only a monetary dimension, a perspective he noted as widely utilized in South 
Korea.   
The PWD Fed case resonates with the: 
 
 “…. few categories of WISE (that) encourage and concretely implement the 
participation of workers and/or users in the decision-making process of the 
enterprise…. (such as) the various types of Finnish WISE, work integration 
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enterprises in Belgium subscribing to the SOLID’R Charter, social cooperatives in 
Sweden and community businesses and worker cooperatives in the UK.... In most 
other types of WISE, the degree of participation of workers varies, but is generally 
very limited”. (Davister et al., 2004, p. 21)   
 
The PWD Fed story provides a case that shows how a social enterprise providing 
alternative medium to long-term employment for persons with disability could 
develop the practice of democratic principles espoused in the social economy. The 
PWD Fed case shows that with a combination of transactional and transformational 
services, persons with disability could be enabled to govern and manage their own 
enterprise ventures and cooperatives. However, the PWD Fed faces real challenges in 
terms of governance and management (refer to Table 5.2.a. Participation of the Poor 
in Governance and Management of Core and Allied Organizations of PWD Fed). In a 
sense, these are similar to what Spear et al., (2010) found to be the challenges faced 
by social enterprises in the United Kingdom in general and ‘mutual social enterprises’ 
like cooperatives in particular as discussed in Chapter 1. Of particular relevance is 
their conclusion about the governance challenges of “finding and developing board 
members with the necessary business, financial and entrepreneurial skills and 
experience,… managing diverse stakeholder interests,… (and) balancing business 
decisions with the social mission”.  (Spear et al., 2010, p.198-199). Facing these 
challenges in an unfavorable socio-economic and political environment that is 
different from the United Kingdom and Europe merit due consideration.   
It may be inadequate to characterize the PWD Fed as a WISE that integrates 
PWDs to work and society through productive activity. As SEPPS in a Southern 
country context, it may be better characterized as a self-help response, aided by civil 
society in the Philippines and countries in the North, to enable PWDs to engage state 
and market institutions for the social inclusion and empowerment of their sector.   
As SEPPS, PWD Fed and Alter Trade share a common experience of actively 
engaging government and other stakeholders in working to change the context of 
failures of state and market institutions. This is manifested in terms of lobby and 
advocacy to enact or change state policy or to close the policy-action gap on agrarian 
reform (in the case of Alter Trade) and affirmative action for PWDs in government 
procurement (in the case of PWD Fed). This indicates a political dimension that may 
characterize SEPPS, noted by social entrepreneurship scholars (Nyssens, 2006; 
Martin and Osberg, 2007) as present in some social enterprises when there is an intent 
to change the unfavorable context in which they operate. This dimension is 
recognized by Nyssens (2006) as a distinct feature of social enterprises that sets them 
apart from traditional businesses.  
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5.7.  The PWD Fed from a Stakeholder Perspective 
 
5.7.1.  Primary Stakeholders of PWD Fed 
 
From a normative perspective (Donaldson and Preston, 1995), the primary 
stakeholders of the PWD Fed were the member cooperatives and their individual 
PWD members. As a self-help initiative using a cooperative as organizational 
framework, the PWDs, as individuals and as a group owned, governed, managed and 
served as workers of the PWD Fed. PWD Fed as a SEPPS had the primary objective 
of social inclusion and empowerment of PWDs and served as a mechanism for 
distributing social and economic benefits to PWDs.   
 
5.7.2. Roles and Role Changes: Transactional and 
Transformational Roles 
 
Utilizing Mintzberg’s (2007) organizational stages, there were notable changes in 
the combination of roles that the PWDs and their primary cooperatives enacted over 
time.   
At the initiation stage, PWDs were engaged as owner-workers of their respective 
primary cooperatives and the PWD Fed. Elected PWD leaders from among the ranks 
of the primary cooperatives became representatives to and comprised the PWD Fed 
Board. As representatives of the primary cooperatives, they were engaged as policy 
and decision makers of the PWD Fed through their participation in periodic Board 
meetings and annual General Assemblies. A strong PWD-led management team was 
put in place and enacted a proactive role in policy and decision-making as well as 
day-to-day management. At the initiation stage, the PWD Fed also served as 
representative of the PWD sector in continuing the lobby for the Department of 
Education to implement a 10% special allocation under the General Appropriations 
Act for PWD cooperatives to serve as suppliers of school chairs. The PWD Fed hired 
two part time consultants to assist them lobby not only for the implementation of this 
special provision but also to pursue other measures consistent with the Magna Carta 
for PWDs. The Magna Carta was passed in 1992 and has served as comprehensive 
basis for the PWD Fed to assert the rights and welfare of PWDs in the country, and 
engage government at the national and local level for affirmative action.   
During the development stage, PWD Fed expanded nationwide by assisting the 
organization of ten more PWD primary cooperatives, whose individual members 
became owner-workers. By the end of the development stage, the active primary 
cooperative members numbered fourteen. These cooperatives manifested various 
stages of development: about half were observed to have reached a level of being 
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vehicles not only for PWD employment but also as vehicles for PWD empowerment 
in their respective communities. The latter became organizations actively working for 
the rights and welfare of PWDs, in the process expanding their respective stakeholder 
bases, and gaining the recognition of local governments. Leaders and members of 
these more developed cooperatives also became role models in their respective 
communities, with some elected to local government positions. The PWD Board and 
General Assembly continued to serve as venues where elected representatives of the 
primary cooperatives were engaged as policy and decision makers supported by a 
strong PWD-led management team.   
During the renewal stage, officers and members of the primary cooperatives took 
a more pro-active role in the governance and management of the federation itself.  
Already evident during the first two years of the renewal stage (mid 2009-early 2011) 
was a higher degree of participation during strategic planning and preparatory stages 
to formal policy and decision-making processes at the level of the General Assembly 
and the Board.  As Hammerle observed:  
 
“With the representatives of the primary cooperatives and the Board taking a 
more pro-active role, plans, decisions, and actions of the PWD Fed have 
become more reflective of the collective sentiment and capacity of the PWD 
Fed members”. (Hammerle, 2011) 
 
From the initiation to the renewal stages, the case provided a rich description of a 
combination of both transactional and transformational roles that the PWDs enacted.  
These roles included being:   
 
 Owner-workers of the school chair venture (transactional role); 
 Owner-decision makers of the school chair venture (transactional and 
transformational role); 
 Empowered PWDs leading and managing cooperatives and the PWD Fed who 
were: 
o enabling other PWDs to become owner-workers and owner decision 
makers of their respective cooperatives (transformational role); 
o engaging various external groups to provide support and undertake 
affirmative action to uphold PWD rights and welfare (transformational 
role); 
o engaging government to enact enabling legislation and implement its 
commitment for affirmative action for PWDs (transformational role); and 
 Empowered PWDs serving as role models and leaders in the broader 
community and beyond the PWD sector. 
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From the initiation to the renewal stages, the case also provided a rich description of 
the combination of transactional and transformational roles that the primary 
cooperatives enacted as ‘cooperatives for PWD employment’ and as ‘cooperatives for 
PWD empowerment’.    
The combination of transactional and transformational roles enacted by the 
PWDs, as individuals and as a collective, may be characterized as efforts of the 
primary stakeholders, to simultaneously enact roles in what Harrison and St. John’s 
(1994; 1998) calls the three regions of PWD Fed’s stakeholder environment (internal, 
operational and broad regions) or to engage what Post et al., (2002a, 2002b) describe 
as the three broad categories of stakeholder groups (resource base, industry structure 
and socio-political). However, unlike the corporate context, such enactment of roles 
or stakeholder engagement processes are consciously geared towards increasing PWD 
Fed’s influence in these three regions or among these stakeholder categories to make 
the normative goal of poverty reduction among PWD’s possible. In this sense, the 
PWD Fed did not simply manage the groups in different regions of the stakeholder 
environment but engaged these groups to create an enabling stakeholder environment 
for poverty reduction among PWDs. 
Table 5.2. traces the evolution of the roles of the PWDs across Mintzberg’s (2007) 
organizational stages of initiation, development and renewal of the PWD Fed. 
Interestingly, role changes happened among individual PWDs and PWD primary 
cooperatives, as they became part of the PWD Fed over time. However, from 
initiation to renewal, there was an increasing segment of empowered PWDs from 
among the ranks of the primary cooperative members who engaged external 
stakeholders to make these role changes possible.   
The roles and role changes experienced by the PWDs and PWD primary 
cooperatives may be likened to the experience of Alter Trade’s sugar farmer partners: 
as individuals and as groups, they started enacting transactional roles, then over time 
also enacted transformational roles. However, the enactment of transformational roles 
by a segment of PWDs and PWD primary cooperatives, as well as the PWD Fed 
itself, happened from initiation.  In contrast, the enactment of transformational roles 
by a segment of the sugar farmer partners started to happen later, at the development 
stage, after going through an initiation stage where the sugar farmer partners, as 
individuals and as groups enacted only transactional roles.     
 
5.7.3.  Roots and Routes of Role Changes  
 
Enabling institutions and individuals, a conscious strategy of empowering PWDs 
through the cooperative approach and sustained efforts in delivering a combination of 
transactional and transformational services to PWDs may be seen as contributing 
factors in the role changes enacted by PWDs in the social enterprise.   
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PWD Fed management staff Mayta Banday and Loi Maguigad explained:   
 
“At the first instance, PWDs become members at the primary level to find work 
and thus come in with a worker mentality. But, as the PWD Fed and its 
cooperative members have shown, PWDs could be trained to own and manage 
their social enterprise, with a little help in terms of capacity building from support 
institutions in and out of government. The cooperative has been an expression of 
self-help in a situation where there were not many NGOs like Tahanang Walang 
Hagdanan and not many corporations like Hapee Toothpaste who were committed 
to employing PWDs.61 Also, we have not come across any entrepreneurs or NGOs 
that have set up an enterprise to employ PWDs and later turned over ownership to 
PWDs. PWD cooperatives and the federation are a response to the reality that 
PWDs who number about 10% of the population need to be assisted and 
empowered”. (Banday and Maguigad, 2010) 
 
Peter Hammerle expressed his belief that the “self owned and managed cooperative 
approach” is superior to other strategies such as sheltered workshops and NGO-
managed enterprises employing PWDs:   
 
“The cooperative set-up where PWDs are owner-members of the enterprise from 
the start allows a framework where value formation, leadership development and 
empowerment of PWDs can happen – a process of self and group selection takes 
place where the best among them form the core of leaders and managers of the 
cooperative. In a sheltered workshop and even in an NGO, at best the PWDs are 
employees – of course like in Tahanan, a number of them already occupy 
management positions, but they are still answerable not to themselves but to a 
Board that is composed of abled persons.” (Hammerle, 2010) 
 
The German development agency, CBM had been the most consistent enabling 
institutional stakeholder in the PWD Fed story. What catalyzed the setting up of the 
PWD Fed was CBM’s belief and pursuit of a community-based rehabilitation 
initiative in the country. CBM sent Peter Hammerle who proposed and initially led 
the implementation of the school chair venture through PWD cooperatives. With only 
one PWD cooperative existing then, CBM supported the organization of PWD 
cooperatives during a pre-initiation stage together with a successful lobby effort to 
persuade government to procure 10% of their school chair needs through PWD 
cooperatives. This pre-initiation stage was what made possible the performance of 
                                                 
61 A case on Tahanang Walang Hagdanan is contained in Chapter 6. It is a foundation that among others, runs sheltered 
workshops for PWDs. Hapee Toothpaste is one of the few local companies that is known for assisting and hiring a 
significant percentage of its workers from among PWDs. The owner of the company has a child who is a PWD and  is a 
known supporter of PWD causes.   
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both transactional and transformational roles by the founding PWD cooperatives as 
owner-workers and as owner-decision makers, and it also created the conditions for 
the emergence of an initial group of empowered PWDs, who served as PWD Board 
members, as leaders and managers of the founding cooperatives and as PWD Fed 
General Manager.  Hammerle expressed: 
 
“As the founding General Manager, a post he occupied until 2009, Johnny was the 
personification of an empowered PWD who rose from poverty and social 
exclusion, given the opportunities that the school chair venture and PWD Fed 
provided. When he left the PWD Fed in 2009, it was to take on a CBM 
consultancy assignment to in essence replicate the PWD Fed experience in 
another country, Paraguay”. (Hammerle, 2011)   
 
PWD Fed General Manager Johnny Lantion, in tandem with CBM Consultant Peter 
Hammerle, became a strong pillar for the federation during its initiation and 
development stages.         
In addition to loans for production, CBM and CCA jointly provided support for a 
more systematic leadership and organizational capacity development program among 
the member cooperatives and for the federation, and made the support of other 
institutions such as Rabo Bank (e.g. for financial management systems development 
and additional production loans) feasible.  
Like in the Alter Trade story, a dedicated program and staffing were put in place 
to ensure the delivery of transformational services. These were beyond the 
transactional services that both organizations provided to their primary stakeholders 
to ensure that the latter were able to deliver the quality and volume requirements for 
their respective markets. Notably, the transformational services provided by both 
included leadership formation among the poor being served, capacity-building for the 
development of the organizations of the poor, enabling programs for income 
diversification that were not directly linked to the value chain for the enterprise’s 
main product(s), and advocacy with the government for an enabling environment for 
their respective sectors. In a sense, the direct impact of the advocacy-related services 
in the case of PWD Fed had been more pronounced, relative to Alter Trade, as 
government itself undertook affirmative action to provide a market for PWD school 
chairs. In the case of Alter Trade, there were other actors who played a bigger role in 
agrarian reform advocacy, and Alter Trade’s services filled the gap of government’s 
inability to provide services to the sugar farmer-agrarian reform beneficiaries. 
However, services for income diversification had been more significant in the Alter 
Trade case. Most of the income diversification initiatives undertaken by the PWD 
primary cooperatives had so far been mainly products of their own initiatives, as they 
reached a higher level of development, and were still at the level of planning at the 
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level of PWD Fed. As embodiments of the empowerment of the poverty sectors 
concerned, PWD Fed and NOFTA, the newly organized federation of sugar producer-
partners in the Alter Trade case, are comparable. In this sense, the two cases may be 
seen as representing two different routes to the empowerment of previously excluded 
poverty sectors.         
Notwithstanding the issues and difficulties that had arisen, the Department of 
Education, and the Philippine government as a whole, comprised a major and critical 
enabling stakeholder, with the enactment and implementation, of the special provision 
in the GAA, allocating 10 percent of the DepEd school chair budget to cooperatives 
of PWDs. It must be noted however that the lobby efforts of the PWD Fed and its 
supporters to enact and implement the GAA special provision was a critical factor in 
the government taking affirmative action. This has been the same story for the Magna 
Carta for PWDs.  
 
5.7.4. Impact of Roles and Role Changes  
 
At the time of this research, the PWD Fed had an aggregate membership of 1,250 
PWDs in 15 primary cooperatives nationwide. Of this total, 650 PWDs were directly 
employed in the school chair enterprise, while programs and activities of the member 
cooperatives employed another 500.   
The SROI study done in 2009 (Pelejo, 2009) noted that 64% of the PWDs 
surveyed said that they earned more with their participation in the enterprise, with 
average annual incomes increasing from PhP 30,323 to PhP 54,467 per year. What 
could be considered as the much bigger impact though, was the pronouncement by 
91% of the PWDs surveyed that their self-esteem had increased, and they socialized 
more, after they joined the cooperative’s school chair project.   
Over time, the primary cooperatives showed greatly enhanced collective and 
individual (as exhibited by the leaders) capabilities to create ‘actual opportunities’ to 
improve their ‘means of living’ (Sen, 1999; 2009). From being owner-workers in the 
value chain for the school chairs, the primary cooperatives and their members (both 
within the primary cooperatives and indirectly in the PWD Fed) became more 
conscious of their role as owner-decision makers of the social enterprise(s) and grew 
to participate more pro-actively in the governance and management of the enterprise 
and the federation. 
The primary cooperatives and the PWD Fed itself, as expressions of PWD 
empowerment, became strong organizational mechanisms for the PWD sector to 
engage the government to give more attention to the plight and solutions to problems 
of the PWD sector in the Philippines. 
It could be said that the roles and role changes manifested by the PWDs created a 
high level of social impact on the PWDs, comparable to the level of social impact that 
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the roles and role changes of the sugar farmers had in the case of Alter Trade. Both 
Alter Trade and PWD Fed also showed the positive impact of empowered sugar 
producers and empowered PWD workers on the viability of their respective 
enterprises. However, the PWD Fed case demonstrates a more nuanced picture, 
showing how the role of empowered PWDs as owner–decision makers of the 
enterprise may negatively affect PWD productivity and enterprise efficiency. This 
presents a question of real trade-offs between the empowerment of primary 
stakeholders and social enterprise efficiency.   
Leading scholars of stakeholder theory, in characterizing the state of the art posit 
that:  
 
“A stakeholder approach to business is about creating as much value as possible 
for stakeholders, without resorting to trade-offs”. (Freeman, et al., 2010, p. 28) 
 
The PWD Fed story could not be adequately understood using this conception of a 
stakeholder approach to business, suggesting the need for a framework that could 
better explain what is happening in a SEPPS exemplified by PWD Fed. Recognizing 
the trade-off between social and enterprise goals, and accepting that when trade-offs 
are made, they are made in favor of upholding the interests of the poor as primary 
stakeholders, seems to be a more appropriate way of characterizing a stakeholder 
approach for SEPPS. The PWD Fed case brings this issue to life. Who decides what is 
in favor of the primary stakeholders’ interests is an important concern, especially 
when the empowerment of the poor as owner-decision makers is a desired social 
enterprise outcome, as in the PWD Fed story.       
In the case of Alter Trade, the synergy between enterprise viability and 
empowerment of the producer groups emerged as an important theme, with Alter 
Trade noting that their best producer groups were those who were most empowered.  
This theme also emerged during the development stage of the PWD Fed.  
The renewal stage of the PWD Fed was characterized by the dominant role 
exercised by a greater number of empowered PWDs in governance and management 
within the PWD Fed itself. At this stage, the General Assembly and the Board of 
PWD Fed decided in favor of shifting from component production to the complete 
chair production system. In this sense, the empowered PWDs made a choice in favor 
of what they may perceive as a more empowering process of production at the level of 
primary cooperatives with an accepted trade-off in terms of productivity and 
efficiency of the PWD Fed’s school chair venture. In real terms, this has meant 
prolonging the completion of the contract for delivering the chairs to schools. As of 
June 2011, the PWD Fed had still to complete the PhP 77 million contract awarded to 
them in November 2010. Whether this is a positive or a negative development may be 
a matter of perspective and social acceptability among the stakeholders concerned. In 
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this sense, what may be useful is a stakeholder engagement framework that is similar 
to how such is conceived by scholars in public/environmental policy and natural 
resource management discussed in Chapter 1. Scholars of the stakeholder approach in 
these fields (Poindexter, 1995; De Lopez, 2001; Jamal and Eyre, 2003; Beutler, 2005) 
emphasize the need for larger normative goals, like poverty reduction among PWDs, 
to guide the process of stakeholder dialogue in resolving perceived trade-offs or 
conflicts of interest.    
 
5.7.5.  Stakeholder Engagement Strategy over Time 
 
Using Mintzberg’s (2007) theory on strategy formation, the intended and realized 
stakeholder engagement strategy of PWD Fed from the initiation to renewal stages 
has been one of empowerment. A realized empowerment strategy at the initiation 
stage was made possible by a 4-year pre-initiation stage. During this pre-initiation 
stage, CBM provided the transactional and transformational services to start the 
school chair venture while also organizing and developing most of the founding PWD 
cooperatives of the federation. During the initiation up to the renewal stages, the 
PWD Fed itself already provided the transactional and transformational services for 
the PWD primary cooperatives and their members. Empowered PWDs at the primary 
cooperative and federation level, with the support of enabling institutions and 
individuals, made this possible.  
The PWD Fed case further demonstrates the inadequacy of Sloan’s (2009) 
stakeholder engagement models of control and collaboration in explaining how the 
poor are engaged by social enterprises. It strengthens the need for evolving 
stakeholder engagement models that are more appropriate for social enterprises with 
the poor as primary stakeholders.   
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The stakeholder engagement strategy of empowerment, as jointly demonstrated by 
the way Alter Trade engaged its sugar farmer partners and the way PWD Fed engaged 
its PWD members may be characterized as having the following common features: 
 
 Managerial orientation towards the poor: poor as transactional and 
transformational stakeholders 
 Key engagement processes: enabling, empowering 
 
 Nature of roles among the poor: Empowered supplier-partners or empowered 
worker-owners; Organized participants in enterprise and value chain 
governance and management (transactional roles); Organized stakeholders in 
poverty reduction and community, sector and/or societal transformation 
(transformational roles) 
 Nature of programs and services: Provision of financial, market and/or 
technological services to make the poor effective suppliers or workers 
(transactional services); Organization building, leadership formation, capacity-
building for organizational development, enabling programs for income 
diversification not directly linked to the value chain for the enterprise’s main 
product(s), and advocacy with the government for an enabling environment for 
their respective sectors (transformational services) 
 Impact: Social inclusion and improved self esteem; Food sufficiency and 
reduction of income poverty; High levels of collective capability to seek and 
take advantage of opportunities to improve means of living of their families, 
community and/or sector   
 
While Alter Trade also manifested an intended and realized stakeholder engagement 
strategy of empowerment during the development and renewal stages, the level of 
empowerment manifested by PWD Fed may be characterized as having reached a 
higher level. Empowered PWDs were directly facilitating the delivery of transactional 
and transformational services to themselves and their fellow PWDs through a venture 
and a federation they were governing and managing by themselves from the 
beginning. This was just starting to happen in 2009 with the setting up of NOFTA, the 
federation of sugar producers, in the case of Alter Trade. NOFTA was an outcome of 
Alter Trade’s transactional and transformational services while PWD Fed as the case 
subject, was the provider of the transactional and transformational services. On one 
hand, this may indicate two different routes in the pursuit of empowerment as a 
stakeholder engagement strategy among social enterprises. On the other hand, 
NOFTA and PWD Fed may be seen in a continuum, that PWD Fed provides insights 
on how NOFTA may evolve and develop further. In this respect, the PWD Fed story 
provides insights about the workings of a social enterprise that is governed and 
managed by the poor themselves.  
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During the initiation stage, a start-up number of PWD cooperatives and leaders 
from among their ranks were already governing and managing the school chair 
venture and the PWD Fed as a representative body for self-help and advocacy. During 
the development stage, we saw an increase in the number of PWD primary 
cooperatives organized, and the level of participation among PWDs in the governance 
and management of both the school chair venture and their organization progress at 
different paces at the level of primary cooperatives. During the renewal stage, the 
dynamism developed at the level of the primary cooperatives resulted to a bigger 
number of pro-active PWD representatives in the governance and management 
structures of the PWD Fed itself. It was at this stage, when the PWDs reached what 
Alter Trade Foundation’s Executive Director Edwin Lopez characterized as 
‘independent decision making’ (Lopez, 2010) that issues related to trade-offs between 
the empowerment of PWDs (or of the poor in general) and efficiency in serving the 
PWD Fed’s school chair market (or social enterprise markets in general) surfaced.  
Before ‘independent decision making’ was possible, the empowerment of the PWDs 
seemed to have a positive and synergistic relationship with serving their markets. This 
synergistic relationship was also shown in the case of Alter Trade vis- à-vis their 
sugar producer partners.     
This ‘empowerment-efficiency trade-off’ is an interesting area of future research 
as it shows that the ‘no trade-off mindset’ of the stakeholder approach for business 
may not be appropriate for social enterprises with the poor as primary stakeholders.       
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5.8.  Discussion 
 
The PWD Fed case contributes to the body of literature on social entrepreneurship 
and stakeholder theory in many ways.  
The case presents SEPPS as a counterpart of WISE (Nyssens, 2006) in terms of 
prominence and importance, in a country context in the South where there is systemic 
poverty, massive unemployment and underdevelopment, where a huge policy-action 
gap exists in relation to the state’s affirmative action for PWDs and there is a severe 
lack of opportunities for employment in the mainstream job market even for non-
PWDs. As a SEPPS, the PWD Fed demonstrates the dynamic process of empowering 
PWDs to practice democratic principles in a cooperative organizational framework in 
this difficult external environment. 
The case demonstrates an empowerment strategy of stakeholder engagement 
implemented by PWDs themselves assisted by enabling stakeholders mainly from 
civil society in the Philippines and countries in the North. Rather than just being 
managed in a specific region as workers-owners, PWDs were empowered to play 
transactional and transformational roles in all three regions of PWD’s stakeholder 
environment (Harrison and St. John, 1994; 1998) to overcome income poverty and 
capability deprivation (Sen, 1999; 2009). This resonates with social enterprises 
developing a political dimension because of the need to change the broader context 
within which they operate. (Nyssens, 2006; Martin and Osberg, 2007)      
The PWD Fed and Alter Trade (involving sugar farmers) cases may be seen as 
SEPPS demonstrating two different routes of pursuing the stakeholder engagement 
strategy of empowerment. The PWD Fed may be characterized as utilizing a ‘direct 
empowerment strategy’ of stakeholder engagement while the Alter Trade case 
involving the sugar farmers may be characterized as utilizing a ‘devolutionary 
empowerment strategy’ of stakeholder engagement. With the direct empowerment 
strategy, the primary stakeholders are enabled to enact both transactional and 
transformational roles as owner-decision makers of their social enterprise from 
initiation. With the devolutionary empowerment strategy, the primary stakeholders 
are first engaged as transactional partners then enabled to enact both transactional and 
transformational roles, as owner-decision makers of their social enterprise(s) over 
time. This is a refinement of the findings of the author from an earlier action research 
on social enterprises in Asia that did not delineate transactional from transformational 
roles (Dacanay, 2004). 
These two routes to empowerment as stakeholder engagement strategies are 
clearly beyond the models of stakeholder engagement developed by Sloan (2009) 
linked to a study among European corporations.  As detailed in Section 5.7.5, the 
PWD Fed and Alter Trade cases taken together present a strong case for developing a 
distinct framework for understanding stakeholder engagement strategies among 
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SEPPS. Such a framework would benefit from the rich literature emanating from the 
social economy school of social entrepreneurship that characterizes social enterprises 
as multi-stakeholder organizations having a democratic management style and 
furthering democracy at the local level (Defourny, 2001; Vidal, 2010).   
This framework for understanding stakeholder engagement among SEPPS also 
needs to address the applicability of the corporate approach of “creating as much 
value as possible for stakeholders, without resorting to trade-offs” (Freeman, et al., 
2010, p. 28). As demonstrated by the empowerment-efficiency dilemma faced by the 
PWD Fed as they exercised independent decision making during the renewal stage, 
conflicts and trade-offs between the interests of primary stakeholders and the interests 
of markets they serve are real and need to be creatively resolved.  Spear, et al., (2010) 
characterize this as part of the challenges of social enterprise governance. Whether 
PWD Fed is able to balance enterprise decisions with their social mission and manage 
diverse stakeholder interests may largely depend on what Spear et al., (2010) found to 
be critical among mutual social enterprises like cooperatives: “the need to fully 
address the challenges of maintaining an active membership and developing a 
competent board” (Spear, et al., 2010, p. 199). This will entail PWD Fed’s 
simultaneous and creative enactment of transactional and transformational roles in its 
internal, operating and broad social-political stakeholder environment. With the 
establishment of the Foundation for TheseAbled Persons Inc, PWD Fed has co-
created an institutional partner that could assist this process in a harsh external 
environment of failed state and market institutions.   
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CHAPTER 6 – TAHANANG WALANG HAGDANAN: 
FROM WORKERS TO TRANSACTIONAL PARTNERS 
IN SOCIAL ENTERPRISE MANAGEMENT  
 
This chapter highlights Tahanan Walang Hagdanan (Tahanan) as a SEPPS 
engaging the excluded poor as partners in social enterprise management. The 
best evidence for this was a situation where a majority of Tahanan’s supervisors 
and managers/directors rose from the ranks of the PWDs they were serving. The 
study shows the dynamic process of shifting stakeholder engagement strategies 
during the initiation, development and renewal stages of a SEPPS. The case 
shows how a stakeholder engagement strategy of collaboration that involved the 
poor as worker-partners could unintentionally shift to a control strategy that 
involved the poor as passive beneficiaries. In an effort to expand its outreach 
among PWDs during its development stage, a team of business-oriented 
professionals was brought in to manage big contracts with traders in the 
mainstream export market. What resulted was a classic case of mission drift that 
plunged Tahanan into crisis. This resulted to PWDs hanging on, for a time, to 
what became an exploitative work environment of long hours for little pay 
followed by a period where they were back to their status of being unemployed 
and excluded. What the Tahanan experience suggests is that a control strategy of 
stakeholder engagement seems to result to limited short term impacts with the risk 
of fostering subservience and dependency leading to a hardening of social 
exclusion. From a crisis situation, the case of Tahanan also demonstrates how 
individually-directed transformational services in combination with transactional 
services, as well as putting in place participatory management systems involving 
the rank and file workers, could assist the process of restoring a management 
orientation and practice of engaging the poor as worker-partners, characteristic 
of the collaboration strategy of stakeholder engagement.  
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6.1.  Introduction 
 
Tahanang Walang Hagdanan Inc., (Tahanan) is a non-stock, non-profit 
corporation dedicated to providing rehabilitation to the physically handicapped 
towards their achieving gainful and productive lives. The founders saw this as part of 
an enabling process: “This will enable them to restore their sense of dignity and self-
respect so that their God-given talents and potentials blossom to the fullest”. 
(Tahanang Walang Hagdanan, 2007). 
Tahanang Walang Hagdanan, literally translated means ‘House With No Steps’.  
Steps or stairways represented physical and other symbolic barriers for persons with 
disability (PWD), which may be economic, psychological and social in nature. The 
name suggested the elimination of these barriers and the rejection of severely disabled 
persons. The aspiration for an enlightened community where these barriers would 
have been eliminated was likened to a ‘House With No Steps’ where the handicapped 
live with independence and dignity (Tahanang Walang Hagdanan, 1977). 
Tahanan’s objectives as articulated in their organizational documents had 
essentially remained unchanged from 1987 up to the time of the research in 2009-
early 2011.  Their first objective was ‘to equip the disabled with skills and knowledge 
for their integration into the mainstream of society’ by: 
 
 Exposing them to ‘on-the-job’ skills training in metal craft, woodcraft, 
needlecraft, information technology, paper-making, and packaging workshops 
of the center62; 
 Educating the disabled young adults through regular classes and special 
education from elementary to college; and 
 Developing enterprises which can be managed by the disabled themselves and 
can compete in commercial situations, so that eventually, they may become 
self-employed individuals” (Tahanang Walang Hagdanan, 1987; 2000; 2007). 
 
Tahanan also provided shelter and other welfare assistance to those who were 
severely disabled and could not cope with workshop routines. They adopted a 
regionalization approach, building homes for the disabled in various parts of the 
country. By 1987, 21 affiliated homes for the disabled had been set up: 12 in the 
National Capital Region; 3 in other parts of Luzon; 3 in the Visayas; and 3 in 
Mindanao. By 2007, there were 24 affiliated homes (Tahanang Walang Hagdanan, 
1987; 2000; 2007). 
 
                                                 
62 Information technology and paper making activities were added in the 2000 and 2007 organizational documents.   
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6.2. Initiation Stage:  The Religious Sector takes the Lead   
       (1973-early 1980s)     
             
Tahanan was organized on February 21, 197363 by Sr. Valeriana Baerts, ICM64, a 
Belgian missionary assigned as a volunteer nurse in the National Orthopedic Hospital 
in the Philippines. She noted that after the medical rehabilitation of patients, they had 
nowhere to go. At the World Rehabilitation Congress in Sydney, Australia, Sr. 
Valeriana was inspired by the work of Mr. Lionel Watts, founder of the House with 
No Steps, Australia. Together, they conceived of a live-in rehabilitation and training 
center for paraplegics and other orthopedically handicapped persons, which would 
provide a transition between their discharge from the hospital and re-entry into the 
world of work. Sr. Valeriana believed that everyone involved in the founding of 
Tahanan were instruments of the Divine Providence in pursuing a mission so that ‘No 
one is left out’. (Baerts, 2011)    
In 1973, Tahanan started with metal craft for wheel chair production in a small 
place in New Manila, Quezon City. The wheelchair manufacturing project served as a 
sheltered workshop that initially employed about 20 paraplegics and orthopedically 
handicapped persons, while also producing a product that was directly useful to 
PWDs needing mobility aids. Tahanan had a program called Sponsor a Wheelchair, 
which assisted persons with disability (PWDs) to own this mobility aid by 
shouldering 25-75% of its cost.    
To develop a full-blown center, the founders first approached the Belgian 
government, which agreed to shoulder seventy five percent (75%) of the construction 
cost. Sr. Valeriana then turned to the Philippine President to provide the other twenty 
five percent (25%) but it was not approved. A 4.5 hectare lot owned by the Catholic 
Church, located in the Municipality of Cainta within the National Capital Region, was 
leased to Tahanan for free through the Archdiocese of Manila, under a Memorandum 
of Agreement renewable every 25 years.65 It was here where the center was 
constructed and substantively completed in 1977-78.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
63 Tahanang Walang Hagdanan was incorporated on July 19, 1973. 
64 ICM stands for Immaculate Conception of Mary, a religious congregation. 
65 The lease of the lot was renewed through the Diocese of Antipolo in 2008.  
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6.3.  Development Stage: Expansion through 
Diversification (mid 1980s-1990s)  
 
While sustaining its wheelchair production operations, Tahanan exerted efforts to 
expand its outreach among PWDs through diversification. Tahanan diversified its 
employment activities for PWDs by serving packaging requirements of businesses 
and as a subcontractor for entrepreneurs serving the export market.   
Joy Garcia, Executive Vice President and Chief Operations Officer (COO), 
provided an overview of what Tahanan had been through in terms of evolving their 
sheltered workshops during the 1980s and 1990s:   
 
“From metal craft for wheel chair production, Tahanan diversified into packaging, 
woodcraft and fish hooks. In the 1980s, Tahanan had packaging contracts from 
pharmaceutical companies such as United Laboratories and the chocolate 
company Serg’s. In the 1980s and 1990s, Tahanan also went into woodcraft, 
producing collapsible tables, wood jewelry and letter openers for export. Also in 
the 1990s, Tahanan went into making fish hooks under contract with a company 
exporting the product”. (Garcia, 2009) 
 
Management staff recalled the problems they faced in dealing with the mainstream 
export market in the 1980s and 1990s. They provided stories about how Tahanan paid 
a high price for getting involved in the export market for wood products without the 
necessary preparation. The collapsible coffee tables produced for export warped and 
Tahanan lost machineries and cash amounting to about PhP 1.5 million in a law suit 
filed against them. At first the volume required by the export market in the 1980s 
seemed large so Tahanan was able to employ more PWDs. However, the piece rate 
price paid to Tahanan for these subcontracted products did not cover operational 
expenses. Therefore, in the 1990s, Tahanan tried to become more selective, by having 
a policy of refusing to accept contracts priced below breakeven levels. This happened 
as exporters, because of globalization, were also pulling out orders from the 
Philippines and were transferring their manufacturing to China. This resulted in 
periods where the PWDs had no work.  
 
6.4. Crisis Management and Renewal (1990’s-2010): 
Engaging Schools, the Private Sector and Government 
   
The legal battle Tahanan experienced in the early 1990’s and the lack of work 
contracts to sustain the employment of the many PWDs who were recruited to fulfill 
the requirements of the export market pushed Tahanan to a crisis situation. The policy 
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to be selective with work contracts and the desire to continue to give work to many 
PWDs became a continuing source of tension. For a time, the mentality that prevailed 
was to continue to serve the export market ‘just to give work for people’. 1998-2000 
became another trying period for Tahanan as continuing to serve the export market 
despite very low contract prices took a toll on both Tahanan’s financial health and the 
income of PWDs as well.  
 
6.4.1.  Local Market Development  
 
Given the continuing difficulties associated with serving the mainstream export 
market, Tahanan started to look towards institutional markets, direct selling, and the 
use of media to develop alternative markets at the local level. Tahanan continued to 
do sewing, woodworks, metal works, encoding jobs, and subcontracted works. 
Tahanan started direct selling to consumers through garage sales in exclusive 
subdivisions. It sustained links with pharmaceutical and other companies for 
packaging jobs and corporate give-aways. It focused on companies that subcontracted 
work and ordered products from Tahanan as an expression of their corporate social 
responsibility. It did school-to-school and school foundation day selling for 
Montessori educational materials (Garcia, 2010). 
While these opportunities in the local market had been there before, Tahanan did 
not give much attention to fully exploring them in the past. For example, Tahanan’s 
first experience in serving the Department of Education (DepEd) with educational 
toys happened in 1998, but it was much later that the DepEd became a focus for 
Tahanan’s market development efforts.  
Executive Order (EO) 417 issued by the Office of the President of the Philippines 
that mandated the procurement of 10% of supplies of government agencies from 
PWDs boosted Tahanan’s efforts to develop the local market for educational toys.  
Educational toys became both an important source of PWD employment and revenue 
for Tahanan, as the DepEd became a major market (Garcia, 2009). 
Since 2003, Tahanan’s market development efforts focused on serving 
government and corporate clients with quality products. Tahanan’s Executive Vice 
President and Chief Operating Officer Joy Garcia explained that they needed to 
continue building a reputation for quality products and not just depend on the social 
responsibility of their institutional markets (Garcia, 2011).      
 
6.4.2.  Business Center Development 
 
In 2006, Tahanan set up a Business Center using the award money it won through 
the World Bank-led Philippine Development Marketplace competition with the 
theme, Development with Equity. The Business Center was meant to assist the 
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development and marketing of PWD-made products and hence develop PWD micro-
entrepreneurs. The Philippine-Australia Community Assistance Program (PACAP), 
one of the funding partners for the competition, with a PhP 1 million grant, directly 
funded the Center. The PACAP-assisted program started in November 2006 (Lloren, 
2009; Philippine-Australia Community Assistance Program, 2009).  
The Business Center was a welcome development in giving a boost to Tahanan’s 
Community-based Rehabilitation Program.  Virgie Montilla explained: 
 
“In 1994, we set up a Community-based Rehabilitation Program. Its objective was 
to organize groups of PWD in target communities, develop them by extending 
trainings, and engaging these PWDs in awareness and advocacy efforts, in the 
process linking them with the local government. Our first area was Rizal province 
where we assisted the orthopedically impaired, and persons with intellectual 
disability. We engaged them in basket making, making rattan-based products, 
making bags from recycled materials soap making, poultry and hog raising. We 
have reached Marikina, Antipolo and 12 other towns. We cooperated with local 
government units and their Municipal Social Welfare and Development office.  
What we have noted is the PWD groups become weak after they are turned over 
to LGUs. With Tahanan’s Business Center that is helping develop and market 
their products, they are doing better”. (Montilla, 2009)  
 
During her field research in December 2009, the researcher noted that the Business 
Center was marketing the following products (Tahanang Walang Hagdanan, 2009a): 
 
 Wheelchairs and other mobility aid devices (e.g. walkers, crutches, prosthetics); 
 Educational toys; 
 Corporate give-aways; 
 Kitchen items; 
 Handmade paper products;  
 Needlecraft items; 
 Tetra board products; and 
 Chairs and household items from mixed materials. 
 
Some of these were products of the recycling projects of Tahanan, like the tetra board 
products from the tetra pack and doy pack of juice drinks; some parts of mobility aids 
from aluminum cans of soft drinks and the handmade paper products from 
newspapers and magazines. For these efforts, Tahanan received an Award of Merit for 
Environmental Protection in 2000 from the Public Relations Society of the 
Philippines (Tahanang Walang Hagdanan, 2000; 2009b).  
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During the same field research, the researcher was able to observe ongoing 
workshops for repacking medicines (under contract with the pharmaceutical company, 
United Laboratories), school chair making using wood and steel (under contract with 
the Gintong Pangarap Cooperative), sewing of souvenir and give-away bags from 
cloth and recycled tarpaulin (mostly ordered by the Circle of Friends Foundation, Inc., 
and Gifts and Graces), woodworks for making educational toys (under contract with 
the DepEd), and silk screening.   
 
6.4.3.  Government as Main Market 
 
From 2006 up to the time of the research in 2009-early 2011, educational toys had 
become the biggest source of contracts for Tahanan. In 2007, Tahanan noted that a big 
part of their sales for educational toys were being made by bidders with the 
Department of Education (DepEd). They saw an opportunity to expand the 
employment of PWDs in their workshops by bidding directly with this government 
agency. This meant Tahanan would no longer just depend on the government policy 
that allocated 10% of their budget for educational toys and other supplies to PWD 
groups. This entailed going through the regular bidding process for supply contracts, 
competing with business enterprises based on cost, quality and delivery. In March 24, 
2009, Tahanan won their first regular bid for PhP 16 million. In 2010, Tahanan 
continued to get engaged in the regular bidding process to supply DepEd with 
educational toys (Garcia, 2009; 2010). 
Tahanan’s Social Director Virgie Montilla saw the local market as becoming 
significant side by side with government contracts and support: 
 
“Our support from government now is more although it’s not full, and some 
government projects consider us a supplier. When DepEd, the Department of 
Social Work and Development (DSWD) and the Philippine Charity 
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) became clients, the local market for Tahanan’s 
products became more sustainable. Support from international organizations, 
such as the Philippine-Australia Community Assistance Program, has also been 
important”. (Montilla, 2009)   
 
However, Tahanan’s COO expressed some difficulties faced with government 
contracts: 
 
“For government contracts, you need a performance bond of 5% and ideally, 
capitalization of 70%. For the PhP 16 million contract, we needed PhP 850,000 
as performance bond, which we didn’t have but was loaned to us by our board 
member and past President, Engr. Felix M. Gonzalez. We also had to borrow 
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for capitalization, and managed to get a PhP 3.5 million loan from the 
Foundation for a Sustainable Society Inc. With all these requirements, we 
managed to finish production by June 24, 2009, but till now, the account 
remains a collectible66”. (Garcia, 2009)  
 
Loreta Sta Ana, the secretary of Sr. Valeriana in Tahanan since 1976, expressed a 
similar concern: 
 
“While our earned income is significant, it is uncertain given that government 
is our main consumer or client, as shown by the delays in contracts and 
payments from DepEd for school chairs and educational materials”. (Sta Ana, 
2009) 
 
6.4.4.  Services for the PWDs 
 
Tahanan’s main objective as a social enterprise was ‘to equip the disabled with 
skills and knowledge for their integration into the mainstream of society’. Tahanan 
provided an array of services and ran several programs towards this end, as outlined 
below. (Tahanang Walang Hagdanan, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009). These 
services were made available to both the Tahanan workers and the larger PWD 
community. 
 
 Mobility Aid Assistance Program. Tahanan provided mobility aids (e.g. 
wheelchair, walker, leg brace, artificial leg, cane, corrective shoes) to indigent 
persons, with counterpart from the family or referring NGOs. In 2008, it was 
able to serve 716 beneficiaries, up from around 100 – 150 per year in the 2003-
2006 period. It also had a Prosthesis and Brace Center which trained amputees 
on the use of the devices; 
 Education Program. Through tie-ups with other NGOs like the ERDA 
Foundation and the Assisi Foundation, Tahanan supported the schooling of 
PWDs and/or the children of PWDs who were either directly involved with 
Tahanan or those living in their community and referred through the 
Community-Based Rehabilitation (CBR) Program. Tahanan was supporting 
104 such scholars, from the elementary to college level, in 2008; 
 Community-Based Rehabilitation (CBR) Program. Tahanan had a CBR 
program in the province of Rizal, run in cooperation with some local 
government units in the province. This program covered mobility aid 
                                                 
66 This meant that the account remained a collectible after more than 5 months since contract completion.  
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assistance, medical services, education assistance, and trainings and seminars 
on livelihood development and other topics; 
 Trainings and Seminars. Employees and workers (both at the staff and 
managerial level), as well as participants in the CBR and rehabilitation 
programs, were given trainings on such aspects as Personality Development, 
Esteem Development, Leadership, and other capability building and skills 
development trainings. For instance, the last quarter of 2008 saw the conduct of 
the following trainings and seminars (Tahanang Walang Hagdanan, 2009): 
Filipino Sign Language Module II, Basic Skills Rehabilitation, Intermediate 
Skills Rehabilitation, Poultry, Hog and Goat Raising, Water lily Stem Weaving, 
Study Tour for CBR Workers, Leadership Training for PWD Leaders, Product 
Costing, Packaging, Labeling and Marketing, Participation Learning and 
Action, a seminar on the Magna Carta for the Disabled, and a Training for 
Trainers seminar in line with the CBR program. Tahanan also sent staff to 
external trainings on topics ranging from effective communications, to project 
cycle management, to personality development, to specific skills like computer 
hardware and servicing, and consumer electronics servicing; 
 Rehabilitation and Vocational Training. Tahanan assisted people who had 
recently acquired disability via physical rehabilitation services and on-the-job 
training to enable them to be independent and regain productivity; 
 Medical Services. These included medical missions, referrals of PWDs to 
hospitals, and a Botika ng Barangay (community drugstore); 
 Day Care Services. Tahanan ran a day care center for children of employees 
(both PWD and non-PWD) who need to bring their children with them; and 
 Sports and Recreation. Tahanan supported the participation of PWD athletes in 
sporting events. In December 2008, it launched the 1st Philippine Wheelchair 
Ballroom Dancing/Dance Sports Competition. Internally, Tahanan regularly 
held recreational events for the employees and workers. 
 
6.4.5.   Tahanan’s Board and Management Team   
 
At the time of the research, Tahanan’s 11-member Board of Directors was 
composed of 5 ICM sisters including Sr. Valeriana as Founder and Chairperson; 3 
priests from the Diocese of Antipolo; and 3 lay persons or individuals from the 
business community and the private sector (including the President Mr. Manuel 
Agcaoili and a former President, Engr. Felix M. Gonzalez). The COO, Ms. Joy Garcia 
sat as an ex-officio member of the board given her appointment as Executive Vice 
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President. Also appointed, as Corporate Secretary, was the Head of Special Projects, 
Ms. Tess Lloren.67  
The Board had always been mainly composed of non-PWDs. However, in the 
past, there had been more individuals from the business community and some 
prominent people with connections to politicians. What had changed was that there 
were more members from the religious sector in the new board. This was due to the 
change of bylaws required by the Diocese of Antipolo as the Catholic Church 
renewed their contact of land lease with Tahanan. At the time of the research, Mr. 
Agcaoili, the President, was the only PWD among its eleven members. However, Mr. 
Agcaoili did not rise from the ranks within Tahanan. He became part of the Tahanan 
board as a prominent figure in the business community and a recognized leader-
advocate of PWD rights and welfare (Sta Ana, 2009; Garcia, 2011). 
Tahanan’s management team, at the time of the research was composed of 13 
members.  These included the following positions and persons:  
 
Chief Operating Officer and EVP          Ms. Joy Garcia 
Workshop Operations Director      Ms. Lita Evangelista 
Production Manager                          Mr. Lito Derigay 
Materials Management  
and Control Manager              Mr. Ben Lagunero 
Sales and Marketing Director      Ms. Lolit Tuazon (non-PWD) 
Sales and Marketing Manager     Ms. Rowena Mondejar (non-PWD) 
Admin and Social Services Director Ms. Virgie Montilla 
Finance Director        Ms. Mia Garcia (non-PWD) 
Accounting Manager        Ms. Riza Lagunero 
PR & Resource Mobilization Director  Ms. Angel Villafuerte 
PR & Resource Mobilization Manager  Ms. Maricel Candole 
Head of Special Projects/  
Executive Asst to the COO   Ms. Tess Lloren 
HR Manager         Ms. Claire Llenares   
 
Ten out of the thirteen management positions were occupied by PWDs. They all had 
college degrees, some with the help of Tahanan, others on their own. Among the 
people in management positions, Tahanan, directly assisted Social Services Director 
Virgie Montilla; Workshop Operations Director Lita Evangelista; Special Projects 
Head Tess Lloren; and Materials Management and Control Manager Ben Lagunero, 
for the school/college education together with leadership development opportunities.  
                                                 
67 www.tahanangwalanghagdanan.org/boardofdirectors_twh.htm (downloaded January 11, 2011; Garcia, 2011).    
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The PWDs in the management team generally came from poor to middle class 
backgrounds68. (Sta Ana, 2009; Lloren, 2009; Evangelista, 2009; Garcia, 2011)  
The EVP and COO, Joy Garcia, credited Tahanan for providing her trainings and 
learning opportunities to become what she had. She rose from the ranks in Tahanan, 
from being an accounting clerk in 1986 to a bookkeeper and a supervisor. In the late 
1990s, she became a marketing officer before she was promoted to her current 
position of EVP and COO (Garcia, 2009).  
 
6.4.6.  Perceptions and Perspectives of PWDs  
 
Ms. Joy Garcia expressed that even as she could find work in mainstream 
institutions, she had chosen to come back and work for Tahanan as she felt more 
fulfilled relating to and helping fellow PWDs. (Garcia, 2009).  
While the management team members who were also PWDs saw themselves as 
having a choice beyond Tahanan in terms of work, all of the workshop workers 
interviewed, except for one, saw Tahanan as their only source of opportunity. The 
management team members who were also PWDs saw themselves as playing a pro-
active role in terms of planning and decision-making. The workers interviewed 
manifested varied perceptions and levels of participation.  
 
A worker in his 30s who joined Tahanan in 2001 expressed: 
 
“…. My role is to do my work well, to ensure that my work outputs are not 
rejected. I also need to follow rules and do as my supervisor asks. For example, I 
need to come to work with my ID, in uniform complete with shoes, apron and a 
mask to shield me from dust…. In General Meetings, I attend, listen, agree and 
speak if I have something to say”. 
 
Another worker who was also in his 30s related that before joining Tahanan, he was a 
high school graduate living in a rural fishing community. In Tahanan, he had tried 
different types of work for over 10 years – from fish hook production to craft design, 
to packaging and woodcraft.  He expressed:   
 
“As a worker in Tahanan, I just do what I can. My section head approves my work 
especially if I’m going beyond my regular responsibility.  I am not intelligent but 
I’m good with machines. In meetings I just listen”. 
   
                                                 
68 www.tahanangwalanghagdanan.org, downloaded January 10, 2011) 
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One of the workers saw himself as playing a role in making suggestions for 
improving their work. Rolando Narciza, 38 years old and a metal craft workshop 
worker since 1995, was promoted as supervisor or head of wheelchair production with 
28 people directly under him, four months before the researcher’s field visit. He 
described how his change in position had changed his behavior, and the role he played 
in Tahanan: 
 
“As a worker, it is important to follow rules and regulations – for example, no 
smoking at work, smoke only in designated areas during breaks and observe the 
curfew at 9pm. Especially now that I am a supervisor, it’s not only following the 
rules for myself, but I need to also see to it that my fellow workers also follow the 
rules. I would like to help make our department be a model department.... Also, it 
is my duty to make suggestions to improve our work or even take suggestions 
from other workers to suggest to management. For example, we have a suggestion 
about a safer and more efficient lay-out for our work area which is pending 
approval with management”. (Narciza, 2009) 
 
While all of them were workers or employees working for an institution that 
considered them as partners in their respective rehabilitation processes, one could 
discern three segments:   
 
 A majority who saw themselves as workers needing to follow rules and doing 
their work as required. Using their self-assessment in terms of level of 
participation in meetings as gauge, this segment included passive to self-
assured workers;  
 A small segment achieving a level of pro-activity who had been promoted to 
supervisory positions. They got engaged in work improvement processes and 
felt responsible for the performance of their teams; and 
 A small number of empowered employees who were manager-decision makers, 
some of whom chose to work in Tahanan even if they had other options. This 
segment had risen above their disability and poverty to help other PWDs.  
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6.5.  Financial and Social Outcomes 
 
6.5.1. Financial Outcomes 
 
Tahanan’s operations had a social development and a social enterprise side. They 
received donations and received grants to support PWD programs while also 
generating surplus from the sale of their various workshop and enterprise products. 
Figure 6.1. below shows the magnitude of total resources generated (collectively 
called ‘Revenues’ by Tahanan) at selected points over the period from 1985 to 2008, 
while Figure 6.2. shows the annual figures for the decade from 1999 to 2008. As 
shown by these figures, revenues peaked from the late 1990s to 2003, averaging PhP 
20.49 million per year. In comparison, total revenue was only PhP 14.14 million in 
2008.   
 
 
Figure 6.1. Tahanang Walang Hagdanan: Composition of Revenues 1985, 1990, 2000, 2005, 200869. 
Sources: Tahanang Walang Hagdanan, Audited Financial Statement for 2008, Unaudited Financial 
Statements for 1985 (1986), 1990 (1991), 2000 (2001), 2005 (2006). 
                                                 
69 Fiscal year for 2008 is January to December.  Fiscal year for all other years is October of prior year to September of 
current year. 
0.00 
2.00 
4.00 
6.00 
8.00 
10.00 
12.00 
14.00 
16.00 
18.00 
20.00 
1985 1990 2000 2005 2008 
Year 
Excess of sales over cost
Donations and other income Ph
P 
(in
 M
ill
io
ns
) 
 208 
 
Figure 6.2. Tahanang Walang Hagdanan: Composition of Revenues 1999 – 2008.  
Sources: Tahanang Walang Hagdanan, Audited Financial Statement for 2007 and 2008, Unaudited 
Financial Statements for 1999 to 2006.70 
 
Donations and other income peaked in 2003 and 2006 at more than PhP 14 
million. The levels for both 1999 and 2008 were roughly the same, hovering at PhP 
11.5 million. Enterprise income (excess of sales over cost), however, declined greatly 
from a range of PhP 11 to 12 million from 1999 to 2001, to PhP 8.5 to 10 million in 
the next two years, to PhP 5 to 6 million up to 2007 (with a low of PhP 3.49 million in 
                                                 
70 Fiscal year for 2008 is January to December.  Fiscal year for all other years is October of prior year to September of 
current year. 
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2006) to only PhP 2.52 million in 2008.71 Thus, from providing a high of around 60% 
of revenues (57 – 61%) in the 2000 – 2002 period, enterprise income slid to shares in 
the 20 – 30+ percent range in the mid to late 2000s, and accounted for just 18% of 
revenue in 2008.72 
 
Ms. Lita Evangelista, Director for Operations described their financial situation:  
 
“Before 2005, our workshop projects were doing okay financially. Sales were 
small, about PhP 10 million or less but we were making a profit. However, with 
the onslaught of globalization, we can’t seem to cope with China selling products 
at a very low price (e.g. wheelchairs). Except for the Unilab73 contract that 
provides for costs other than labor, all our other workshops are on the red. The 
only reason why we have been able to stay afloat is because of increased 
donations since 2005.  Maybe we need to look at our pricing and management of 
raw materials”. (Evangelista, 2009)  
 
In terms of sources of revenue, Lagunero continued:  
 
“Sources of donations and grants since 2000 has also shifted from individuals in 
the 1980s and 1990s (giving PhP 500 - PhP 200,000 each) to a variety of 
institutions such as GMA7, ABS-CBN, PACAP, Watsons74 (giving PhP 100,000 - 
PhP 1 million each). In terms of earned income, our big earners are mobility aids, 
educational toys and bags, and woodcraft. What are not making money are IT75, 
detergent/shampoo packaging, electronic items packaging, and manufacture of 
baby dresses”.  (Lagunero, 2009) 
 
The instability of the revenue stream for the past decade is shown in Figure 6.3. 
 
                                                 
71 The fiscal year for 2008 is January to December. Prior to this, the fiscal year was for October in the prior year to 
September in the current year. 
72 Sales from 1999 to 2006 (latest year for which sales data are available) ranged from a low of around PhP 19 - 20 
million (PhP 19.45 million in 2004; PhP 20.08 million in 1999) to a high of PhP 28.04 million in 2005.  
73 Unilab is a local pharmaceutical company  
74 GMA7 and ABS-CBN are two of the largest television networks in the Philippines. PACAP is the Philippine-
Australia Community Assistance Program, which is part of Australia’s official development assistance program directed 
at poverty groups in the Philippines. Watsons is an international company engaged in the retailing of medicines and 
toiletries.    
75 What was being referred to here was Tahanan’s contracts for computer encoding services. 
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Figure 6.3. Tahanang Walang Hagdanan: Revenues, Expenses and Excess (Deficiency) of Revenues 
over Expenses, 1999 – 2008.  
Sources: Tahanang Walang Hagdanan, Audited Financial Statement for 2008 and 2007, Unaudited 
Financial Statements for 1999 to 2006.76 
 
Riza Lagunero, Accounting Manager for 21 years, mused:   
 
“In 2008, we experienced a net loss in terms of income. I think we are overstaffed 
but we cannot easily let PWDs go. There is also a problem with inefficiency in the 
use of raw materials. In 200977, we did well because of the Dep Ed educational 
toys contract of PhP 16 million but with the flooding of typhoon Ondoy 
                                                 
76 Fiscal year for 2008 is January to December.  Fiscal year for all other years is October of prior year to September of 
current year. 
77 Financial details not available. 
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(International name Ketsana), we are still just recovering with the help of 
donations that have come in for our rehabilitation”.  (Lagunero, 2009) 
 
Total assets went down from PhP 24.47 million in 2003 to around PhP 18 – 19 
million in the next three years. After a recovery in 2007 to PhP 23 million, assets 
declined to a mere PhP 17.82 million in 2008. Equity had eroded by almost half to 
PhP 10.84 million in 2008 from PhP 20.1 million in 2003 (Please see Figure. 6.4.). 
 
 
Figure 6.4. Tahanang Walang Hagdanan:  Assets, Liabilities and Equity, 2003 – 2008.78  
Sources: Tahanang Walang Hagdanan, Audited Financial Statement for 2008 and 2007, Unaudited 
Financial Statements for 2003 to 2006.79 
 
  
                                                 
78 Unaudited balance sheets provided for the years prior to 2003 included Intra-Company Accounts under Assets and 
Liabilities, hence the amounts indicated could not be compared to the amounts in the 2003 to 2008 balance sheets. 
79 Fiscal year for 2008 is January to December.  Fiscal year for all other years is October of prior year to September of 
current year. 
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6.5.2.  Social Outcomes 
 
Before the typhoons and floods in 200980, the workers in Tahanan numbered 309.  
Approximately 90 were office-based and program support staff, and the rest were 
distributed across different workshops. Workshop workers included approximately 30 
in metal craft, 5 in needlecraft, 40 in woodwork, 60 in packaging and 8 in fish hooks.  
The others were piece rate workers.81 Most were amputees and paraplegics coming 
from poor family backgrounds, had very little schooling, and were unemployed before 
their engagement with Tahanan (Garcia, 2009; Evangelista, 2009). Lita Evangelista, 
Workshop Operations Director, explained: 
 
“The regular workers of Tahanan have sustained income. Without Tahanan, most 
would have either been unemployed after their accident or those who were 
disabled from birth would have become totally dependent on their families 
without the opportunity for study or work. Non-financial impacts are many. You 
could tell the difference when they meet people – upon entry in Tahanan, 
‘nakayuko’ - they are usually just looking down, their heads bowed, a usual 
expression of shame because of their disability. With their entry into Tahanan, 
they get a job, they start to have a sense of belongingness, they learn to socialize 
and become contributing members of their families. Tahanan also has a program 
to benefit their families and children. All these help increase their self esteem and 
social standing”.  (Evangelista, 2009) 
 
Workers interviewed validated how their life had changed for the better with 
Tahanan, not only in terms of employment but also in terms of increased self-esteem 
and standing in their families and communities. Leon Caraog, one of the workers, 
expressed: 
 
“I came to Tahanan at 21 years old in 1993, with no formal schooling and no 
work. It was Tahanan that helped me finish elementary and high school, and gave 
me opportunities to work and make a living, first in metal craft then in woodcraft. 
I make PhP 170/day or PhP 850/week. However, it’s not only work. Tahanan 
opened my eyes and helped me to stand on my own…. I don’t know what would 
have happened to me without Tahanan”.  (Caranog, 2009) 
 
                                                 
80 A series of strong storms hit the Philippines in 2009, including Tropical Storm Ondoy (International name Ketsana) 
which created the worst flooding in Metro Manila in decades. 
81 No breakdown was acquired for this except for needlecraft that had 20 piece rate workers. For fish hooks, there were 7 
other workers who were abled. Many PWDs did not like to work with fish hooks as they felt it was hard work for very 
little pay. 
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Maekel Lita expressed how Tahanan had paved the way for him to have a direction in 
life:    
 
“I have a wife who is also disabled – she used to work with fish hooks, and we 
have 3 children, aged 2, 4 and 5. Since August this year, my wife and children 
have gone home to Bicol and live with my mother in law. I stayed behind to work 
and send them PhP 600-800/week, which is most of what I earn at PhP 170/day or 
PhP 850/week. It’s not much but at least I’m not dependent on my parents…. My 
life used not to have any direction. If not for Tahanan, I probably would still be 
fishing in the province, and drinking liquor in between. Having a family and work 
has made a big difference in my life – it has given me direction”.  (Lita, 2009) 
 
Vanessa Celso, 26 years old, suffered from a congenital disability, and was on a 
wheelchair she acquired through Tahanan since she was 4 years old. She finished high 
school at the Cainta Catholic School when she was 18 years old and had 2 years of 
college at the Systems Technology Institute (STI).  The Citibank Savings Installment 
Loan Program employed her for 4 months but her place of work was too far and she 
found it difficult to source her transportation expenses on a daily basis. In November 
2008, she was employed with the fish hook and packaging departments of Tahanan.  
She explained Tahanan’s effects on her after only over a year: 
 
“I am no longer shy. I have participated in the dance olympics and the choir. I’ve 
even competed in sports activities like the ‘karera sa wheelchair’. Tahanan has 
helped me develop my personality and build my self confidence. I’ve learned to 
be independent, to socialize, to be more patient, to be humble, and to be of service 
to others…. My family still supports me financially – my father gives me about 
PhP 1,000 per month. But with what I earn, which can be as low as PhP 
400/month to a high of PhP 5,000 per month depending on the contracts available, 
I feel good that I am able to give money to my mother once in a while to add to 
family expenses, I could give ‘baon’ to my nephew for school and I can 
participate in the ‘paluwagan’82”.  (Celso, 2009) 
 
Rolando Narciza, the worker turned supervisor four months before the research, 
expressed: 
  
 
                                                 
82 The dance olympics engages paraplegics in dance competitions. The karera sa wheelchair is a relay competition where 
the team that can travel the fastest by wheel chair wins. ‘Baon’ is cash given to a child of school age for snacks, 
transportation and other day-to-day expenses. ‘Paluwagan’ is a system of group savings where members contribute a 
small amount regularly and take turns using the amount saved by the group in regular intervals.  
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“It was Tahanan that assisted me to finish my elementary then my high school       
education. I tried to set up a small bakery after I graduated in 1992 but it didn’t 
prosper. So, I was just at home, unemployed from 1992-94…. Then I thought 
of going back to Tahanan. I make PhP 246/day, or PhP 2,806.00 every 15 days, 
which is just enough for me and my family…. Tahanan has been a big factor in 
my rehabilitation, changing my outlook on life, and also helping me acquire 
leadership skills”.  (Narciza, 2009)   
 
Virgie Montilla, Tahanan’s Social Director, who credited Tahanan for her 
rehabilitation and development after being diagnosed with tuberculosis of the spine 
when she was a second year high school student in 1975, explained that the majority 
of PWDs Tahanan had helped were poor like Caraog, Lita and Narciza.  
 
“I would say that about 70% of the PWDs we are able to help are poor people 
referred to us by religious organizations, the Department of Social Work and 
Development, other organizations, and with some walk-ins. We create about 10 
new jobs per year through our center-based workshops. We are able to reach 
more poor people through our Community-Based Rehabilitation Program. Less 
than 500 have been given direct employment through Tahanan’s projects but 
we have helped thousands of PWDs in many other ways”.  (Montilla, 2009)   
 
 
6.6.  Tahanang Walang Hagdanan and Social 
Entrepreneurship 
 
6.6.1.   Tahanan as SEPPS 
 
 Tahanan has the basic characteristics of a SEPPS as defined in Section 2.5: 
 
 Firstly, PWDs, the majority of whom are poor are its primary stakeholders and 
their social inclusion is its main reason for being.  
 Secondly, it sustains its mission of social inclusion in part by creating wealth 
through the manufacture and sale of educational toys and other products from its 
sheltered workshops. 
 Thirdly, it distributes the economic and social benefits it generates principally to 
unemployed PWDs through sheltered workshops where the PWDs are engaged as 
workers. It also undertakes programs to provide various rehabilitation services to 
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PWDs. It does these through an organizational and legal set up of a non-stock, non-
profit foundation.   
 
6.6.2.   SEPPS in a Developing Country Context 
 
Relative to PWD Fed, Tahanan is closer to the characterization of WISE in 
European countries as integrating marginalized groups to work and society through 
productive activity (Nyssens, 2006; Defourny and Nyssens, 2008). However, the 
external environment of Tahanan as SEPPS in the Philippines is quite different from 
the context of Europe. In short, this context may be characterized as one of state 
neglect for PWDs amidst market failure. State neglect has many expressions, 
including the lack of government action and absence of subsidies for social 
enterprises assisting PWD integration.   
This unfavorable situation has pushed Tahanan to be more entrepreneurial.  
During its development stage, Tahanan ventured into serving the mainstream export 
market, with problematic results. During its renewal stage, Tahanan has ventured into 
bidding for regular contracts with government given its many challenges, beyond just 
claiming the 10% allocation for PWD groups mandated by legislation.  
Many institutions and individuals played enabling roles:  
 
 Institutions from the North, such as the ICM congregation, the Belgian 
government (who provided 75% of the construction cost of the Tahanan 
Center) and the Australian government (through the Philippine-Australia 
Community Assistance Program); 
 The Catholic Church through the Archdiocese of Manila and Antipolo, for 
providing leaders to serve in Tahanan’s Board and leasing for free the 4.5 
hectare lot for the Tahanan center;   
 Schools, companies and organizations serving as markets for Tahanan’s 
products and services; and 
 Individuals committed to the cause of PWDs, including those from the business 
community in Tahanan’s Board. 
 
While the Department of Education serves as a major market for Tahanan’s products, 
particularly educational toys, it is important to note that DepEd treats Tahanan as a 
regular bidder and supplier, subject to the same requirements, procedures and 
difficulties tackled in Section 6.4.3. 
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6.6.3.   SEPPS and Social Entrepreneurship  
 
Among the three schools of thought in social entrepreneurship, Tahanan resonates 
with the social economy school in terms of characterizing social enterprises as multi-
stakeholder organizations, locating them as entrepreneurial organizations with roots in 
the third sector, giving importance to the role of government and espousing a plural 
economy that promotes the principles of redistribution and reciprocity (Defourny, 
2001; Defourny and Nyssens, 2008, 2010; Vidal, 2010; Laville, 2010).      
Tahanan has what Spear, et al., (2010) considered as having a self-selecting 
trustee-based board, characteristic of social enterprises with charitable origins.   As 
shown by Table 6.1.a., the rank and file PWDs are not represented as voting members 
of the Board of Tahanan.  Sisters from the ICM congregation, representatives of the 
Catholic Church and individuals committed to the cause of PWDs specifically from 
the business community form this trustee-based board. When asked about the 
composition of the Board, a management staff of Tahanan commented that given the 
possibility of powerful politicians and private interests controlling Tahanan for self-
serving ends, it was probably better to retain the religious sector as the dominant 
group in the Board to protect Tahanan’s ‘moral ascendancy’ and the ‘integrity of 
PWDs’. This view is consistent with Cornforth’s (2003) characterization of one of the 
roles of Boards in co-opting potential external threats.  
Tahanan has similar features to one of the work integration social enterprise 
(WISE) models that Davister et al., (2004) identified in their study on WISE 
involving the 12 member states of the European Union: one of the four main modes 
identified in the study was professional integration with permanent subsidies for the 
most disadvantaged groups. These took the form of sheltered workshops and adapted 
work enterprises, usually involving persons with disability and with a severe social 
handicap.  The lack of systematic state support however is a key differentiating factor 
faced by Tahanan as SEPPS, making it distinct from its European WISE counterparts.  
Tahanan’s experience of mission drift as it diversified its products and markets to 
serve more PWDs during the development stage as well as its difficulties in achieving 
full cost recovery among its past and current contractors may be likened to the 
challenges faced by social enterprises with charitable origins in the United Kingdom 
(Spear, et al., 2010).  However, there are critical issues that Tahanan has faced as 
SEPPS in a developing country context where severe neglect of PWDs is part of the 
reality of widespread state and market failures.    
Like Upland Marketing, the case of Tahanan shows the pitfalls of SEPPS in 
engaging the mainstream market while pursuing a social mission, in this case of 
facilitating the rehabilitation and social inclusion of PWDs.  
Unlike the developed economies of Europe where the state has a strong tradition 
of undertaking affirmative action to assist PWDs, Tahanan’s experience showcases  
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an unreliable state in implementing even its own policies for PWDs.  Like PWD Fed, 
it shows the potentials and challenges of engaging the state as market, and actualizing 
its role in redressing inequalities (Laville, 2010) towards creating equality of 
conditions and opportunities (Turner, 1986) for PWDs.  
 
6.7.  Tahanang Walang Hagdanan: A Stakeholder 
Perspective 
 
6.7.1. Primary Stakeholders of Tahanan 
 
Tahanan and PWD Fed both serve a poverty sector who, from Sen’s capability 
perspective, are “…. not only among the most deprived human beings in the world, 
they are also, frequently enough, the most neglected” (Sen, 2009, p.258). Sen noted 
that the situation of PWDs in developing countries, of which the Philippines is a part, 
is even more difficult, relative to their counterparts in developed countries: 
 
“Furthermore in the developing world, the disabled are quite often the poorest of 
the poor in terms of income, but in addition, their need for income is greater than 
that of able-bodied people, since they require money and assistance to try to live 
normal lives and to attempt to alleviate their handicaps. The impairment of 
income-earning ability, which can be called ‘the earning handicap’ tends to be 
reinforced and much magnified in its effect by ‘the conversion handicap’: the 
difficulty in converting incomes and resources into good living, precisely because 
of disability”.  (Sen, 2009, p. 258)                                                                                          
 
From the very beginning, the Tahanan founders were clear that their main mission 
was the integration of PWDs to the mainstream of society through education, training 
and employment. The PWDs, the majority of whom were poor, were the primary 
stakeholders of Tahanan. They were the main reason for Tahanan’s being, and all 
programs, including their wealth creation activities, were geared towards their social 
inclusion.  Like the cases of Alter Trade, Upland Marketing and PWD Fed, the PWDs 
in Tahanan were primary stakeholders from what Donaldson and Preston (1995) 
consider a normative approach. 
 
6.7.2.  Roles and Role Changes:  From Passive Worker-
Beneficiaries to Worker-Partners   
 
Unlike the PWD Fed that was self-initiated by PWDs, Tahanan started as a 
mission of religious people and concerned private citizens among able-bodied persons 
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of society. Unlike the case of PWD Fed, as well as the cases of Alter Trade and 
Upland Marketing, Tahanan engaged the PWDs or the poor, as individuals but not as 
groups. 
 At the initiation stage, a small number of PWDs were engaged as participants in 
their own rehabilitation process: Tahanan involved them as workers in a sheltered 
workshop to produce wheelchairs that were used for Tahanan’s Sponsor a Wheelchair 
program. As workers, they enacted transactional roles. They were also engaged as 
partners in their own rehabilitation process. 
At the development stage, there were two types of sheltered workshops: a small 
but stable sheltered workshop producing the wheelchairs, and workshops that 
expanded and contracted according to the requirements of exporters. The former was 
run in the original spirit of providing rehabilitation to PWDs. The latter tended to 
engage the PWDs like workers in an assembly line to meet the delivery requirements 
of the contracts. As one management staff explained, “With exporters concerned 
about lowering costs to stay competitive, workers in these workshops felt they were 
doing hard work for little pay. Most stayed on as it was their only option”. With the 
mentality of serving the export market ‘just to give work to people’, one could say 
that the dominant role played by most of the PWDs then was as worker-beneficiary.  
They were dependent on Tahanan for work but they were only employed on a piece 
rate basis when orders came in. One may even surmise that as a whole, and especially 
in relation to the contract for the wood tables that warped, the PWDs indicated 
enacting the role of being passive worker-beneficiaries.                                                              
During the renewal stage, the essence of work as part of the rehabilitation process 
had apparently been restored in most of Tahanan’s sheltered workshops. On the 
whole, most of the PWDs seemed to see themselves as passive to self-assured 
workers, thankful to Tahanan for giving them the opportunity to earn a living and 
appreciating their self-worth. If one was to use their self-assessment in terms of 
participation in face-to-face meetings as gauge, one could draw a spectrum that 
ranged from ‘just listening’ to ‘speaking when asked’ to ‘volunteering to speak to 
make suggestions’. These seemed to show different levels of individual development 
as part of their rehabilitation process. At the same time, some of the PWDs, though a 
small minority had become pro-active supervisors, empowered managers, and 
directors. All of the PWD workers interviewed reported they had been transformed 
from being ‘dependent’ to becoming ‘contributing’ members of their families. 
On the whole, PWDs within Tahanan had played transactional roles as worker-
partners except for the period when being passive worker-beneficiaries seemed to 
have become the dominant role enacted during the development stage. As worker-
partners during the renewal stage, there were 3 segments observed: passive to self-
assured workers, pro-active supervisors and empowered managers/directors.        
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6.7.3.  Roots and Routes of Role Changes 
 
Table 6.1. details the evolution of the roles enacted and services provided to 
Tahanan’s primary stakeholders of PWDs using Mintzberg’s (2007) stages of 
initiation, development and renewal.   
6.7.3.1.  From Worker-Beneficiaries to Worker-Partners 
The essential role change from being worker-partners at initiation to becoming 
mainly worker-beneficiaries during the development stage then shifting back to being 
worker-partners during the renewal stage may have several explanations.  
One explanation may be the nature of markets served. The shift to becoming 
worker beneficiaries happened when Tahanan was mainly serving subcontracting 
arrangements with mainstream exporters. These contracts required the completion of 
big job orders of consistent quality, delivered on time at very low cost. This 
transformed the sheltered workshops into assembly lines of passive workers. The shift 
back to becoming worker-partners happened as Tahanan served local institutional 
markets the biggest of which was the Dep Ed, and companies practicing corporate 
social responsibility.  
Without discounting the possibility that this may have been a factor, one could 
raise the point that the Dep Ed as a market had its own challenges especially that 
Tahanan had started to win bids under the regular process of the DepEd since 2009.  
As such, Tahanan needed to bid in big volumes and compete with other business 
enterprises in terms of price, quality and delivery. With the Dep Ed as market, it is not 
unthinkable for the sheltered workshops to be run like assembly lines of passive 
workers. In 2009, despite the highly competitive process and the additional 
difficulties associated with government contracts as detailed in Section 6.4.3, 
including not being paid on time, the PWDs had continued to enact the role of being 
worker-partners.   
A more probable explanation may be a change in management orientation towards 
the PWD workers. During the time Tahanan was serving the export market, the 
General Manager appointed by the Board brought into the organization a professional 
team of non-PWD staff who had experience in running a business. This was deemed 
important to ensure that Tahanan would meet its contractual obligations and comply 
with the demands of the export market. Even after this professional team of non-PWD 
staff had left, the PWD-led management team that took their place chose to continue 
to serve the export market ‘just to give work to people’.  The professional team who 
came from a purely business context may not have had the social orientation for 
managing a work environment under a rehabilitation framework involving PWDs.  
On the other hand, the PWD-led team that took their place may not have had the 
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knowledge, skills and experience to appreciate and manage the tension between 
ensuring a rehabilitation framework in providing employment for PWDs and serving 
chosen enterprise markets. On the whole, this may be seen as a reflection of the 
Tahanan Board’s own difficulty and lack of preparedness at that time in governing 
and managing the tension between social and business goals as the social enterprise 
expanded its outreach and operations. This explanation resonates with the findings of 
Spear, et al., (2010) on the sources of mission drift and governance issues usually 
faced by social enterprises.   
Nevertheless, as reflected by a shift back to a management orientation of engaging 
the PWDs as worker-partners during the renewal stage, the mission drift seems to 
have been arrested. With all the difficulties faced, the Board had consciously invested 
in building a committed and competent management team that restored a 
collaborative relationship with the PWD workers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.7.3.2.  Worker-Partners as Supervisors, Managers and Directors  
This is directly related to the other aspect of role change that had occurred within 
Tahanan. By the renewal stage, notable changes had occurred in the level of 
participation of some of the individual PWD worker-partners in enterprise 
management. One may ask: what would explain the 3 segments of worker-partners?  
Why and how did a number of PWDs especially from the poverty sectors come to 
enact roles of being supervisors as well as managers and directors?   
The positions of President and General Manager had historically been occupied by 
a combination of PWDs and non-PWDs, without any particular pattern. Box 6.1. 
details who occupied these top leadership positions over time. Beyond the positions of 
President and General Manager, it was in the early 1990s, after the crisis Tahanan 
Box 6.1. Top Management, Tahanang Walang Hagdanan 1979-2011 
 Mr. Agustin Cabrera, a non-PWD, was appointed overall coordinator for 
workshops in 1979. 
 Ms. Ruby Gonzales became the first PWD General Manager (GM) and later 
President from 1984-86; Ms. Edna Daroy, a PWD, became GM in 1984 but retired 
in 1986. 
 Mr. Antonio Kohtiao, a PWD became President in the late 80s; the GM then was 
Mr. Lorenzo Binuya, a non-PWD.                
 Engr. Felix Gonzales, a non-PWD, became President from 1988-2007. 
 Mr. Jesus Docot, a PWD became GM sometime 1988-1990, and later became 
Executive Vice President (EVP) and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) until he retired 
in 2003; Ms. Joy Garcia, a PWD, became EVP and CEO after Mr. Docot retired. 
 Mr. Manuel Agcaoili, a PWD, became President and CEO in 2007,with Ms. Joy 
Garcia as EVP and Chief Operations Officer (COO).  
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went through, that the appointment of PWDs to management positions began. By the 
late 1990s, the PWD managers had become the majority. There was also a conscious 
effort to send PWDs being appointed to management positions to undertake relevant 
seminars and trainings. As one management staff put it, “Tahanan’s founder and 
officers had been successful in spotting PWDs with the potential to be honed for 
future leadership positions” (Evangelista, 2009). When Engr. Gonzales became 
President, a position he held from 1988-2007, he also pursued a policy of ‘minimum 
interference and maximum encouragement among PWDs’. This gave impetus to 
training more PWDs for management positions (Garcia, 2011).  
The common experience among the PWD supervisors, managers and directors of 
receiving scholarships for elementary, high school and/or college as well as being 
provided with training and other learning opportunities for leadership development 
may be considered manifestations of Tahanan’s transformational services.  However, 
unlike the transformational services provided by PWD Fed or Alter Trade to their 
primary stakeholders, these transformational services that Tahanan provided were 
directed to individual PWDs who showed promise, and those who showed the most 
promise in the process of enacting their transactional roles as worker partners were 
provided the opportunity to enact the role of supervisors, managers and directors.  
Moreover, unlike the transformational services provided by PWD Fed or Alter 
Trade, they were not directed at building the collective capacity of the PWDs to 
govern themselves and undertake group initiatives to overcome their poverty and 
contribute to community or sectoral development.  
In other words, the transformational services directed at individuals did not 
translate to the PWDs’ enacting transformational roles beyond the social enterprise, 
like in the case of PWD Fed and Alter Trade. At the same time, the roles within the 
social enterprise, indicating increased participation in planning, decision-making, and 
team leading characteristic of being supervisor or of being manager or director, may 
still be considered transactional roles. This is because these roles are directly related 
to enterprise operations and the performance of such is remunerated by the social 
enterprise with corresponding salaries and benefits.  
These transformational services targeted at individual PWDs, seem to be distinct 
in terms of enabling them to achieve what Turner (1986) refers to as equality of 
condition and equality of opportunity. Turner explains the notion of equality of 
condition and of opportunity this way:  “…. there is an attempt to make the condition 
of life equal for relevant social groups”  to the point that they could enjoy equality of 
opportunity.  “Equality of opportunity rewards those who have the ability and who are 
prepared to exercise their skill in the interest of personal achievement in a competitive 
situation” (Turner, 1986, pp 34-35).   
Applying this to the present case, PWDs were provided scholarships to complete 
their formal education, and undertook personality development and leadership 
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training, so they may reach a condition (equality of condition) where they can have 
the same opportunity (equality of opportunity) relative to their able bodied 
counterparts to be appointed to management positions within Tahanan. In a sense, the 
supervisor, manager and director positions are competitive positions that the PWDs 
needed to vie for, utilizing the abilities they acquired through Tahanan’s 
transformational services. These positions however were limited. As of June 2011, 
Tahanan had 13 manager/director positions with 10 occupied by PWDs and 14 
supervisor positions with 11 occupied by PWDs (Garcia, 2011; Lloren, 2011). 
6.7.3.3.  Engaging the Front Line PWD Workers as Partners   
During the renewal stage, Tahanan had grown to be a big organization, reaching 
90 office-based and program support staff and 219 workers by 2009. A legitimate 
question to ask is, how were the majority of front line PWD workers engaged? What 
would indicate that at the renewal stage, they were being engaged as partners rather 
than as beneficiaries?   
A development and planning office within Tahanan was created in the 1990s. The 
office initiated planning processes that happened every three years. Up to 2007, 
institutional planning processes involved the Board with the participation of managers 
and supervisors. However, interviews with management staff revealed that since early 
2000, planning and decision-making processes started to be more rigorous, 
participatory and transparent. COO and EVP Joy Garcia explained that the main 
changes in their planning practice was in the involvement of the rank and file PWD 
workers and reviewing accomplishments based on plans and budgets. Other 
management staff expressed that under Ms. Joy Garcia, a process of involving the 
staff per department was initiated to get their views about problems, and suggestions 
on how they could be solved. Overall, the management staff in 2009 felt they were in 
a better position to represent views from PWDs not only because a majority of them 
were PWDs but also because of the involvement of the rank and file PWDs in 
planning and decision-making (Evangelista and Villafuerte, 2009). Aiding this 
process was the setting up of an Executive Committee in 2007, by the President of 
Tahanan, Mr. Agcaoili, which he headed. He also initiated the appointment of 
directors, in addition to managers so that leading and managing each functional area 
became a shared responsibility between two people. The directors were members of 
the Executive Committee. The Executive Committee met regularly to plan, review 
accomplishments based on plans and budgets, as well as adjust plans accordingly 
(Garcia, 2011).  
What may be culled from the aforementioned discussion is a combination of 
factors had contributed to the shift towards engaging the PWDs as partners during the 
renewal stage. The management team composed mainly of professional PWDs had a 
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clear orientation of pursuing rehabilitation and social inclusion. The institution of 
management systems that have been described as more rigorous, participatory and 
transparent complemented this.   
One may also note the nature and combination of services provided by Tahanan 
during the renewal stage: a combination of individually directed transformational 
services and transactional services that included those that were not fee-based.   
Transformational services directed at the rehabilitation and development of PWDs 
is discussed in Section 6.4.4. These include provision of mobility aids, engaging them 
in socialization activities such as sports and dance competitions, as well as seminars 
and trainings on Personality and Esteem Development. These may still be part of 
what Turner (1986) considered as enabling the PWDs to a point of achieving equality 
of condition vis-à-vis their able-bodied counterparts. As shown in Section 6.4.4., there 
is also evidence of transactional services to do their jobs as workers more effectively 
and efficiently such as trainings on Product Costing, Packaging, Labeling and 
Marketing as well as skills training on livelihood related activities like water lily stem 
weaving, linked to making products marketed by their Business Center. This is in 
addition to the employment they provide through their sheltered workshops for which 
the PWDs received income.        
 
6.7.4.  Impact of Roles and Role Changes  
 
The impact of the PWDs being worker-partners of Tahanan was extensively 
discussed in Section 6.5.2: from a condition of unemployment and social exclusion, 
they experienced sustained income and a host of non-financial impacts such as 
increased self-esteem, self-worth and improved relations and standing in their 
families. What is interesting to explore further is the impact of the role change from 
worker-partner to worker-beneficiary, ‘just to give work for people’, with periods of 
becoming unemployed during the development stage.  
The experience with the warped wood tables that became the reason for the 
lawsuit that pushed Tahanan to a crisis situation in the 1990s may be good take-off 
point. One indication that they may not have been engaged as partners was they were 
not provided the support needed in terms of technology and training to effectively 
play their transactional roles as workers. For a PWD who was still in the process of 
grappling with self-esteem and self-worth, one could surmise how a rejection of their 
work output and fear of loss of employment must have been devastating.   
With the lawsuit and the crisis situation that followed where Tahanan stopped the 
workshops serving the export market, one could theorize that each of the workers who 
were involved then and could not find work elsewhere may have felt the loss in more 
ways than just income. Citing many studies on poverty and social exclusion in the 
North and South, Sen explains: 
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“There is plenty of evidence that unemployment has many far-reaching effects 
other than loss of income, including psychological harm, loss of work motivation, 
skill and confidence, increase in ailments and morbidity (and even mortality 
rates), disruption of family relations and social life, hardening of social exclusion, 
and accentuation of racial tensions and gender asymmetries”. (Sen, 1999, p.94) 
 
If one were to add what Sen (2009) called ‘the earning handicap’ and ‘the conversion 
handicap’ experienced by persons with disability in the South discussed in Section 
6.7.1, one could theorize that the negative impacts on the affected PWDs then were, 
though unintended, grave and far-reaching.   
Considering the foregoing, the impact of enacting the role of being passive 
worker-beneficiary, of staying on just to have work despite the unfavorable conditions 
among the PWDs, then may be characterized as generally fostering subservience, 
dependence and fear of unemployment. This resonates with what Sen (2000, p.30) 
discusses as unfavorable inclusion or “unequal inclusion in an exploitative 
occupation…. by the sheer necessity of earning a living”, leading to psychological 
harm and hardening of social exclusion (Sen, 1999).  
 
6.7.5.  Stakeholder Engagement Strategy over Time 
 
Using Mintzberg’s (2007) theory of strategy formation, the intended primary 
stakeholder engagement strategy of Tahanan from initiation to renewal was one of 
collaboration. This may be a reflection of the organizational model chosen by the 
founders of Tahanan in pursuing its mission. To pursue the rehabilitation and social 
inclusion of persons with disability in the context of state neglect, sisters from an 
international religious congregation mobilized individuals from the business 
community and some prominent people with connections to politicians to comprise a 
board of a non-stock non-profit corporation.   
Using Cornforth’s (2003) characterization of how boards work in the non-profit 
sector, the founders of Tahanan seem to have combined aspects of what he calls the 
compliance and co-optation models: board members (the ICM sisters) served as 
guardians of the non-profit mission, and others were chosen to secure the resources 
and relations with key stakeholders in an uncertain external environment.  
This is in contrast to what Cornforth (2003) characterizes as the democratic model 
as exemplified by the PWD Fed where ‘lay’ representatives among the PWDs 
comprised the board. The board of Tahanan was composed mainly of non-PWDs. The 
intention from initiation was for PWDs to be engaged as worker-partners or as 
transactional partners, in their rehabilitation process.   
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The realized stakeholder engagement strategy of Tahanan was dominantly one of 
collaboration, made possible by the delivery of transactional and individually directed 
transformational services to their worker-partners. As discussed in Section 6.7.2, the 
individually directed transformational services, coupled with transactional services to 
assist the performance of their role as workers, contributed to the process of 
rehabilitation and development of the PWDs, at different paces. Their rehabilitation 
and development as individuals helped them overcome what Sen (1999, 2009) calls 
their ‘capability deprivation’. As discussed in Section 6.7.1, the specific nature of 
PWDs as a poverty group, not only make these transformational services critical to 
overcoming their impairment of income-earning ability and their difficulty in 
converting incomes and resources into good living because of disability (Sen, 2009), 
but also critical to enabling them achieve equality of condition and opportunity 
(Turner, 1986) vis-à-vis their able-bodied counterparts. With the PWDs individually 
undergoing rehabilitation and development at different paces, the more advanced 
comprise the segments of PWDs enacting the roles of self-assured workers, pro-active 
supervisors and empowered managers and directors.  
The intended and realized stakeholder engagement strategy of collaboration of 
Tahanan, may be likened in many ways to the stakeholder engagement strategy of 
collaboration pursued by Upland Marketing and Alter Trade (in engaging the banana 
growers).  There are however some particularities worth noting:    
 
 On the nature of transactional roles enacted: The poor in Tahanan were 
engaged as worker-partners and as partners in enterprise management while 
they were engaged as supplier-partners and as partners in value chain 
management in Upland Marketing and Alter Trade; 
 On the nature of services provided: For Tahanan, individually directed 
transformational services were provided to the PWDs in addition to 
transactional services, which were not evident in the cases of Upland Marketing 
and Alter Trade. This may be a function of the nature of PWDs as a poverty 
group; and 
 On the nature of results/impact: For Tahanan, the individually directed 
transformational services resulted to the self development of PWDs that 
translated to the performance of various types of transactional roles within the 
social enterprise, notably as proactive supervisors and empowered managers 
and directors. They however did not result to the performance of 
transformational roles by the primary stakeholders manifested by the sugar 
farmers in Alter Trade and PWDs in PWD Fed. For Tahanan, the combination 
of transactional services and individually directed transformational services had 
many non-income impacts such as improved self-esteem and self-worth, 
characteristic of social inclusion.    
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The unintended shift to a stakeholder engagement strategy characterized by relating to 
the PWDs as passive worker-beneficiaries that became dominant during the 
development stage may be likened to Sloan’s (2009) control model of stakeholder 
engagement, but only in terms of key engagement processes. The key engagement 
processes were ‘telling’ the workers what to do and ‘monitoring’ their work output.  
Given the unintended impact of fostering of subservience, dependence and fear of 
unemployment discussed in Section 6.7.4, there may not even have been an 
engagement process of ‘listening’ to feedback from PWDs. Moreover, the other 
elements of the control model of stakeholder engagement of Sloan (2009), like in the 
case of her collaboration model as applied to Upland Marketing, or Alter Trade (in 
engaging banana growers) seem inappropriate. A more appropriate way of 
characterizing this particular stakeholder engagement strategy based on the 
discussions so far and taking off from the dimensions used in characterizing the 
collaboration and empowerment models discussed in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 is presented 
here: 
 
 Managerial orientation towards the poor: poor as passive beneficiary; 
 Key engagement processes: telling, monitoring; 
 Nature of roles and capabilities developed among the poor: passive workers; 
 Nature of programs/services and delivery systems involving the poor: limited to 
fee-based transactional services such as provision of employment; and 
 Impact on the poor: limited with unintended consequences of fostering 
subservience, dependency and fear of unemployment 
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6.8.  Discussion 
 
The primary stakeholder engagement strategies manifested in the Tahanan case 
cannot be adequately characterized using the dimensions of Sloan’s (2009) control 
and collaboration models of stakeholder engagement that was drawn from corporate 
experience. The social economy school of social entrepreneurship is premised on 
participatory processes of decision-making and multi-stakeholder governance 
systems (Defourny, 2001; Defourny and Nyssens, 2008; Vidal, 2010).  However, 
empirical studies on participation and multi-stakeholder governance in social 
enterprises among scholars in the social economy school, including those involving 
PWD WISE, mainly cover experiences in European country contexts (Davister et al., 
2004; Spear and Bidet, 2005; Spear et al., 2010; Vidal, 2010). These strengthen the 
need for evolving a distinct framework for understanding how SEPPS engage the 
poor as primary stakeholders in a developing country context.  
 
As a case of SEPPS, the Tahanan experience demonstrates: 
 
 How a control strategy of stakeholder engagement, where the poor are 
involved as passive worker beneficiaries, could result to limited short term 
gains and negative social impacts such as fostering dependence and 
subservience among the poor;  
 How an intended collaboration strategy of stakeholder engagement could 
deteriorate to a control strategy when managerial orientation shifts towards 
considering the poor as passive worker-beneficiaries and only transactional 
services that are fee-based are provided; 
 How conscious, individually directed, transformational services, such as 
scholarships for the completion of high school and college education, coupled 
with providing other learning opportunities, could assist the development of 
partners among the poor, who could assume bigger roles in social enterprise 
management, such as that of being supervisors, managers and directors;   
 How individually directed, transformational services in combination with fee-
based and non-fee based transactional services could assist the process of 
restoring a management orientation and practice of involving the poor as 
worker-partners, characteristic of the collaboration strategy of stakeholder 
engagement; and 
 How a participatory and transparent management system could contribute to 
the pursuit of a collaboration strategy of stakeholder engagement involving the 
poor as workers.    
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Tahanan’s lack of support from government is a reflection of an ineffective state that 
is unable to deliver basic social services and address disability as a major cause of 
poverty (Schelzig, 2005). Local government units have not been able to sustain 
efforts started by Tahanan to assist PWDs in their areas. In its efforts to expand its 
outreach among PWDs amidst state neglect, Tahanan was, in the past, pushed to 
serving mainstream export markets that provided intermittent jobs but did not serve 
the rehabilitation objective for PWDs. Again, in its efforts to expand outreach among 
PWDs, it shifted to the state as market, with its own difficulties and dangers.  
Tahanan started to participate in the regular bidding processes of government. In 
doing so, Tahanan is not only competing with regular business enterprises but is also 
faced with the usual problems and uncertainties attached to serving government as a 
client in the Philippine context. This includes delays in contracts and payments83 
affecting Tahanan’s cash flow and causing a big part of its financial difficulties.  
Whether Tahanan would be able to surmount its current difficulties will depend 
not only on its efforts to effectively meet contract requirements with government but 
more importantly, its success will depend on making government accountable for its 
contractual obligations in the short term and for its commitment to close the policy-
action gap related to serving PWDs as a poverty sector in the medium to long term. 
This political dimension that Tahanan needs to develop as SEPPS is consistent with a 
distinct characteristic observed among fair trade and other social enterprises that need 
to change the broader context within which they operate (Nyssens, 2006; Martin and 
Osberg, 2007). This would entail building the capability of Tahanan to engage 
government not only as a customer in what Harrison and St. John (1994; 1998) and 
Post et al., (2002a; 2002b) consider as Tahanan’s operating environment or industry 
structure, but it will also entail effectively engaging government to enact what 
Laville (2010) considers as the state’s role in redressing inequalities in favor of 
PWDs in what Harrison and St. John (1994; 1998) and Post et al., (2002) consider to 
be Tahanan’s broader social-political environment.                                                                    
 
                                                 
83 Part of the serious challenges in serving government as a client in the Philippine context is corruption. The 
Philippines is part of the list of most corrupt countries, using Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, 
a measure of domestic public sector corruption.  See 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results.  However, this issue was not raised by 
Tahanan’s stakeholders in the course of the research. 
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CHAPTER 7 – LAMAC MULTI-PURPOSE 
COOPERATIVE: OWNER-CLIENTS AS 
TRANSACTIONAL PARTNERS 
 
The Lamac MPC case shows the relevance of cooperatives as SEPPS in 
responding to the failure of state and market institutions to provide the poor with 
financial and basic social services in the Philippines. The case also demonstrates 
the power of the collaboration strategy of stakeholder engagement in reaching 
large numbers of the poor but with relatively less qualitative impact compared to 
the empowerment strategy of stakeholder engagement manifested by PWD Fed. 
From the perspective of cooperatives as SEPPS, part of the challenge faced by 
Lamac MPC is overcoming what seems to be a major weakness in harnessing the 
participation of the poor among its members to meaningfully participate in the 
governance of the cooperative, and create avenues for them to articulate and 
initiate programs that may deepen the cooperative’s impact on their poverty 
situation. What Lamac MPC is facing may reflect an overall challenge among 
cooperatives in the Philippines as they strive to go beyond serving their poor 
members in a transactional way.   
  
7.1.  Introduction 
 
Barangay Lamac is a rural village 42 kilometers from Cebu City, which is a 
center for trade in central Philippines. In the early 1970s, Lamac was a farming 
community that had little or no access to basic needs and social services. They had 
only foot trails with no roads to transport their farm produce; kerosene lamps and 
fireflies were their only sources of light at night; and they fetched their drinking 
water from wells and a nearby spring. They planted rice, corn, bananas, and root 
crops for subsistence and a number earned some cash to meet their family’s basic 
needs as migrant contractual workers in nearby cities (Lamac MPC, 2009).   
Lamac Multi-Purpose Cooperative (MPC) Chairperson Delfin Tuquib 
emphasized, “Lamac is very different now”. (Tuquib, 2009)  
Lamac’s transformation was a heartwarming story of how a poor, isolated 
barangay rose up with the Lamac MPC playing a central role as a community 
cooperative. Lamac residents, at the time of the field research in 2009, enjoyed 
access to potable water and electricity in their homes as well as a road and 
transportation system connecting them to various destinations. Lamac MPC owned 
and managed several enterprises, notably the Hidden Valley Resort. More than 90% 
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of Lamac households had members in the cooperative, and availed of their products 
and services.   
Since the late 1990s, Lamac MPC had expanded its area of coverage to include 
first the town, then the province and finally the whole region where it was located.  
Such expansion had changed its character. It started as a community cooperative 
serving the village of Lamac in 1992. At the time of the research in 2009, it had 
become a cooperative providing microfinance services for livelihood, basic social 
services, and social protection to more than 37,000 marginalized people in central 
Philippines.    
Lamac MPC envisioned itself as ‘An image builder, financially-sustainable 
cooperative providing wholesome services to empowered communities’. Its mission 
was ‘To strongly respond to the holistic empowerment needs of the vulnerable 
sectors through socio-economic programs’. Its core values were embodied in the 
acronym LOVE that stood for Loyalty, Oneness, Valor and Empathy (Lamac MPC, 
2009). 
 
7.2.  Pre-Inception Stage (1973-1991): Rise and Fall of 
Self-Help Group of Farmers  
 
Lamac MPC had its roots in the Lamac Samahang Nayon84 (Lamac SN) set up in 
1973 by 70 tenant tillers and small farm owners with the assistance of the 
Department of Local Government and Community Development (DLGCD). The 
DLGCD was a state agency that had a program to organize poor farmers into self-
help groups. With an initial capital of PhP 50.00 per member, the Lamac SN had 
been able to raise PhP 3,500 to undertake consumer and marketing services for its 
members. From 1973-1986, the Lamac SN became a conduit of government services 
and projects for farmers, and for a time, was the recipient of many awards. As the 
government program that created and supported it ended, and as requirements for 
implementing projects became more complex, they experienced leadership and 
management problems, and subsequently, financial decline. 
About the same time that the Lamac SN was on the decline, a group of young 
professionals and college level residents organized themselves into the Barangay 
Lamac Organization and Management Effectiveness Systems Inc.  (BLOMES Inc.).  
Their aim was to provide and assist organizations in the barangay (village) with 
management and technical assistance. BLOMES Inc., was requested by the Lamac 
SN management to assist them in revitalizing their organization. With the assistance 
of BLOMES Inc., and leaders from another cooperative, the Lamac SN was 
                                                 
84 Literally means organization in the countryside.  
 234 
rehabilitated. (Lamac MPC, 2009; Lamac MPC, 2009a; Tuquib, 2009; Limocon, 
2009) 
Mr. Delfin Tuquib, Chairperson of the cooperative for 10 years and Vice 
Chairperson for 8 years before that, recalled that in 1986, he was President of 
BLOMES Inc., the organization of professionals that assisted the rehabilitation of the 
Lamac Samahang Nayon. Mr. Tuquib, a teacher by profession who was principal of 
the local high school at the time of the research, emphasized,   
 
“The Samahang Nayon, composed 100% of farmers, requested me to come in as 
they felt they needed professionals with management skills to revitalize the 
organization. I became a member in 1988, as I also have a small farm of 1.5 
hectares. The leadership that presided over the rehabilitation period from 1988-92 
was composed of five professionals from BLOMES Inc., and 2 from among the 
farmer-leaders”.  (Tuquib, 2010)   
 
7.3. Inception Stage (1992-1998): From Self Help Group to 
Community Cooperative 
 
By 1992, the Lamac SN had been transformed and registered as a full-fledged 
multi-sectoral, multi-purpose agricultural cooperative under the management of 
BLOMES Inc., giving birth to the Lamac Multi Purpose Cooperative (Lamac MPC).    
(Lamac MPC, 2009; Lamac MPC, 2009a; Tuquib, 2009; Limocon, 2009) 
While the Lamac SN was composed purely of farmers, membership in the Lamac 
MPC was opened to all members of the Lamac community including professionals 
and non-farmer segments among the poor. Lamac MPC Board Chairperson Tuquib 
recalled: 
 
“The first Lamac MPC Board of Directors elected in 1992 was composed of 3 
farmer-leaders with 4 professionals, including myself”. (Tuquib, 2009) 
 
From 1992-1998, Lamac MPC remained a community cooperative, drawing its 
membership among residents in the barangay. 
Lamac MPC General Manager Ellen Limocon explained that they started as a 
multi-purpose agricultural cooperative and they remained so until the time of the 
research in 2009.  She explained: 
 
“During the cooperative’s first monthly ownership meetings, most of those who 
came were our farmer members. We tried to respond to their needs. They 
expressed the need for financial services to increase their production, in addition 
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to farm inputs, pre- and post- harvest facilities and irrigation. This was the 
inspiration for us to open our lending facility in 1992”. (Limocon, 2009) 
 
Lamac MPC opened its first lending facility in 1992. Lamac MPC General Manager 
Ellen Limocon recalled:  
 
“Both our chairman and I did not know how to run a credit program. Therefore, 
we visited nearby cooperatives that had credit operations for exposure. We heard 
about the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) extending credit to agricultural 
cooperatives so we visited them. Shortly after, LBP visited us and helped work 
out our accreditation. They extended a PhP 1 million credit line, and a technical 
partnership. Since then, our credit operations have grown on average about PhP 5 
million per year”.   (Limocon, 2009)                                                                                     
 
The General Manager also recounted that some of their earliest fixed asset 
acquisition were for post harvest facilities: 
 
“Our first loan from the bank was for the amount of PhP 440,000 to buy a 
hauling truck which we rented out. The hauling truck is also used to bring sick 
people to the hospital. Also in 1995, using the award money we got from winning 
second place in the LBP National Gawad Pitak Award amounting to PhP 
400,000, we invested in a rice and corn mill, a hand tractor and a thresher to 
service our farmer-members”.  (Limocon, 2009)  
 
It was also during the 1990s that the Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources (DENR), under its Community Based Forest Management Assistance 
(CBFMA) Program, partnered with Lamac MPC for a watershed management 
programme covering 35 hectares within the vicinity. In the process, Lamac MPC and 
the DENR pursued Income Generating Projects involving upland farmers that 
included swine dispersal and forest/fruit tree seedling production (Lamac MPC, 
2009). 
Lamac MPC likewise became the lead actor in responding to the community’s 
socio-economic and spiritual needs. They joined many prestigious contests that 
showcased best practices among cooperatives, and they used their cash reward to 
invest in community projects. Their contribution was often used as leverage to lobby 
for government officials to do more for Lamac (Lamac MPC, 2009; Limocon, 2009).   
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 In 1995, an ownership meeting decided to push the establishment of a parish in 
Lamac. The members felt it was important so people did not have to travel 12 
kilometers to avail of spiritual services. Lamac MPC provided financial 
assistance to construct a convent and undertake major renovations of the 
church, while people provided labor as counterpart; 
 In 1997, Lamac MPC constructed a PhP 2 million, 3-story building made of 
concrete in the heart of Lamac. This replaced their dilapidated office made of 
bamboo, and also housed their consumer store. With an ownership meeting 
pushing the establishment of a bakery, Lamac MPC likewise ventured into 
one; and 
 In 1998, Lamac MPC rehabilitated an old water reservoir and had it connected 
to a nearby spring, a priority barangay government project that had not been 
implemented because of lack of funds. Using its first prize cash reward of PhP 
500,000 from the LBP National Gawad Pitak Award and a PhP 200,000 loan 
from LBP, they installed a new water system with the technical assistance of 
the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). This was used as leverage 
for the district congressman to allocate PhP 1.5 million from his Countryside 
Development Fund (CDF) for a filtration plant. This paved the way for most 
households to have direct access to potable water. The cooperative continued 
to provide potable water services to the community.  
 
The partnership with the LBP was sustained through the years.  The Lamac MPC 
became recognized as one of the best LBP-assisted cooperatives, as proven by the 
series of Gawad Pitak awards that it garnered. Every year, the LBP awarded the 
Gawad Pitak to what were considered as the country’s most outstanding 
cooperatives. From 1994 onwards, the Lamac MPC was always in the running for the 
Gawad Pitak. In 1995, it garnered 2nd prize, for which it won PhP 400,000. In 1998, 
the cooperative got the 1st prize, for which it won PhP 500,000. This prize money 
was spent for the installation of the water system in the barangay, with the district 
congressman providing a PhP 1.5 million counterpart from his Countryside 
Development Fund allocation (or CDF).85 
From its transformation into a multi-purpose cooperative in 1992, the Lamac 
MPC engaged with, and in the process was assisted by, several institutions from the 
government, the financing sector, and the cooperative movement. Interestingly, most 
of Lamac MPC’s early infrastructure projects, whether for its own use or the 
community’s, had been funded by the prize monies of awards that it had garnered 
from various institutions. 
                                                 
85 This was a lump sum fund given annually to each national legislator for funding of small local infrastructure and 
other community projects that were not covered by the national budget. Allocation for specific projects was left to the 
discretion of the legislator. The CDF was later re-named the Priority Development Assistance Fund or PDAF. 
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The trend of providing for the needs of people in the Lamac community, 
characteristic of the inception stage, continued through to the development stage, but 
to a much lesser extent. For example in 2000, Lamac MPC bought land worth PhP 
250,000 from the barangay government to start a housing program.  The barangay 
had purchased the lot intending to build a market but it turned out that the project 
was not feasible. The cooperative housing program benefitted 20 members who were 
squatting on private land86.    
 
7.4.  Development Stage (1998-2009): Spreading its Wings 
through Microfinance  (Lamac MPC, 2008; Lamac MPC, 2009; 
Lamac MPC Management Team FGD, 2009) 
 
In the late 1990s, the Lamac MPC Board, with the confirmation of the General 
Assembly, decided on a membership expansion strategy going beyond the barangay.  
The expansion strategy was hinged on microfinance as entry point.   
The Lamac MPC expanded to cover: the entire town of Pinamungajan in 1998; 
the third district of the province of Cebu in 2001; the whole province of Cebu in 
2004; and eventually the rest of the Visayas region by 2009. While starting to go 
beyond Lamac in 1998, their massive expansion from 6 to 12 branches happened 
from 2006-2009 (Pantino, 2009).  
Given this expansion strategy, its members beyond Lamac barangay had come 
mainly from among the entrepreneurial poor or micro-entrepreneurs and 
professionals. This expansion strategy was influenced by a combination of three 
factors: 
                                                                                                                                                      
 The push from people outside of Lamac to become members of a cooperative 
that had become popular due to its achievements, and to avail of the 
cooperative’s financial services given the prevailing problem of usury in the 
countryside;  
 The program and financial resources offered or awarded to it by government 
and non-government agencies because of the cooperative’s track record; and 
 The cooperative leadership’s commitment to cover a larger number of poor 
people in pursuit of the organization’s mission and vision.87  
  
                                                 
86 Squatting was a common phenomenon in the Philippines given the skewed distribution of land. Privately owned or 
government lands that were left idle usually became areas where informal settlers built shelters or houses where they 
lived until such time that they were asked to leave, at times forcibly.  
87 See Section 7.1 for Lamac MPC’s vision and mission statements.  
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7.4.1.  Programs and Services  
 
Lamac MPC’s expansion beyond the barangay boosted the development of its 
financial services. It developed a savings program requiring only PhP 50 as initial 
minimum deposit and PhP 10 as minimum additional deposit. It provided an interest 
of 4% per annum computed and compounded quarterly. It carried an automatic 
Mortuary Cash Assistance Benefit ranging from PhP 20,000 - PhP 120,000 for 
members and their beneficiaries with a minimum maintaining balance of PhP 500. Its 
time deposit products of 90-360 days, with a minimum amount of PhP 1,000, earned 
interest from 4.25-8% per annum. Starting from 2008, other benefits linked to the 
savings and capital build-up program of the cooperative included: 
 
 Hospital Income Benefit; 
 Retirement Benefit; 
 Insurance; and  
 Pension.  
 
Lamac MPC also developed a credit program with 4 types of loan products:  
 
 HELP: livelihood loans (PhP 4,000 - PhP 50,000) using group lending for 
those with assets below PhP 500,000;   
 ME: micro-enterprise loans (PhP 5,000 - PhP 150,000) for those with assets 
above PhP 500,000; 
 SMILE: asset-based lending (PhP 150,000 - PhP 2 million) for enterprises with 
assets above PhP 1.5 million; and 
 RELAX: providential loans of PhP 1,000 - PhP 2 million for members with a 
share capital above PhP 50,000. 
 
Interest was from 2.5-5% monthly, with 1-12 months term and 0-4% service fee.  
HELP and ME carried a Housing Loan Assistance incentive for house repair and 
renovation with a 2% monthly interest for a maximum of 24 months. ME carried an 
Asset Acquisition Financing incentive over a 24 month period, with 2.5% monthly 
interest. SMILE had the same Asset Acquisition Financing incentive. This was 
complemented by Marketing Information Assistance, which linked the clients to 
Lamac MPC’s internet website and business networks and provided market 
information and Information and Communication Technology (ICT) training to help 
clients in product and market development. 
Lamac MPC developed a scholarship program and had started a youth organizing 
and children’s program through the Coop Youth Planet (CYP). CYP provided a 
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training ground for future cooperative leaders and members. The CYP had also 
established and was managing the first cooperative-run dormitory for students 
located in Cebu City, and had initiated a school-based savings consciousness and 
mobilization program for children in cooperation with Aflatoun.     
While the services of Lamac MPC among most of its members were mainly 
financial services linked to providing social protection and benefits, the cooperative 
continued to provide a host of non-financial services to the Lamac community.  
These services included the following:  
 
 Agriculture-related services such as rice and corn milling, hauling, swine 
fattening and breeding, poultry raising, agri-veterinary products and services, 
ornamental plant production, and maintenance of an agricultural demonstration 
farm; 
 Community services including water, postal, transportation, leasing, catering, 
drug store, bakery and canteen, ID lamination, photocopying (xerox copying), 
sound system and communications equipment, and Clean and Green Programs; 
 Consumer services for dry goods and houseware as well as hardware and 
electrical supplies; and 
 Resort and training amenities through the Hidden Valley Resort and Training 
Center, which catered to conventions and conferences, retreats and 
recollections, trainings and relaxation, inclusive of games, videoke and inland 
fishing.  
 
The direction of spreading its wings beyond Lamac was expected to continue for the 
period 2008-2012. In its 5 Year Development Plan (2008-2012), Lamac MPC 
targeted to achieve 300% or 100,000 membership growth by 2012. The plan also 
defined “the innovation of existing non-financial services and establishment of direct 
and rewarding programs for membership” that translated to the following key 
investments (Lamac MPC, 2007): 
 
 Filtration plant and expansion of water system (PhP 4 million); 
 Agri-based project including demonstration farm, poultry, piggery, layer, 
dairy, inland fishing, and goatery (PhP 3 million);  
 Milling Facility in Punod (PhP 500,000); 
 Housing Development cum Tourism: Bed and Breakfast (PhP 5 million); 
 Memorial Park (PhP 8 million); 
 Funeral Parlor (PhP 1 million); 
 Improvement of Hidden Valley Resort (HVR) Training Center/Facilities, 
Covered Court and Sport Amenities (PhP 6 million); 
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 Procurement of 1 mini bus, 2 multicab/van for HVR and branches (PhP 2 
million); 
 Construction of building in Balamban (PhP 4 million); 
 Purchase of lot in Lutopan (PhP 1.5 million); 
 Construction of Business Development Center in Toledo (PhP 6 million); and 
 Dormitory and Hub in Cebu City (PhP 1 million). 
 
As part of its 2008-2012 plans, Lamac MPC also targeted the organization and 
registration of the Lamac MPC foundation as a subsidiary “to provide incentives to at 
least 50% identified good members and clients through direct social and basic 
services” (Lamac MPC, 2007). This project however had not been implemented at 
the time of this research.  
 
7.4.2.  Membership and Membership Participation  
 
Lamac’s membership as of end December 2008 had reached 39,869, spread 
across 14 branches and sub-offices. Membership consisted of 26,825 regular 
members, 13,044 associate members and 2,546 youth as a distinct membership 
group. Criteria used for membership is as follows:  
 
o Regular full-fledged members had undergone a Pre-Membership Education 
Seminar (PMES), paid their membership fee of PhP 200, and had a savings 
deposit of PhP 500 and share capital of at least PhP 1,000. Upon initial 
enrollment for membership, regular members should have invested share 
capital of PhP 100 representing 2 shares of the minimum paid up capital of 
PhP 1,000. They were considered non-full-fledged regular members if their 
share capital was less than PhP 1,000 and/or their savings deposit were less 
than PhP 500. Associate members were those who had availed of a service 
from the cooperative but had not undergone PMES; 
o All members were rated quarterly based on the criteria of undertaking regular 
monthly capital build-up (CBU) and savings (regardless of amount) and paying 
loans on time. Members in Good Standing (MIGS) were classified into 
Diamond, Gold and Silver, while those who were Members Not in Good 
Standing (MNIGS) were classified as Bronze; and   
o Only Diamond and Gold members were eligible to run as Board of Chapter 
Leaders. Only Diamond members were eligible to run as members of the 
Board of Directors. Diamond, Gold and Silver members comprised the General 
Assembly as voters and could avail of loans.   
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By the end of 2008, Lamac MPC’s membership in the barangay where it started was 
estimated at 2,42488, including the youth. (Lamac MPC, 2008). This represented 6% 
of the total membership of 39,869 spread across 14 branches and sub-offices. While 
94% of the membership coming from the other branches was composed of 
entrepreneurial poor, micro-entrepreneurs, and professionals, the membership within 
Lamac was composed of farmers and livestock raisers (60%); construction, domestic 
and migrant workers (20%); sari-sari store owners and micro-entrepreneurs (10%); 
and professionals or salaried employees (10%) (Tuquib, 2009; Lamac MPC 
Management Committee FGD, 2009).  
In terms of overall participation, the members from poverty sectors who were 
interviewed saw their leaders as the ones responsible for decision-making. One of the 
members interviewed put it this way: “As a member, as long as I am in good 
standing, I can vote for our leaders. They are the ones responsible for making 
decisions for the cooperative”. It is important to point out that the criteria for 
becoming a Member in Good Standing, which was the basis for inclusion in the 
General Assembly, was purely determined by the capacity of members to regularly 
undertake capital build-up, savings and loan payments. These same criteria 
determined the eligibility of members to be elected in the Board of Chapter Leaders 
or the Board of Lamac MPC. Such criteria tended to discriminate against poorer 
members in their exercise of their right to become part of governing bodies, and 
tended to negate the cooperative’s mission of empowering vulnerable sectors.      
A General Assembly usually generated participation from 60 to 80% of Members 
in Good Standing or MIGS. During the 19th General Assembly at the Cebu Coliseum, 
this translated to about 8,000 members. The parade before the actual meeting created 
traffic in the provincial capital and the talk of the town was “Lamac is having its 
General Assembly” (Pantino, 2009). Assuming a 60% participation rate of the MIGS 
during this General Assembly and 26,825 regular members by end 2008, about 50% 
of these regular members, or about 13,412 would have been Members in Good 
Standing.  
 
7.4.3.  Governance and Planning Practice                                                 
 
Among the 3 farmer leaders from the first Lamac MPC Board of Directors, only 
1 remained in the board, Mr. Pablito Lucero, aged 59, during the development stage.  
Mr. Lucero had been President of the Lamac Irrigators Association from 1990-2008.  
He worked on a 1-hectare parcel of land that he leased at a fee of 10% of the farm 
yield. Off-season, he was also a carpenter. The professions of the Board of Directors 
                                                 
88 The latest available breakdown of membership across branches was for the year 2007, which put membership within 
Lamac at 2, 265. Assuming the same % increase in membership listed in Lamac from 2006-2007, put at 7%, 
membership would have grown to 2,424. 
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at the time of the research, apart from Mr. Lucero, included two principals of local 
schools, a retired bank employee, a nurse, a teacher, a midwife, and a sanitary 
inspector of a national government agency.    
Mr. Lucero explained the change in Board composition: 
 
“I am the only surviving farmer leader from the Samahang Nayon. My 2 other 
colleagues have died and have been replaced with professionals. We can say that 
those who may be replacing us farmer leaders in the cooperative are sons and 
daughters of farmers who have gone through college. We try to keep them 
interested in farming by asking them to work in the rice and corn fields during 
vacation time. They are professionals but with some guidance, they could remain 
interested in farming. For myself, I have endeavored to guide my child and 
nephew – and I think there are indications that I am achieving some success with 
my nephew”. (Lucero, 2010)    
                                                                                                                                                      
Since its expansion outside of Lamac, the leadership structure of the cooperative was 
changed to include a Board of Chapter Leaders who were elected per office. At the 
time of the research in 2009, there were 14 branches (including the Lamac Main 
Office), so there were 14 Boards of Chapter Leaders elected at large by the members 
in good standing in their respective areas of coverage. Interaction and consultations 
between the members and the leadership happened mainly during Quarterly 
Ownership Meetings per office. There was also an Annual General Assembly. The 
Annual General Assembly Meeting was conducted in two parts:   
 
 Part I, conducted by office, was when elections and the distribution of 
dividends and patronage refunds happened; and 
 Part II, conducted as one big meeting across offices, was when the business 
meeting and social activities happened.   
 
Referring to their planning practice, General Manager Ellen Limocon explained that 
they have had three medium term plans covering 2008-2012, 2005-2007 and 2002-
2004. These plans were usually discussed at the level of the management committee 
and the board, and ratified during General Assemblies (Limocon, 2009).  
 
7.4.4.  Partnerships and Recognition 
 
During the development stage, Lamac MPC sustained its partnership with the 
Land Bank of the Philippines. By then, Lamac MPC had become a model among the 
government bank’s partner model cooperatives. In 2003, the Lamac MPC won the 
top prize – the Ginintuang Gawad Pitak, a special award given to the best 
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agriculture-based cooperative among the Gawad Pitak Hall of Fame awardees89.  
This was only the second year when the award was given out. The award carried with 
it a PhP 1 million prize that the Lamac MPC used to partially fund the construction 
of a Cooperative Training Center that eventually became the Hidden Valley Training 
Center and Resort. Also in 2002, Lamac MPC was an awardee under the Ramon 
Aboitiz Foundation Inc. (RAFI) Triennial Awards. The prize money of PhP 250,000 
was spent for the procurement of the lot for the cooperative’s housing project.   
Within the Philippine cooperative sector, Lamac MPC was a member of VICTO 
National90, and the National Confederation of Cooperatives (NATCCO). Among 
others, these networks introduced enterprise ideas and facilitated international 
networking among their members. In 2001, Lamac MPC’s linkage with the Canada-
based Capital Credit Union (CCU) was opened through the twinning cooperative 
program of the Canadian Cooperative Association (CCA) and VICTO. The two 
cooperatives forged a partnership following exchange visits between the Lamac MPC 
and the CCU leaders, and the CCU has been a supportive partner of the cooperative 
since then.  Among others, the CCU also contributed funding for the construction of 
the Hidden Valley Training Center and Resort.  
The Lamac MPC was actively involved in the Municipal Cooperative 
Development Council (MCDC), through various activities like the small and big 
cooperative brother program. This program allowed Lamac MPC to assist start up or 
smaller cooperatives in the municipality. The cooperative credited its involvement in 
the MCDC for its being given preferential rights to finance the local government unit 
(LGU) administered-infrastructure projects. With this involvement, the Cooperative 
Development Authority and the Representative of the 3rd Congressional District of 
Cebu chose Lamac MPC as the conduit of livelihood credit facilities for the poor 
such as the ‘Lingap sa Mahirap’91 fund (PhP 1 million) and the Philippine 
Development Assistance Fund (PhP 4.9 million). 
The Lamac MPC had a wide array of other partners from the government and the 
private sector, who all helped fuel the cooperatives’ expansion. The cooperative was 
able to secure financing from the National Livelihood Development Corporation, the 
People’s Credit and Finance Corporation (PCFC) and the SEEDFINANCE 
Corporation.   
 
                                                 
89 ‘Ginintuang’ means  ‘Golden’. The Hall of Fame award was given to a cooperative that had already won a grand 
prize, as well as a second or third prize in previous Gawad Pitak searches. 
90 VICTO used to be the center for NATCCO in the Visayas. In 2007, it spinned off as an independent center for 
cooperatives and had been called VICTO National since then.   
91 ‘Lingap sa Mahirap’ means ‘Looking After the Poor’ 
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7.5.  Financial and Social Outcomes 
 
7.5.1. Financial Outcomes 
 
As of end December 2008, Lamac MPC had an asset base of PhP 424 million, 
loan receivables of PhP 314 million (PhP 293 million net of allowance for doubtful 
accounts), savings and time deposits of PhP 107 million, share capital amounting to 
PhP 151 million, and members’ equity of PhP 171 million.  
Growth had been tremendous since 1998, with the start of the expansion 
program.  As seen in the following figures (Figure 7.1. – 7.4.), growth slopes had 
become particularly pronounced with the expansion to cover the rest of Cebu 
province in 2004, and with the corresponding expansion from 6 to 12 branches. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1. Lamac MPC, Assets, Liabilities and Members’ Equity, 1997 – 2008.  
Sources: Audited Financial Statements, 1997 to 2008; Report to General Assembly, 2008. 
 
Share capital rose from PhP 6.48 million (representing 62% of members’ equity) 
in 1997 to PhP 151.4 million (accounting for 88% of members’ equity) in 2008. The 
trend is seen in Figure 7.3. At 39,869 members in 2008, average share capital was 
PhP 3,797.  With an exchange rate of PhP 44 to USD 1, this was about USD 86. 
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Figure 7.2. Lamac MPC, Number of Members, 1997 -2001, 2005 – 2008.  
Sources: Reports to General Assembly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3. Lamac MPC, Share Capital vis-à-vis Members Equity, 1997 – 2008.  
Sources: Audited Financial Statements, 1997 to 2008; Report to General Assembly, 2008 
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Lamac MPC’s primary enterprise was the provision of financial services. By 
2008, loans receivable, net of allowance for doubtful accounts, were at PhP 293 
million, from a mere PhP 5.15 million in 1997. This was a 5,589% increase over the 
period. Savings and time deposits had increased by around the same percentage 
(5,578%) from just PhP 1.88 million in 1997 to PhP 106.91 million in 2008 (Please 
see Figure 7.4.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4. Lamac MPC, Net Loans Receivable and Savings and Time Deposits, 1997 – 2008. 
Sources: Audited Financial Statements, 1997 to 2008; Report to General Assembly, 2008. 
 
Lamac MPC’s massive expansion had led to its registering a total income of PhP 
112.07 million in 2007, from only PhP 2.88 million in 1997, or a 3,795% increase.  
Net surplus rose by 2,952% from less than a million (PhP 760,638) in 1997 to PhP 
23.21 million in 2007. The next year, however, Lamac MPC experienced its first 
decrease in income in the expansion period. Despite an increase in the loan portfolio, 
interest income on loans had gone down by 11%. Profit from its other operations 
(which accounted for 4% of total income in 2007 and 5% in 2008) also registered a 
lower than targeted level. These led to a decrease in total income and net surplus to 
only PhP 101.4 million and PhP 15.1 million, respectively (see Figure 7.5.). Still, 
Lamac MPC remained in a very healthy financial situation as shown by the key 
balance sheet data (see Figure 7.1.). 
Since its’ founding, it was loans from the Land Bank of the Philippines and other 
external sources that had assisted the development and growth of Lamac MPC. A big 
percentage of the cash prizes it reaped from 1995-2003 totaling PhP 2.15 million, 
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revenues, except in the form of contributions for the construction of community 
infrastructure projects as detailed in Section 7.3 and 7.4. Likewise, the cooperative 
had been chosen as a conduit of livelihood credit facilities for the poor amounting to 
PhP 5.9 million, as detailed in Section 7.4.4. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.5. Lamac MPC, Total Income and Net Surplus, 1997 – 2008.  
Sources: Audited Financial Statements, 1997 to 2008; Report to General Assembly, 2008. 
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37,000 marginalized individuals in Cebu province alone (Generoso, 2009) at a time 
that its total membership had reached almost 40,000. Going by these estimates, the 
poor, mainly comprising the entrepreneurial poor and micro-entrepreneurs outside 
Lamac, as well as the farmers and workers in Lamac, comprised over 90% of Lamac 
MPC’s members. By implication, the professionals and salaried employees, and 
small entrepreneurs composed less than 10%.   
The researcher requested from the Lamac MPC management a purposive sample 
of members coming from poverty sectors, whom they thought represented varying 
levels of impact of the cooperative – from good, better and best. Twelve members 
were interviewed. The results of the interviews, summarized below (with some 
experiences highlighted in Boxes 7.1., and 7.2.) gave an overview of the range of 
qualitative effects of the cooperative’s services on individual members and their 
families. 
The members spoke of how they had benefited from the financial and other 
services extended by the cooperative. The benefits derived or generated may be 
classified into economic gains from access to livelihood loans; employment 
generated by the cooperative and micro-entrepreneurs assisted by the cooperative; 
savings and capital build-up among members; improved access to education; and 
improved access to health, housing and social protection.    
 
 Economic gains from livelihood loans. The members interviewed had availed 
themselves of livelihood loans ranging from PhP 5,000 to more than PhP 
300,000. These loans had been used for their farming expenses, or had enabled 
them to establish or enhance existing micro-enterprises such as livestock-
raising, selling of cooked food, or running a sari-sari store (small variety store 
selling basic goods). At the time of the interview, incomes of the interviewed 
members ranged from around PhP 50 to PhP 1,000 a day.    
Box 7.1., describes some of the economic gains enjoyed by members. In 
general, the assessment was as member Bernardita Alfeche cited, “With the 
cooperative, my life has changed – it has made it easier for me to earn a 
living”; 
 Employment generation. Two of the micro-entrepreneurs interviewed had been 
able to employ others in the community. Two of the members were employed 
by the cooperative itself, aside from having their own micro-enterprises. Three 
members (including one of the aforementioned two) had children employed by 
the MPC. The story of one family is narrated in Box 7.2; 
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 Savings and capital build-up. The cooperative provided a vehicle for setting 
aside money for savings and capital build-up. Capital build-up, which tended 
to be higher than savings since it was linked to availment of the lending 
services, ranged from PhP 10,000 to PhP 90,000 for the 12 members 
interviewed; 
 Education for the children. This was facilitated by the higher household 
income brought in by the enterprises, loans from the cooperative to pay tuition 
and other fees, and by scholarship grants that some members were able to avail 
of for their children.  Of the 12 members interviewed by the researcher, two 
had children who had been or were still scholars of the cooperative; and 
 Health, housing and social protection. The cooperative had been a source of 
loans and other financial assistance during emergencies such as dealing with 
sickness or death in the family. Services like the pension for seniors, and the 
mortuary benefit, had also been a big help to members. Some of the 
interviewed members had also been able to avail of loans for housing and 
similar needs. Box 7.2., describes how some of the members had availed of 
these services.   
 
The members also recognized the benefits derived by the community. On the whole, 
the Lamac MPC had served as a vehicle for development in the barangay. As 
outlined in Section 7.3, the cooperative had facilitated the community’s access to 
vital services and infrastructure – ranging from helping in the establishment of the 
parish, to the installation of electricity, a transportation system and potable water 
services, to a housing project for informal settlers/squatters. In a country where 
public services were usually not accessible to isolated villages and the private sector 
would not find such areas as attractive investment sites, the cooperative had stepped 
in as social investor, mobilizing community resources and engaging government to 
make such possible. Member Digna Tanodra, featured in Box 7.3., echoed the 
sentiment of the Lamac MPC Chair in describing the overall impact of the 
cooperative: “Lamac is very different now! You would only see bamboo huts before.  
But now, there are concrete houses, buildings, and we even have a resort with a 
swimming pool!” 
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Box 7.1. Lamac MPC: Supporting Livelihoods and Education 
 
The Tapaleses. Teofilo Tapales was a farmer of a 1 hectare rice and corn land under a share-cropping 
arrangement of 60-40 (60% of the produce went to him while 40% went to the land owner). He got about 
15-25 sacks of palay per harvest; with 2 harvests a year, this was just enough for his family’s consumption.  
He had 5 children: 2 graduates in commerce and engineering both working in Cebu, 1 in college and 2 in 
elementary school. Teofilo’s wife had been a member of Lamac MPC since 1994 (with capital build-up or 
CBU amounting to PhP 190,000) while he became a member in 2007 (with a CBU of PhP 6,000). Their 
membership in the cooperative had helped them with both their business and the education of their children. 
Since their membership, they had availed of a PhP 20,000 express loan and 5 years ago, they had availed of 
a PhP 300,000 livelihood loan. Their business involved procuring hogs and cows, butchering them, retailing 
pork and beef, as well as cooking and selling cooked meat dishes such as barbecue. Apart from themselves, 
they were able to employ 2 more neighbors as assistants to do ambulant vending. Overall, they made about 
PhP 4-5,000/day and had a net income of about PhP 1,000/day, on average. With payments of PhP 750/day 
for their loan, they used to have about PhP 250/day as cash income. At the time of the interview, they had 
finished amortizing their loan. Two of the children had graduated and were working by the time of the 
research. These children were able to send about PhP 2-3,000/month to their parents to assist with the 
schooling of their siblings. 
 
Bernardita Alfeche, 38, was a housewife whose husband was a construction worker (welder) in Lapu-Lapu 
City. He remitted PhP 800 – PhP 1,000/week for household expenses. They had 4 children – 2 in high 
school and 2 in elementary. She had a CBU with Lamac MPC of PhP 33,000, and she endeavored to add 
PhP 500/month. In 2009, she had a patronage refund of PhP 4,000. Bernardita opened a sari-sari store 5 
years ago with a loan of PhP 5000 and enjoyed a credit line of up to PhP 6,000. She generated sales of PhP 
350 – PhP 400 per day and was able to net PhP 50 – PhP 100 per day. 
 
Teresita Ubaob was 53 years old, married and had 2 children. She became a member in 1980 and now had 
a CBU of PhP 50,000 and savings of PhP 500. While both children (aged 31 and 23) were married and 
working, she recalled how the cooperative helped her make a living to enable her to send the children to 
school from 2003 to 2007. Teresita used to be part of a hog raising program that allowed members to get 
piglets and feeds from the cooperative for them to raise and sell back to the cooperative. She used to earn a 
net income of PhP 15,000 to PhP 25,000 twice a year. At the time of the interview, she sewed and sold 
clothes, making PhP 700 – PhP 1,000/week in terms of net income.     
 
Elvie Tana was 36 years old with 6 children, aged 7 to 19. She became a member in 1990. Her first loan 
was PhP 1,500; her second was a 1-year loan of PhP 20,000 payable at PhP 2,000 per month. At the time of 
the interview, she was on her ninth loan of PhP 40,000, payable in 3 years. She used her loan to set up a 
sari-sari store which generated PhP 300-600 in sales and PhP 100-200 in terms of net income daily. She 
also sold cooked food, with sales of PhP 200 and a net income of PhP 110 daily. Her CBU was PhP 13,000, 
with savings of PhP 600. With her business, she was able to send her children to high school. 
 
Rose Libay.  Rose, 34 years old, was a housewife with 2 children (11 and 9 years old). She got married in 
1998. Her husband was a collector of a finance company in Makati City and remitted PhP 5,000/month to 
the family. Her CBU was PhP 16,000 and savings were PhP 300. She got a PhP 20,000 loan from the 
cooperative to set up a sari-sari store in 2008. She made PhP 200-PhP 300 daily and an additional PhP 50-
PhP 150 from selling vegetables during weekends. Her monthly amortization was PhP 1,700.  
 
Rosa Ferrer.  Rosa, 45 years old, had been a member for 7 years. She had 7 children – 2 in high school and 
1 in elementary school, with 4 working, one as collector for the cooperative. She used to be an ambulant 
vendor of fish but had set up a sari-sari store with a loan from the cooperative, making sales of PhP 2,000-
7,000 daily with a net income of PhP1,000-2,000. Her CBU had reached PhP 90,000 and she had been a 
diamond member, but since sales had decreased, she had not been able to pay her amortization for 3 months 
before the interview.   
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7.6.  Lamac MPC and Social Entrepreneurship 
 
7.6.1.  Lamac MPC as SEPPS 
 
 Lamac MPC exhibits the three elements of being a SEPPS, as defined in Section 
2.5.   
 Firstly, it is driven by its social mission ‘to strongly respond to the holistic 
empowerment needs of the vulnerable sectors through socio-economic programs’ 
(Lamac MPC, 2009). Over the years, it has expanded its membership to many 
segments of the poor, providing financial and social protection services to them.   
 Secondly, it creates wealth by charging fees as it provides financial and social 
protection services to its members. It does so for purposes of becoming a ‘financially 
sustainable cooperative providing wholesome services to empowered communities’ 
(Lamac MPC, 2009).  
Box 7.2. The Tanodras: Promoting Social Inclusion and Mobility 
 
Digna Tanodra, 51 years old, was a widow with 6 children – 2 already married, and 4 single (2 
working and 2 in college). Digna’s husband died in 1993 at a time that the cooperative did not have the 
mortuary assistance yet (this was put in place in 1998).   
She fondly remembered the year of 1988 when electricity was brought to Lamac. The cooperative 
approached and convinced the provincial electric cooperative, CEBECO to include Lamac as an area of 
operation. Cooperative members bought the electric posts, provided labor to dig and set up the posts, and 
paid for 15 out of the 30 kilometers of service wires through loans. The cooperative also negotiated to be 
responsible for accepting payments from 100 households. Digna also remembered that in 1990, members 
cleaned up the muddy 7 kilometer trail after the cooperative approached the local government to build the 
road. 
Digna made a living from farming bananas, corn, camote and other rootcrops. She harvested crops 
from her farm every four months for consumption and sold PhP 600 to PhP 1,000 worth of produce. She 
made a net income of PhP 300 – PhP 500 every 4 months or PhP 1,200 – PhP 2,000/year. She also made 
candles and handicrafts from recycled paper which she sold to the Department of Labor and Employment 
(DOLE) to generate cash for day to day expenses.   
Her CBU was PhP 32,000 and savings was PhP 480. She became a coordinator for Lamac MPC in 
1992, which meant she was responsible for relations with a number of members. It used to be a purely 
volunteer position but by end 2009, she was in charge of 200 accounts and got PhP 1.00/account as 
honorarium twice a month or PhP 400/month.    
In 2004, she took out a loan from the cooperative for the first time in the amount of PhP 120,000.  
This was followed by a PhP 125,000 loan in 2005 and a PhP 50,000 loan in 2009. She used the loans for 
the schooling of her children, the marriage of her second child and as capital for farming.   
One of Digna’s sons, Eric, became a scholar of Lamac MPC and graduated with a diploma in 
cooperatives development at the Polytechnic University of the Philippines. At the time of the research, he 
was an account officer of Lamac MPC. From his salary, he remitted PhP 3,000-PhP 3,500/month to the 
family, which usually went to loan payments (Tanodra, 2009). 
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 Thirdly, it pursues its mission in a cooperative set-up, where any surplus from its 
operations is distributed as dividends to members or utilized in furthering its 
organizational mission.  
 
7.6.2.  SEPPS in a Developing Country Context  
 
As with the other SEPPS covered in this research, the Lamac MPC may be 
characterized as a response to the failure of state and market institutions in serving 
the needs of the poor and of poor communities. During the initiation stage, Lamac 
MPC played a key role in mobilizing community resources and in engaging 
government agencies to provide a neglected and poor community infrastructural 
resources that facilitated access of households to potable water, electricity and 
transportation.      The support services that the cooperative made available to 
farmers particularly in Lamac also reflected market infirmities as well as the failure 
of state institutions to provide sustained support to small farmer-based agricultural 
development.  
An indication of the failure of market institutions during the development stage 
was the lack of access by the poor – farmers, contractual workers, entrepreneurial 
poor – to non-usurious financial services. As shown by the members interviewed, 
these were mainly used as livelihood capital and to finance basic needs like the 
education of their children and health care. On a broader basis, the popularity of the 
Lamac MPC’s social protection services reflected the failure of government to 
provide such, and to ensure access by the poor to basic social services.   
These aspects of the Lamac MPC experience echo Encarnacion-Tadem’s (2010) 
finding that the rise of cooperatives in the Philippines has been partly a response to 
the government’s inefficiency in delivery of basic needs. She posits that NGOs, 
people’s organizations and cooperative federations have helped fill the vacuum the 
state has left in the following aspects: access to capital, technical and infrastructural 
resources, marketing of products and self management.  
Interestingly, Lamac MPC had successfully engaged government in accessing 
financial and technical resources for its development and growth. Not only did 
Lamac MPC become a major partner of the state-owned Land Bank of the 
Philippines, it became a multi-awarded model partner cooperative, and served as a 
major conduit for government microfinance programs in the Visayan region. There 
were of course also other supportive civil society actors such as cooperative 
federations in the Philippines and other countries, notably Canada, and other non-
government organizations.   
In his narrative of the Philippine cooperative movement, Sibal (2002) recognizes 
the continuing problems of poverty and income inequality in the country, with 
inequality existing among classes and among regions. He avers that people 
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empowerment is the correct approach in solving these twin problems, and locates 
cooperatives as among the major pillars of the people empowerment movement in 
the Philippines. Given its articulated vision and mission, Lamac MPC seems to locate 
itself in this realm of people empowerment.    
 
7.6.3.  SEPPS and Social Entrepreneurship  
 
As a cooperative, the Lamac MPC resonates with the social economy school of 
social entrepreneurship (Defourny and Nyssens, 2008; Hulgaard, 2008) discussed in 
Chapter 1. In particular, Lamac MPC may be seen as typifying what Spear, et al., 
(2010) consider as a mutual social enterprise with a member-based governance 
structure. In their study on governance challenges among social enterprises in the 
United Kingdom, these scholars found that mutual social enterprises are faced by the 
challenges of maintaining an active membership and developing a competent board. 
With the farmers successfully bringing into the revitalized cooperative the skills and 
experience of local professionals, Lamac MPC may be said to have found a way 
forward in ensuring a competent board. They have also set up Coop Youth Planet as 
a training ground for future cooperative leaders. This may be considered a formation 
strategy deemed important by past studies on governance of cooperatives for training 
and qualifying potential candidates to the cooperative’s Board of Directors 
(Cornforth, 2004; Vidal, 2010).   
The case of Lamac MPC adds to the body of literature that studies the trends and 
challenges for social enterprises within the cooperative framework. Probably the 
most extensive study on this subject was that of Borzaga and Spear (2004) covering 
country experiences in Canada and 9 European countries, considered as developed 
and transition economies. This case on Lamac MPC provides a perspective on this 
subject from the context of a developing country. While coming from a different 
country context, the trend of the international cooperative movement towards the 
direction of revitalizing the communitarian tradition is validated by the case. This 
could be seen in the reorganization of the farmer-based Samahang Nayon (single 
stakeholder model), towards establishing a partnership between the farmers and the 
professionals in the Lamac Multi Purpose Cooperative, that embraced the community 
as a whole (multi-stakeholder model). Eighteen years after establishment, other 
segments of the poor, notably the entrepreneurial poor have become a majority 
segment.    
As a cooperative that now counts among its members various segments of the 
poor, such as farmers (at least in Lamac), workers and the entrepreneurial poor, there 
may be room to consider and institutionalize what Cheney (2001) discussed as a 
combination of direct and representative democracy that was utilized by the 
Mondragon Worker Cooperatives in Spain.  Direct democracy, manifested in the one 
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person, one vote principle already practiced by Lamac MPC, may be enriched by 
representative democracy in ensuring that significant segments of members coming 
from various segments of the poor are fairly represented.  This may be particularly 
important for a cooperative like Lamac MPC, whose mission is ‘to strongly respond 
(to) the holistic empowerment needs of the vulnerable sectors’ (Lamac MPC, 2009) 
in a social context of massive poverty and inequality. Trends indicated by the past 
and current composition of the Lamac MPC Board, and the attitude of members 
among the ranks of the poor to delegate governance functions to professionals 
demonstrate the importance of these complementary mechanisms for representative 
democracy.   
What Lamac MPC is facing may be characterized as an expression of what 
Borzaga and Spear (2004) articulated as the challenge of finding more effective 
mechanisms for multi-stakeholder governance given the international trend towards 
communitarianism among cooperatives as social enterprises.       
Thorp et al., (2003) argue that the chronically poor are disadvantaged in group 
formations, both in forming groups and in making them work. This is consistent with 
Sen’s (1999; 2009) perspective of poverty as capability deprivation. As SEPPS in a 
developing country context therefore, the biggest challenge that Lamac MPC faces is 
evolving mechanisms and undertaking programs that would build the capability of 
key segments of the poor in its membership to articulate and work for their specific 
interests and to effectively represent themselves in governing bodies.  Table 7.1.a. 
depicts the ‘Participation of the Poor in Governance and Management of Core and 
Allied Organizations of Lamac MPC’. 
 
7.7.  The Lamac MPC from a Stakeholder Perspective 
 
7.7.1.  Primary Stakeholders of Lamac MPC 
 
The Lamac MPC mission of focusing on ‘vulnerable sectors’ and vision towards  
‘empowered communities’, and their 18-years of practice show that the poor were a 
major target for the cooperative’s membership recruitment and services. As detailed 
in Section 7.5.2, the segments of the poor they have recruited as members and 
provided services to include the entrepreneurial poor, micro-entrepreneurs, farmers 
including livestock raisers, and construction, domestic and migrant workers. They 
comprise 90% of their membership.  
As a SEPPS, these various segments of the poor are Lamac MPC’s primary 
stakeholders from what Donaldson and Preston (1995) consider as a normative 
approach.   
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 7.7.2.  Roles and Role Changes among the Poor 
 
The main roles enacted by the poor in Lamac MPC were as clients or customers 
and as owners. They had put in their stake as owners via their initial capital 
contributions, and with their capital built-up over time mainly as they availed of the 
services. At the start of their membership, a sense of ownership was instilled through 
their participation in a Pre-Membership Education Seminar (PMES). Their being 
owners was also exercised mainly through their participation in periodic ownership 
meetings and annual General Assemblies.  
The relationship between the cooperative and its client-owners among the poor 
could be viewed as largely transactional in nature. As clients, the poor availed 
themselves of the cooperative’s services for a fee. As client-owners, in exchange for 
their patronage of the cooperative’s services and their capital contributions, they 
received dividends and patronage refunds.   
Through their entitlement to vote and be voted upon, they theoretically had the 
power to make decisions and to govern their enterprise. However, the power to vote 
and be voted upon in General Assemblies was limited to members in good standing 
(MIGS). Apart from the attendance of the PMES, a member would remain a MIGS, 
assuming they already met the initial minimum amount of share capital and savings 
deposit, if they had regular monthly capital build-up and savings, as well as paid 
loans on time. As described in Section 7.4.2., members were further subdivided into 
categories based on their capital build-up, savings practice, and loan repayment. Only 
the Gold and Diamond members were eligible to run as Board of Chapter leaders, 
and only Diamond members were eligible to run as members of the Board of 
Directors.  All these indicate a largely transactional relationship between the 
cooperative and its client-owners, especially among the poor.  
Although around 60 to 80% of the MIGS participated in General Assemblies, and 
there were quarterly Ownership Meetings, substantive planning and decision-making 
was also done by the leadership. Plans were usually discussed at the level of the 
management committee and the board, and ratified during General Assemblies. As 
described in Sections 7.4 and 7.5, the members from poverty sectors who were 
interviewed saw their leaders as the ones responsible for decision-making.      
The substantial but minority representation of the farmers (3 out of 7) in the 
Lamac MPC Board during the initiation stage had declined over time, with only one 
farmer leader remaining. From his explanation in Section 7.4.3, the remaining 
farmer-leader would most probably be replaced by a professional in the future, like 
his two other colleagues who were replaced by professionals when they died. This 
may be understandable given the reality that since the cooperative had expanded 
outside of Lamac, the farming segment in the membership had not increased. This 
may be a function of the decision to expand through microfinance, a service known 
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to target more the entrepreneurial segment of the poor. However, at the time of the 
research, there were also no indications that the entrepreneurial poor, who already by 
then comprised a majority of Lamac MPC’s members, were being elected to Board 
positions. As shown by the results of the interviews, the poor saw their membership 
more as a means to have social protection and access to financial services.          
Compared to the PWD Fed, Lamac MPC’s transactional nature of the role 
enacted by the poor as owner over time shows a different face of the cooperative 
approach. It indicates that the role of the poor as owner in a social enterprise may 
have a dual character exhibiting both a transactional and a transformational side.    
 
7.7.3.  Roots of No Significant Role Change among the Poor 
 
Two important questions that need to be further explored on the Lamac MPC 
experience regarding the roles enacted by the poor are: (1) Why did the poor 
experience no significant role change over time? and (2) Why did the role of the poor 
as owners remain at the transactional level despite a cooperative approach?   
One may argue that the professionals in the Lamac MPC Board, who had been 
asked to revitalize a failed farmers’ organization, and comprised the majority from 
the beginning, viewed the poor as transactional partners. They also looked at the 
cooperative mainly as a mechanism they needed to govern and manage effectively 
for the efficient delivery of services. Following this line of argument, they saw their 
role as governing and managing a cooperative to deliver what they understood were 
services needed by the community and members from ‘vulnerable sectors’.   
However, as discussed in Sections 7.1 and 7.6, the intention of the governing 
bodies of the Lamac MPC seemed to go beyond engaging the poor as transactional 
partners. If we are to use as gauge their statement of vision towards ‘empowered 
communities’ and mission ‘to strongly respond to the holistic empowerment needs of 
the vulnerable sectors’, one may need to probe further.  
The discussion in Section 7.7.2 regarding Lamac MPC’s history of shifting from 
what Borzaga and Spear (2004) characterized as a single stakeholder organization 
(the Lamac Samahang Nayon as a self help group of farmers) to a multi-stakeholder 
social enterprise (the Lamac MPC as initially a partnership between professionals 
and farmers, and later included other segments of the poor) may be a good starting 
point.  In a multi-stakeholder cooperative set-up of one person one vote, the poor’s 
capability deprivation (Sen, 1999; 2009) would work to their disadvantage unless 
affirmative action was taken to assist them overcome such. This is consistent with the 
findings of Thorp et al., (2003) that the chronically poor are disadvantaged in group 
formation, and this may form a significant part of the vicious cycle and dynamics of 
chronic poverty, unless adequately addressed.   
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In the case of PWD Fed, the capability deprivation of the poor was overcome by 
transformational services such as education, training and experiential learning 
opportunities directed at leadership formation and organizational development. These 
were on top of the services to effectively enact their transactional role, in their case 
as workers in the school chair project.   
In the case of Lamac MPC, its services are dominantly transactional in nature:  
they are delivered to members, including the poor, for a fee. While there is some 
effort to provide education and training for leadership formation, these seem to be 
directed at Board of Chapter leaders or staff, who would most probably be coming 
from the ranks of the professionals. The most significant transformational service 
directed at the poor noted by the researcher is scholarships for selected recipients 
among children of the poor to finish their formal education. As in the case of 
Tahanan, these services are individually directed. An indication of what may result 
from such transformational service would be what had happened to Digna Tanodra’s 
son, Eric as discussed in Box 7.3. Eric became an account officer after going through 
college with the help of a scholarship from Lamac MPC. Eric and others like him 
may be in a position to contribute to the improvement of the socio-economic status of 
their families. However, such would not adequately respond to the need for the 
various segments of the poor in Lamac MPC to be assisted to effectively participate 
in the governance structures of the cooperative.      
The transformational services geared towards leadership formation and 
organizational development directed at the various poverty segments of Lamac 
MPC’s membership seem to be the crucial missing element and raises further 
questions: Why despite a cooperative approach, had no significant role change 
happened among the poor? Why had the poor as owners remained so at the 
transactional level?  Why did the transformational potential of the poor as owners not 
materialize? The delivery of these transformational services may be worth 
considering as a potential focus of the planned Lamac MPC Foundation, or as a 
special agenda for its membership development program.   
The importance of the effective participation of various segments of the poor in 
the governance of the cooperative may be better appreciated if one were to consider 
decisions related to overall direction and thrust. For example, if the farmers, who 
comprised the majority of the Lamac MPC members in 1998 were to have been 
provided transformational services to allow them to decide the cooperative’s future 
direction or thrusts then, would they have voted for an expansion strategy through 
microfinance? Consider that in 1992, the needs the farmers articulated during 
ownership meetings included “financial services to increase their production, in 
addition to farm inputs, pre- and post- harvest facilities and irrigation” (Limocon, 
2009). In 1998, wouldn’t the farmers have raised the need for a more comprehensive 
and integrated set of services as direction?   
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The point of emphasizing this concern is not to suggest a reassessment of Lamac 
MPC’s strategy of expansion through microfinance. It is to underscore the specific 
challenges faced by cooperatives as multi-stakeholder social enterprises with the 
poor as primary stakeholders in the context of massive poverty and inequality. In 
Section 7.6, the importance of combining mechanisms for direct and representative 
democracy (Cheney, 2001) was suggested as a starting point. The need for 
transformational services geared towards leadership formation and organizational 
development among concerned segments of the poor may be another crucial element.  
Overall, what these suggest is the lack of role change among the poor in Lamac MPC 
despite the cooperative set-up and a desire for empowerment by the management, 
may be attributed to the lack of transformational services and the absence of 
complementary mechanisms for representative democracy. These reflect specific 
challenges faced by cooperatives as SEPPS or as multi-stakeholder or mutual social 
enterprises in the context of massive poverty and inequality.  
Table 7.1. details the particularities of the roles enacted and services provided by 
the Lamac MPC among the poor as primary stakeholders.    
 
7.7.4.  Impact of Roles and No Significant Role Changes  
 
By 2010, the Lamac MPC had provided loans and other services to more than 
37,000 poor or vulnerable people. As described in Section 7.5.2. the benefits derived 
or generated may be classified into economic gains from access to livelihood loans; 
employment generated by the cooperative and micro-entrepreneurs assisted by the 
cooperative; savings and capital build-up among members; improved access to 
education; and improved access to health, housing and social protection. In addition, 
the cooperative had been a major engine for the overall development of the barangay 
of Lamac, facilitating the access of households to potable water, electricity, 
transportation and spiritual services. 
Lamac MPC’s overall impact may be characterized as facilitating social inclusion 
and social protection among a significant number of the poor. In relative terms, the 
number of poor people reached estimated at 37,000 has been the most dramatic 
among all the cases studied.    
 
7.7.5.  Stakeholder Engagement Strategy over Time 
 
Applying Mintzberg’s (2007) theory of strategy formation, Lamac MPC’s 
intended stakeholder engagement strategy among the poor during its stages of 
initiation and development, may be characterized as one of empowerment. However, 
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its realized stakeholder engagement strategy among the poor may be characterized as 
one of collaboration.  
Its intended stakeholder engagement strategy of empowerment is evidenced by its 
vision, mission and choice of the cooperative as organizational form as discussed in 
Section 7.6. The lack of transformational services for leadership formation and 
organizational development and complementary mechanisms to adequately represent 
significant segments of the poor in Lamac MPC’s governance bodies were identified 
as reasons why what was intended was not realized.   
Its realized stakeholder engagement strategy of collaboration may be likened to 
that of Upland Marketing, Alter Trade (among banana growers), and Tahanan except 
for the particularities related to the nature of transactional roles enacted and services 
provided.    
Lamac MPC’s realized stakeholder engagement strategy of collaboration may be 
characterized as exhibiting the following features:    
 
 Managerial orientation towards the poor: poor as transactional partners; even 
in engaging the poor as owners, what was dominant was the transactional 
aspect of providing dividends in exchange for their capital investment; 
 Key engagement processes: collaborating, partnering, dialoguing, learning; 
collaboration and partnership were expressed mainly in transactional terms 
through capital and savings build-up and paying loans on time which also gave 
the poor the right to vote; regular venues for dialogue and learning between its 
board composed mainly of professionals and the poor included ownership 
meetings and general assemblies;  
 Nature of roles among the poor: mainly transactional as clients and owners; 
 Nature of programs and services: mainly transactional in the form of fee-based 
provision of financial and social services including social protection schemes; 
and  
 Impact on the poor: access to financial and social services by a large number 
of poor leading to social inclusion and social protection. 
 
As in the earlier cases, Sloan’s (2009) conception of models of stakeholder 
engagement based on a study of European corporations, is inadequate in explaining 
how Lamac MPC engages the poor as primary stakeholders. Again, this strengthens 
the need for evolving a framework for understanding stakeholder engagement 
strategies appropriate for social enterprises serving the poor as primary stakeholders 
(SEPPS).  
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Table 7.1. Lamac MPC: Evolution of Roles and Services among Primary Stakeholders  
 Pre-Inception to Inception Stages: 
From Self Help Group of Farmers 
 to Community Cooperative  
         (1973 – 1992; 1992 – 1998) 
Development Stage:  Spreading its 
Wings through Microfinance 
(1998 – 2009) 
 
Key  
Organizational 
Developments 
 Birth, operation and decline of the 
Lamac Samahang Nayon (SN), a 
self-help group composed of poor 
farmers in Bgy. Lamac; 
 Rehabilitation of Lamac SN by 
BLOMES, Inc., a group of local 
professionals; 
 1992: Transformation of Lamac 
SN to Lamac MPC; registration 
and opening of membership to 
members of Lamac community; 
 Operation as community 
cooperative; and 
 Mobilization of resources and 
engagement with government to 
provide community access to 
potable water, electricity, 
transportation and spiritual 
services.   
 Expansion to other geographical 
areas with microfinance as entry 
point 
o Town-wide (1998); 
o District-wide (2001); 
o Province-wide (2004); and 
o Region-wide (2009) 
 Expansion of line of financial 
services; 
 Establishment of scholarships and 
program for children and youth; 
 Coop Youth Planet as training 
ground for future cooperative 
leaders; and 
 Establishment of Hidden Valley 
Resort and many other enterprises. 
 
Roles of the 
Poor: upland 
farmers, 
workers (from 
Lamac),  
entrepreneurial 
poor 
 Clients; and 
 Owners with formal voting 
powers as members when in good 
standing; with minority 
representation in Board; and 
management delegated to 
professionals.     
 Clients; and 
 Owners with formal voting powers 
as members when in good standing; 
governance and management 
delegated to professionals. 
 
Services  
 Financial services including 
lending for farm production; 
 Rental of hauling truck, hand 
tractor and thresher; and 
 Milling services for rice and corn.  
 Financial services:    
o Loan products: livelihood loans, 
micro-enterprise loans, asset-
based lending for larger 
enterprises, providential loans; 
and 
o Savings and capital build-up 
program;  
 Social protection services:  
mortuary, hospital, retirement, 
insurance, pension services; and 
 Within Lamac: agriculture-related 
services, community and consumer 
services; resort and training 
facilities 
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Table 7.1.a. Participation of the Poor in Governance and Management of Core and Allied 
Organizations of Lamac MPC 
 Initiation Stage Development Stage 
Participation  
in Core 
Organization 
Members of the General Assembly 
 
Minority Members of Board 
Members of the General Assembly 
 
Progressively declining membership in 
the Board  
 
7.8. Discussion 
 
Much of the literature on the Philippine cooperative sector has looked at factors 
influencing the survival or demise of cooperatives in the country (Sibal, 2002; 
Deriada, 2005). Sibal (2002) cites more than 80 studies that had assessed the growth 
and development of cooperatives in the Philippines. The fluctuations in government 
support for cooperative-like organizations that Sibal (2002) details in his narrative of 
the 100-year history of Philippine cooperatives validate that the failure of the Lamac 
Samahang Nayon, the precursor of Lamac MPC was not an isolated case. However, 
as a success story, Lamac MPC seems to have surmounted the factors identified by 
these studies as reasons for the failure of many cooperatives. 
This case adds value to the literature on Philippine cooperatives by its exploration 
of the Lamac MPC experience from the perspective of social entrepreneurship and 
stakeholder theory. In particular, the case explores Lamac MPC as a social enterprise 
with the poor as primary stakeholders (SEPPS).   
As discussed in Section 7.6, there have been studies by scholars identified with 
the social economy school of social entrepreneurship, on the trends and challenges 
faced by cooperatives as social enterprises (Borzaga and Spear, 2004) but mainly 
covering developed and transition economies such as Canada and 9 European 
countries. Cooperatives as social enterprises have also been studied in the United 
Kingdom (Spear, et al., 2010) and Spain (Vidal, 2010) in exploring issues of 
governance in social enterprises, and the challenges faced by cooperatives as multi-
stakeholder organizations. Borzaga and Spear highlighted “Cooperative increasing 
involvement in the provision of social services is to be noticed in some non-European 
countries such as the United States, Japan, Canada, Philippines and Latin America” 
(Borzaga and Spear, 2004, p. 30). They also noted the extremely different conditions 
faced by cooperatives as social enterprises in the advanced and transition economies 
they studied. In this context, the contribution of the Lamac MPC case to this growing 
body of literature is exploring the challenges and issues faced by cooperatives as 
social enterprises in a developing country context.   
The Lamac MPC case substantiates the relevance of cooperatives as social 
enterprises with the poor as primary stakeholders (SEPPS) in responding to the 
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failure of state and market institutions to provide the poor with financial and basic 
social services. In particular, the Lamac MPC has demonstrated the power of a 
collaborative strategy of stakeholder engagement, or engaging the poor as 
transactional partners, in achieving social inclusion and social protection among a 
substantive number of poor people in central Philippines.   
However, if we make a comparative analysis of the Lamac MPC case with the 
PWD Fed case discussed in Chapter 5, one notes a contrasting stakeholder 
engagement strategy of empowerment employed by a cooperative federation. The 
PWD Fed case showed the value of the stakeholder engagement strategy of 
empowerment, or engaging the poor as transactional and transformational partners, to 
overcome income poverty and capability deprivation. However, while engaging the 
poor as transactional and transformational partners, as shown by PWD Fed, yielded 
more depth in terms of impact on poverty, engaging the poor as transactional 
partners, as shown by Lamac MPC, yielded greater numbers in terms of outreach 
among the poor.   
Section 7.6 and 7.7.3 explored how Lamac MPC may incorporate features of the 
empowerment strategy of stakeholder engagement within a cooperative context.  
Combining the delivery of transformational services and instituting complementary 
mechanisms of representative democracy directed at significant segments of the poor 
were articulated as possibilities. This suggests that even as the empowerment and 
collaboration strategies of stakeholder engagement are important conceptual 
constructs, practitioners and policy makers could combine both strategies in real 
world efforts to enhance the role of SEPPS in confronting poverty as a social malaise 
in the South. 
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CHAPTER 8 – CORDOVA MULTI-PURPOSE 
COOPERATIVE: OWNER-CLIENTS AS 
TRANSACTIONAL PARTNERS 
 
As SEPPS, Cordova MPC is responding to the failure of state and market 
institutions by providing access to financial and basic social services to the poor. 
In pursuing a stakeholder engagement strategy of collaboration, it has also 
shown its potential to reach large numbers of the poor to provide access to these 
services. However, like in the Lamac MPC case, the qualitative impact on the 
poor of a stakeholder engagement strategy of empowerment as shown by PWD 
Fed and Alter Trade-sugar, in terms of overcoming capability deprivation is not 
evident. As SEPPS, it shows the same challenge of governance of unintentionally 
excluding the poor. An important part of Cordova’s experience that maybe 
explored in this context is the possible revival of its strategy of building satellite 
cooperatives as mechanisms for self-governance and empowerment. Coupled 
with transformational services, these satellite cooperatives could serve as 
mechanisms where various poverty sectors (such as fishers, workers, the 
entrepreneurial poor) could enact transformational roles in addressing the 
specific problems of their poverty sectors. When used as mechanisms for 
ensuring representation of the poor in Cordova MPC’s governing bodies, they 
could very well become the complementary mechanisms for representative 
democracy that current mechanisms for direct democracy are unable to provide. 
In this sense, Cordova MPC’s experience provides useful insights for 
cooperatives as SEPPS that are wanting to innovate on more effective systems of 
multi-stakeholder governance.  
  
8.1.  Introduction 
 
Cordova is a small coastal town located in the southern part of Mactan Island, 
host of the Cebu International Airport in central Philippines. In the 1970s, the 
municipality was one of the poorest in the country, classified as 6th class in terms of 
income. By April 2009, Cordova had become a 3rd class municipality92. 
                                                 
92 Municipalities in the Philippines are given a classification of 1st to 6th class, based on income by the Department of 
Finance, with 6th class as having the least income and 1st class as having the most income. The ranges of income 
classification for municipalities have changed over time. In 1992, 6th class municipalities had incomes of PhP 2 million 
or less whilst 1st class municipalities had incomes of PhP15M pesos or more. From 2005 to the time of the research in 
2009, 6th class municipalities had incomes of PhP 7 million or less while 1st class municipalities had incomes of PhP 50 
million or more. Within the same period, 3rd class municipalities had incomes from PhP 30-40 million. 
(http://www.newsbreak.com.ph/democracyandgovernance/Income_Municipalities.html downloaded January 21, 2011)  
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Mr. Rodrigo Jumao-as, the Vice Mayor of the municipality believed that Cordova 
Multi-Purpose Cooperative (MPC) was an important factor in the town’s progress:    
 
“As of April 2009, Cordova has become a 3rd class from being a 5th class 
municipality 3 years ago and a 6th class municipality before then. The change in a 
municipality’s class has to do with the expansion of the local economy and 
increasing the purchasing power of the people, especially the poor, and Cordova 
MPC has played an important role in that effort. Cordova MPC has abated ‘loan 
sharks’ and changed the attitudes of people. They played an active role in 
promoting self-help, of saving for their capitalization”. (Jumao-as, 2009)    
 
By 2009, Cordova MPC had more than 7,000 members composed of fishers, 
handicraft makers, tricycle and trisikad93 drivers, micro-entrepreneurs, salaried 
workers, and professionals. It was providing a host of financial, social protection, and 
consumer services in Cordova and neighboring areas. Cordova MPC envisioned itself 
as ‘a globally competitive vehicle for socio-economic empowerment’ with its 
mission ‘to respond to the socio-economic needs of the people through sustainable 
programs and services’ (Cordova MPC, 2009). 
Based on the 1995 National Census and Statistics Office survey, Cordova had 
5,172 households, a population of 26,613, with unemployment placed at 40% and 
underemployment at 25%. By the 2007 census, the population had almost doubled 
with 9,541 households and 45,066 people. The rapid population growth had in part 
been attributed to migration from the nearby urban growth centers of Cebu and Lapu-
Lapu Cities. Main sources of income included fishing, stone extraction, shell 
gleaning and gathering, guso (seaweed) farming, eco-tourism, and employment from 
services or migrant work in Cebu City and the Mactan Export Processing Zone in 
Lapu Lapu City94 (NSO, 1995; Jumao-as, 2009; Tampus, 2009).  
 
8.2. Pre-Initiation Stage (1971-1987): Rise and Fall of 
Cooperatives for the Poor (Cordova MPC, 1997; 2007; 2009a; 
2009b; De Remayo, 2009) 
 
Cordova Multi-Purpose Cooperative had its roots in the Cordova Credit Union 
Inc., which was set up on December 12, 1971. Consistent with its mission to help 
poor communities, the National Secretariat for Social Action (NASSA) of the Roman 
Catholic Church conducted a one month training and Pre-Membership Education 
                                                 
93 Tricycles were 3-wheeled vehicles powered by motorcycles commonly used for public transportation in many parts 
of the Philippines. Trisikads are similarly used for public transportation  but are manually driven using bicycles.     
94 http://cordova.gov.ph (downloaded January 21, 2011). 
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Seminar attended by 25 Cordova parishioners. The 25 parishioners, led by Father 
Rudy Abao,  put up their share capital totaling PhP 250, and this became the initial 
capital of the credit cooperative.  
The credit cooperative established a savings program in 1971 and a credit 
program by 1972. The cooperative’s savings and credit program was seen as an 
alternative to informal money lenders (‘loan sharks’) charging exorbitant interest 
rates among the poor. The cooperative’s membership flourished among fishers and 
teachers. In 1976, a decision was made to pool the dividends and patronage refunds 
of members to set up a consumers’ cooperative, to allow members to buy groceries 
on credit at reasonable prices.   
Until 1982, the credit cooperative and the consumers’ cooperative developed and 
grew separately. However, the period 1982-86 were difficult years, with both 
cooperatives experiencing management problems. The Board of Directors tried to 
change the managers twice, without good results. By 1986, both cooperatives were 
suffering net losses, and by 1987, both Boards of Directors proposed to close them 
down. At that time, they had 800 members composed of fishers, tricycle drivers, 
teachers and government employees. Fishers, tricycle drivers and some teachers 
comprised the Board.   
The cooperatives faced a problematic financial situation in 1986: a 95% loan 
delinquency rate, a combined PhP 56,000 net loss, and PhP 600,000 worth of assets 
and PhP 300 cash. They also had overdue loans with the Philippine Business for 
Social Progress, CARE and VICTO, and had not paid their staff for 2 months.   
 
8.3.  Initiation Stage (1987- 1993): Revitalization and 
Consolidation into Cordova MPC  
 
Around that time, Ms. Aurea De Ramayo, then principal of Cordova Academy 
(now the Cordova Cooperative Catholic School) had just finished her MA in 
Educational Management at the De La Salle University. Ms. De Ramayo saw the 
potential of the cooperatives. She was invited to a Board meeting where she 
presented the idea to revive and nurture the cooperatives. She argued that “it is not so 
easy to close then reopen a cooperative” (De Ramayo, 2009). The Board 
reconsidered their recommendation to close down and Ms. De Ramayo led a process 
of awakening the General Assembly with the participation of the Cordova Academy 
administration, teachers and students.  
Through singing carols in members’ homes, they raised PhP 3,000 within one 
week’s time in October 1987. With this, Ms. De Ramayo put up a skeletal work force 
of one full time and one half time staff and started to work on loan restructuring and 
collection. Salaried members were asked to pay their loans voluntarily and were not 
compelled through salary deduction. The cooperatives set a policy that delinquency 
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would not disqualify members from borrowing as long as they also worked on paying 
their old account. By the March 1988 General Assembly, the majority of the 
members voted for non-closure, with the condition that Ms. De Ramayo managed the 
cooperative.  
The period 1987-1990 was one of regaining the trust and confidence of the 
members. By 1990, the cooperatives’ assets had grown to PhP 1 million. In 1991, the 
Cooperative Development Authority confirmed their separate registrations. 
Membership slowly but steadily grew from 971 in 1991, to 1,105 in 1992, to 1,180 in 
1993. On June 19, 1993, a Special General Assembly resolved the consolidation of 
the two cooperatives. Formalized as the Cordova Multi-Purpose Cooperative, it was 
considered the first consolidated cooperative in the country. Services during the first 
years of revival revolved around credit services and the provision of consumer 
products. 
 
8.4.  Development Stage (1993-2009): Expansion and 
Diversification (Cordova MPC, 1997; 2009; 2009b; De Remayo, 
2009; Revalde-Tajanlangit, 2009) 
 
After the consolidation of the two cooperatives into the Cordova MPC, the next 
phase was one of ‘accidental enterprise ventures’ (De Ramayo, 2009), as well as 
diversification and expansion of services and sectors of the poor served. In this 
process, the management and front line staff played a pro-active role, often getting 
ideas from members proposing a new service or area of operation (Revalde-
Tajanlangit, 2009).   
Two sub-phases were discernible during Cordova’s expansion and 
diversification: a sub-phase from 1993 to 2006, where the process was relatively 
slow; and a succeeding sub-phase starting in 2007 up to the time of the research, 
where the process gained momentum.    
For the first sub-phase of the development stage (1993-2006), expansion of 
members came from cooperative operations in Cordova and one branch in nearby 
Lapu-Lapu City.  Membership grew to over four thousand by 2006.   
In 2007, the cooperative opened another branch (Basak) in Lapu Lapu City. This 
was followed by a branch in Sta. Rosa in Olango Island in 2008. Membership almost 
doubled in less than 3 years, reaching over seven thousand by end-2008 and about 
8,000 by 2009. The Chairperson of Cordova MPC’s Board, Dr. Celedonio Sitoy, 
attributed the phenomenal expansion rate to innovative product offerings and 
aggressive marketing. In his Chairperson’s Report in early 2009, Dr. Sitoy 
characterized the period starting 2007 as ushering in a new period for Cordova MPC:  
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“Cordova MPC opened its doors to new approaches of its operations, from a 
mere ‘sit and wait’ to a ‘plow and plant’ attitude. We do not only listen to the 
needs of the members but also take a pro-active approach through product 
development and improvements in the quality of services”. (Sitoy, 2009)  
 
8.4.1.  From Creation of Satellites to Branches 
 
The cooperative went into the creation of satellites as it started to expand its 
membership. Satellites were units composed of not less than 15 cooperative 
members, who after meeting the minimum organizational requirement, agreed to 
operate and manage a cooperative themselves. This was to allow the decentralization 
of management of services, encourage the regular and active participation of 
members in cooperative affairs, and ensure that total human development was given 
attention by the cooperative. Another consideration was to ensure that the interest of 
sectors and communities were given adequate attention.   
For example, one satellite of Cordova MPC was the Buagsong Mini Cooperative, 
which was established in 1994 with the assistance of Cordova MPC through its 
Project Officer and the late Alberto Jumao-as, who was in the Board of Directors.  
The members were 22 men and women from the ranks of fishermen, housewives, and 
fish vendors. By 1996, their membership had grown to 115 regular members and 58 
associates.   
By 1996, there were 6 satellites established – 2 based in barangay communities 
(Buagsong and Dapitan), 1 among the Cordova Academy Parent Teachers’ 
Association, 2 among teachers in Cordova Academy and the Pajo National High 
School, 1 among students at Cordova Academy, and another among sewers in the 
community of Matab-ang. By 1998, there were 9 satellites including a Fishermen’s 
Cooperative.   
There were no clear indications about what had happened to the strategy of 
setting up satellites after 1998. What can be gleaned from annual reports and 
organizational documents in the years that followed focused on growth in 
membership, assets and lending operations. By 2007-2009, establishment of branches 
as an expansion strategy seemed to have taken over, with the setting up of the Basak 
and Olanggo branches in 2007 and 2008 respectively.    
 
8.4.2.  Expansion to Lapu Lapu City 
 
The decision to open a branch and to expand membership among salaried 
workers in the nearby town of Lapu-Lapu in 1993 was in response to emerging 
opportunities recognized by members and management. A significant number of 
members in Cordova were workers or married to workers in companies located in 
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Lapu-Lapu. These members had actively expressed and suggested the need to 
establish an office there during informal consultations. The General Manager 
presented this for approval to the Board of Directors explaining that the population in 
Lapu-Lapu was 5-6 times more than Cordova. The General Assembly later ratified 
the decision. 
In November 2006, the Lapu-Lapu Branch Manager (who was the COO at the 
time of the research) Glenn Revalde–Tajanlangit, had proposed to open the 
cooperative’s membership to Mactan Export Processing Zone (MEPZ) workers who 
were getting their regular salary through Automated Teller Machines (ATMs). From 
talking with them, Tajanlangit had found out that workers were pawning their ATM 
cards to loan sharks at 5-13% interest per month. The workers did so because they 
were often ‘cash-strapped’ to meet their family’s basic needs. Tajanlangit had the 
idea that the cooperative could help these workers end their bondage with the loan 
sharks. As cooperative members, they could borrow from the cooperative at lower 
interest rates, and their payments could be automatically collected from their (or their 
spouses’) ATM accounts. To some Board members, this went against the spirit and 
policy of voluntary payment by salaried workers that the cooperative instituted 
during its revival period. Members of the Board were hesitant when this was first 
presented as they emphasized values such as trust that were important to the 
cooperative. It was after 2 Board meetings that this was finally approved and an 
additional branch (Basak) in Lapu-Lapu City was opened. In 6 months time, the 
branch income rose from PhP 150,000/month to PhP 210,000/month and members 
grew from 50 to 1000. By the end of 2009, about 50% of the more than 3,000 
members of the cooperative in Lapu-Lapu were salaried workers from the MEPZ. In 
less than two years, the branch also reached an asset level of about PhP 20 million.  
 
8.4.3.  Core Services and Enterprises  
 
Core financial services included express loans (PhP 500-10,000 at 3-5% 
interest/month for 6 months), microenterprise loans (3% interest per month for 6 
months) and regular loans (1.67% interest per month for 12 months) in addition to 
savings and time deposits (with 5-10% interest per annum). Social services included 
health care for poor members without health insurance (with a premium of PhP 
500/year entitling the member to a cash benefit of PhP 5,000 per hospitalization up to 
three times per year), ‘Damayan’ (with a premium of PhP 700 per year carrying a 
death benefit of PhP 30,000, with coverage including the member’s spouse, and 2 
children), pension savings and ‘kiddie savings’ for children in public schools. The 
Cordova MPC also owned a school that provided scholarships to poor but deserving 
children of members.  
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At the end of 2009, the cooperative owned a school, a lumber/hardware store, a 
consumer store, a pharmacy, a gasoline station, and a banking system with ATM 
services. These collectively comprised the cooperative’s business enterprises. With 
these, Cordova MPC offered consumer products in addition to social and financial 
services. 
 
8.4.4.  Accidental Enterprise Ventures 
 
An example of an ‘accidental’ enterprise was the cooperative’s lumber/hardware 
store. It used to be owned by a member who thought it was being mismanaged. The 
member offered to sell it to the cooperative in 2001. The General Manager saw a 
business opportunity for the cooperative and agreed to buy it at PhP 2 million, 
equivalent to the unpaid accounts of customers, with a down payment of PhP 
600,000, and the rest to be paid in installment. The Board initially thought that it was 
not a good investment so the General Manager offered to sell it for PhP 3 million.  
After 2 months of operation, an offer was made to the cooperative for the purchase of 
the lumber/hardware for PhP 3.5 million.95 In the end, the Board decided not to sell 
the business as they saw that it was thriving. After this, the cooperative entered into 
joint ventures with members having problematic businesses – with the intention of 
getting them back on track then selling them back to the member-owner. Two such 
businesses were a printing press and a carrageenan trading enterprise. The 
carrageenan trading enterprise, at the time of the field research was already exporting 
1/3 of its seaweeds from a situation where it was totally dependent on importations. 
 
8.4.5.  Governance and Planning Practice 
 
Cordova MPC was governed by a Board of Directors, which were elected during 
the annual meetings of the General Assembly. Ownership Meetings happened once 
or twice a year. Ownership Meetings and General Assemblies served to ratify 
decisions made by the Board of Directors. A pro-active management team played a 
big role in making proposals to the Board of Directors.  
Among the Board of Directors of Cordova MPC as of the time of the research, 
only one was not a professional - Mario Jumao-as, a barangay council member and 
poultry raiser. The rest were doctors (3), teachers (3), information technology (IT) 
professionals (2), a human resource (HR) officer of a company, and the treasurer of 
the Cordova municipality. This trend of professionals occupying leadership positions 
began with the cooperative’s revival in the 1990s. Since then, the Board had been 
                                                 
95 At the time of the research in end 2009, the cooperative was getting offers to buy the lumber/hardware business at 
PhP 5 million. 
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dominated by professionals with at most 1 from the poverty sectors and sometimes 
none at all. This trend was true even in Board Committees (Ompad, 2009). 
In relative terms, Cordova MPC management staff saw other cooperatives, 
notably Lamac MPC, as more successful in terms of membership and asset growth. 
Key management staff attributed this phenomenon to more deliberate strategic and 
operations planning. Chief Operations Officer Glenn Revalde-Tajanlangit explained: 
 
“Asset and membership growth has been slow because we have not really been 
into serious planning for a long time. Informal processes have been the rule in 
Cordova MPC for 38 years. In the past, we made strategic plans to comply with 
Land Bank of the Philippines requirements for Cordova MPC’s credit line 
approval. There has been no clear relationship between our strategic and 
operations plans. Our operations plans, usually made by our General Manager, 
become the basis for the plans of our branches. In the past, the Board and the 
General Assembly had no strategic planning process – both just dealt with what 
members put forward as their concerns, which were then translated into plans by 
management”. (Revalde-Tajanlangit, 2009)  
 
This planning practice of the cooperative was changing at the time of the research. In 
September 2009, a head office of the cooperative was set up to oversee Cordova 
MPC’s overall operations and planning. This was to march in step with the reality of 
already having multiple branches and areas of operation. The COO further explained:   
 
“Since the setting up of the head office, we have focused on improving 
member services which we hope to incorporate in a strategic plan that we are 
formulating for 2010-2012. We developed this initial 3-year plan during a 
Cooperative Strategic Planning Seminar sponsored by the Land Bank of the 
Philippines, which we hope to present in the next Board of Directors meeting”. 
(Revalde-Tajanlangit, 2009) 
 
8.4.6.  New Product Development  
 
Ownership meetings were the venues for making decisions, after proposals had 
been approved by the Board, upon the recommendation of frontline staff. The new 
venture of Cordova MPC called the ‘Coop on Wheels’, which brought the 
cooperative to members’ doorsteps in Olango Island in October 2008, went through 
this process. Olango became the fourth branch of Cordova MPC, with the ‘Coop on 
Wheels’ as part of its delivery system. This entailed investments for a second hand 
vehicle, a sound system, and an ATM system. The Olango branch mainly served 
micro-entrepreneurs and the enterprising poor with microfinance services. 
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Another new venture that had gone through this process was the Coop Purchase 
Order Loan. This entailed the member’s making a loan in kind by purchasing goods 
from one of the cooperative’s enterprises in the form of lumber materials, consumer 
goods or generic medicines. The staff proposed this as they believed it would 
improve sales. At the time of the research, the Board had already approved the 
venture for implementation by January 2010.   
 
8.4.7. Dual Character of Members as Owners and Customers 
 
The Pre-Membership Education Seminar that all members were required to take 
to become regular members specified that members were both owners and customers. 
Box 8.1 details the rights and duties of members as owners of the cooperative on one 
hand, and the privileges and obligations they had as customers on the other. 
To become a member, the PMES Module listed 6 requirements (Cordova MPC, 
2009): 
o One must be 18-60 years old; 
o One must attend the PMES within 1 year; 
o One must put up a share capital (minimum of PhP 1,000); 
o One must put up a savings deposit (minimum of PhP 200); 
o Health care fee of PhP 500/year; and 
o Damayan fee of PhP 400/year. 
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8.4.8.  Weak Membership Development Program 
 
In comparison to 2006, membership almost doubled, from 4,043 in December 
2006 to 7,225 by end 2008. Total assets grew from PhP 114.3 million at the end of 
2006 to PhP 163 M by end 2008, a record increase of 30% in two years time.   
As regular membership doubled, non-regular membership grew as well, reaching 
9,000 by 2009 composed of 7000 associate members and 2,000 children savers 
(Aflatoun kiddie savers). Associate members were users of the cooperative’s 
products and services but had not gone through the required Pre-Membership 
Education Seminar.  
Even as they took a pro-active stance in developing their products and services, 
Cordova MPC’s COO, Glenn Revalde-Tajanlangit shared that they lacked a 
membership development program, a weakness they identified during their 2009 
strategic planning session (Revalde-Tajanlangit, 2009; Cordova MPC, 2009c). The 
Education Committee Report in 2008 during the 37th General Assembly validated 
this: it contained numbers of members, cooperative celebration activities, and 3 
Box 8.1. Cordova MPC Members as Owners and Customers.  
Source: Cordova MPC Pre-Membership Education Seminar Module, 2009. 
 
Members as Owners 
Rights as Owner: 
o To vote; 
o To be voted upon; and 
o To receive interest on capital contribution. 
 
Duties as Owner: 
o To contribute to the capital of the cooperative; 
o To deposit regularly; 
o To serve when elected; and 
o To participate in decision-making through the General Assembly and other membership meetings. 
 
Members as Customers 
Privileges as Customer 
o To receive quality services; 
o To be provided with efficient services; 
o To be treated well by the people handling the business; and 
o To receive patronage refund. 
 
Obligations as Customer 
o To settle obligations, for example, to pay loans on time; 
o To suggest improvements; and 
o To patronize the coop business. 
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seminars conducted by Landbank and the Bureau of Internal Revenue attended by 
officers and staff, with no clear education activities for members.   
Cordova MPC’s structure and staffing by the end of 2009 had a head office with 
a CEO, a COO plus staff in charge of human resources/finance, a 3 staff credit and 
collections team, managers and staff dedicated to the 4 credit and savings branches, 
and managers and staff of the 4 business enterprises owned by the cooperative 
(printing press, health plus, lumber and consumer) (Revalde-Tajanlangit, 2009).  This 
staffing pattern of the cooperative was not equipped to sufficiently handle a 
development program for a membership base that was growing rapidly.   
 
8.4.9.  Perspectives of Members Coming from Poverty Sectors 
 
Members coming from poverty sectors were interviewed about how they viewed 
themselves, their level of participation and the role they played in the cooperative. Fe 
Gloria Sentillas articulated a sentiment that was typical in this manner:  
 
“I see my membership as providing me ready and easy access to financial 
services with very reasonable interest rates. I usually attend ownership meetings 
and General Assemblies but I usually don’t speak directly about my questions. I 
feel shy with many people around and I don’t speak English like others do. I 
didn’t finish any formal schooling so I don’t see myself as qualified to run for 
office. I usually vote in General Assemblies for people I personally know and 
trust, especially my friends. One time I did vote for someone who didn’t have a 
college education. However, I think it’s better that cooperative leaders are 
educated because they have to deal with problems and relate to NATCCO96 in 
solving them. They need to be able to communicate in English and Tagalog. It is 
hard for people without any education to lead or run an organization”. (Sentilas, 
2009)  
 
Rosalia Baguio added another typical response: 
 
“I listen to reports during General Assemblies and owners’ meetings. Whenever I 
have a question, I ask my sister in law to ask it for me. I feel too shy to do it 
myself.  I vote for people I trust to be cooperative leaders, and from experience, I 
end up voting for relatives and friends”. (Baguio, 2009)   
 
When successful micro-entrepreneur Miriam Fuentes was asked about her role in the 
cooperative, her response was informative especially when seen in the context of her 
                                                 
96 The National Confederation of Cooperatives, of which the Cordova MPC was a member.  
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being identified by Cordova MPC management as typifying a member manifesting a 
high level of social impact:  
 
“I see my membership as giving me the right to vote during General Assemblies 
for leaders who are responsible and approachable. I am usually on the sidelines 
during ownership meetings except when I have questions like when the 
cooperative took over ownership of the lumber enterprise. With a CBU of PhP 
112,000 and savings of PhP 62,000, I see myself more as a client of the 
cooperative rather than an owner. My loan of PhP 4 million is way above my 
CBU and savings. Maybe when I no longer have a big loan and my CBU/savings 
is able to provide loans for others, I may start to feel like an owner and think 
about being elected as a Board member. For now, that’s the farthest from my 
mind”.  When asked why she had not gone to the bank for her loan requirements, 
she explained “One of the banks I tried to loan from has an interest of only 9% 
per annum as opposed to 38% per annum with the cooperative, but my lot is not 
titled so I cannot use it as collateral. With the cooperative, my tax declaration is 
adequate”. (Fuentes, 2009)  
 
Even as all members of the cooperative had the right to vote and be voted upon, and 
to participate in decision making processes, these members seemed to feel inadequate 
in fully exercising these rights and duties as owners of Cordova MPC.   
 
8.4.10. Partnerships 
 
Several institutions assisted the development of the Cordova MPC since its 
revival and consolidation in 1993. The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), a 
government bank mandated to undertake countryside development by partnering with 
agricultural cooperatives, was a major partner for capacity-building and financing. In 
addition to supporting its strategic planning process, trainings conducted by the LBP 
covered topics like credit investigation, credit management, and microfinance 
technology for cooperatives.   
In 1996, the Cordova MPC was a Regional Gawad Pitak awardee of the LBP.  
The annual award was given to outstanding cooperative partners of LBP. Another 
partner in the government sector that also provided technical assistance as well as 
recognition was the Department of Trade and Industry, which recognized the 
Cordova MPC as the Most Outstanding NGO in Cebu in 1994. 
 Cordova MPC was a member and got support from VICTO National97 and the 
National Confederation of Cooperatives (NATCCO). From NATCCO and VICTO, 
                                                 
97 Until 2007, VICTO was the regional office for the Visayas of the National Confederation of Cooperatives or 
NATCCO, but has since spun off to an independent national network of cooperatives.   
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the Cordova MPC was able to access trainings on cooperative management, 
leadership development, financial analysis, and exposures to best practices of 
cooperatives like Lamac MPC.   
Cordova MPC also had relations with other development organizations like the 
National Pharmaceutical Foundation, Inc. (NPF). NPF introduced to Cordova MPC 
the Health Plus, a social franchising system for the distribution of generic 
pharmaceuticals, mainly catering to poor households in the rural areas. The 
cooperative started this social enterprise in 2009 as the provincial pharmaceutical 
franchisee for Cebu. 
 
8.5.  Financial and Social Outcomes 
 
8.5.1.   Financial Outcomes 
 
At the end of 2008, the Cordova MPC had total assets of PhP 159.953 million, 
net loan receivables of PhP 111.785 million, deposit liabilities of PhP 93.309 million, 
share capital amounting to PhP 40.113 million, and members’ equity of PhP 52.627 
million. 
Assets had steadily climbed since the early 1990s, as shown in Figure 8.1. Assets 
stood at PhP 3.6 million in 1991, and had grown by around 150% to PhP 8.9 million 
in 1993, its year of “rebirth”. Only one slight decrease was experienced during 2002, 
and by 2008, the asset base had reached PhP 159.953 million, a 1,697% increase 
from the 1993 figure. (Please see Figure 8.1.). 
By 2009, Cordova MPC’s assets stood at PhP 173 million. Its asset growth had 
generally matched its membership growth, with the greatest increase registered 
during the period of 2006-2008.   
For the 2002 to 200898 period alone, assets more than doubled from PhP 77.8 
million to almost PhP 160 million. Within this period, Cordova MPC was able to 
maintain a debt-equity ratio within the range of 1:4 to 2:1. Total liabilities grew from 
PhP 45 million in 2002 to PhP 107.2 million in 2008, while members’ equity grew 
from PhP 32.6 million to PhP 52.6 million. (Please see Figure 8.2.). 
Share capital of members within the period 1991 to 2005 hovered around 30 to 
35% of total assets, but declined to 25% of total assets by 2008 at PhP 40 million. 
With respect to members’ equity, share capital held steady at 76 to 79 per cent over 
the 2004 to 2008 period (Please see Figure 8.3.). 
 
 
 
                                                 
98 Period for which complete audited financial statements were made available, except for the years 2004 and 2007. 
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Figure 8.1. Cordova MPC Assets, 1991-2008.  
Sources: Reports to General Assembly, Cordova MPC, 1991-2008.99 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
99 Report for 2007 not available.    
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Figure 8.2. Cordova MPC Assets, Liabilities and Members’ Equity, 2002-2008.  
Sources: Audited Financial Statements and Reports to General Assembly, Cordova MPC, 2002-8 
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Figure 8.3. Cordova MPC Share Capital and Members’ Equity, 2002 -2008.  
Sources: Audited Financial Statements and Reports to General Assembly, Cordova MPC, 2002-
2008. 
 
The cooperative’s net income over the years had been erratic, although it always 
managed to achieve a positive net income from operations (Please see Figure 8.4.).  
2006 was a particularly problematic year, as net income went below the one million 
level (at around PhP 880,000) for the first time since the mid-1990s. In that year, net 
income was a mere 6% of revenues. Still, Cordova MPC was able to recover, earning 
about  PhP 4 million in 2008 representing 16% of its PhP 25.86 million revenue. A 
continuing issue faced by the cooperative had been the high rate of past due accounts, 
although such improved over the years from 95% delinquency in 1987 to 61% 
(Portfolio at Risk) in 2008 (De Ramayo, 2009). 
 External grants had not been a significant source of revenues for Cordova MPC.  
However, as detailed in Section 8.4.10, it had received capacity building and 
technical assistance from both government and non-government partners in addition 
to external financing in the form of loans. 
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Figure 8.4. Cordova MPC Net Income, Years Where Data Available, 1995-2008. 
Sources: Reports to General Assembly, Cordova MPC, 1995-2008 
 
8.5.2.  Social Outcomes 
 
Since its revival, membership of Cordova MPC had grown from a little less than 
1,000 in 1991 to over 7,000 in 2008. Membership was estimated at 8,000 by end 
2009. Membership was 100% from Cordova municipality in 1991 and they remained 
the majority until 2006, even as a branch in Lapu-Lapu was opened in 1993. But by 
2007, with the opening of another branch in Basak, Lapu-Lapu City, members from 
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other areas started to outnumber members from Cordova, as shown by Figure 8.5.
 
Figure 8.5. Cordova MPC Membership, 1991-2008.  
Sources: Reports to General Assembly, Cordova MPC, 1991-2008  
 
The 2,929 members from Cordova by end 2008, representing 40% of regular 
members, comprised over 30% of the total households in the municipality, assuming 
one member per household (or over 15% of the total households, assuming two 
members per household). Membership, by 2009, included fishers, handicraft makers, 
tricycle and trisikad drivers, micro-entrepreneurs, salaried workers, and 
professionals. Professionals comprised the minority. The professionals who joined 
the cooperative were either those who wanted to be of help to the poor and their 
community, or needed capital to set up businesses, or were attracted to the 
cooperative after it had earned a name (De Ramayo, 2009). 
Given that total share capital by 2008 was PhP 40 million, the average capital 
build-up per member was about PhP 5,556. With an exchange rate of PhP 44 to USD 
1, this was about USD 126. This was below the range of the capital build-up among 
members interviewed, which ranged from a low of PhP 7,643 to a high of PhP 
112,000. Given this data, one may assume that there were probably a significant 
number of members whose capital build-up was below PhP 5,556, belonging to the 
aforementioned poverty sectors.       
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In terms of the range of impact on individuals and their households, stories culled 
from interviews by the researcher among a purposive sample of members deemed as 
exhibiting ‘good, better and best impact’ by Cordova MPC management showed that 
members had benefited mainly in terms of financial support to grow their enterprises 
and generate employment as well as to support livelihoods and basic needs of 
members’ families. Basic needs of members’ families supported by the financial 
services of the cooperative cited by the interviewees included the education of 
children, house improvement, household appliances, expenses during emergencies, 
and pensions (Please see Boxes 8.2 and 8.3.) 
 
 
 
  
Box 8.2. Cordova MPC: Growing Enterprises, Generating Employment 
 
Miriam Fuentes, 38, was married with 5 children aged 6-19. In 1997, she was a factory worker 
in a small business making cartons for packing, before she became a member of the cooperative. 
Her first loan with the cooperative was PhP 2,500. She used the loan to start her own small 
business producing and selling cartons. Her cooperative loan grew as the capital for her business 
grew. Two months later, she borrowed PhP 60,000; 6 months later PhP 100,000; 1 year later 
PhP 500,000. Twelve years later, her loan from the cooperative had reached PhP 4 million – a 
special loan of PhP 0.5 million (renewable every 6 months) and a regular loan of PhP 3.5 
million payable over a period of 3 years. Much of the loan was meant to upgrade the machines 
in her factory. From 3 workers in 1997, she was employing up to 42 workers by 2009, 15 of 
them in carton making. Her factory floor had grown from 300 square meters to 2,000 square 
meters. She had 4 delivery trucks as her clients had grown to include established companies 
such as Timex, Fairchild, CHC Canning, Autolease, etc. By 2009, her sales had reached PhP 5 
million per month. She looked at the cooperative as having been a big help in expanding her 
business, as its interest on loans were reasonable and she was able to get them for a longer term.  
She felt her family was better off with her growing business but they still lived simply. She still 
sent her children to public school but every once in a while they could already go shopping. She 
was pleased that her business was able to provide employment to people who would otherwise 
be unemployed – she was able to give them a salary of PhP 200-285/day. (Fuentes, 2009) 
 
The cooperative had also helped enterprising professionals set up and grow their businesses, in 
the process providing employment to people. Two cases in point were Ethel Gonzales and 
Judith Velasquez. Ethel Gonzales was a nurse who went to the US with the help of a loan from 
the cooperative. She eventually returned and wanted to set up a business. She borrowed PhP 
2,000 to set up a cell phone business, which flourished through direct selling. As of end-2009, 
she had a loan of PhP 9 million from the cooperative. She owned a house and lot and had a PhP 
20 million deposit in the cooperative. Judith Velazquez, a chemical engineer, was the owner of 
Jovel Enterprises.  She started with a loan of PhP 5,000 to set up a beauty salon. By end 2009, 
she had 10 salons all over Cebu. (De Ramayo, 2009).   
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Asked about the poor as members of the cooperative, Cordova MPC’s COO Glenn 
Revalde –Tajanlangit said,  
 
“The cooperative serves as a partner of the poor in progress. As my family 
experience shows, the cooperative helped produce professionals like my brothers 
and me.  A significant number of 2nd generation members of the cooperative are 
professionals from families that used to be poor”.  (Tajanlangit, 2009) 
Box 8.3. Cordova MPC: Supporting Livelihoods and Basic Needs   
 
Rosalia Baguio, 73, had been a sari-sari store1 owner since 1972. She had been married to a 
laborer at a Visayan corn mill, who died and left her with 4 children 15 years ago (1994). The 
loans she got from the cooperative helped to finance the education of her children and sustained 
her sari-sari store as a regular income source. In 2009, two of her children had finished college, 
had gotten jobs in Taiwan, and were helping out with family expenses in her old age. She also 
had her small pension from the cooperative (Baguio, 2009). 
 
Fe Gloria Sentillas was 54, and had been a member in good standing since 1983. She had 10 
children (7 from the first husband and 3 from a second one) whom she practically raised on her 
own. She used to make a living picking and selling shells and tending to a sari-sari store. With 
loans from the cooperative for tuition, school needs, and capital for her sari-sari store, she was 
able to send her children to elementary and high school. She had also been able to benefit from 
the cooperative’s consumer credit line of up to PhP 10,000 for her grocery needs, in addition to 
being able to renovate their house and buy appliances with low interest loans. Her share capital 
or CBU had reached PhP 7,643. One of her children had also become a member of the 
cooperative and the others were depositors. In 2009, she stopped picking shells and became a 
dealer for direct selling of personal care products, to augment her income from her sari-sari 
store. She sold about PhP 500-700/day and made a profit of at least PhP 700/week (Sentillas, 
2009).    
 
Cordova MPC COO Glenn Revalde-Tajanlangit also recalled how his family was helped by the 
cooperative. Beatrice Tajanlangit, his mother, was a high school graduate and a housewife. His 
father, an accounting graduate, was the manager of Visayan Glass, a factory of plates and 
glasses. In 1990, the father died and Beatrice was left behind to raise 7 children on her own, with 
only a small pension. The oldest of the children had to stop schooling to work as a laborer in 
Visayan Glass to help earn a living. Beatrice became a member of the cooperative, and applied 
for loans to pay for the tuition of her children, for emergency purposes, and as capitalization for 
her buy and sell business. She also cooked meals to sell to the neighborhood. Glenn recognized 
that without the help of the cooperative loans, he and his brothers would not have been able to 
finish their schooling. Now four of them are professionals – 1 a certified public accountant, 
another a programmer, and the 3rd a sea man. He applied for employment with the cooperative 
after a few months of working in an auditing firm outside of Cordova, he felt it was more 
challenging and liked to be based in Cordova. He started as an accountant, and after 3 ½ years he 
became the branch manager of Lapu-Lapu and served the main branch of Cordova for 4 years 
before he was appointed COO in 2009  (Revalde-Tajanlangit, 2009). 
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In terms of overall impact, General Manager De Ramayo echoed the assessment of 
the Municipal Vice Mayor that Cordova MPC had been a major factor in the progress 
of the municipality.  She explained,  
 
“In my estimation, Cordova MPC is 70% responsible for the reclassification of 
Cordova town from a 6th class municipality to a 4th class municipality”. (De 
Ramayo, 2009)   
 
It may be difficult to ascertain whether Cordova MPC was indeed the most 
significant factor in moving the municipality’s income status from one of the poorest 
to becoming part of the not-so-poor towns in the country. Nevertheless, what the data 
generated by the research showed was that Cordova MPC played a big role as partner 
of the poor in promoting social inclusion and social mobility.    
The cooperative promoted social inclusion by providing financial services that 
enabled a significant percentage (estimated at 15%) of the households of Cordova, 
majority of whom were most probably poor, to have access to employment (whether 
self employed like Fe Sentillas or employed by members of the cooperative whose 
businesses grew like Ethel Gonzales or Judith Velazquez) and basic social services 
(education, pension, housing). The cooperative promoted social mobility for those 
members who were able to send their children to college and whose children had 
gotten jobs locally (like the COO) or abroad (like the children of Rosalia Baguio who 
were employed in Taiwan). These children had become instruments for moving their 
respective families out of poverty.   
What may also be noted was that the cooperative directly contributed to moving 
Miriam Fuentes out of poverty. Though most probably fewer in number, the story of 
Miriam Fuentes exemplified how the cooperative’s financial services had been a 
direct factor in growing her enterprise. Such helped not only in moving her family 
out of poverty but also in assisting her transformation from a factory worker to a 
factory owner and an employer of the unemployed.     
 
8.6.  The Cordova MPC and Social Entrepreneurship     
                                                                                                
8.6.1.  Cordova MPC as SEPPS 
 
 Cordova MPC may be considered a SEPPS using the three criteria set forth in the 
definition in Section 2.5.  
 Firstly, it is driven by its vision of “socio-economic empowerment” (Cordova 
MPC, 2009) in the delivery of services among its members, the majority of whom are 
 284 
poor - fishers, handicraft makers, micro-entrepreneurs, and workers in the formal and 
informal sectors.  
 Secondly, it creates wealth in the pursuit of a double bottom line: it provides 
financial and social protection services to its members while charging fees to ensure 
‘sustainable programs and services’ (Cordova MPC, 2009).   
 Thirdly, its distributive enterprise philosophy is manifested in the pursuit of its 
mission and programs through a cooperative set-up, where any surplus income 
generated goes back to the fulfillment of its objectives or is distributed as dividends 
to its members, majority of whom are poor.   
 
8.6.2.   SEPPS in a Developing Country Context 
 
Similar to the origins of the Lamac MPC, Cordova MPC developed from self-
help initiatives in response to unfavorable market conditions and the failure of the 
state to ensure access to basic social and economic services among the poor. The 
MPC’s precursor, the Cordova Credit Union, was conceived at a time when the town 
of Cordova was among the poorest in the country. The credit union’s savings and 
credit program was seen as an alternative to informal money lenders charging 
exorbitant interest rates among the poor. Subsequent services by the credit union and 
the cooperative were aimed at filling in gaps or weaknesses in the poor’s access to 
financial and social protection services.   
As SEPPS, the Cordova MPC served various segments of the poor in different 
ways. Among the entrepreneurial poor, Cordova MPC served as an intermediary 
financial service provider to sustain their means of livelihood, or grow their micro-
enterprises to employ others. Among the unemployed and underemployed, the 
cooperative served as a mechanism that facilitated social inclusion. The poor were 
either provided employment by the enterprises of members and/or were assisted to 
have access to social services such as education for children and pensions for the 
elderly. The poor who were able to send their children to college with the help of the 
cooperative, had overcome poverty as their children became professionals and were 
employed locally or abroad.   
Cordova MPC has a similar experience with Lamac MPC of successfully 
engaging government agencies to provide technical and financial support to make 
services accessible to the poor. In this sense, Cordova MPC as well as Lamac MPC, 
may be said to have directly assisted the performance of what social economy 
scholars (Laville, 2010) consider to be the state’s function of redistribution.   
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8.6.3.   SEPPS and Social Entrepreneurship  
 
In the context of an ineffective state that is unable to deliver basic services and 
provide policy and service support to small producers (Schelzig, 2005), the cases of 
Lamac and Cordova MPC suggest a potentially bigger redistributive role of 
cooperatives as SEPPS, relative to their counterparts in developed economies in the 
North.   
As SEPPS, the Cordova MPC resonates with the social economy school of social 
entrepreneurship (Defourny and Nyssens, 2008; Hulgaard, 2008) discussed in 
Chapter 1. Interestingly, its experience validates many of the issues and concerns 
faced by Lamac MPC as a SEPPS in a developing country. Foremost of these is the 
important challenge of developing more effective mechanisms of multi-stakeholder 
governance to harness the participation of the majority of its members in seeking 
solutions to problems confronting various segments of the poor. Together with the 
case on PWD Fed, which is a cooperative federation, the three provide the basis for 
developing propositions about cooperatives as social enterprises with the poor as 
primary stakeholders or SEPPS. Initial insights on this are contained in Section 8.8 
but discussed more thoroughly in Chapters 9-11. 
 
8.7.  The Cordova MPC from a Stakeholder Perspective 
 
8.7.1.  Primary Stakeholders of Cordova MPC 
 
As SEPPS, Cordova MPC engages the poor as primary stakeholders from a 
normative perspective (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). The poor comprise the 
majority of Cordova MPC’s members. They include fishers including shell pickers, 
handicraft makers, the entrepreneurial poor, micro-entrepreneurs, and workers in the 
formal and informal sectors.   
 
8.7.2.  Roles among the Poor 
 
The Cordova MPC case closely resembled the Lamac MPC experience. Within a 
cooperative structure, the poor mainly enacted transactional roles as owners and as 
clients. Since initiation, no significant role change can be discerned.   
As clients, they availed themselves of the financial and social protection services 
of the cooperative for a fee. In exchange for their capital contribution and patronage 
of services, the poor received dividends, and patronage refunds. Historically, as 
shown in Section 8.4.5, the Board of Cordova MPC, including its Board Committees, 
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had been dominated by professionals, despite the reality of the poor sectors 
comprising the majority of the membership.  
As detailed in Box 8.1, the cooperative system, as explicitly explained during 
their Pre-Membership Education Seminars (PMES), formally provided for all 
members as having the right and duty to vote, be voted upon and to serve when 
elected.  However, as detailed in Section 8.4.9, the members among the poor saw 
themselves more as clients and only nominally as owners. This included Miriam 
Fuentes who had clearly overcome income poverty, and Fe Arguilles who was a 
Member in Good Standing.     
 
8.7.3.  Roots of No Significant Role Change  
 
The pattern of no distinct role change among the poor in Cordova MPC seems to 
have similar roots to what were identified in the case of Lamac MPC. Both 
cooperatives shared a common experience of originating from efforts to revitalize 
failed cooperative/pre-cooperative formations of poverty sectors. Professionals who 
were invited or were received warmly by the members of these failed formations led 
these rehabilitation efforts. Since then, the leadership of both cooperatives have 
remained in the hands of the professionals who were entrusted with the rehabilitation 
of their pre-cursor formations. No major changes in leadership and management had 
happened since initiation.   
Cordova MPC had been focused on providing financial services, consumer and 
social services on a transactional basis to a majority of their members. Cordova MPC 
did recognize that it had a weak membership development program. As described in 
Section 8.4.8, this weakness had been identified in the cooperative’s 2009 strategic 
planning session. At the time of the research in 2009, there were no clear programs to 
deliver transformational services to enable members from poverty sectors to take on 
leadership positions.    
By 2009, the only active transformational service being delivered was the 
provision of scholarships that were selectively and individually directed towards a 
limited number of children among poor members. Again as in the case of Lamac 
MPC, such translated at most to allowing some management staff like the COO to 
come from the ranks of the poor and in helping some poor families improve their 
socio-economic standing. Again as was discussed in Chapter 7, what seemed to be 
missing were transformational services directed at leadership formation and 
developing mechanisms for representative democracy work for the poor given the 
nature of Cordova MPC as a democratic member-based social enterprise.  
One may hypothesize that the inadequacy of transformational services may be a 
function of the orientation of the local professionals in engaging the poor as 
transactional partners. However, there was a period in Cordova MPC’s history that it 
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implemented transformational services towards leadership formation and 
organizational development among the poor. At the beginning of its development 
stage, Cordova MPC established a strategy of satellite formation. As explained in 
Section 8.4.1, this was to allow the decentralization of management of services, 
encourage the regular and active participation of members in cooperative affairs, 
pursue total human development of members, and ensure that the interest of sectors 
and communities were given adequate attention. As discussed in Section 8.4.1, 
satellite cooperatives among fishers and some poor communities were organized 
during this period, with Cordova MPC Board members actively involved. Although 
this was pursued between 1993-1998, there were no clear indications of their status 
by the time of the research in 2009.   
This overshadowing of the strategy of building satellites needs due consideration.  
The vision statement of Cordova MPC to be a ‘globally competitive vehicle for 
socio-economic empowerment’ (Cordova MPC, 2009) still reflects an intention not 
just to partner but to empower members. If one were to assume this statement of 
intent, maybe the phenomenon of no role change may be better related to the 
capability of Cordova MPC to manage the tension between social and business goals, 
which has been identified as a common governance issue among social enterprises 
(Spear, et al., 2010). To illustrate, the current strategy of branch formation, which 
facilitated the quick expansion of transactional services that seems to have taken 
over, may be responding better to the need for enterprise growth but not to 
empowerment.    
Details on the evolution of roles and services provided to the poor by Cordova 
MPC during the stages of pre-initiation, initiation and development are contained in 
Table 8.1.     
 
8.7.4. Impact on the Poor 
 
As clients and owners, or as transactional partners, the poor that comprise the 
majority in Cordova MPC’s membership of 8,000 have benefitted mainly in terms of 
access to financial and social services leading to social inclusion and social 
protection. Cordova MPC also assisted in sustaining livelihoods, creating 
employment opportunities, and to a limited extent, moving people out of income 
poverty. The details of these were already discussed in Section 8.5.2, with examples 
contained in Boxes 8.2 and 8.3.    
In comparison to PWD Fed that engaged the poor as transactional and 
transformational partners, the Cordova MPC shows a relatively large number of poor 
reached through transactional services. The depth of impact on the poor is 
comparable to Lamac MPC.   
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Table 8.1. Cordova MPC: Evolution of Roles and Services among Primary Stakeholders 
 
 Pre-Inception to Inception Stage 
(1971 – 1993) 
Development Stage 
(1993 – 2009) 
 
Key  
Organizational 
Developments 
 
 Setting up of Cordova Credit 
Union Inc., in 1971; 
establishment of savings and 
credit program; pooling of 
members’ dividends and 
patronage refunds to set up 
consumers’ cooperative in 1972; 
 Development and decline of both 
cooperatives (1971-1986); 
 Rehabilitation with intervention 
of professionals (1987-1990); 
and 
 Revitalization leading to 
consolidation of two cooperatives 
as MPC (1993). 
 
 
 Expansion and diversification; 
 Sub-phase 1: 1993 – 2006  
o Establishment of satellite 
cooperatives (1993-1998); 
o Expansion within Cordova; 1st 
Branch in Lapu-Lapu City; and  
o Membership growth: 1,200 to 
over 4,000. 
 Sub-phase 2:  2007 – 2009  
o Opening of another branch 
(Basak) in Lapu Lapu City and a 
branch in Sta. Rosa in Olango 
Island; 
o New product development: Coop 
on Wheels, Coop Purchase 
Order Loan; 
o Membership growth to about 
8,000 by 2009; and  
o Enterprises by end-2009:  
school, lumber/hardware, 
consumer store, pharmacy, 
gasoline station, banking system 
with ATM services. 
 
Roles of the 
Poor: Artisanal 
fishers,workers, 
entrepreneurial 
poor 
 Client-owners with formal voting 
powers in General Assembly 
with little or no representation in 
Board and with management 
delegated to professionals 
 Client-owners with formal voting 
powers in General Assembly, with 
little or no representation in Board 
and with management delegated to 
professionals; and 
 
 Some members: leaders and 
members of satellite cooperatives 
(1993-98).  
Services from 
Cordova MPC 
 Credit services; and 
 Access to consumer products.  
 Financial services: express loans, 
microenterprise loans, regular loans, 
savings products; 
 Social services: health benefit, death 
benefit, scholarships for poor but 
deserving children of members; and  
 Access to consumer products. 
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Table 8.1.a. Participation of the Poor in Governance and Management of the Core and Allied 
Organizations of Cordova MPC  
 Initiation Stage Development Stage 
Participation in Core 
Organization 
Members of the General 
Assembly 
 
Rarely elected as members of 
the Board 
Members of the General 
Assembly 
 
Rarely elected as members of 
the Board 
 
8.7.5. Stakeholder Engagement Strategy over Time 
 
Using Mintzberg’s (2007) theory of strategy formation, Cordova MPC may be 
said to have had an intended primary stakeholder engagement strategy of 
empowerment. As discussed in Section 8.7.2 and 8.7.3, the Cordova MPC had the 
explicit vision of becoming a globally competitive vehicle for socio-economic 
empowerment. As a cooperative, it oriented its members, the majority of whom were 
poor, on how they could exercise their rights and duties as fully fledged owners as 
well as privileges and obligations as customers.  
However, Cordova MPC’s realized primary stakeholder engagement strategy 
may be characterized as one of collaboration. From the stages of initiation to 
development, their dominant mode of engagement with the poor was as transactional 
partners. One may argue that there was a brief period where they may have engaged 
a limited number of poor as transformational partners through their organization of 
satellite cooperatives. However, this was not sustained and did not clearly translate to 
providing the poor a systematic mechanism for the representation and pursuit of their 
interests in the cooperative’s governance bodies. As explained in Section 8.7.3, the 
gap between the intention to empower the poor and the reality of engaging them 
mainly as transactional partners may be attributed to two factors: the unsustained 
delivery of transformational services towards the poor and the limitations in their 
overall capability to manage the tension between empowerment and enterprise 
growth objectives. 
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Cordova MPC’s primary stakeholder engagement strategy of collaboration 
echoes the same features as that of Lamac MPC discussed in Chapter 7. These 
features are discussed below: 
 
 Managerial orientation towards the poor: poor as transactional partners even 
as owners as dominant orientation; poor as transformational partners exhibited 
to a limited extent in 1993-98 but was not sustained; 
 Key engagement processes: collaborating, partnering, dialoguing, learning; 
collaboration and partnership were expressed mainly in transactional terms 
through capital and savings build-up and paying loans on time which also gave 
poor right to vote; regular venues for dialogue and learning between its board 
composed mainly of professionals and the poor included ownership meetings 
and general assemblies;  
 Nature of roles among the poor: mainly transactional as clients and owners;  
 Nature of programs and services: mainly transactional in the form of fee-based 
provision of financial and social services including social protection schemes; 
and 
 Impact on the poor: access to financial and social services by a large number 
of poor leading to social inclusion, social protection and social mobility; 
sustaining livelihoods, creating employment opportunities, and moving a 
limited number of people out of income poverty.  
 
As in the earlier cases, Sloan’s (2009) conception of models of stakeholder 
engagement based on a study of European corporations, is inadequate in explaining 
how Cordova MPC engages the poor as primary stakeholders. Again, this strengthens 
the need for evolving a framework for understanding stakeholder engagement 
strategies appropriate for social enterprises serving the poor as primary stakeholders 
(SEPPS). 
 
8.8.  Discussion 
 
The role of cooperatives as SEPPS in the context of an ineffective state and 
amidst market failures in developing countries like the Philippines is an important 
area of exploration in the social economy school of social entrepreneurship. The 
potentially bigger redistributive role of cooperatives as SEPPS discussed in Section 
8.6 underscores the importance for practitioners, policy makers, and scholars, to 
better understand the challenges they face and how they could work more effectively 
in favor of the poor.   
Robinson, et al., (2009) have recognized that context matters in developing 
frameworks for understanding social entrepreneurship in different social milieus. The 
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major differences in the context faced by SEPPS vis-à-vis their counterparts in the 
North are the combined realities of pervasive market failures, massive poverty and 
inequality, as well as the state’s ineffectiveness in redressing inequalities. This case, 
together with the cases of Lamac MPC and PWD Fed, builds on the work of past 
scholars, notably Borzaga and Spear (2004) in understanding cooperatives as social 
enterprises in developed and transition economies. These three cases provide insights 
on the challenges that cooperatives are facing in a developing country context, as 
social enterprises with the poor as primary stakeholders (SEPPS). As shown by these 
three cases, how the poor are engaged in cooperatives as SEPPS could yield very 
different results. 
In the case of PWD Fed, the poor were engaged both as transactional and 
transformational partners. The case showed the power of combining transactional and 
transformational services to empower the PWDs to govern themselves in a 
cooperative context. As a cooperative, the PWD Fed exhibited the characteristics of 
what Borzaga and Spear, (2004) consider as a single stakeholder cooperative, with 
the PWDs as the only members. However, PWD Fed’s efforts to co-create the 
Foundation for TheaseAbled Persons Inc., as a multi-stakeholder organization where 
empowered PWDs could work with supporters and advocates for a broad and 
sustained effort of engaging government and other stakeholders towards inclusive 
development indicates the importance of complementary mechanisms of self-
governance and multi-stakeholder governance in confronting poverty as a social 
problem.    
The Cordova MPC, like the Lamac MPC reflects the trend towards the 
communitarian tradition observed in the international cooperative movement 
(Borzaga and Spear, 2004). As such, Cordova MPC’s membership has grown to 
include various sectors in the community and has taken on the challenge of helping 
to address issues confronting the poor. The particular condition that the poor as 
members, are starting from a position of capability deprivation (Sen, 1999; 2009) and 
are disadvantaged in forming groups and making them work (Thorp et al., 2003) 
merits due consideration. As shown by both the cases of Cordova and Lamac MPC, 
the poor who have become the majority of their members, have tended to opt out 
from exercising their role in the governing bodies of the cooperatives. In the process, 
they have ‘delegated’ such function to the professionals whom they perceive to be 
more capable. In this sense, the cooperative’s governing bodies have tended to reflect 
the hierarchy and inequality in the broader society, making the democratic member-
based governance system in the cooperative less meaningful.   
Both the Cordova and Lamac MPC experiences seem to show that a cooperative 
that engages the poor mainly as transactional partners may fill the gap of the 
government’s and market’s failure to make social and economic services accessible 
to the poor. However, the governance structures of these cooperatives have so far 
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tended to mirror the capability deprivation of the poor and inequality characterizing 
the society at large. This may indicate the importance of complementing 
transactional with transformational services directed towards leadership formation 
and organizational development to make the democratic member-based governance 
system of the cooperative, as SEPPS, to work for the poor.   
While Cordova MPC already recognized the need for them to overcome their 
weak membership development program, the insights from this case show how 
critical it is for such program to be directed towards enabling significant sectors of 
the poor among their current and potential members to effectively participate in the 
cooperative’s governance system. The case on Lamac MPC, particularly Sections 
7.6., 7.7., and 7.8., already discussed the importance of transformational services 
geared towards leadership formation and organizational development coupled with 
putting in place mechanisms for complementing direct democracy with 
representative democracy. In addition to validating the relevance of this emerging 
proposition for cooperatives as SEPPS, the Cordova MPC case also points to how 
this may be pursued. In particular, Cordova MPC’s thrust of building what were 
called satellite cooperatives during the early part of its development stage provides 
one way on how these program elements could be operationalized. An assessment 
and strengthening of this strategy, of developing dynamic satellite cooperatives 
among the most significant sectors of the poor in its constituency could very well 
become the vehicles for leadership formation and organizational development, as 
well as the springboards for representative democracy if integrated into Cordova 
MPC’s governance structures.  
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CHAPTER 9 – CROSS CASE ANALYSIS: SOCIAL 
ENTERPRISES WITH THE POOR AS PRIMARY 
STAKEHOLDERS  
 
This chapter discusses the results of a cross-case analysis of a theoretical sample 
chosen to explore how social enterprises serve the poor and address poverty. It 
studies six Philippine-based social enterprises with the poor as primary 
stakeholders or SEPPS. It introduces two types of roles that the poor enact as 
stakeholders: transactional and transformational roles. It tracks these roles and 
the role changes that the poor enact as stakeholders of SEPPS over time. It 
analyzes how and why these roles change or don’t change, and the impact such 
change has on the social enterprise and the poor. It notes that SEPPS engage the 
poor to enact these roles through transactional and transformational services. It 
draws patterns from the analysis towards defining dimensions that differentiate 
three ways that SEPPS engage the poor as stakeholders: as passive beneficiaries, 
as transactional partners, and as transformational partners.  
  
The thesis uses case-based theory building (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007) to explore a framework for understanding how social enterprises 
serve the poor and address poverty. Poverty is understood as a multidimensional 
phenomenon, consistent with Sen’s (1999; 2009) conception that it is not just a state 
of ‘lowness of income’ but of ‘capability deprivation’.   
The thesis studies a theoretical sample of three pairs of social enterprises in the 
Philippines where the poor were suppliers (Alter Trade and Upland Marketing), 
workers (PWD Fed and Tahanan), and clients (Lamac MPC and Cordova MPC). In 
half of the theoretical sample, the poor were also owners of the social enterprises, 
being members of cooperatives (Lamac MPC and Cordova MPC), or of a cooperative 
federation (PWD Fed). The thesis studies the roles and role changes of the poor in 
these social enterprises, how and why they changed, or did not change, and the 
impact of the roles and role changes, if any, on the social enterprises and the poor.   
This chapter discusses the results of the cross case analysis involving the three 
pairs of social enterprises in the theoretical sample.    
 
9.1.  Roles and Role Changes among the Poor 
 
Tracking the roles and role changes among the poor across the six cases was 
aided by Mintzberg’s (2007) organizational stages of initiation, development and 
renewal discussed in Section 2.11. The main roles they enacted across these stages, 
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over a period of 10-37 years may be classified into two: transactional roles and 
transformational roles.  
Transactional roles are functions performed by the poor that involve an exchange 
of goods or services for money or vice versa. These are directly linked to enterprise 
operations and include being suppliers for which they receive a payment for goods or 
services rendered, being workers for which they receive wages, being clients where 
they pay a fee to avail of a product or service, and being owners for which they 
receive dividends.   
Transformational roles are functions performed by the poor as conscious agents 
of change, to lift them from poverty, and to participate in group efforts to improve 
the quality of life of their community, sector or society as a whole. These include 
their participation in self-governed cooperatives, associations or federations that 
envision a better future, and serve as venues for planning and implementing 
initiatives to overcome poverty and contribute to community or sectoral 
development.   
Table 9.1. provides details of transactional and transformational roles and role 
changes across the stages of initiation, development and renewal as shown by the 
cases in the theoretical sample. By the time of the research in 2009-2010, three of the 
cases (Alter Trade, PWD Fed and Tahanan) were in their renewal stage, having been 
in existence for 22, 12 and 37 years respectively. The other three cases (Upland 
Marketing, Lamac MPC and Cordova MPC) were still at their development stage 
after a period of 10, 17 and 22 years respectively. The number of years of existence 
seemed not to be a key determining factor in terms of stages traversed.     
The transactional roles that the poor enacted in the social enterprises were the 
starting points for the choice of the cases – the poor as suppliers (in the case of Alter 
Trade and Upland Marketing), the poor as workers (in the case of Tahanan and PWD 
Fed), and the poor as clients (in the case of Lamac MPC and Cordova MPC).    
How were the poor involved or engaged in the process of enacting these 
transactional roles?  At what point did they enact transformational roles?   
In all six cases, the poor manifested enacting transactional roles at the point of 
initiation. It was only in the case of PWD Fed that the poor simultaneously enacted 
transformational roles, and continued to do so up to the renewal stage.  
Transformational roles were enacted by the poor in Alter Trade as well but only 
starting at the development to renewal stage for the sugar farmers, and at the renewal 
stage for the banana growers.   
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9.1.1.   From Passive Workers to Self-Assured Workers,   
            Supervisors and Managers 
 
At the initiation stage, Tahanan engaged a limited number of 20 PWDs in their 
metal craft sheltered workshop as workers and partners in their rehabilitation process.  
As it sought to expand its reach among PWDs by diversifying its sheltered 
workshops to serve the mainstream export market, the dominant role enacted by most 
of the PWDs were as passive workers. Plunging into a period of crisis, then a renewal 
stage, the PWDs had been re-engaged as worker-partners with a number of them 
showing levels of being self-assured and pro-active. The most dramatic changes were 
exhibited by the PWDs who had assumed the roles of supervisors (11 out of 14 
supervisors were already PWDs), and the roles of managers and directors (10 out of 
the 14 managers and directors were already PWDs). These dramatic changes 
however are still within the realm of transactional roles, as partners in social 
enterprise management. As a foundation, Tahanan’s board had always been 
composed primarily of religious leaders and prominent members of the private sector 
who supported PWD rights and welfare.  
 
9.1.2. Poor as Partners in Social Enterprise and Value  
          Chain Management 
 
The poor as transactional partners manifested itself in other ways in the 
remaining cases: as supplier-partners (in the case of Alter Trade and Upland 
Marketing), as worker-members (in the case of PWD Fed), or as client-members (in 
the case of Cordova Coop and Lamac Coop).   
PWD Fed, Alter Trade and Upland Marketing pursued capacity development 
programs in collaboration with the poor to meet the quality and volume requirements 
of their respective markets. In these three cases, their partners among the poor were 
progressively engaged as groups collaborating with them in value chain management.  
For example, in Alter Trade and Upland Marketing, their supplier-partners were 
actively engaged in transparently negotiating ‘fair prices’ and in annual planning 
processes to align levels and requirements for production and trading. In the case of 
Alter Trade, their supplier partners were assisted to take over functions in the value 
chain such as organic fertilizer production and trucking for transport of raw materials 
and products. At one stage, PWD Fed engaged its primary member cooperatives in a 
decentralized system of producing whole chairs or components that were assembled 
upon delivery to different schools nationwide. 
The collaborative nature of the relationship with the poor on the part of Lamac 
MPC and Cordova MPC at the point of initiation was explicit as they made their 
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initial capital contributions and were required to go through Pre-Membership 
Education Seminars (PMES). The PMES served as venues to orient members about 
their rights and responsibilities as owner-clients. In both cases, the PMES 
emphasized the need for the poor to patronize the services of the cooperative, pay 
their loans on time and regularly save and build up their capital with the cooperative.  
This may be considered another form of engaging the poor as partners in social 
enterprise management.  
All these demonstrate the dynamic ways that SEPPS have engaged the poor as 
transactional partners. The poor were engaged not only as workers, clients and 
suppliers, but also as partners in social enterprise and value chain management.   
 
9.1.3. Transactional Nature and Transformational Potential of     
  Poor as Owner   
      
As has been pointed out, PWD Fed was the only case where the poor enacted not 
only transactional but also transformational roles at the point of initiation. The 
researcher was actually expecting that where the poor were owners, they would also 
be enacting transformational roles. In the two cases (Lamac MPC and Cordova 
MPC), where the poor were owners, the enactment of transformational roles did not 
manifest.  This indicates that the role of the poor as owner may have a dual character: 
that it has a transactional nature and a transformational potential, but the latter may 
need to be harnessed to be realized.   
As shown by all the 3 cooperative cases, the poor as owner had a transactional 
nature: in exchange for their capital contribution, the poor received dividends. It also 
had a transformational potential, given their entitlement to vote and to be voted upon.  
This meant they potentially had the power to make decisions and to participate in 
governing bodies of the enterprise to advance their interests, beyond being workers 
or clients.  
In PWD Fed, such transformational potential was realized at the level of the 
federation and at the level of the primary cooperative. From initiation,  the primary 
cooperative members, had representatives in the PWD Fed General Assembly, who 
from the beginning, elected a governing board composed 100% of PWDs. From 
initiation, the PWD Fed acted as a representative body of the PWDs to engage 
government to enact and implement affirmative policies for PWDs. Over time, the 
PWD Fed enabled its primary cooperative members to become self-sustaining 
vehicles for PWD employment and empowerment in their respective areas.   
      In the case of both Lamac MPC and Cordova MPC, the transactional nature of 
the poor not only as clients, but also as owners was dominant from the initiation to 
the development stages. For example, the criteria used for members in good standing 
(MIGS) in both cooperatives, which gave them the power to vote and be voted upon 
 298 
in General Assemblies, were purely transactional in nature: regular capital build-up 
and savings as well as timely payment of loans. In Cordova MPC, representation of 
the poor in the Board, over time was rare, if not absent altogether. In Lamac, the 
minority representation of the farmers in the Board had declined over time, and there 
were no indications that the entrepreneurial poor, who comprised the majority of 
their members at the time of the research, were being elected to Board positions. The 
poor members in both Lamac MPC and Cordova MPC saw their membership more 
as a means to have social protection and access to financial services.         
 
Table 9.1. Roles and Role Changes among the Poor Served 
Social Enterprise 
and Poor Served 
 
 
Roles Played at Different Stages 
Initiation 
(3-5 years) 
Development 
(7-14 or more years) 
Renewal 
(3 or more years) 
Alter Trade:   
Sugar workers-
turned agrarian 
reform beneficiaries  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Banana growers 
 
 
 
 
 
 Organized suppliers 
of sugar cane for 
muscovado 
production and 
trading 
 
Partners in Bio-
Organic Conversion 
Program  
 
Partners in fair trade 
with European fair 
trade organizations 
Organized suppliers of 
organic sugar cane engaged in 
negotiations for fair price 
 
Partners in Sustainable 
Agriculture for Sustainable 
Communities Program 
 
Organized into Fair Trade Sub 
Group and represented in 
Alter Trade Foundation Board  
 
Leaders and members of self- 
determining producer 
organizations at various stages 
of development  
 Self help groups 
 Entrepreneurial farmers’ 
organizations 
 Organizations practicing 
social entrepreneurship 
Organized participants in 
value chains linked to Alter 
Trade and beyond  
 
Partners in fair trade and 
sustainable agriculture 
federated into Negros Organic 
and Fair Trade Association 
(NOFTA) 
 
NOFTA as co-equal partner 
of Alter Trade Group in 
local/global organic and fair 
trade movement  
 
Leaders and members of self-
determining producer 
organizations  
 
Suppliers of 
Balangon bananas 
 
Partners in people-to-
people trade with 
Japanese 
cooperatives 
Suppliers of Balangon 
bananas  
 
Partners in people-to-people 
trade 
 
Leaders and members of 
growers’ associations 
exhibiting capabilities as self 
help groups 
Organized growers 
participating in value chain 
management 
 
Partners in people-to-people 
trade  
 
Leaders and members of 
associations planning and 
implementing community 
development plans  
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Social Enterprise 
and Poor Served 
Roles Played at Different Stages 
Initiation 
(3-5 years) 
Development 
(7-14 or more years) 
Renewal 
(3 or more years) 
Upland 
Marketing: 
Organic rice 
farmers and 
muscovado 
producers 
Suppliers of 
organic rice, 
muscovado sugar 
and other food 
products 
 
Community-based 
enterprise partners 
assisted with 
technology, 
financing and 
market access 
Suppliers organized as 
community-based enterprises 
(CBEs) at various stages of 
development:  start-up, take-off, 
growth and sustainable 
 
Partners engaged in negotiations 
for fair price, with most 
advanced playing proactive roles 
in value chain management 
 
 
 
 
(Note: Upland Marketing 
had not reached renewal 
stage) 
Social Enterprise 
and Poor Served 
Roles Played at Different Stages 
Initiation 
(2-11 years) 
Development 
(8.5-10 or more years) 
Renewal 
(1.5-16 years or more) 
PWD Fed:   
Unemployed 
persons with 
disability (PWD) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Workers of school 
chair enterprise 
project  
 
Leaders and 
members of PWD 
primary 
cooperatives 
 
Representatives of 
primary 
cooperatives in 
PWD Fed General 
Assembly 
 
Elected members of 
all-PWD board 
 
Leaders of 
management team    
 
PWD Fed as 
representative body 
in engaging 
government and 
support institutions 
Members of primary 
cooperatives engaged as workers 
in production of school chairs  
 
Leaders and members of primary 
cooperatives at various stages of 
development 
 Cooperatives for PWD 
employment 
 Cooperatives for PWD 
empowerment 
 
Leaders in governance and 
management bodies of PWD Fed 
 
PWD Fed as  
 Organizer and enabler of 
PWD primary cooperatives  
 Representative body in 
engaging government and 
support institutions  
Members as workers of 
enterprise ventures and 
participants in programs of 
PWD Fed and primary 
cooperatives 
 
Leaders and members of 
primary cooperatives at 
various stages of 
development 
 Cooperatives for PWD 
employment 
 Cooperatives for PWD 
empowerment 
 
Leaders and role models in 
communities 
 
Leaders in governance and 
management bodies of PWD 
Fed 
 
PWD Fed as  
 Promoter of economic 
empowerment and 
inclusion of PWDs 
nationwide  
 Representative body in 
engaging government 
and support institutions 
Empowered PWDs as co-
founders of foundation for 
national partnership towards 
inclusive development 
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Tahanan:   
Unemployed 
persons with 
disability (PWD) 
 
Selected PWDs 
from poor families 
of school age  
 
 
 
 
 
Worker-partners in 
sheltered workshop 
for wheelchair 
production 
 
Beneficiaries of 
rehabilitation, 
scholarships and 
special education 
programs 
Passive worker beneficiaries in 
sheltered workshops serving 
export market  (Dominant) 
 
Worker-partners in sheltered 
workshop for wheelchair 
production (Small)  
 
Beneficiaries of rehabilitation, 
scholarships and special 
education programs showing 
potential start to be appointed to 
management, supervisory and 
staff positions  
Worker-partners exhibiting 
various levels of 
development 
 
 Passive to self assured 
workers 
 Pro-active workers and 
supervisors  
 Empowered managers 
and directors 
Social Enterprise 
and Poor Served 
Roles Played at Different Stages 
Initiation 
(6 years) 
Development 
(11-16 years or more) 
Renewal 
Lamac MPC: 
Upland farmers, 
workers, 
entrepreneurial 
poor 
Client-owners with 
formal voting 
powers in General 
Assembly 
 
With minority but 
substantive 
representation in 
board 
 
Management 
delegated to 
professionals  
Client-owners with formal 
voting powers in General 
Assembly 
 
Board almost totally composed 
of professionals  
 1 of 3 surviving farmer 
leaders in original board still 
a member 
 No mechanism for poverty 
sectors to be represented  
 
Management delegated to 
professionals  
 
Poor see membership as means 
to have social protection and 
access to financial services  
(Note:  Lamac MPC had not 
reached renewal stage) 
Cordova   MPC: 
Artisanal fishers, 
workers, 
entrepreneurial 
poor 
Client-owners with 
formal voting 
powers in General 
Assembly 
 
Little or no 
representation in 
board   
 
Management 
delegated to 
professionals 
Client-owners with formal 
voting powers in General 
Assembly 
 
Little or no representation in 
Board 
 
Management delegated to 
professionals 
 
Poor see membership as means 
to have social protection and 
access to financial services  
(Note:  Cordova MPC had 
not reached renewal stage) 
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9.1.4.  Poor as Transactional and Transformational Partners  
 
Among the six cases, the most dramatic changes in terms of roles happened in 
Alter Trade, among its sugar farmer partners and in PWD Fed. In both cases, the 
poor manifested transformational roles as they became conscious change agents not 
only for themselves but for their respective communities or sectors and society as a 
whole.    
In the case of Alter Trade, the organized sugar farmer partners did not only serve 
as an organized producer base for Alter Trade, they defined and implemented 
community development plans, and started to initiate crop and income diversification 
efforts. Crop and income diversification have been shown as key to achieving food 
security and overcoming income poverty for a significant percentage of Alter Trade’s 
sugar farmer partners. By the end of the development stage, the organized sugar 
farmer partners were at various stages of development as self help groups, 
entrepreneurial farmers’ organizations and as organizations practicing social 
entrepreneurship.100  MIARBA, featured in Box 3.1., and 3.5., exemplified a partner 
reaching the third stage. Not only was it engaged as a producers’ group in the Alter 
Trade system, it was actively assisting its members diversify their crops and sources 
of income. MIARBA was playing a lead role in community reforestation and health 
services delivery. It was also recognized by the local government as a leader in the 
promotion of sustainable agriculture and a significant contributor to the local 
economy. At the renewal stage, MIARBA and the other sugar farmer partners of 
Alter Trade became founding members of NOFTA or the Negros Organic Fair Trade 
Association. As a federation, NOFTA had become a small producers’ organization 
serving as Alter Trade’s co-equal partner in the local and global organic and fair 
trade movement, with the capacity to plan, mobilize resources, and implement their 
own enterprise and development efforts.   
As has been emphasized, the poor in PWD Fed manifested transformational roles 
from initiation. What may be important to take into account in explaining this early 
manifestation of the poor’s transformational roles is a pre-initiation stage that lasted 
4-5 years. During this period from 1993-1997, CBM101 assisted the initial formation 
of cooperatives to start the school chair project. These cooperatives became the 
founding members of PWD Fed in 1998. Of course, the PWD Fed primary 
cooperatives and the individual PWD members developed at different paces. As the 
PWD Fed initiated the organization of more primary cooperatives, each of them went 
through an organizational life cycle of their own. The pattern observed was they 
usually started as ‘cooperatives for PWD employment’ before they reached a stage 
                                                 
100 See Appendix 12.10 for the instrument used to measure the level of development of Alter Trade’s producer partners. 
101 CBM was the German development agency that sent a consultant and supported the initiation of the school chair 
venture among PWDs. 
 302 
where they became ‘cooperatives for PWD empowerment.’ The most developed 
among the primary cooperatives that reached the latter stage had become self-
propelling organizations, engaging their members in various initiatives beyond the 
school chair project to look after the rights and welfare of PWDs in their own 
communities. The most advanced among the individual PWDs became founding 
members of the Foundation for TheseAbled Persons to create a venue to engage non-
PWD supporters to assist and serve as enabling partner to PWD Fed and PWDs in 
general. Their membership in the Foundation signified their readiness for broader 
efforts to participate as co-equals in mobilizing other organizations and engaging 
government “in a national partnership for sustainable, inclusive …development 
towards equal social and economic participation of PWDs” (Foundation for 
TheseAbled Persons, 2011).  
These transformational roles of the poor may be appreciated as manifestations of 
their overcoming ‘capability deprivation’, having become active participants in 
creating ‘actual opportunities’ to improve their ‘means of living’. The enactment of 
these transformational roles through their own self-propelling organizations are 
directly assisting the exercise of political freedoms and mediating their access to 
various forms of economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, 
and protective security. These are the freedoms identified by Sen as critical to 
poverty reduction and development (Sen, 1999). 
 
9.1.5. Situating Roles in Regions of Stakeholder Environment 
One way of enriching our analysis of the roles and role changes of the poor 
among the social enterprises is to use tools developed by scholars advancing a 
stakeholder approach to strategic management (Freeman, 1984; Harrison and St. 
John, 1994, 1998; Post et al., 2002a). Of particular interest is Harrison and St. John’s 
(1994, 1998) conception of the three regions of the stakeholder environment: the 
internal organization (stakeholders with formal ties with the firm), the operating 
environment (external stakeholders that influence the firm over which the firm has 
some influence), and the broader environment (society, technology, economy and 
political/legal, where the firm has little influence). This is similar to the conception 
by Post et al., (2002) of the three broad categories of stakeholders: the resource base, 
industry structure, and social-political. Each group is characterized as being situated 
in a set of concentric circles with those belonging to the resource base closest and 
those belonging to the socio-political the most distant. (Post et al., 2002).102    
Exploring the application of these broad categories or regions of the stakeholder 
environment to better understand how the poor are engaged by SEPPS yields 
interesting insights.  
                                                 
102 See Figures 1.1. and 1.2. in Chapter 1 for graphical illustrations of the 3 regions of the stakeholder environment and 
the broad categories of stakeholders.   
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Four of the cases (Upland Marketing, Tahanan, Lamac MPC and Cordova MPC) 
show the poor as playing roles in either the internal organization (Tahanan as worker-
partners), the operating environment (Upland Marketing as supplier-partners and co-
managers of the value chain) or both (Lamac MPC and Cordova MPC as owner-
clients). Two of the cases (Alter Trade and PWD Fed) show the poor as progressively 
playing a combination of roles over time, not only in the internal and operating 
environment, but also in the broader, social-political environment. Interestingly, the 
cases of Alter Trade and PWD Fed are the same ones that, as discussed earlier in this 
section, demonstrated the poor as enacting transformational roles in their 
community/sector and society as a whole.   
In corporate models of stakeholder management  (Harrison and St. John, 1994. 
1998; Post et al., 2002a), specific stakeholders are classified or located in these 
regions, and are managed to facilitate the achievement of organizational goals, 
depending on their level of influence and whether they are evaluated as posing an 
opportunity or threat. As shown by the cases, the poor as stakeholders in SEPPS, 
were initially located in either the internal (as workers, owners) and/or operating 
environment (as clients, suppliers). As primary stakeholders, the poor were engaged 
to enact their transactional roles more effectively, no matter where they were located 
and no matter their initial level of influence. Moreover, in two of the cases (Alter 
Trade and PWD Fed), they were enabled by the SEPPS not only to more effectively 
enact their transactional roles in the internal and operating environment, but the poor 
were also empowered by SEPPS to enact transformational roles in the broader, 
social-political environment: in Alter Trade, as partners in the local/global organic 
and fair trade movement; and in PWD Fed, as promoters of economic empowerment 
and inclusion of PWDs in their local communities and at the national level.   
Enacting transformational roles in the broader, social-political environment is 
consistent with the observations and propositions from earlier literature by scholars 
of social entrepreneurship notably Huybrechts and Defourny (2008), Nyssens (2006), 
Martin and Osberg (2007) and Austin et al., (2006). Nyssens (2006) in particular 
argued that the political dimension is an attribute of some social enterprises that 
distinguishes them more sharply from traditional businesses. Martin and Osberg 
emphasized that political goals are present when there is an intent of acting on the 
wider system in order to change the context in which social enterprises operate. 
Austin et al., (2006) see this as particularly important when the social problem being 
addressed is deeply embedded in contextual factors, which poverty as a social 
probem is.   
 
9.2.  Roots and Routes of Role Changes among the Poor   
A corollary conceptual tool that needs to be introduced at this point, which would 
be used to explain in part the roots and routes of role changes among the poor is 
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classifying services rendered to the poor by SEPPS as transactional and/or 
transformational. Earlier in Section 9.1, the concepts of transactional and 
transformational roles were introduced. Transactional and transformational services 
are linked to what it takes for the poor to perform these roles.   
 
 Transactional services pertain to activities, such as providing loans, 
demonstrating new technologies or conducting trainings that are necessary for 
the poor in the social enterprise system to effectively and efficiently perform 
their transactional roles as workers, suppliers, clients, and owners.  
Transactional services are usually defined by what is needed by enterprise 
operations to serve markets effectively and efficiently, so are enterprise or 
market-driven.      
 Transformational services pertain to sustained capacity development efforts 
including leadership and organizational development, asset build-up and 
providing education and experiential learning opportunities, to empower the 
poor as conscious stakeholders in overcoming their poverty situation and 
becoming partners in pursuing change in their community/sector and society as 
a whole. Transformational services are defined by what the poor need to 
become conscious actors in overcoming their poverty situation, so are primary 
stakeholder-driven.  
 
Two types of transactional services were noted: fee based, such as loans; or non-fee 
based, such as job-related trainings.   
Two types of transformational services were noted:  individually directed, such as 
scholarships to complete formal schooling or trainings for individual advancement; 
or group directed such as leadership formation linked to organizational development.   
Significant role changes were observed among the poor in three cases over time:  
Alter Trade, PWD Fed and Tahanan. The other three manifested no distinct role 
changes (Upland Marketing, Lamac MPC and Cordova MPC). However, a 
significant segment of Upland Marketing’s partners among the poor exhibited 
changes in terms of higher levels of participation as supplier partners over time.   
Table 9.2.a. provides a summary of the roots (why) and routes (how) of the role 
changes. The most significant role changes could be attributed to the sustained 
delivery of transformational services, in addition to transactional services; strategic 
efforts to close the gap between intended and realized strategies for engaging the 
poor; changes in management orientation and/or systems; and the support of enabling 
stakeholders.   
Responses to pressures in the external environment such as more effectively 
meeting market requirements also triggered some changes. Responses to these 
market pressures, that were mediated by management orientation and capability were 
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surfaced as governance challenges among SEPPS as they navigate the balance of 
social and enterprise sustainability objectives in the individual case analysis, but may 
be better explored further in a future research initiative. 
 
9.2.1.  Alter Trade and PWD Fed: Dedicated Programs and   
Delivery Systems for Transformational Services 
 
For Alter Trade and PWD Fed, the two cases where the most significant role 
changes among the poor were evident, the role changes were products of 
vision/mission clarification and strategic planning and responses to emerging threats 
and challenges in their enterprise operations. From these strategic visioning, strategic 
planning and strategic learning processes (Mintzberg, 2007), dedicated programs and 
structures/staffing were put in place to ensure the delivery of transformational 
services. These transformational services were over and above the transactional 
services that Alter Trade and PWD Fed also provided their partners.   
Transactional services included skills development for the PWDs to participate as 
workers of PWD Fed in manufacturing chairs required by DepEd and providing the 
financial, technological and product development assistance to supplier partners of 
Alter Trade to deliver the quality and volume requirements of the European fair trade 
buyers of muscovado and the Japanese cooperative buyers of Balangon bananas. 
Transformational services provided by PWD Fed and Alter Trade were wide-
ranging and include leadership formation; enabling programs towards income 
diversification that are not directly linked to the value chain of the social enterprise; 
capacity building in organizational and change management, community visioning 
and planning; as well as facilitating networking, advocacy and claim-making 
initiatives vis-à-vis government towards sectoral and community development.     
The transformational roles enacted by the primary cooperative members of the 
PWD Fed and the supplier partners of Alter Trade are largely attributable to the 
transformational services provided by PWD Fed and Alter Trade. The contrasting 
experiences between the sugar and banana producer partners of Alter Trade, where 
only the former performed transformational roles at the development to renewal stage 
also support this conclusion. For a significant period of time until almost the end of 
the development stage, Alter Trade was unable to provide transformational services 
to their banana producer partners. Alter Trade Foundation’s Sustainable Agriculture 
for Sustainable Community Program (SASC) was dedicated to their sugar farmer 
partners during the development stage. Although organizing efforts among Balangon 
banana growers started during the last years of the development stage, it was only 
during the renewal stage that transformational services using the SASC framework 
implemented through Alter Trade Foundation was pursued among banana growers.  
Even the initial results of these efforts, with the banana growers associations starting 
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to do their community development plans, also point to how critical sustained 
transformational services through a dedicated delivery system is, in effecting 
transformational roles.       
While the ownership of the poor in both Lamac MPC and Cordova MPC 
remained transactional, such was given substance by PWD Fed through conscious 
capacity development programs for the members and leaders of their primary 
cooperative members. In the case of Alter Trade, their conscious capacity building 
programs also developed their sugar farmer partners to become owners of their 
respective community-based enterprises. These community-based enterprises, that 
took the form of cooperatives and associations, served not only as a reliable supplier 
base for Alter Trade, but also as planning and implementing bodies for crop and 
income diversification and community development efforts. 
 
Table 9.2.a. Roots and Routes of Role Changes among the Poor   
Social 
Enterprise 
Roots (Why) of Role Change(s) Routes (How) of Role Change(s) 
Alter 
Trade  
Vision/mission clarification and 
commitment to close the gap between 
intended and realized stakeholder 
engagement strategy  
 
Realization that improved product 
quality and production efficiency can 
be realized and threat from armed 
groups neutralized with organized 
Balangon growers 
 
Enabling stakeholders:  
Push and support from solidarity 
markets and international partners 
from Europe and Japan resulting from 
evaluation studies/visits and 
certification inspections/audit  
    
 
Transformational services:   
 Sustainable Agriculture for 
Sustainable Communities (SASC) 
Program for sugar farmers  
 SASC-type program for banana 
growers instituted at renewal stage  
Transactional services: 
 Program to transform sugar farms 
from conventional to organic 
 Banana growers development 
program to ensure market 
requirements 
 
Foundation as distinct structure to deliver 
transformational services to sugar farmers 
(development-renewal stages) and banana 
growers (renewal stage) 
 
Cooperatives of sugar farmers as 
mechanisms for planning and 
implementation of crop and income 
diversification and community 
development   
 
NOFTA as mechanism for self-
governance, collective action, and 
advocacy among small producers  
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Social 
Enterprise 
Roots (Why) of Role Change(s) Routes (How) of Role Change(s) 
PWD Fed Strategic planning that clarified critical 
role of self-propelling primary 
cooperatives  
 To ensure quality and efficiency of 
school chair production nationwide  
 To plan and implement local 
programs for PWD employment 
and empowerment  
 
Enabling stakeholders: 
Partners from Europe and Canada 
providing technical and financial 
support for capacity development and 
participatory strategic planning process  
Transformational services:   
 Dedicated leadership and capacity 
development program for primary 
cooperative members 
 
Participatory strategic planning process 
involving primary cooperatives 
 
Tahanan Change in management and 
management orientation towards 
PWDs:   
 from worker-partners to passive 
worker beneficiaries 
 from passive worker-beneficiaries 
to worker partners   
Conscious initiation of individually-
directed transformational services by 
founders and top leadership 
(e.g.scholarships, leadership 
development) created critical mass of 
pro-active, committed and capable 
PWDs  
 
Business-oriented professional team 
managing sheltered workshops 
 
Appointment of committed and qualified 
PWDs to majority of supervisory and 
management/director positions 
 
Participatory planning and operating 
structures/system 
 
9.2.2.  Tahanan:   Transformational Services and Changes in  
       Management 
  
For Tahanan, a process of providing individually directed transformational 
services (such as scholarships, leadership and management trainings) to a selected 
number of PWDs, who by the renewal stage had assumed supervisory and 
manager/director positions may be the most important factor that had brought about 
the role changes.     
This was a reflection of a conscious orientation on the part of the Board and the 
top leadership to develop PWDs as partners in the management of Tahanan and its 
sheltered workshops. The management orientation of the team of supervisors, 
managers and directors towards the rank and file PWD workers also reflects this 
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collaborative mode. Reflecting and aiding this collaborative mode are planning and 
decision making processes that have been characterized as more rigorous, 
participatory and transparent, with the institution of systems for teamwork, shared 
responsibility and accountability.       
The change in management and management orientation from the initiation to the 
development stage was also a big factor in the role change from being worker-
partners to dominantly becoming passive worker beneficiaries. The business-oriented 
professional management team of non-PWDs brought in to ensure that contractual 
obligations of Tahanan to mainstream exporters would be met and the successor 
management team who continued serving the export market ‘just to give work for 
people’ both manifested an orientation of viewing the PWD workers as passive 
beneficiaries.  
     
9.2.3.  Mandate of Upland Marketing: Poor as Transactional   
Partner 
 
An interesting aspect to explore is why there was no role change in Upland 
Marketing. The absence of a distinct role change for the poor was a product of the 
organizational mandate of Upland Marketing as an intermediary marketing 
organization in the context of a broader network strategy. Upland Marketing was set 
up, and is, the marketing arm of the Upland NGO Assistance Committee (UNAC), a 
consortium of institutions working for comprehensive upland development. In the 
process, Upland Marketing was expected to provide transactional services while 
other members would provide the transformational services.  
Nevertheless, even as there was no distinct role change for the poor, there was an 
increase in their level of participation in planning and decision-making as supplier-
partners over time. By the development stage, the supplier partners for organic rice 
and muscovado were already participating in annual planning meetings to align 
production and marketing targets and discuss the resolution of problem areas.  
Increasing the level of participation of the supplier partners was made possible by 
transactional services provided by Upland Marketing. This took the form of a 
dedicated program for capacitating supplier-partners in community-based enterprise 
and value chain management.  
 
9.2.4.  Cordova and Lamac MPC: Transactional Management 
Orientation and Services      
 
Another interesting question to ask is why no role changes among the poor have 
happened in both the Cordova and Lamac MPC.  
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The absence of a distinct role change among the poor in Cordova MPC and 
Lamac MPC may be better understood if we go back to their common historical 
experience. Both Lamac and Cordova MPC came from efforts to revitalize failed 
cooperative/pre-cooperative formations that used to be self-help initiatives of poverty 
sectors (Lamac Samahang Nayon involving farmers and the Cordova Credit Union 
involving parishioners who were mainly fishers). Both intentionally brought in 
professionals in the community to rehabilitate them. Since then, the leadership of 
both cooperatives remained in the hands of the professionals who were entrusted 
with the cooperative’s rehabilitation. No major change in leadership and management 
has happened in both cooperatives since their rehabilitation. Both cooperatives have 
been focused on providing financial services, consumer and social services on a 
transactional level. Individually directed transformational services such as 
scholarships have enabled children of poor households to become staff of the 
cooperatives. However, no clear programs or structures are in place to enable 
members from poverty sectors to take on leadership positions or to enact 
transformational roles.    
 
9.2.5.  Cooperatives as SEPPS:  Governance Issues    
 
Cordova and Lamac MPC seem to be confronted with governance issues related 
to cooperatives as mutual social enterprises especially as they become more 
communitarian and get involved in broader social concerns. The need to develop 
more appropriate multi-stakeholder systems of governance as a key issue among 
cooperatives as social enterprises, found as a need in studies undertaken in developed 
and transition countries (Borzaga and Spear, 2004; Cornforth and Aiken, 2010), is 
validated by this study.  However, this study shows that the capability deprivation of 
the poor in a developing country context makes answering this need particularly 
challenging if SEPPS are to give an effective voice and vote to the poor.   
The Lamac and Cordova MPC cases demonstrated that even as the poor had the 
right to be elected in governance bodies, they generally felt they were not in a 
position to become leaders and make decisions for the cooperative. With Lamac and 
Cordova MPC engaging their poor members mainly as clients at the transactional 
level, formal provisions of participatory governance become ineffective to give the 
poor a voice and vote. But as the PWD Fed and Alter Trade cases showed, the poor 
could be capacitated, through the delivery of transformational services and the setting 
up of mechanisms for self governance where they can enact transformational roles, to 
become leaders and make decisions for themselves. Such is of particular importance 
for cooperatives as SEPPS, which may be inferred as an intent of both Lamac and 
Cordova MPC. Not only do they have the poor as the majority of their members but 
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they have incorporated the empowerment of the poor as part of their vision and 
mission.   
 
9.2.6.   Enabling and Disabling Stakeholders 
 
In all 6 cases in the theoretical sample, one could identify a pattern of failure 
among state and market institutions in addressing the needs of the poor. The SEPPS 
were set up to meet these unmet needs. Table 9.2.b. provides details of these 
indications of failure and how the SEPPS in the theoretical sample responded to 
them.  
The cases showed various agencies of government having the mandate, power 
and potential to be enabling stakeholders of SEPPS. In practice, government agencies 
tended to have marginal or limited roles, acted as unreliable partners or even played 
disabling roles. An exception was the government-owned Land Bank of the 
Philippines that was consistent in supporting the growth of Lamac MPC and Cordova 
MPC in terms of technical and financial services.   
Alter Trade exemplifies a case where government, as an enabling stakeholder in 
the broad environment, played a minimal but critical legitimizing role in formalizing 
ownership of the sugar workers over land they had already occupied. Such minimal 
role by government was not without problems as shown by the story of MIARBA, 
one of Alter Trade’s best partner producers. The efforts of the land owner to block 
the process of land reform through the courts were overcome in part by the persistent 
lobby efforts of MIARBA and its partners for government to implement the law. To 
date though, MIARBA members are still in a legal battle over 50 of the 127 hectares 
of land they filed claims for. At the same time, the case showed that the Department 
of Agrarian Reform was mandated but did not have the political will or the resources 
to play an enabling role, resulting to its failure to provide support services to 97% of 
agrarian reform beneficiaries in the province. 
The PWD Fed case on the other hand demonstrates, at the initiation stage, a 
major role played by government, as it responded to lobby efforts made by PWD Fed 
and its supporters to enact a special provision in the General Appropriations Act of 
the Philippines, to allocate 10 percent of the Department of Education’s (DepEd) 
school chair budget to cooperatives of PWDs. In the process, the government became 
a major and critical enabling stakeholder in the broader and operating environment of 
PWD Fed. However, PWD Fed faced a major crisis in 2010 as it decided not to take 
on a major contract from the DepEd. This happened because the price offered per 
school chair could not adequately cover the operating and other costs of production.  
This is ironic given that a social return on investment (SROI) study covering 2002-
2007 had already showed government as disproportionately benefitting from buying 
relatively cheaper and more durable chairs from PWD Fed. While none of the 
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stakeholders wanted to openly discuss corruption as an issue in relation to the failed 
DepEd contract, the researcher notes it may have played a role. Here we see the same 
government agency playing a disabling role,  and creating setbacks for PWD Fed.   
In the case of Alter Trade, the social enterprise and its enabling stakeholders 
pursued a strategy that enabled MIARBA and agrarian reform beneficiary partners to 
develop with them. Government played only a minimal legitimizing role in land 
redistribution. In the case of PWD Fed, giving up the 2010 DepEd contract while 
declaring a diversification strategy in terms of products and markets may mean it’s 
evolving a strategy that is not dependent on government. But considering that DepEd 
as a market evolved from its lobby and advocacy efforts to enact the law requiring 
the procurement of 10% of school chairs from PWD organizations, it may still be 
appropriate for PWD Fed to strengthen its lobby and advocacy efforts to address the 
policy-action gap.  
Here lies the importance of assisting the poor to overcome their capability 
deprivation not only in the internal organization of the social enterprise and the 
operating environment of the economic subsector, industry or value chain where the 
poor and the social enterprise are situated but also in the broader environment where 
they need to be pro-active players in their own development process. In the case of 
PWD Fed, engaging the government in the broader environment to enact and 
effectively implement legislation was what made possible and what would sustain the 
DepEd as a market for its school chairs. In the case of Alter Trade and their sugar 
farmer partner MIARBA, both need to enhance their efforts in engaging forces in the 
broader environment and strive to win the legal and political battle for land 
ownership.       
 Equally interesting is the disabling role that stakeholders of the social enterprises 
studied from the mainstream market enacted, as demonstrated by Upland Marketing 
(from pre-initiation to the development stage) and Tahanan (at the development 
stage). The logic of the mainstream export market of pushing prices down (as shown 
by Tahanan at the development stage) and the industry practice of supermarkets as 
distribution channels (as shown by the case of Upland Marketing) emphasize the 
importance of working beyond the operating environment. In these 2 cases, 
networking and advocacy of ethical or fair trade as expressions of corporate social 
responsibility in the market place, are potentially useful engagements with 
stakeholders in the broad environment that Upland Marketing and Tahanan could 
pursue to redefine the rules in their operating environment. To enable the poor as 
partners in this process, they would need to be empowered to perform   
transformational roles. 
Interestingly, SEPPS that have uncritically engaged mainstream market channels, 
whether at the international level (such as what Tahanan experienced with exporters 
during its development stage) or at the local level (such as what Upland Marketing 
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experienced with supermarket chains as market channels), or government as market 
for their products (such as what Tahanan and PWD Fed experienced with the DepEd) 
have encountered challenges that have affected their sustainability and viability. This 
suggests that SEPPS would need to have a clear agenda for change in dealing with 
mainstream markets, whether local or international, or in dealing with government as 
market, if they are to succeed in achieving their mission. Otherwise, they may end up   
mirroring if not absorbing the very problems of failed state and market institutions 
that they were set up to respond to. 
Amidst these negative experiences with state and market institutions, an 
important countervailing force that emerged as enabling stakeholders in most of the 
cases studied are development agencies in the North. 
These agencies in the North served as solidarity markets assisting product and 
enterprise development. They served as enabling partners supporting institutional 
development efforts and the delivery of transformational services to the poor. An 
important expression of the support coming from these enabling stakeholders was  
funding in the form of both grants and loans. Outstanding examples of development 
agencies in the North that served as enabling stakeholders in the cases are the 
following: 
 
 Bread for the World in Germany provided resources in the form of grants for 
Alter Trade’s Sustainable Agriculture for Sustainable Communities Program 
from 2002-2010, that transformed assetless sugar workers to become self-
sustaining farmer partners federated into the Negros Organic and Fair Trade 
Association; 
 Alter Trade Japan, Green Coop and other Japanese cooperatives supported the 
development of a small grower-based system of cultivating, harvesting and 
shipping Balangon bananas to Japan, including investments covering spoiled 
shipments and failed plantation production experiments 
 Christoffel Blinden Mission provided PWD Fed with a technical consultant 
and an annual organizational subsidy to initiate the school chair project and 
help develop strong primary cooperatives; 
 ICCO, the Dutch Interchurch Organization for International Development 
Cooperation, provided the resources for developing the capability of producer 
partners of Upland Marketing in value chain management; and   
 The sisters of the Immaculate Conception of Mary who initiated the 
establishment of Tahanan and continue to play an important role in the 
governance of Tahanan.  
 
These agencies may be contextualized as expressions of broader efforts to address 
the global dimensions of poverty. Net resource outflows to the North not only from 
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the Philippines but also from other countries in the South have been well documented 
by many scholars in the context of unequal trade, tied aid, and foreign direct 
investments. These net resource outflows have been criticized as sharing the 
responsibility for reproducing and exacerbating poverty in the South (Stiglitz, 2002; 
Bello, 2004; Broad and Cavanagh, 2009). Effectively harnessing these global forces 
in the broader environment to become enabling stakeholders of the operating 
environment of SEPPS is an important agenda for global poverty reduction. 
This suggests that SEPPS have and could perform critical catalyzing roles in 
mobilizing these development agencies in the North, as enabling institutions and 
markets, to bring about  North-South cooperation for global poverty reduction, in the 
Philippines and other similarly situated countries in the South. At the same time, 
SEPPS would need to invest more in developing support institutions including 
markets that share their vision and mission among local government and business 
institutions, and the local population as a whole.    
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Table 9.2.b. Indications of State and Market Failures and Response by SEPPS in Cases 
Social 
Enterprise 
Case 
Indication of Failure of 
Market Institutions 
Indication of Failure of 
State Institutions 
Social Enterprise 
Response 
Alter 
Trade 
Hunger among sugar 
workers in Negros 
Occidental 
 Landlords abandoned 
sugar lands as US 
lowered Philippine 
import quota 
 Local economy 
completely dependent on 
sugar with US as main 
market.    
Problematic 
implementation of 
agrarian reform law  
 Prolonged, 
unresolved land 
cases in agrarian 
courts  
 Inability of ARBs 
to pay amortizations  
Failure to provide 
support services to 97% 
of ARBs 
 Lands awarded 
unproductive 
 Landlords and 
traders (re) establish 
control  
Empowerment of 
agrarian reform 
beneficiaries (ARBs) to 
overcome poverty: 
 Participate in fair 
trade in the organic 
muscovado sugar 
 Diversify farm 
produce and income 
sources  
Assistance to ARBs in 
redeeming lands and 
resolving land claims  
Upland 
Marketing  
Refusal of mainstream 
traders and upland 
communities to engage in 
direct trading:  
 Farmers considered 
traders ‘heartless’  
 Traders saw farmers 
incapable of meeting 
volume, quality and 
delivery requirements 
Upland communities unable 
to reconcile meeting volume 
requirements of commodity 
trading and sustainable forest 
use    
 
Financial health of Upland 
Marketing threatened 
 Normal practice of 
supermarkets (payments 
after 60-120 days) 
 Fair trade practice of 
prompt payments among 
partner suppliers  
Policy-action gap in 
social forestry and 
agrarian reform: no 
program for building 
sustainable livelihoods 
in upland communities  
Creation of 
intermediary 
organization practicing 
fair trade to: 
 Provide sustainable 
livelihoods 
 Assist poor 
communities with 
product 
development and 
marketing  
 Provide access to 
mainstream markets 
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Social 
Enterprise 
Case 
Indication of Failure of 
Market Institutions 
Indication of Failure of 
State Institutions 
Social Enterprise 
Response 
PWD Fed Majority of PWDs unable to 
find/sustain employment in 
private sector despite Magna 
Carta for Disabled Persons 
Policy-action gap: 
 Affirmative policy 
of employing 5-
10% PWDs as staff 
in government   
 Procurement of 
10% of supplies 
from PWD 
cooperatives.    
 
Refusal of PWD Fed to 
enter contract with 
DepEd given 
unfavorable terms and 
conditions.   
PWD Fed as self-help 
initiative 
 Provide 
employment to 
PWDs 
 Promote their 
economic 
empowerment and 
inclusion 
 
Institution of 3 pronged 
strategy by PWD Fed 
 Training and job 
placement 
 Micro-enterprise 
development  
 Product/market 
diversification  
Tahanan Majority of PWDs unable to 
find/sustain employment in 
private sector despite Magna 
Carta for Disabled Persons 
 
Periods of no work for 
PWDs 
 Refusal to accept 
contracts with 
mainstream exporters 
priced below breakeven  
 Legal battle with 
mainstream exporter 
Policy-action gap (same 
as PWD Fed) 
 
Prolonged delays in 
payment of contracts by 
government  
 
Entry in regular bidding 
processes given 
inadequacy of 10% 
procurement policy for 
educational toys  
Setting up of sheltered 
workshops to employ 
PWDs 
 
 
Lamac 
MPC 
and  
Cordova 
MPC 
 
 
Lack of access of poor to 
financial services  
 
Dominance of informal 
money lenders charging 
usurious interest rates 
 
Lack of access of poor 
to basic social services 
and social protection  
 
Inability of government 
to provide social 
protection to poor 
 
Cooperatives as 
community mechanism 
 To pool and access 
resources 
 Provide financial 
services and social 
protection to poor 
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9.3.  Impact of Roles and Role Changes  
 
A cross case analysis of the impact of the roles and role changes on the 
enterprise, the poor served, and the poverty sector yielded interesting results. Table 
9.3. provides a summary across the 6 cases.   
The cases show that over time, enabling stakeholders from the internal 
organization, work with enabling stakeholders in the operating and broader 
environments to assist the poor overcome social exclusion (Tahanan, PWD Fed, 
Lamac MPC, Cordova MPC), food insecurity and income poverty, (Alter Trade, 
Upland Marketing) and capability deprivation beyond the enterprise and value chain 
(PWD Fed and Alter Trade).  
The SEPPS exhibiting the most significant qualitative social impact are those 
where the enabling processes resulted to helping the poor overcome capability 
deprivation to play transformational roles. This is observable in Alter Trade (sugar) 
and PWD Fed.   
The SEPPS exhibiting relatively high quantitative outreach among the poor 
(outreach of 3,000 and above) were Lamac MPC, Cordova MPC, Upland Marketing 
and Alter Trade (banana). While their qualitative social impact on the poor remained 
at the level of access to financial and social services leading to social inclusion and 
social mobility (for Lamac and Cordova MPC), as well as access to markets and 
increase in incomes (for Upland Marketing and Alter Trade-banana), it is noteworthy 
that they have reached thousands in multiple sites. These are the SEPPS that mainly 
delivered transactional services for the poor to better perform their transactional roles 
from initiation to development stages.    
The summary in Table 9.3. does not include the negative impact that was 
experienced by Tahanan  during the development phase of shifting from engaging the 
poor as worker-partners to engaging them as passive beneficiaries. It is important to 
reiterate what was extensively discussed in Chapter 6 to complete our analysis. The 
negative impact resulting from the shift to engaging the workers as passive 
beneficiaries may be characterized as fostering subservience, dependence and fear of 
unemployment. As explained in Chapter 6, this leads to what Sen (1999) has called 
psychological harm and hardening of social exclusion.    
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Table 9.3. Impact of Roles and Role Changes  
Social 
Enterprise 
Impact on 
Enterprise 
Scale of Reach Impact on Poor Served/Poverty 
Sector 
Alter Trade 
(sugar) and 
PWD Fed 
Facilitated more 
effective and 
efficient 
operations to 
meet market 
requirements 
 
Facilitated 
alignment of 
operations with 
vision/mission  
 
Facilitated 
assertion of 
PWDs to give 
more importance 
to integrity of 
production 
process within 
each primary 
cooperative rather 
than more 
efficiently 
meeting market 
requirements at 
the national level  
 
 
 
Alter Trade: 
820 sugar farmers in 
1 province 
 
PWD Fed: 
1,250 PWDs in 15 
primary cooperatives 
nationwide 
Provided substantial and regular income 
sources for unemployed PWDs with 
corresponding improvements in self-
esteem and self-worth resulting to social 
inclusion (among members) and 
empowerment (among leaders)   
 
For Alter Trade, moved people from 
absolute poverty to food sufficiency, on 
or above income poverty  (for sugar 
farmer partners) 
 
Greatly enhanced collective (self-
determining primary cooperatives and 
producer organizations) and individual 
capability (as exhibited by leaders) of 
the poor reached to create ‘actual 
opportunities’ to improve their ‘means 
of living’  
 
Created organizational mechanisms for 
the poverty sectors to engage civil 
society, market and government players 
to give more attention to plight and 
solutions to problems of PWDs (PWD 
Fed) and agrarian reform 
beneficiaries/farmers (NOFTA) 
Alter Trade 
(banana) 
and Upland 
Marketing 
 
 
 
 
 
Facilitated more 
effective and 
efficient 
operations to 
meet market 
requirements 
 
 
Alter Trade:  
3,493 banana 
growers spread 
nationwide 
 
Upland Marketing: 
3,000 poor 
producers in 60 
community-based 
enterprises 
nationwide 
 
 
 
 
Improved access to technologies and 
markets bringing about increased 
incomes 
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Social 
Enterprise 
Impact on 
Enterprise 
Scale of Reach Impact on Poor Served/Poverty 
Sector 
Tahanan Facilitated 
repositioning of 
organization to 
better serve 
PWDs 
273 PWD 
employees, workers, 
producers and 
students 
Created relatively sustained income 
streams with corresponding impacts on 
self-worth and self-esteem of PWDs 
reached103 
Lamac and 
Cordova 
MPC 
Created 
mechanism for 
pooling of 
community 
resources to 
deliver inclusive 
financial and 
social services  
Lamac:  
35,040 mainly 
entrepreneurial poor 
in various provinces  
 
Cordova: 
5,694 mainly 
entrepreneurial poor 
in 1 province 
Improved access to financial and social 
services among thousands of poor 
people resulting to social inclusion and 
facilitating social mobility  
 
9.4.  Patterns Defining Stakeholder Engagement Strategies 
Pursued by SEPPS in the Theoretical Sample 
 
Based on a cross case analysis of SEPPS in the theoretical sample, the dynamic 
process of how the poor are involved as stakeholders, as manifested in the roles and 
role changes they enact over time show interesting patterns. Three types of 
stakeholder engagement strategies are discernible: Type 1 (poor as passive 
beneficiary) is represented by Tahanan at the development stage; Type 2 (poor as 
transactional partner) is represented by Upland Marketing, Alter Trade-banana, 
Lamac MPC and Cordova MPC at the initiation and development stages; and Type 3 
(poor as transactional and transformational partner) is represented by Alter Trade-
sugar (development to renewal stages) and PWD Fed (initiation to renewal stages). 
These different types of stakeholder engagement strategies seem to involve distinct 
processes for engaging the poor. These engagement processes seem to be pursued 
through programs that provide transactional and transformational services facilitating 
the development of individual and group capabilities. The capabilities developed in 
turn enable the poor to enact transactional and/or transformational roles. The 
performance of these transactional and transformational roles by the poor in turn 
results to various levels of social impact.   
These patterns that define the three types of stakeholder engagement strategies 
pursued by SEPPS in the theoretical sample are systematized into a framework for 
understanding models of stakeholder engagement in Chapter 10. The dimensions 
                                                 
103 This was observed as a result of the role change from the development to the renewal stages.   
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differentiating the three stakeholder engagement models, consistent with the patterns 
observed among the SEPPS in the theoretical sample are: 
 
 Managerial orientation towards the poor; 
 Key engagement processes; 
 Nature of programs/services and delivery systems directed at the poor;  
 Nature of roles and capabilities developed among the poor; and 
 Social impact.   
 
These models are discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 10. 
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CHAPTER 10 – PROPOSITIONS AND 
CONTRIBUTIONS: ENRICHING SOCIAL 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND STAKEHOLDER 
THEORY 
 
 
This chapter develops propositions about social enterprises with the poor as 
primary stakeholders or SEPPS. These propositions are based on a cross case 
analysis of a theoretical sample of six Philippine-based SEPPS. Using case-
based theory building, it makes a contribution to social entrepreneurship and 
stakeholder theory. While needing further testing and replication in a broader 
sample of SEPPS in the Philippines and other countries in the South, it 
nevertheless contributes to the under-theorized area of stakeholder engagement.  
It also contributes to stakeholder discourse beyond the corporate context, where 
much of stakeholder theorizing has so far happened. It demonstrates the dynamic 
process of stakeholder engagement among SEPPS, in the process evolving three 
models: control, collaboration, and empowerment. It suggests the applicability of 
the propositions on SEPPS in countries in the South where systemic poverty is 
exacerbated by the failure of state and market institutions to address the needs of 
the poor. The thesis is a first step to developing a stakeholder theory for social 
enterprises with the poor as primary stakeholders, in the newly evolving 
academic field of social entrepreneurship. The thesis locates SEPPS as having a 
strong affinity to the social economy school of social entrepreneurship. It 
contributes a perspective from the South in social entrepreneurship theorizing in 
the context of the discourse being dominated by the American and European 
schools of thought. It emphasizes the need for collaborative research to better 
appreciate how contextual differences between North and South affect theorizing 
about social enterprises. 
 
 
This thesis uses case-based theory building (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007) to make a contribution to social entrepreneurship and stakeholder 
theory. It does so by sharing a perspective from the South and giving a voice to the 
poor as stakeholders. The researcher noted in her review of literature that overall, the 
poor and the South are under-represented in these discourses.   
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The thesis develops a framework for understanding how social enterprises serve 
the poor and address poverty. Poverty is defined as a deprivation of basic capabilities 
to achieve well being, rather than merely as low income (Sen, 1999; 2009).   
From a theoretical sample of six social enterprises in the Philippines where the 
poor are clients, workers, suppliers, as well as owners, it studies and develops 
propositions on social enterprises with the poor as primary stakeholders or SEPPS.  
Among SEPPS, it identifies two types of roles that the poor enact: transactional 
roles and transformational roles. As discussed in Chapter 9:   
 
 Transactional roles are enterprise-related functions performed by the poor that 
involve an exchange of goods or services for money including being workers, 
suppliers, clients, or owners; and 
 Transformational roles are functions performed by the poor as conscious 
agents of change to lift them from poverty and to participate in group efforts to 
improve the quality of life of their community, sector or society as a whole.  
 
Chapter 9 tracked these roles and the role changes among the poor in the theoretical 
sample, and discussed why and how these roles changed, or did not change over 
time. Role changes were in part, attributed to shifts in management orientation and 
the provision of enabling services that, similar to the roles, may be classified into 
transactional and transformational services. To reiterate what was discussed in 
Chapter 9:  
 
 Transactional services pertain to enterprise or market-driven activities, such as 
providing loans, demonstrating new technologies or conducting trainings that 
are necessary for the poor in the social enterprise system, to effectively and 
efficiently perform their roles as workers, suppliers, clients and owners; and   
 Transformational services pertain to activities that empower the poor, such as 
leadership formation and organizational development, asset build-up and 
providing education and experiential learning opportunities, to become 
conscious change agents for themselves, for their communities, sectors and 
society as a whole. 
Transactional services may be fee-based (for example loans) or non-fee based (for 
example trainings). Transformational services may be individually directed (like 
scholarships to finish high school and/or collage) or group directed (for example 
organizing and leadership formation).   
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The  roles and role changes that the poor enact in the social enterprises and their 
relevant environments, made possible by transactional and transformational services, 
may be seen as indicative of how the poor are involved as stakeholders. For social 
enterprises with the poor as primary stakeholders or SEPPS, these various ways of 
how the poor are involved may be equivalent to their stakeholder engagement 
strategy. Stakeholder engagement has been identified by scholars of the field as an 
under-theorized area of research (Greenwood, 2007; Sloan, 2009; Freeman et al., 
2010).   
This research is a contribution to this under-theorized area of stakeholder 
engagement. In particular, it highlights stakeholder engagement among social 
enterprises with the poor as primary stakeholders, which has not been done 
previously. Based on a cross-case analysis of the theoretical sample, the researcher 
develops a framework for defining models of stakeholder engagement utilized by 
SEPPS vis-à-vis the poor.    
 
10.1. Models of Stakeholder Engagement among Social 
Enterprises with the Poor as Primary Stakeholders 
(SEPPS) 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, past studies involving corporations have identified 
two models of stakeholder engagement, the control and collaboration models (Sloan, 
2009). The most salient dimensions characterizing these models are given in Table 
10.1. 
 
Table 10.1. Models of Stakeholder Engagement among Corporations (Sloan, 2009)  
Dimension Control Model Collaboration Model 
Corporate Focus Arm’s length engagement Inclusive engagement 
Manager orientation to 
stakeholders 
Stakeholders are a source of 
risk 
Stakeholders are a source of 
opportunity 
Key engagement processes Monitoring, listening, telling Collaborating, partnering, 
learning 
Relationship to core business 
process 
‘Bolted on’ to core business 
and strategic processes 
Integrated into core business 
and strategic process  
Potential for corporate change Limited change Transformative change  
Likely performance  Good  Great  
Source: Sloan, 2009 
 
An overall cross case analysis of the social enterprises studied suggests three 
models of stakeholder engagement among the poor: control, collaboration, and 
empowerment. As social enterprises with the poor as primary stakeholders, all of 
them have a purposive engagement with the poor. In this sense, their enterprise 
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focus, no matter the model is the same. This is unlike corporations where Sloan’s 
(2009) control model and collaboration models are characterized as having an arm’s 
length engagement and inclusive engagement with stakeholders, respectively.   
Given their nature as social enterprises with the poor as primary stakeholders or 
SEPPS, and based on a cross case analysis of the theoretical sample, the three 
stakeholder engagement models vary in terms of the following dimensions: 
 
 Managerial orientation towards the poor; 
 Key engagement processes;  
 Nature of roles and capabilities developed among the poor;  
 Nature of programs/services and structures/delivery systems involving the 
poor; and  
 Social impact.   
 
Table 10.2. details these differences. The common dimension and features 
differentiating the control and collaboration models for both corporations and social 
enterprises is the key stakeholder engagement processes: monitoring, listening, and 
telling for the control model and collaborating, partnering, and learning for the 
collaboration model. The empowerment model of stakeholder engagement is distinct 
and observable among SEPPS and has as key stakeholder engagement processes 
enabling, and empowering.  
On the empowerment model, the member cooperatives of the PWD Fed and the 
organized sugar farmer partners of Alter Trade at the grassroots level demonstrate the 
state of empowered workers and suppliers. PWD Fed itself and NOFTA, the 
federation of small producers initiated by the sugar farmers, did not only symbolize 
reaching a higher level of empowerment but also served as structures that facilitated 
the enactment of transformational roles by the poor. PWD Fed and NOFTA are not 
only representing the poor but also facilitating their engagement with state 
institutions and enabling stakeholders to improve the means of living of the poor in 
the PWD and small farmer sectors respectively.   
The state of empowered clients is included as within the realm of possibilities for 
the poor who are members of Cordova MPC and Lamac MPC, possibly during a 
renewal stage. Using the framework summarized in Table 10.3. such is theorized as 
possible with the introduction of certain changes discussed in Chapters 7, 8, and 9: a 
shift in managerial orientation towards the poor as transformational partners, the 
delivery of transformational services in the form of membership and  leadership  
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Table 10.2. Models of Stakeholder Engagement among SEPPS 
 
Dimension Control Model Collaboration Model Empowerment Model 
Enterprise  
Focus 
Purposive 
engagement with poor 
to improve their 
quality of life  
Purposive engagement with 
poor to improve their quality 
of life 
 
Purposive engagement with 
poor to improve their quality 
of life 
 
Managerial 
orientation 
towards poor  
Poor as passive 
beneficiary 
Poor as transactional partner Poor as transformational 
partner  
Key 
engagement 
processes 
Monitoring, listening, 
telling 
Collaborating, partnering, 
learning  
Enabling, empowering 
Nature of roles 
and 
capabilities 
developed 
among poor 
Passive workers, 
suppliers or clients  
Pro-active workers, suppliers 
or clients  
 
Partners in social enterprise 
and value chain management  
Empowered workers, 
suppliers or clients  
 
Organized partners in poverty 
reduction and community, 
sector and/or societal 
transformation  
Nature of 
programs/ 
services and 
structures/ 
delivery 
systems  
involving the 
poor  
Limited to fee-based 
transactional services  
Transactional services include 
capability building to ensure 
effective performance of 
transactional roles (fee based 
and non-fee based)  
 
Delivery system of 
transactional services 
integrated into operating 
systems  
Dedicated programs to enable 
performance of transactional 
and transformational roles   
 
Distinct delivery system for 
transformational services 
 
Distinct structures and 
systems set up to enable 
performance of 
transformational roles 
Impact on 
poor  
Limited with risk of 
fostering subservience 
and dependency 
leading to hardening 
of social exclusion  
Access to social and/or 
economic services leading to 
social inclusion  
 
Access dependent on 
continuing relationship with 
social enterprise  
 
Increases in incomes may not 
be adequate in overcoming 
income poverty  
Significant outcomes in 
overcoming capability 
deprivation and income 
poverty 
 
Outcomes derived from 
relationship with social 
enterprise and organized 
initiatives of poor themselves    
   
Case(s) 
Typifying 
Model 
Tahanan (dominant 
during development 
stage) 
Tahanan (initiation stage); 
Lamac MPC, 
Cordova MPC; Alter Trade 
(initiation stage for sugar 
farmers and banana growers;  
development stage for banana 
growers); Upland Marketing 
Alter Trade (development to 
renewal stage for sugar 
farmers; renewal stage for 
banana growers) 
PWD Fed (initiation, 
development and renewal 
stages) 
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development programs directed at significant segments of the poor, and affirmative 
mechanisms for representation in the cooperative’s governing bodies. In this changed 
context, Lamac and Cordova MPC could be transformed as the vehicles for the 
poor’s enactment of their transformational roles. Alternatively, mechanisms similar 
to the satellite cooperatives that Cordova MPC pursued at one stage, could become 
such vehicles, with the mother cooperatives (Lamac MPC and Cordova MPC) 
playing a supportive role.    
While the empowerment model of stakeholder engagement observed among 
SEPPS may be considered as an enhancement to stakeholder engagement models 
from literature emanating from the experience of the corporate or the private for-
profit sector, elements of the empowerment model may be considered as part of the 
defining features of “socio-economic initiatives which belong neither to the 
traditional private for profit sector nor to the public sector…. which is often called 
the non-profit sector or the social economy” (Defourny, 2001. p. 1). Cooperatives, 
mutual-type organizations and associations which have historically comprised the 
social economy adhere to “a democratic decision making process” involving 
members using the principle of one member, one vote (Defourny, 2001, p. 7).  This is 
carried over in social entrepreneurship literature, particularly by scholars of the social 
economy school where these ‘mutual social enterprises’ (Spear et al., 2010) are a 
part. Social economy scholars as exemplified by Defourny and Nyssens (2008, p. 
202) define social enterprises as not-for-profit private organizations that “…. rely on 
a collective dynamics involving various types of stakeholders in their governing 
bodies”.  
While collective dynamics and representation of various types of stakeholders in 
governing bodies can be noted in SEPPS, the distinctive feature of the empowerment 
model of stakeholder engagement is its giving primary importance to assisting the 
poor, who are coming from a state of capability deprivation (Sen, 1999), to acquire 
the knowledge, skills and confidence to become co-equal partners of the enabling 
stakeholders in the development process. Through transformational services 
delivered by the SEPPS, the poor go through a learning process of giving meaning to 
the democratic exercise of one person one vote and collective self-governance to 
become such co-equal partners.  
In the context of the South or developing economies like the Philippines, where 
many of the poor, as exemplified by Alter Trade’s partners and PWD Fed’s 
members, have not had the opportunity to complete even the first six years of basic 
education, the importance of such transformational services to empower the poor, 
and to make the cooperative model work for the poor, cannot be over emphasized.         
The empowerment model of stakeholder engagement among SEPPS, as 
exemplified by the cases of Alter Trade and PWD Fed utilized cooperatives and 
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associations governed by the poor themselves as vehicles for enacting 
transformational roles, as organized partners in their own process of poverty 
reduction, and in the broader process of development in their communities, sectors 
and society at large.  Over time, both Alter Trade and PWD Fed became multi-
organizational social enterprise systems, where the poor were assisted to 
progressively articulate their collective interests and exert greater influence in policy 
and decision making processes. While the poor were already formally the policy and 
decision-makers from the initiation stage in the case of the PWD Fed, it was in the 
renewal stage where they started to effectively assert their collective interest to give 
greater importance to their process of empowerment, even if it meant giving up a 
level of efficiency in serving the DepEd as market for school chairs. The PWD Fed 
also became a vehicle for nurturing PWDs to become co-equal members and to 
represent PWD interests in the General Assembly and Board of the Foundation for 
TheseAbled, which was meant to be a multi-stakeholder organization to support 
PWD empowerment and integration into mainstream society. In the case of Alter 
Trade, the poor, during the renewal stage, became co-equal partners in the social 
enterprise system as NOFTA developed into an independent federation of partner 
producer cooperatives and associations in addition to leaders from among these 
organizations becoming members of the Alter Trade Foundation General Assembly 
and Board.     
The empowerment model of stakeholder engagement has been demonstrated as 
having the most significant impact on the quality of life of the poor.  This brings us 
to Proposition 1. 
 
PROPOSITION 1: On the empowerment model of stakeholder 
engagement among SEPPS  
 
Social enterprises that empower the poor as transformational partners tend to 
have a significant qualitative impact on poverty reduction.  
 
The empowerment model, where the poor are transformational partners, demonstrate 
their overcoming income poverty and acquiring what Sen (1999) characterizes as 
capabilities to improve their means of living. These outcomes are not dependent on 
their participation in the value chains where the SEPPS are situated. They are 
outcomes in combination with initiatives by the empowered organizations of the poor 
themselves. Take the diversification of crops and sources of income initiated by the 
sugar farmers’ associations or cooperatives as example. It was these diversification 
efforts, in combination with the production of organic muscovado sold to Alter Trade 
that enabled a significant percentage of the sugar farmers to achieve food security 
and get out of income poverty. More profoundly, from being assetless, powerless 
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sugar workers who had just acquired small plots of land through agrarian reform, 
they became leaders and members of self-sustaining farmers cooperatives. These 
farmers’ cooperatives did not only serve as supplier partners of Alter Trade, they 
served as vehicles for planning and pursuing crop and income diversification as well 
as for undertaking joint projects such as the provision of financial services to other 
sugar farmers. They served as mechanisms for community development initiatives 
such as providing health care services. Beyond their community, NOFTA, the 
federation of producers’ organizations the sugar farmers established, served as co-
equal partner of Alter Trade in fair trade and sustainable agriculture organizing and 
advocacy. Overall, a continuing and sustainable process of improving the quality of 
life of these sugar farmers had been put in place, with their cooperatives and NOFTA 
as main vehicles.   
Similarly, the capability deprivation overcome by the PWDs, as symbolized by 
PWD Fed and their primary cooperatives, demonstrates the profound impact of the 
empowerment model on the lives of the PWDs. The federation and the cooperatives 
became their means to secure employment and create other economic and social 
opportunities for PWDs. Their regular income stream, and the improved self-worth 
and self-esteem of the PWDs resulted not only from participating in the school chair 
project per se, but in being active members and leaders of their self-governed 
cooperatives and cooperative federation. 
Now let’s examine the collaboration model of stakeholder engagement. As 
shown by Lamac MPC and Cordova MPC, Alter Trade (banana) and Upland 
Marketing, these SEPPS seem to have less qualitative impact.  Nevertheless, what 
SEPPS pursuing the collaboration model may lack in depth of impact seems to be 
compensated by the significance of their quantitative reach. This leads us to 
Proposition 2.   
 
PROPOSITION 2: On the collaboration model of stakeholder 
engagement among SEPPS    
 
Relative to social enterprises that engage the poor as transformational partners, 
social enterprises that engage the poor as transactional partners tend to reach a 
bigger number but with less qualitative impact on their poverty situation.   
 
Overall, the SEPPS in the theoretical sample that sustained a collaboration model of 
stakeholder engagement from initiation to development tended to reach more poor in 
more geographical areas. This was strongly demonstrated by Lamac MPC and 
Cordova MPC. Where PWD Fed and Alter Trade only reached hundreds of sugar 
workers and PWDs, Lamac MPC and Cordova MPC reached thousands. The cases of 
Lamac MPC and Cordova MPC show that they have been able to provide access to 
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financial and social services, employment and social protection leading to social 
inclusion and mobility among significant numbers of the poor. But in terms of 
qualitative impact on the poverty situation of the poor, PWD Fed and Alter Trade-
sugar clearly achieved a much higher level, especially if viewed from a multi-
dimensional perspective as well as in terms of participation and capability to improve 
their means of living. 
The Alter Trade case in Negros Island has been especially powerful in 
demonstrating a comparative qualitative impact between the empowerment and 
collaboration models. Alter Trade’s impact on the banana growers within Negros 
Island, whom they had engaged as transactional partners, was at most providing them 
a supplementary source of income. This is in contrast to Alter Trade’s dramatic 
impact on the sugar farmers, from a state of exclusion to a state of empowerment: as 
individuals with greater self-worth and self-esteem, as leaders and members of their 
primary cooperatives, and as leaders and members of NOFTA.      
The case of Upland Marketing, that pursued a collaboration model of stakeholder 
engagement, also supports this proposition in a different but interesting way. Among 
Upland Marketing’s organic rice farmer partners, it was the multiple sources of 
income from their pursuit of sustainable agriculture-related initiatives that moved 
them out of poverty, not just the trading of organic rice with Upland Marketing.  
These initiatives in sustainable agriculture resulted from the organic rice farmers’ 
partnership with other non-government organizations or NGOs. These other NGOs 
had integrated programs to organize farmers into cooperatives practicing sustainable 
agriculture. Upland Marketing was actually asked by these NGOs and farmers 
cooperatives to assist specifically with marketing. The outcomes manifested by these 
organic rice partners therefore may be considered a special case resulting from a 
combination of the transactional services provided by Upland Marketing and the 
transformational services provided by other NGOs. But it nevertheless strengthens 
the proposition we have made about the differentiated qualitative impact of the 
empowerment and collaboration models.         
Given that the poor are considered by SEPPS as primary stakeholders in a 
normative sense, it is expected that all SEPPS intend to positively impact on the 
quality of life of the poor. However, as shown by our framework for understanding 
the stakeholder engagement strategies of SEPPS, the control model has even a 
negative impact on the poor.   
At this point, it is important to bring into the discussion a summary of what was 
documented by the researcher as the intended and realized stakeholder engagement 
strategies of the SEPPS in the theoretical sample, guided by Mintzberg’s (2007) 
framework of strategy formation.   
Table 10.3. shows a comparison of the intended and realized stakeholder 
engagement strategies of the 6 case subjects across the three stages of initiation, 
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development and renewal. As shown in the table, the intended strategy did not 
always become the realized stakeholder engagement strategy. 
As shown in Table 10.3. none of the SEPPS intended a control strategy of 
stakeholder engagement. The only indication where it became an unintended but 
realized strategy was in the case of Tahanan during its development stage. As 
discussed in Chapter 6 Section 7, this was characterized as a period where Tahanan 
experienced a mission drift. Given this observation, one may argue that only the 
collaboration and empowerment models deserve to be considered as significant 
stakeholder engagement strategies among SEPPS.    
 
Table 10.3. Intended and Realized Stakeholder Engagement Strategies among SEPPS across Stages 
 
SEPPS 
Intended Stakeholder 
Engagement Strategy 
Realized Stakeholder 
Engagement Strategy 
Initiation Development Renewal Initiation Development Renewal 
Alter 
Trade 
(sugar 
farmers) 
 
Empowerment 
 
Empowerment 
 
Empowerment 
 
Collaboration 
 
Empowerment 
 
Empowerment 
Alter 
Trade-
(banana 
growers) 
 
Empowerment 
 
Empowerment 
 
Empowerment 
 
Collaboration 
 
Collaboration 
 
Empowerment 
Upland 
Marketing
 
Collaboration 
 
Collaboration 
 
 
 
Collaboration 
 
Collaboration 
 
PWD Fed  
Empowerment 
 
 
Empowerment 
 
Empowerment 
 
Empowerment 
 
Empowerment 
 
Empowerment 
Tahanan  
Collaboration 
 
Collaboration 
 
Collaboration 
 
Collaboration 
 
Control 
 
Collaboration 
Lamac  
MPC 
 
Empowerment  
 
Empowerment 
  
Collaboration 
 
Collaboration 
 
 
Cordova  
MPC  
 
Empowerment  
 
Empowerment 
  
Collaboration 
 
Collaboration 
 
 
However, the researcher believes that the usefulness of including the control 
model in the framework for understanding stakeholder engagement strategies among 
SEPPS has 2 dimensions.   
 
 The first dimension has to do with making explicit the risks and potential 
negative consequences when SEPPS pursue the control model of stakeholder 
engagement, even if unintentionally; and   
 The second dimension has to do with providing a comparative point for 
engaging scholars and practitioners on business and society. It is important to 
highlight the risks and potential negative consequences of pursuing the control 
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model of stakeholder engagement. Such may be extrapolated as similar to the 
risks and consequences that may be experienced by Base of the Pyramid 
(BOP) enterprises or corporations, when they wittingly or unwittingly pursue 
the control model of stakeholder engagement.  
 
Considering its usefulness as a theoretical construct, a proposition on the control 
model is in order.    
 
PROPOSITION 3: On the control model of stakeholder engagement 
among SEPPS  
 
Social enterprises that engage the poor as passive beneficiaries have a tendency 
to foster subservience and dependency that may lead to the hardening of social 
exclusion. This results in a limited or even a negative impact on the poor, 
associated with mission drift among SEPPS.   
.       
Tahanan’s mission of providing meaningful employment to PWDs and engaging 
them as partners in their rehabilitation process was de-prioritized when the control 
model was pursued, although unintentionally. We do not want to overly draw 
attention to an experience during a specific period in only one of the theoretical 
cases, but the occurrence shows how a well-meaning stakeholder engagement 
strategy of collaboration could deteriorate to a control strategy. Tahanan’s experience 
of such when they brought in a business-oriented professional team to manage the 
sheltered workshops to meet the requirements of mainstream export markets is 
particularly informative. As SEPPS scale up impact, well-intentioned efforts to 
professionalize management are usually a response to the challenge of balancing 
social and enterprise goals. In this context, the caution provided by the control model 
in our framework for understanding stakeholder engagement strategies among 
SEPPS, needs to be complemented by a better understanding of the factors that 
would define a shift from control to collaboration, or more broadly, how the 
collaboration model can be effectively pursued. This brings us to Proposition 4. 
 
Proposition 4: On the effective pursuit of a collaboration model of 
stakeholder engagement  
 
SEPPS intending or pursuing a collaboration model of stakeholder engagement 
tend to be effective when managers view the poor as partners and provide for 
their effective participation in social enterprise or value chain management.    
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As indicated in Table 10.3. providing for the effective participation of the poor in 
social enterprise and value chain management entails capacity development as well 
as installing structures and systems to make this possible. The experiences of 
Tahanan and Upland Marketing are informative in demonstrating these. Tahanan’s 
case shows how individually directed transformational services (through scholarships 
for completing high school and college degrees as well as personality development, 
management and leadership courses) could develop a critical mass of pro-active 
workers and staff emanating from the poor. As shown by Tahanan, the best among 
them could be appointed to supervisory and management positions over time.  
Coupled with participatory management systems involving the rank and file workers, 
Tahanan powerfully demonstrates how to effectively make the excluded poor 
partners in social enterprise management. Upland Marketing on the other hand shows 
how non-fee based transactional services such as trainings on market trends and 
production technologies coupled with regular venues for planning and negotiations, 
could develop suppliers among the poor to become partners in value chain 
management. The effect of fostering participation in social enterprise and value chain 
management is improved effectiveness and efficiency of the poor in delivering the 
quality and quantity of products required by the markets of SEPPS. This is the 
essence of engaging the poor as transactional partners.   
In addition, a synthesis of what the cooperative cases as SEPPS demonstrated is 
in order: PWD Fed, Lamac MPC and Cordova MPC are SEPPS where the poor are 
all owners. By design, the poor are formally part of their respective governance 
systems. However, it was only the poor in PWD Fed who actualized their role as full 
fledged owners. This demonstrates the dual character of the poor as owners as 
discussed in Chapter 9: it has a transactional nature but also a transformational 
potential. The role of the poor as owner remains transactional unless corresponding 
services are delivered to realize this transformational potential. Formal ownership by 
the poor of SEPPS is an important but inadequate condition for the pursuit of 
empowerment.   
Moreover, the relative success demonstrated by the primary cooperative members 
of PWD Fed and the sugar farmer partner cooperatives of Alter Trade are important 
to note. These may be compared to the failed cooperative and pre-cooperative 
formations of the poor before the professionals took over in Lamac MPC and 
Cordova MPC. These substantiate the importance of a combination of transactional 
and transformational services in cooperatives as SEPPS. Without these services, self-
help cooperatives of the poor will mirror their capability deprivation and fail. 
However, as shown by the cases of PWD Fed and Alter Trade, which dramatically 
transformed the lives of the assetless and powerless persons with disability (PWDs) 
and sugar workers, a combination of transactional and transformational services 
could create success stories. This is actually supported in part, by the more than 80 
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studies cited by Sibal (1993) in his research on 100 years of the Philippine 
cooperative movement. Sibal cites the lack of education and training as the main 
reason for the failure of many cooperatives in the Philippines.  
Using Table 10.3. as an aid, we would note that while all three cooperative cases 
(Lamac MPC, Cordova MPC and PWD Fed) had empowerment as an intended 
strategy, only the PWD Fed realized it. The three elements that would effect a shift 
from collaboration to empowerment as realized stakeholder engagement strategy for 
Lamac MPC and Cordova MPC was already mentioned in the earlier discussion in 
this chapter on the empowerment model: a shift in managerial orientation towards the 
poor as transformational partners, the delivery of transformational services in the 
form of membership and leadership development programs directed at significant 
segments of the poor, and affirmative mechanisms for self-governance and 
representation in the cooperative’s governing bodies. Appreciating these 
requirements are important for cooperatives as SEPPS given the reality of capability 
deprivation among the poor and inequality in developing countries in the South 
However, there is an additional dimension about the nature of Lamac and Cordova 
MPC that needs to be given attention.   
The Lamac and Cordova MPC experiences seem to reflect the international trend 
towards communitarianism among cooperatives observed by Borzaga and Spear 
(2004) and provide insights on rethinking the traditional cooperative concept of 
democracy to ensure interest harmonization among various stakeholders while 
keeping the difficult balance between productive and social aims. As SEPPS in a 
developing country context where various segments among the poor such as farmers, 
fishers, workers in the formal and informal sector, and the entrepreneurial poor have 
become members, the question of workable mechanisms to effectively represent their 
interests and harness their participation in governance structures, as articulated by 
Borzaga and Spear (2004) comes to the fore. This is consistent with the question of 
how to effectively give stakeholders with differing interests a voice and vote in the 
context of multi-stakeholder governance (Vidal, 2010). This brings us to Proposition 
5, specific to cooperatives as SEPPS. This discussion also contributes to Proposition 
6 which defines the factors that shape how cooperatives and other forms of SEPPS 
may realize a stakeholder engagement strategy of empowerment:   
 
Proposition 5: On cooperatives as SEPPS 
 
Cooperatives that count among their members various segments of the poor will 
tend to fail in giving these stakeholders an effective voice and vote unless these 
various segments of the poor are provided transformational services and 
mechanisms to practice self-governance as foundation for multi-stakeholder 
governance.      
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Given the capability deprivation of the poor, it is not enough to implement the 
principle of one person one vote in a cooperative where various segments of the poor 
are members. As shown by the Lamac and Cordova MPC cases, even as the poor had 
the right to elect and be elected in their governance bodies, they generally felt they 
were not in a position to become leaders and to make decisions for the cooperative. A 
necessary prerequisite is developing their consciousness and capability to articulate 
and work for their interests as farmers, fishers, entrepreneurial poor and to represent 
such interests in multi-stakeholder governance bodies. Such entails developing 
mechanisms for self-governance. A theoretical example of how this could be pursued 
may be organizing satellite-type cooperatives such as what Cordova MPC initiated at 
one stage for various segments of the poor, and providing for their representation in 
the mother cooperative’s governance structures. A clear element making the 
empowerment model distinct is the performance of the poor of transformational roles 
– the poor themselves become partners in poverty reduction and community/sectoral 
and societal transformation. However, it is important to reiterate that such is in 
addition to making the poor perform their transactional roles as workers, clients, 
suppliers and owners. It goes without saying that the poor as transformational 
partners, also assumes the effective performance of their transactional roles.   
On the whole, Proposition 5 validates the importance of governance as an 
important element that defines SEPPS. It also shows the affinity of the concept of 
SEPPS to the social economy school of social entrepreneurship. Among the three 
schools of thought on social entrepreneurship, it is only the social economy school 
that highlights multi-stakeholder governance as an important characteristic of social 
enterprises. This is reflected in the EMES definition that lists the following social 
dimension in its criteria of an ideal type of social enterprise:   
 
“A participatory nature, which involves the persons affected by the activity: 
Representation and participation of customers, stakeholder orientation and a 
democratic management style are important characteristics of social enterprises. In 
many cases, one of the aims of social enterprises is to further democracy at the local 
level through economic activity”. (Defourny, 2001, p. 20)  
 
Enabling the poor to enact transactional roles entails enterprise or market-driven, 
output-oriented services, similar to what are provided by the collaboration models of 
stakeholder engagement. Empowering the poor to enact transformational roles entails 
stakeholder-driven, process-oriented services. What insights can be drawn from the 
experience of SEPPS in simultaneously providing these services? The delivery 
systems in terms of program components and staffing for these services are quite 
different and evidence from the cases suggests they cannot be accommodated in the 
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same organizational structure or unit. This is an important detail related to the 
effective process of enabling the poor to enact both transactional and 
transformational roles.   
The need for distinct delivery systems for transformational services was clearly 
shown in the case of Alter Trade which evolved into a multi-organizational system 
with a foundation and three corporations – one engaged in marketing and 
distribution, another in manufacturing and the third in organic fertilizer production. 
The foundation focused on transformational services while the corporations provided 
different transactional services for the sugar farmer partners. In the case of the 
banana grower partners, Alter Trade experienced major problems when the 
corporation delivering transactional services was tasked with the delivery of 
transformational services. In the end, Alter Trade decided to transfer all 
transformational services for both sugar farmer and banana grower partners to the 
foundation.   
Interestingly, the case of Upland Marketing also supports the importance of 
distinct delivery systems for transactional and transformational services. Upland 
Marketing Foundation Inc., was conceived by the Upland NGO Committee (UNAC) 
to be mainly a delivery system for transactional services. At the time that UNAC 
conceived of Upland Marketing, UNAC members were focused on providing 
transformational services, and saw transactional services as a weak area of their 
development interventions.   
In the case of PWD Fed, a separate structure was not set up to deliver 
transformational services to its members but a distinct membership development 
program was put in place, separate from the school chair enterprise operations. The 
initiation of the Foundation for TheseAbled however may be an indication that 
leaders within PWD Fed may be feeling the limitation or difficulty of putting the 
delivery of both the transactional and transformational services for PWD 
cooperatives and PWD Fed itself within PWD Fed. This is indicated by the role they 
articulated for PWD Fed – that of economic empowerment and inclusion of PWDs – 
focused on creating employment and self-employment opportunities. The foundation 
on the other hand would focus on supporting PWD Fed in other aspects of PWD 
empowerment.     
The combined insights from the cooperative cases and this discussion on how 
PWD Fed and Alter Trade may be pursuing or may be closing the gap between their 
intended and realized stakeholder engagement strategy leads us to Proposition 6.  
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Proposition 6: On shifting from a collaboration to an empowerment 
model of stakeholder engagement 
 
SEPPS wanting to shift from a collaboration to an empowerment model of 
stakeholder engagement tend to succeed with managers and programs oriented 
towards the poor as transformational partners. These programs tend to fail in the 
absence of dedicated structures and systems to deliver transformational services 
complemented by dedicated structures and systems to serve as venues for the 
performance of transformational roles. The establishment of distinct structures to 
ensure the delivery of transformational services and to provide venues for the 
poor’s performance of transformational roles would tend to result to SEPPS as 
multi-organizational systems.  
 
Dedicated structures for delivering transformational services may take the form of 
foundations like in the case of Alter Trade, or adequately staffed departments or units 
serving as implementing structures for membership development programs for 
cooperatives. Dedicated structures and systems to serve as venues for the 
performance of transformational roles may be primary cooperatives or associations 
of the poor that are linked to the core organization, and at a higher level, federations 
like PWD Fed (which is the core organization of the SEPPS itself) or NOFTA, that 
co-exists with the core organization of the SEPPS (in this case Alter Trade).   
A review of the theoretical example of the satellite cooperatives as structures 
indicates that they may also serve as venues for the poor to enact transformational 
roles, beyond being mechanisms for representation. For example, in the case of 
Cordova MPC, a satellite cooperative for fishers could serve both to represent fishers 
in Cordova MPC’s board, as well as to provide a venue for the fishers to undertake 
initiatives important to their poverty group: a coastal resource management program 
to rehabilitate their municipal fishing grounds may be a possibility. In the case of 
Lamac MPC, a satellite cooperative for farmers could serve both to purposively 
represent the farmers in Lamac MPC’s board, as well as to provide a venue for the 
farmers to set up a program to pursue important issues affecting their poverty group:  
the resolution of lingering land tenure issues or the setting up of an irrigation system 
to improve the productivity of their lands may be possibilities. These are just 
illustrative examples. In reality, the cooperatives could develop what may be 
effective ways of representing poverty groups in their governing boards as well as 
encouraging them to develop mechanisms for articulating and acting on issues 
affecting their rights and welfare. This may be systematized into a sectoral agenda 
for change per poverty group.     
So far, the propositions have been about collaboration and empowerment as 
distinct models of stakeholder engagement. There are indications from the cases of 
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Upland Marketing and Alter Trade that it may be possible to conceive of combining 
the depth of impact of the empowerment model and the breadth of reach of the 
collaboration model. This seems to have been pursued by the Upland NGO 
Assistance Committee when they set up Upland Marketing to provide transactional 
services, to complement the transformational services being provided by their 
members. This seems to have also been pursued by Alter Trade in engaging 
Balangon banana growers in their efforts to organize and/or partner with regional and 
local formations to work with them outside of Negros Island.   
However, the researcher notes that it was outside of the scope of this research to 
study in full the interventions of Upland NGO Assistance Committee (UNAC) 
members or even UNAC itself in partnership with Upland Marketing. We could say 
the same for Alter Trade’s intervention among banana growers involving indigenous 
and other upland communities in partnership with various groups outside of Negros 
Occidental. As follow up studies, these cases could potentially provide insights from 
which to develop propositions on scaling up impact among SEPPS pursuing what 
seems to be a combination of empowerment and collaboration strategies.  
 
10.2. Applicability of Propositions on SEPPS    
 
Chapter 9 provided a detailed discussion about how the cases in the theoretical 
sample exemplify SEPPS as responses to the failure of state and market institutions 
to address the needs of the poor. These propositions are therefore suggested to be 
applicable in countries other than the Philippines where state and market institutions 
have failed to address various needs of the poor.   
Moreover, the researcher also suggests the applicability of these propositions to 
other countries in the South104, where massive poverty has been the result of similar 
factors causing such in the Philippines. The relevant factors directly causing poverty 
in the Philippines that were articulated by Schelzig (2005) in an Asian Development 
Bank-commissioned study are useful reference points:  
 
 Macroeconomic policies that have resulted to economic growth but have not 
reduced poverty;  
 Unemployment and underemployment especially in agriculture, forestry and 
fishery;  
 Unchecked population growth;  
 Structural issues in the agricultural sector including a problematic agrarian 
reform program and ineffective policy and service support to small farmers;  
                                                 
104As discussed in Chapter 1, the South refers to developing economies.  The North refers to developed economies.  
The North-South divide is often used to characterize the inequitable global economic order among nations  
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 Governance concerns including corruption and an ineffective state that is 
unable to deliver basic services;  
 Armed conflict; and 
 Disability caused by malnutrition, unsanitary living conditions, accidents and 
injuries, with most persons with disabilities living in poverty. 
 
While the researcher suggests the applicability of these propositions to SEPPS as 
a whole, she clarifies that the current findings based on her theoretical sample of 
three pairs of SEPPS in the Philippines need to be further tested and replicated 
among a broader sample of SEPPS not only in the Philippines but in other countries 
in the South.   
While SEPPS are responses to the failure of state and market institutions in the 
South to meet the needs of the poor, they also find themselves operating in this same 
context as SEPPS. As shown in Chapter 9, state and mainstream market institutions 
have often enacted disabling roles, in the process affecting the sustainability of some 
of the SEPPS. This was reflected in the cases of Upland Marketing in engaging 
supermarkets and Tahanang Walang Hagdanan in engaging mainstream exporters in 
the past. To a certain extent, this is also reflected in the difficulties that Tahanan and 
PWD Fed have had in engaging DepEd as market for educational toys and school 
chairs. In this regard, there is reason to caution SEPPS about ‘uncritically’ engaging 
mainstream market channels or government institutions as markets.   
The researcher is by no means proposing non-engagement with mainstream 
market channels or government institutions but is however cautioning SEPPS and 
proposing the importance of reframing their engagements with mainstream market 
channels and government institutions. This may be similar to what Tucker (2006) 
refers to as an agenda for change which he considers critical for fair trade 
organizations to clarify to effectively engage big companies like transnationals and 
supermarkets.  Such reframing is important so that these SEPPS would not jeopardize 
or sacrifice their mission to improve the quality of life of the poor or their 
sustainability in pursuing their mission. To illustrate, Upland Marketing may need to 
pioneer the pursuit of fair trade as corporate social responsibility (CSR) in dealing 
with the supermarkets as market channels. As SEPPS, Upland Marketing may be in a 
position to contribute to the search and development of what Jeppesen and Lund- 
Thomsen (2010) call locally appropriate solutions to make fair trade as CSR more 
responsive to the interests of the poor in the South. At the same time, Tahanan and 
PWD Fed, in partnership with the Foundation for TheseAbled, may need to enhance 
their efforts to make government more accountable in closing the gap between policy 
and action in relation to PWD rights and welfare. In continuing to engage the DepEd 
as market for educational toys and school chairs, they may need to work with other 
SEPPS to institute what Sen (1999) calls transparency guarantees to prevent 
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corruption, financial irresponsibility and underhand dealings. These kinds of critical 
perspectives in dealing with mainstream market channels and government as market 
are important for SEPPS not to become mirrors of the institutional failures in society 
that they were set up to overcome.   
In the process of crafting creative ways of reframing engagements with 
mainstream markets and government institutions, the role of institutions in the North 
to serve as countervailing institutions have been demonstrated in all cases, without 
exception. As summarized in Chapter 9, institutions in the North have provided 
financial, technical and human resources for institution building and to allow SEPPS 
to deliver various forms of transactional and transformational services to the poor.  
These range from serving as solidarity markets assisting product and enterprise 
development to providing program funds and consultants. In some cases, notably 
PWD Fed and Tahanan, these institutions have directly initiated the setting up of the 
SEPPS themselves.      
In this process of South-North cooperation, the empowerment of the poor to 
enact transformational roles in the broad social-political environment of SEPPS has 
been demonstrated as feasible and critical. The empowerment model of stakeholder 
engagement among SEPPS is particularly important for the poor to become active 
stakeholders in overcoming their capability deprivation amidst inequality and the 
failure of state and market institutions in the South.   
SEPPS that pursue an empowerment model of stakeholder engagement may be 
seen as building blocks for a more equitable economic development process in the 
South. As mechanisms for South-North cooperation, they could show policy makers, 
resource institutions and practitioners in government, the business sector and civil 
society, how the poor and their interests may be put at the center of the economic 
development process.  
   
10.3. Contribution to Stakeholder Theory 
 
The findings of this thesis contribute to the conception of stakeholder theory for 
social enterprises. This is important considering that stakeholder theory has mainly 
evolved from the perspective and experience of corporations. Bevan and Werhane 
(2010) refer to this as the ‘corporate-centricity’ of stakeholder theorizing. In this 
context, leading scholars of stakeholder theory have called for a ‘richer description’ 
of stakeholder engagement strategies or models, a ‘redescription’ of organizations 
other than corporations in stakeholder terms and ‘relating descriptions’ of different 
types of organizations to stakeholder theory (Freeman, et al., 2010).    
This thesis makes a direct contribution to the aforementioned call for a ‘richer 
description’ of stakeholder engagement strategies or models. Stakeholder 
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engagement is considered an under-theorized area in stakeholder literature 
(Greenwood, 2007; Sloan, 2009; Freeman et al., 2010). 
This study shares the normative approach that most stakeholder literature in 
public and environmental policy as well as natural resource management has 
adopted. From the perspective of Freeman et al., (2010), such emphasizes 
stakeholder engagement as a process of stakeholder dialogue with larger normative 
goals. In this non-corporate context, issues of poverty, under representation, and the 
need for critical stakeholders who are often underappreciated to represent organized 
constituencies, are given importance (Grimble and Wellard, 1997; Beutler, 2005). 
This thesis validated the importance of organizing and capacitating the poor as 
primary stakeholders of SEPPS to give them a voice and vote. This perspective goes 
beyond stakeholder dialogue towards larger normative goals described by Freeman et 
al., (2010). It has greater affinity to the concept of stakeholder engagement that social 
entrepreneurship scholars in the social economy school refer to as multi-stakeholder 
governance (Spear et al., 2010; Vidal, 2010).    
While sharing these normative perspectives spanning stakeholder dialogue and 
multi-stakeholder governance, this thesis adds value to stakeholder engagement 
literature in two ways   
 
 Its focus on tracking the dynamic process of how social enterprises in a 
developing country context have engaged the poor as stakeholders; and  
 How changes in the way social enterprises engaged the poor affected  their 
impact on the poor as stakeholders.  
 
As has been discussed, this thesis develops a framework for understanding 
stakeholder engagement models among SEPPS. It explored the application of the 
elements of Sloan’s (2009) conception of the control and collaboration models of 
stakeholder engagement among corporations as a starting point. But the elements 
used by Sloan (2009) could not adequately characterize much of what the cases 
brought to life, except in one aspect. The control and collaboration model of 
stakeholder engagement among SEPPS are similar to Sloan’s (2009) conception only 
in terms of key engagement processes: monitoring, listening, and telling for the 
control model and collaborating, partnering, and learning for the collaboration model. 
The researcher then evolved a distinct set of elements to characterize the stakeholder 
engagement models among SEPPS, redefining much of what the control and 
collaboration models meant in social enterprise terms, beyond these key engagement 
processes. In the process, a third model evolved whose key engagement processes 
were enabling and empowering. The distinct elements characterizing and 
differentiating these three models of stakeholder engagement among the poor, 
beyond key engagement processes are: managerial orientation towards the poor; roles 
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and capabilities developed among the poor; nature of programs/services and 
structures/delivery systems involving the poor; and social impact vis-à-vis the poor.  
While social impact was an element in the Sloan (2009) model, the conception of 
social impact was very specific to the poor in this study, unlike the general and broad 
conception of corporate social performance among corporations in the study where 
Sloan based her paper (Zollo et al., 2007). Unlike the corporate models that exhibited 
an arms length engagement (for the control model) and inclusive engagement (for the 
collaboration model), the focus of the social enterprises, no matter the model of 
stakeholder engagement pursued, was purposive engagement with the poor to 
improve their quality of life. This follows from their consideration of the poor as 
primary stakeholders in a normative sense.   
In the corporate context of stakeholder management, the control and 
collaboration models are similar to what Daft (1992) and Harrison and St. John 
(1994) referred to as the two basic postures for managing stakeholders: buffering and 
bridging. Buffering is described as a low-interaction stakeholder management 
approach. It involves monitoring activities with the purpose of containing the effects 
of stakeholders on a firm. Bridging lowers organizational barriers, builds on 
interdependencies, recognizes common goals, and includes the formation of longer 
term relationships (Freeman et al., 2010). In a limited way, aspects of the 
empowerment model of stakeholder engagement developed by this thesis has 
similarities with the empowerment and constructive engagement perspective 
proposed by Mena et al., (2010) in their study about businesses playing  an active 
role in the protection of human rights.    
The empowerment model of stakeholder engagement in SEPPS may be seen as 
focusing on assisting the poor as primary stakeholders to overcome capability 
deprivation so they may have an effective voice and vote in the context of a multi-
stakeholder governance system. Framed this way, the affinity of the empowerment 
model of stakeholder engagement is clear with the multi-stakeholder governance 
perspective of the social economy school of social entrepreneurship. While not 
explicitly locating their studies in stakeholder theory, social entrepreneurship 
scholars from the social economy school have provided a perspective on stakeholder 
engagement that goes beyond stakeholder dialogue: they have theorized that social 
enterprises are multi-stakeholder organizations  (Spear et al., 2010) that at their best 
employ multi-stakeholder governance, defined as a state where commitments 
approved by different stakeholder groups define organizational direction (Vidal, 
2010).  
An interesting research agenda is whether the three models of stakeholder 
engagement among SEPPS developed by this thesis would be relevant among other 
enterprises, such as small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and corporations, which 
engage the poor as customers, suppliers and employees. These have been called base 
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of the pyramid (BOP) enterprises by some scholars (Kandachar and Halme, 2007; 
Singer, 2008; Davidson, 2009, Habib and Zurawacki, 2010). Certainly, a more 
immediate research agenda is to test the propositions of the thesis about SEPPS and 
stakeholder engagement models in different countries in the South.   
In the process of the cross-case analysis, the researcher considered some of the 
analytical tools developed by scholars that use the stakeholder approach in the more 
established field of strategic management: the conception of primary stakeholders 
(Carrol, 1993; Clarkson, 1998; Gibson, 2000; Freeman, et al., 2010) as well as the 
management of stakeholder types and their location in regions of the stakeholder 
environment (Harrison and St. John, 1994; Post et al., 2002a,b; Freeman et al., 2010).   
The consideration of the poor as primary stakeholders by this study takes on a 
normative approach as articulated by Donaldson and Preston (1995). The poor as 
primary stakeholders are the reason for being of the social enterprise, with the 
explicit intent to improve their quality of life, pursuing such using a distributive 
enterprise philosophy and guided by a broader normative goal of poverty reduction.  
This study on the poor as primary stakeholders goes beyond what Donaldson and 
Preston (1995) characterized as the descriptive and instrumental approaches of 
stakeholder theorizing. Beyond describing the poor as performing the roles of 
worker, supplier, client or owner, this thesis showed how SEPPS enable the poor to 
play these transactional roles more effectively. Beyond showing how the poor enact 
transactional roles to ensure their contribution to enterprise performance, this thesis 
shows how SEPPS engage the poor to play transactional and transformational roles 
to assist them overcome what Sen (1999, 2009) calls ‘capability deprivation’. 
Locating the poor and the roles they play over time in the various regions of the 
stakeholder environment defined by Harrison and St. John (1994, 1998) proved 
useful. However, this thesis went beyond locating and managing the poor as 
stakeholders in the internal environment as owners and workers; or as stakeholders in 
the operating environment as suppliers and customers. The thesis showed that among 
SEPPS, there are stakeholder engagement processes that consciously aim to influence 
components of the broader environment. This goes beyond corporate models of 
stakeholder management that characterize ‘the firm’ as having ‘little or no influence 
over components of the broader environment’ (Freeman et al., 2010). However, these 
findings on SEPPS engaging the broader social-political environment are consistent 
with studies involving social enterprises. Social enterprises have been characterized 
by some scholars as being distinct from business enterprises in pursuing broader 
political goals particularly when they are confronted with and need to change the 
unfavorable context within which they operate (Huybrechts and Defourny, 2008; 
Nyssens, 2006; Martin and Osberg, 2007; Austin et al., 2006).      
The empowerment model of stakeholder engagement defined a dynamic process 
of enabling the poor to enact transformational roles as partners of SEPPS in the broad 
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environment. The purpose of such is to harness local and global social, economic and 
political forces to serve as enabling institutions and markets to assist SEPPS, and to 
pressure or serve as countervailing forces to state and market institutions that are 
causing and exacerbating poverty in the South. In this sense, SEPPS pursuing the 
empowerment model of stakeholder engagement are important catalysts for 
mobilizing North-South cooperation for global poverty reduction.  
 
10.4. Contribution to Social Entrepreneurship Theory 
  
This thesis is a contribution to social entrepreneurship theorizing, characterized 
as embryonic as a topic of academic inquiry by Short, et al., (2009). By developing a 
framework for understanding stakeholder engagement models among social 
enterprises with the poor as primary stakeholders or SEPPS, it made a first step 
towards extending stakeholder theory in a prominent type of social enterprise in 
countries in the South. In doing so, it also contributed to social entrepreneurship as a 
topic of academic inquiry by undertaking an empirical study involving a theoretical 
sample and applying the rigorous method of case-based theory building (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).    
While this thesis shares similar contextual starting points to Mair and Marti’s 
(2009) exploration of the concept of institutional voids in the South105 that have 
created fertile grounds for social enterprises, it differs in its focus on extending 
stakeholder theory. While this thesis also studies types of social entrepreneurship that 
transform sectors (Hockerts, 2010), it differs in its focus on stakeholder engagement 
strategies and their impact on the poor.     
SEPPS may be appreciated as counterparts in the South, in terms of prominence 
and importance, of work integration social enterprises or WISE. WISE became 
prominent in the context of rising unemployment and the crisis of welfare states in 
Europe and elsewhere in the North (Defourny and Nyssens, 2008). SEPPS are 
responses to the systemic and widespread poverty, inequality and the continuing 
failure of state and market institutions to address poverty in the South. 
The reality that state institutions of the South, as demonstrated in the cases, are 
part of the problem causing and exacerbating poverty, could tempt one to locate 
SEPPS as having affinity to the social innovation and social enterprise schools of 
social entrepreneurship (Dees and Anderson, 2006). Notwithstanding the potential 
enrichment to the concept of SEPPS that these two schools could offer, which could 
be the subject of future research, Hoogendoorn (2009) notes important concerns 
related to these two schools. The social innovation and social enterprise schools, 
                                                 
105 The South refers to underdeveloped economies within which the propositions on SEPPS are situated. The North 
refers to developed economies. The North-South divide is often used to characterize the inequitable global economic 
order among nations.    
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respectively, emphasize the application of business tools to pursue innovative 
solutions to social problems by extraordinary individuals and focus on market-based 
solutions to social problems without much involvement from the state (Hoogendoorn, 
2009). As demonstrated by the cases, state institutions are as important, or may even 
be more important, relative to market institutions, for SEPPS to engage.   
In this sense, the concept of SEPPS has a stronger affinity to the social economy 
school of social entrepreneurship that developed in Europe through the EMES 
Research Network (Defourny and Nyssens, 2010). This is especially so given its 
multi-stakeholder character (Vidal, 2010), its conceptual linkage to the issue of 
democracy and participation, and the location of social enterprises in the intersection 
of the civil society, public and private sectors (Hulgaard, 2008). Studies made by 
scholars of the social economy school that explored governance issues among social 
enterprises notably Spear, et al., (2010) and exploring cooperatives as social 
enterprises (Borzaga and Spear, 2004) have also yielded important insights useful for 
understanding SEPPS. The difference in context between the North and South may 
necessitate that the conception and theorizing about SEPPS is pursued as a distinct 
stream within or even beyond the social economy school of social entrepreneurship. 
The possibility of a distinct stream or school of social entrepreneurship to house 
further theorizing about SEPPS is an interesting area of further research. 
Robinson, et al., (2009) have noted that context matters in social entrepreneurship 
research, showing how the phenomenon has unfolded in different ways in Asia, 
Spain, Latin America and the Middle East. Some scholars of social economy such as 
Defourny, et al., (2009) have also recognized the contextual differences in the North 
and South even as they advance the concept of a global social economy.  
Social entrepreneurship theorizing that appreciates the contextual difference 
between the North and South would make interesting collaborative North-South or 
Asia-Europe research projects. This thesis shows how social enterprises serving 
PWDs and cooperatives as SEPPS have evolved quite differently in the Philippines, 
compared to their counterparts in Europe or in the North. For one, the thesis showed 
how the context in the South necessitates structures for self-governance and 
transformational services to address the capability deprivation of the poor for multi-
stakeholder systems of governance to work. 
This thesis therefore shows interesting starting points and suggests directions on 
how such collaborative research across country contexts could enrich theory building 
on social entrepreneurship.    
The aforementioned North-South, Asia-Europe collaborative research is made 
more relevant by the indication in this thesis about the role of development agencies 
in the North in nurturing SEPPS. Without exception, all cases in the theoretical 
sample showed a major role of development agencies from the North supporting the 
initiation, development and renewal of SEPPS.  This indicates that SEPPS may be 
 344 
conceptually appreciated, not only as a social enterprise model in a Southern country 
context.  As part of the contribution of this research to social entrepreneurship 
discourse,  SEPPS may be conceived as a global social enterprise model that could  
catalyze South-North cooperation for poverty reduction.  In this context, SEPPS 
deserve the attention of social entrepreneurship practitioners, policy makers and 
scholars alike, in the North and in the South.   
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CHAPTER 11 – CONCLUSIONS 
 
This thesis is a first step to applying and extending stakeholder theory to a 
specific type of social enterprise that has gained prominence in developing countries 
in the South: social enterprises with the poor as primary stakeholders or SEPPS. In 
doing so, it has developed a framework for understanding how social enterprises 
engage the poor and address poverty, a pressing social problem of the 21st century. 
Notwithstanding the value of such framework for practitioners, policy makers and 
academics, the propositions still need to be tested among a broader sample of SEPPS. 
With social enterprises and the poor as focus, the following research question 
was pursued:    
 
In those cases where social enterprises serve the poor as stakeholders in a 
developing country context, how have they engaged the poor, and why have they 
been effective in terms of their impact? 
 
To answer this question, the researcher used case-based theory building (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) as main methodology. The thesis studied a 
theoretical sample of six Philippine-based social enterprises, where the poor were 
suppliers (Alter Trade and Upland Marketing), workers (Tahanan and PWD Fed), 
and customers (Lamac MPC and Cordova MPC). In three of the cases, the poor were 
also owners (PWD Fed, Lamac MPC and Cordova MPC). It tracked the roles and 
role changes of the poor in these social enterprises, how and why they changed, or 
did not change, and the impact of the roles and role changes, if any, on the social 
enterprises and the poor.   
Chapter 1 discusses the background and review of literature that provided the 
context and theoretical framing of the research. Chapter 2 discusses the research 
problem and methodology. Chapters 3-8 contain the results of the research on the six 
cases in the theoretical sample. Chapter 9 contains the results of the overall cross 
case analysis. Chapter 10 contains the propositions and contributions of this thesis to 
social entrepreneurship and stakeholder theory.   
This thesis develops propositions on social enterprises with the poor as primary 
stakeholders or SEPPS. SEPPS are wealth-creating organizations that have at least a 
double bottom line (social and financial), explicitly have as principal objective, 
poverty reduction/alleviation or improving the quality of life of specific segments of 
the poor, and have a distributive enterprise philosophy. 
This thesis takes off from Sen’s (1999; 2009) definition of poverty, that it is not 
just about low incomes but is more about the deprivation of basic capabilities to 
improve well being.   
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This thesis introduces two types of roles that the poor enact as stakeholders of 
SEPPS: transactional and transformational roles (Please see Table 11.1.).  
 
Table 11.1. Transactional and Transformational Roles and Services 
Transactional roles are enterprise-based 
functions performed by the poor that 
involve an exchange of goods or services 
for money.  They include being workers, 
suppliers, clients or owners.   
Transformational roles are functions 
performed by the poor as conscious 
agents of change to lift them from 
poverty and to participate in group efforts 
to improve the quality of life of their 
community, sector or society as a whole.  
To effectively perform these roles, SEPPS provide transactional and 
transformational services. 
Transactional services pertain to 
enterprise or market-driven activities that 
are necessary for the poor in the social 
enterprise system to effectively and 
efficiently perform their roles as workers, 
suppliers, clients, and owners. 
Transformational services pertain to 
sustained capacity development efforts 
that empower the poor as change agents 
to overcome their poverty situation, and 
contribute to community, sectoral and 
societal development.  
Transactional services may be fee-based 
or non-fee based.   
Transformational services may be 
directed at individuals or groups. 
 
The researcher builds on earlier literature on managing stakeholders (Daft, 1992; 
Harrison and St. John, 1994), forms of stakeholder engagement (Beutler, 2005), 
models of stakeholder engagement (Sloan, 2009), and social enterprises as multi-
stakeholder organizations that further democracy at the grassroots (Defourny, 2001; 
Vidal, 2010). The researcher defines three models of stakeholder engagement            
among SEPPS: control, collaboration, and empowerment.  
   
 Control models engage the poor as passive beneficiaries, unlike the two 
other models that engage the poor as partners.  
 Collaboration models engage the poor as transactional partners: they 
provide transactional services for the poor to effectively perform 
transactional roles as workers, suppliers, clients and/or owners and as 
partners in social enterprise and value chain management.  
 Empowerment models engage the poor as transformational partners: they 
provide transactional and transformational services for the poor to 
undertake not only transactional but also transformational roles as 
participants in social enterprise governance and change agents in their 
community, sector and society. 
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This thesis puts forth six propositions on SEPPS.   
 
The first one is on the empowerment model of stakeholder engagement among 
SEPPS:   
 
Social enterprises that empower the poor as transformational partners tend to 
have a significant qualitative impact on poverty reduction.  
 
Alter Trade and PWD Fed demonstrated how assetless, powerless, sugar workers and 
unemployed persons with disability were transformed into leaders and members of 
self-governing cooperatives. These cooperatives not only served as vehicles for the 
poor’s participation as suppliers and workers in economic value chains, but they also 
served as vehicles for the poor to achieve food security, increase their self-esteem, 
overcome income poverty and contribute to the development of their respective 
communities and sectors.  
 
A second proposition is on the collaboration model of stakeholder engagement 
among SEPPS:  
 
Relative to social enterprises that engage the poor as transformational partners, 
social enterprises that engage the poor as transactional partners tend to reach a 
bigger number but with less qualitative impact on their poverty situation.   
 
As demonstrated by Lamac MPC and Cordova MPC, the access of the poor to 
financial services and social protection did not lead to a significant percentage of the 
poor overcoming income poverty and capability deprivation. At the same time, 
Upland Marketing’s transactional engagement with their producer partners translated 
to market access and increased incomes but could not account for the diversified 
sources of income that their organic rice farmer suppliers had spoken proudly about, 
to overcome income poverty.  Whilst Alter Trade and PWD Fed reached hundreds of 
sugar farmers and PWDs, Lamac MPC and Cordova MPC reached thousands of 
poor.   
 
A third proposition is on the control model of stakeholder engagement among 
SEPPS: 
 
Social enterprises that engage the poor as passive beneficiaries have a tendency 
to foster subservience and dependency that may lead to a hardening of social 
exclusion. This results in a limited or even a negative impact on the poor, 
associated with mission drift among SEPPS.   
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This cautions SEPPS about unintentionally pursuing the control model of stakeholder 
engagement given its risks of hardening social exclusion among the poor. This was 
demonstrated by a well-intentioned effort to expand and make sheltered workshops 
of Tahanan efficient in serving the mainstream export market ‘just to give work to 
people’. PWDs were engaged as passive workers serving long hours with little pay. 
Tahanan’s mission of providing meaningful employment to PWDs and engaging 
them as partners in their rehabilitation process clearly took a back seat during this 
period of crisis and mission drift.  
 
A fourth proposition is on the effective pursuit of a collaboration model of 
stakeholder engagement among SEPPS:  
 
SEPPS intending or pursuing a collaboration model of stakeholder engagement 
tend to be effective when managers view the poor as partners and provide for 
their effective participation in social enterprise or value chain management.   
 
Tahanan and Upland Marketing showed the way in terms of providing non-fee based 
transactional services and individually directed transformational services to 
encourage the effective participation of the poor in social enterprise and value chain 
management. This was coupled with instituting structures and systems for 
participation in planning and decision-making. Tahanan’s recovery from a period of 
mission drift was particularly noteworthy as a critical mass of PWDs among the poor 
were given scholarships and provided with trainings and learning opportunities. At 
their renewal stage, the majority of the supervisors and their managers/directors were 
PWDs emerging from this capacity development process. 
 
A fifth proposition concerns cooperatives as SEPPS 
 
Cooperatives that count among their members various segments of the poor will 
tend to fail in giving these stakeholders an effective voice and vote unless these 
various segments of the poor are provided transformational services and 
mechanisms to practice self-governance as foundation for multi-stakeholder 
governance.      
 
While Lamac MPC and Cordova MPC promoted social inclusion among the poor, 
their governance structures reflected a lack of representation by the poor. The poor 
also saw their membership more as a means of providing them access to financial 
services and social protection. These were unlike the PWD Fed that empowered 
PWDs to govern themselves in their primary cooperatives and the PWD Fed itself. 
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From the perspective of cooperatives as SEPPS, this thesis theorizes the possibility 
for cooperatives like Lamac MPC and Cordova MPC, to shift from a stakeholder 
engagement strategy of collaboration to a stakeholder engagement strategy of 
empowerment. This entails a combination of transformational services, putting in 
place multi-stakeholder governance policies as well as self-governance structures that 
would provide the poor with an effective voice and vote.   
     This proposition validates the nature of social enterprises as multi-stakeholder 
organizations, consistent with how they are defined by scholars from the social 
economy school (Defourny, 2001; Vidal, 2010). It also validates, this time in a 
developing country context, the relevance of Borzaga and Spear’s (2004) findings on 
the need for more effective mechanisms of multi-stakeholder governance as 
cooperatives become more communitarian and take on broader social goals.   
A sixth proposition is a more general one on shifting from a collaboration to an 
empowerment model of stakeholder engagement 
 
SEPPS wanting to shift from a collaboration to an empowerment model of 
stakeholder engagement tend to succeed with managers and programs oriented 
towards the poor as transformational partners. These programs tend to fail in the 
absence of dedicated structures and systems to deliver transformational services 
complemented by dedicated structures and systems to serve as venues for the 
performance of transformational roles. The establishment of distinct structures to 
ensure the delivery of transformational services and to provide venues for the 
poor’s performance of transformational roles would tend to result to SEPPS as 
multi-organizational systems.  
 
Alter Trade’s creation of a foundation to deliver transformational services and their 
assistance in organizing and developing not only the cooperatives of their sugar 
farmer partners but also of helping to federate them into NOFTA are illustrative of 
the essence of this proposition. Dedicated structures and systems for delivering 
transformational services and for the poor to enact transformational roles are 
particularly important for the empowerment strategy of stakeholder engagement.  
This is because transformational services are stakeholder and process-oriented, and 
the effective delivery of such entail a very different set of competencies compared to 
the delivery of market-driven, output-oriented transactional services. At the same 
time, the performance of transformational roles by the poor usually entail collective 
action among their ranks that are best expressed beyond the usual structures of 
SEPPS.   
These propositions are suggested to be applicable in countries in the South other 
than the Philippines where systemic poverty and inequality is exacerbated by the 
failure of state and market institutions to address the needs of the poor. However, 
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these propositions still need to be tested in a broader sample of SEPPS both within 
the Philippines and also within other countries in the South.  
While SEPPS are responses to the failure of state and market institutions in the 
South to meet the needs of the poor, they also find themselves operating in this same 
context. As indicated by the study, state and mainstream market institutions have 
often enacted disabling roles, in the process affecting the sustainability of  SEPPS.  
In this regard, the researcher cautions SEPPS against uncritically engaging 
mainstream market channels or government institutions as markets.   
This entails clarifying an agenda for change in its engagements with mainstream 
market channels and government institutions. Such reframing is important so that 
SEPPS would not jeopardize or sacrifice their mission to improve the quality of life 
of the poor or their sustainability in pursuing their mission. 
In the process of crafting creative ways of reframing engagements with 
mainstream markets and government agencies, the role of institutions in the North to 
serve as countervailing forces have been demonstrated in all cases, without 
exception. Institutions in the North have provided financial, technical and human 
resources for institution building and various forms of transactional and 
transformational services.   
In this process of South-North cooperation, the empowerment of the poor to 
enact transformational roles in the broad social-political environment of SEPPS has 
been demonstrated as feasible and critical. The empowerment model of stakeholder 
engagement among SEPPS is particularly important for the poor to overcome their 
capability deprivation amidst inequality and the failure of state and market 
institutions in the South.  
By sharing a perspective from the South and giving a voice to the poor as 
stakeholders in SEPPS, this thesis makes a contribution to both stakeholder theory 
and social entrepreneurship discourse.   
In developing a framework for understanding stakeholder engagement models 
involving the poor in social enterprises in a developing country context, this thesis 
makes a first step towards applying and extending stakeholder theory in SEPPS.  
This directly responds to the call by leading scholars of stakeholder theory for a 
“richer description” of stakeholder engagement strategies and models, a 
“redescription” of organizations other than corporations in stakeholder terms and 
“relating descriptions” or contributing to the conception of stakeholder theory for 
different types of organizations (Freeman,  et al., 2010, p. 286).   
This thesis makes a contribution to social entrepreneurship theory by articulating 
a framework for understanding and effectively supporting SEPPS as a global social 
enterprise model addressing poverty, a pressing social problem of the 21st century.  
The thesis builds on a normative definition of social enterprise adapted from the 
author’s earlier research  (Dacanay, 2004; Dacanay, 2009) and shows that SEPPS are 
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responses to pervasive state and market failures to serve the needs of the poor in a 
developing country context.  As such, and summarizing the six propositions 
discussed earlier, SEPPS provide a combination of services (transactional and 
transformational) aimed at assisting the poor overcome capability deprivation to 
enact both transactional and transformational roles. On one hand, the poor are 
assisted to enact transactional roles as workers, suppliers and clients, as well as 
partners in social enterprise or value chain management.  On the other hand, the poor 
are assisted to enact transformational roles as full fledged owners of social 
enterprises and as organized partners practicing democracy not only in social 
enterprise governance but also in the pursuit of community, sectoral, and societal 
change.   
The capability deprivation of the poor, the relatively insignificant to negative role 
of the state and the important role of enabling Northern institutions  are critical  
elements shown by the study to be giving SEPPS a distinct character in comparison 
to their social enterprise counterparts specially in the North.  Drawing from the   
review of literature in Chapter 1,  market-based social enterprise models in the 
United States were pursued by extraordinary individuals with the support of  social 
investors in response to cut-backs by federal government for community 
development programs.  In Europe, social enterprise models such as Work 
Integration Social Enterprises or WISE evolved as a response to the crisis of welfare 
states and structural unemployment,  but  with the state providing resources and a 
favorable policy environment.  As the cases in the theoretical sample indicated,  
development-oriented Northern institutions have served as important countervailing 
forces to the continuing failure of state and market institutions, and the minimal to 
even negative roles these  institutions have had towards the development of SEPPS in 
the South.      
      Indeed, both state and market institutions in the South are part of the problem of 
poverty and inequality. However, they also need to be part of the solution. Such 
necessitates innovative strategies for poverty reduction in the South. This thesis 
proposes a multi-stakeholder approach where SEPPS, as a global social enterprise 
model, could play a major catalytic role.  As catalysts in mobilizing South-North 
cooperation for global poverty reduction, SEPPS deserve the attention of policy 
makers, practitioners and scholars not only in the fields of social entrepreneurship 
and business and society,  but of everyone problematizing on a more equitable and 
sustainable future for humanity. 
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CHAPTER 12 – APPENDIX 
 
12.1. Panel of Experts 
 
Fair Trade Cluster 
Agustin, Rommel. Executive Director, Advocate of Philippine Fair Trade (APFTI).   
Interviewed 15 February 2008, Quezon City, Philippines. 
 
David, Claribel. Convenor, Asia Fair Trade Forum (AFTF). Interviewed 11 February 
2008, Quezon City, Philippines. 
 
Lagazo, Ronald. Coordinator, Philippine Fair Trade Forum (PFTF). Interviewed 15 
February 2008/ 31 March 2009, Quezon City, Philippines. 
 
Cooperatives Cluster 
Castillo, Mercedes. Chief Executive Officer, VICTO National. Interviewed 20 July 
2009, 3 August 2009 and 25 August 2009, Cebu City, Philippines. 
 
Detablan, Jose. Sector Network Building Head, VICTO National. Interviewed 3 
August 2009, Cebu City, Philippines. 
 
Flores, Dennis. Executive Officer for Region 7, VICTO National. Interviewed 3 
August 2009, Cebu City, Philippines. 
 
Samson, Audie Joseph. Senior Consultant, Office of the CEO, VICTO National. 
Interviewed 3 August 2009, Cebu City, Philippines. 
 
Tilbe, Jacinto. Social Development and Advocacy Head, VICTO National.  
Interviewed 3 August 2009, Cebu City, Philippines. 
 
PWD Social Enterprise Cluster 
Labanon, Flerida. Regional Program Coordinator, National Council on Disability 
Affairs (NCDA). Interviewed 16 July 2009, Quezon City, Philippines. 
 
Pangan, Angela. Chairperson, NORFIL Foundation. Interviewed 28 July 2009, 
Quezon City, Philippines. 
 
Ravelo, Andy. National Program Coordinator, NCDA. Interviewed 16 July 2009, 
Quezon City, Philippines 
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12.2. Guidelines for Field Research 
 
Guide Questions for Field Interviews 
1. Who do you consider to be the main stakeholders of your social enterprise 
(SE)?  What roles do they play?  How have these roles changed over time?  
What caused these changes in roles?  What impact did these changes have 
on the financial and social performance of your SE? 
2. Has your SE experienced any major changes in: 
a. Products, services rendered 
b. Customers and markets served 
c. Operations and operating systems 
d. Organizational structure and systems 
e. Leadership and management 
f. Owners and ownership 
g. Partners and partnerships 
h. Members recruited and/or employees hired 
3. Describe these changes.  What caused these changes? Who among the SE 
stakeholders played a role in putting in place and implementing these 
changes?  How did these stakeholders participate? What impact did these 
changes have on the financial and social performance of your SE? 
4. Have you experienced any changes or shifts in your external environment?  
Describe these changes?  How did your SE respond to these changes? 
5. How would you assess the performance of your SE in terms of meeting its 
social and financial objectives over time?  What is your basis for this 
performance assessment?  What periods would you consider high or low 
points of your SE in terms of financial and social performance?  Why do 
you say so?  What do you think were the causes or major factors that 
contributed to these high and low points? 
6. Does your SE have or are you aware of a vision and mission statement?  
How would you assess the level of achievement of such vision and mission 
statement since you were established? Rate from 1-10 (1 lowest and 10 
highest) Explain your rating. 
7. For management:  What is your concept of strategy?  Does your SE 
undertake strategic planning processes or strategy formulation sessions?  
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Why or why not? If so, how often or when did such happen? Who led or 
participated in these processes?  How did the main stakeholders participate 
or influence these processes or sessions?  Do you think these processes 
were useful?  (Rate from 1-10) Explain your answer.  To what extent have 
the outcomes of these processes been implemented?  (Rate from 1-10) 
Explain.  
8. For other stakeholders:  What is your concept of strategy?  Are you aware 
of strategic planning processes or strategy sessions being conducted by the 
enterprise? How often did these take place?  Have you participated in these 
processes?  Why or why not?  How? How much influence do you think you 
have had in these processes and their outcomes?  Rate from 1 to 10 (1 
lowest, 10 highest).  Explain your rating.  Have the final results of these 
processes been shared with you?  How? How useful has your participation 
in these processes been to you? (Rate from 1-10) Explain.  To the SE? 
(Rate from 1-10).  Explain. 
Documents to be requested and reviewed: 
 
1. Annual and other reports since founding (external and internal) 
2. Financial statements since founding  (preferably audited) 
3. Documentation of strategic, medium term, annual plans 
4. Documentation of strategic planning workshops or major decision making 
sessions 
5. Evaluation and assessment documents (internal and external) 
6. Strategy papers 
7. Major studies made by and on the SE 
8. Minutes of board meetings and documents circulated in board meetings 
9. Minutes of management committee meetings 
10. Minutes  of meetings with stakeholders 
11. Other documents useful for answering or explaining answers to questions 
discovered on field 
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12.3. Sample MOU between Case Subject and Researcher 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING  
between  
Lamac Multi Purpose Cooperative (Lamac MPC), represented by Ms. Ellen 
Limocon, General Manager, hereafter referred to as the CASE SUBJECT 
and 
Marie Lisa M. Dacanay, PhD Fellow, Copenhagen Business School and President of 
the Institute for Social Entrepreneurship in Asia (ISEA), hereafter referred to as the 
PhD FELLOW   
agree to collaborate in the Strategy Configurations in Social Enterprises Research 
Project under the following terms and conditions: 
1.  That the research has the mutually beneficial objective of contributing to the 
evolving body of knowledge on social entrepreneurship useful for education 
and training programs on social entrepreneurship and social enterprises like 
cooperatives;  
2. That the research is not an evaluation of the case subject’s performance, or 
does not seek to illustrate effective and ineffective management of social 
enterprises but is meant to generate insights for practitioners and academics on 
the role of the poor and other stakeholders in strategy content and formation in 
social enterprises, and how such affects social and financial performance.  
3. Toward these ends, the case subject agrees to: 
a. Provide the PhD fellow access to organizational documents, including 
historical accounts, assessment and annual reports, evaluation and market 
studies, annual financial statements, minutes of meetings, resolutions and 
other relevant materials that would shed light on the strategies adopted and 
implemented, the role of stakeholders and its effects on the fulfillment of the 
case subject’s vision, mission and objectives over time; 
b. Provide the PhD fellow access to its board, officers, management, staff, 
workers and partners as key informants in pre-arranged interviews that are 
mutually agreed upon during the period November 2009-January 2010, and in 
follow-up interviews as necessary.  The questions shall revolve around the 
following: 
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i. How has the content of the case subject’s strategies evolved since its 
inception?  (strategies may involve products and markets intended or 
actually served; major partnerships planned or actually forged; segments 
of the poor chosen or actually served; major financial, human, 
technological, physical investments, sources of investments and 
organizational decisions or actions that have had an effect/impact on the 
case subject’s operations and  financial/social performance)    
ii. What role did the poor and other stakeholders have in evolving or 
shifting these strategies? 
iii. What effects have these various strategies and shift in strategies had on 
the social and financial performance of the case subject?  
c. Allow the PhD fellow to tape interviews 
d. Allow the PhD fellow to attend and observe its workplaces and activities 
during periods that are mutually agreed upon  
e. Allow the inclusion of the case study in the PhD fellow’s dissertation report 
and other publications as mutually agreed upon; 
4. Toward these ends, the PhD fellow agrees to: 
a. Pre-arrange all research activities with the designated officer or staff at times 
and places that are mutually agreed upon 
b. Give due care in handling internal data and reports that the case subject 
shares, and commit to respect the confidentiality of sensitive information and 
documents identified as such; 
c. Get the clearance of the designated officer for all research outputs emanating 
from the research on the case subject to be included in the dissertation report 
and other publications 
d. Allow the case subject use of any research findings and outputs for its 
internal and organizational purposes  
e. Give the case subject and key informants the option to be anonymous, or their 
identities confidential as may be agreed upon. 
f. Utilize the findings of the case research only for education, publication and 
other purposes consistent with the aforementioned objectives of the research.   
That the case subject and PhD fellow may revise this agreement or discontinue 
the research, based on legitimate but unforeseen circumstances, that may be 
mutually recognized and agreed upon by both parties.  
(Original Signed)                                                     (Original Signed) 
ELLEN LIMOCON             MARIE LISA M.DACANAY 
GENERAL MANAGER                      PHD FELLOW 
LAMAC MULTI PURPOSE COOPERATIVE     COPENHAGEN BUSINESS SCH. 
DATE: 1 Dec 2009             DATE: 1 Dec 2009 
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12.4  Development Index For Alter Trade’s Partner 
People’s Organizations106 
 
Aspect Level  1  Points Level 2  Points Level 3  Points 
A.  
Organizational 
cohesion and 
development 
(20) 
      
1.  Basis of 
unity (4) 
Only as 
farmers/ 
growers of a 
common crop 
in the same 
area, and as 
individual 
suppliers of 
produce to 
Alter Trade 
1 Strong basis of 
unity on 
income-
generating 
projects (i.e. 
group-managed 
projects/ 
marketing 
systems); 
Emerging unity 
on directions 
for PO and 
sustainable 
community/ 
sector 
development 
2 – 3 Collective vision 
and joint 
activities for 
community/ 
sector 
development 
anchored on a 
sustainable 
development 
framework 
4 
2.  Member 
participation (4)  
Less than 30% 
of members 
are 
participating in 
meetings and 
other group 
activities 
1 More than 1/3 
to around 2/3 of 
members 
participate 
regularly in 
group activities 
2 – 3 More than 2/3 of 
members actively 
participate in 
activities 
4 
3.  Leadership 
development (4) 
Dependent on 
one to two 
leaders (set of 
officers); no 
second-liners 
1 Leaders (e.g. 
set of officers) 
are capable of 
steering the 
organization; 
with second-
liners 
2 – 3 Complement of 
capable first and 
second-liners in 
place 
4 
                                                 
106 Version as of July 2008. Changes were made later by Alter Trade to reflect the following:  inclusion of ‘capacity for 
networking and advocacy’ under ‘Organizational Cohesion and Development’, ‘Practice of Organic Farming’ as a 
distinct major aspect, and expansion of the aspect ‘Income Diversification’ to include ‘Food Security’ (i.e. capacity to 
produce food for the household). Descriptors for some levels were also enhanced. 
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Aspect Level  1  Points Level 2  Points Level 3  Points 
4.  Installation 
of management 
systems (4) 
Organizational 
management 
systems are 
still in process 
of installation 
1 Organizational 
management 
systems 
installed and 
generally 
functional 
2 – 3 Organizational 
management 
systems are fully 
functional 
4 
5. Capacity for 
self-
management (4) 
Highly 
dependent on 
external 
intervention 
agent (e.g. 
community 
organizer) for 
conduct of 
meetings and 
other group 
activities; self-
initiation of 
activities is 
rare 
1 Can already 
initiate and 
manage 
activities 
without external 
intervenor 
2 – 3 Can manage 
organizational 
concerns without 
external 
intervenor 
4 
       
B.  Capacity to 
engage the 
market  (20) 
      
1.  Consistency 
in meeting 
volume 
requirements for 
tradeable 
product/s (7) 
On the average 
(in terms of 
membership), 
inconsistent in 
meeting 
agreed-on 
volume 
requirements 
1 – 2 Generally 
consistent in 
meeting volume 
requirements 
3-5 High degree of 
reliability in 
meeting agreed-
on volumes  
6-7 
2.  Consistency 
in meeting 
quality 
requirements for 
tradeable 
product/s (7) 
Average 
quality of 
produce (based 
on total 
membership) 
is generally 
below standard  
1-2 Average quality 
of produce 
(based on total 
membership) 
meets quality 
standards  
3-5 Consistently high 
level of product 
quality 
6-7 
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Aspect Level  1  Points Level 2  Points Level 3  Points 
3.  Participation 
in marketing 
system (6) 
Members deal 
with Alter 
Trade/ other 
buyers still 
mainly as 
individual 
growers/ 
suppliers, or as 
a group with 
little 
bargaining 
power 
1-2 Organization is 
able to engage 
in  trading 
relationship 
with Alter 
Trade/ other 
buyers as an 
equal partner; 
other products 
starting to be 
traded  
3-4 Organization’s 
participation in 
marketing system 
goes beyond 
supplier role (e.g. 
it has shares/ 
decision-making 
participation to 
other layers in the 
marketing 
channel/s) 
5-6 
       
C.  Income 
diversification 
among 
members (20) 
      
1.  Range of 
agricultural 
production (10) 
Still largely 
mono-
cropping; 
practice of 
sustainable 
agriculture just 
beginning  
1 – 4 Most of the 
members have 
crops aside 
from the main 
product; main 
product (i.e. 
sugar, banana) 
is almost fully 
(more than 
50%) under 
sustainable 
agriculture; 
sustainable 
agriculture 
practices 
starting to be 
applied to other 
crops   
5 – 6 High level of 
crop 
diversification 
and practice of 
sustainable 
agriculture 
among members 
7 – 10 
2.  Range of off-
farm/ non-farm 
enterprises (10) 
No, to 
minimal, off-
farm 
livelihood 
activities 
1 – 4 Most of the 
members have 
off-farm/ non-
farm enterprises 
5 – 6 All/ almost all of 
the members are 
engaged in a 
variety of off-
farm/ non-farm 
enterprises 
7 – 10 
 360 
Aspect Level  1  Points Level 2  Points Level 3  Points 
D.  
Contribution to 
community/ 
sector  
development 
(20)  
      
1.  Nature of 
concerns/ 
issues/ projects 
that the 
organization is 
involved in (6) 
Projects/ 
concerns are 
mainly limited 
to 
improvement 
of welfare of 
members  
1 – 2 With thematic 
projects (e.g. on 
sustainable 
agriculture, fair 
trade, 
environment, 
social services) 
that benefit the 
larger 
community 
(area) or sector 
3 – 4 Projects/ 
concerns are 
linked to 
comprehensive 
agenda 
concerning 
sustainable 
agriculture, fair 
trade and 
sustainable 
development 
5 – 6 
2.  Extent of 
impact, role of 
organization, 
and level of 
recognition by 
other 
stakeholders in 
the community/ 
sector/ area (14) 
Impact extends 
mainly to 
organization’s 
membership, 
with minimal 
impact on 
immediate 
community 
1 – 5 Impact extends 
to larger 
community 
(area) or sector; 
Organization is 
recognized by 
local 
stakeholders as 
contributing to 
community/ 
sector 
development 
6 – 9 With substantial 
impact on larger 
community/ 
sector; 
Organization is 
recognized as a 
key actor in area/ 
sector 
development by 
local to national/ 
international 
stakeholders 
10 - 
14  
       
E.  Financial 
growth and 
sustainability 
(20) 
      
1.  Asset level  
and asset 
growth (5) 
Inadequate 
assets to 
sustain 
association  
1 – 2 Assets are 
growing at a 
steady rate and 
are at a level 
sufficient for 
organization’s 
core operations 
3 Assets are 
growing at a 
significant rate, 
providing a stable 
resource base for 
organization 
4 – 5 
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Aspect Level  1  Points Level 2  Points Level 3  Points 
2.  Revenues or 
financial 
resources to 
cover operations 
and projects/ 
extent of surplus 
(5) 
No surplus; 
insufficient 
financial 
resources 
(whether 
internally or 
externally-
generated) to 
fund 
operations and 
projects; 
dependent on 
subsidies 
1 – 2 Break-even 
operations to 
positive 
surplus; 
Income/ 
resources 
generated are  
sufficient to 
cover core 
operations and 
key projects 
3 Significant to 
substantial 
surplus adequate 
for enterprise 
growth, 
investments and 
generation of 
earnings for 
members 
4 – 5 
3. Capital build-
up/ investment 
funds (5) 
Irregular/ 
inadequate 
capital build-
up by 
members; no 
investment 
funds 
1 – 2 Regular capital 
build-up by 
members 
though still at 
low levels; 
minimal funds 
for investments 
3 Regular/ 
substantial capital 
build-up among 
members; Portion 
of assets/ 
resources 
allocated for 
investments 
4 – 5 
4.  Dividends 
and other 
benefits derived 
by members (5)  
Not yet 
regularly 
providing 
dividends or 
other financial 
benefits to 
members  
1 – 2 Regularly 
providing 
dividends/ 
financial 
benefits to 
members but 
still at low 
levels 
3  Regularly 
providing 
dividends and 
other financial 
benefits to 
members; such 
financial benefits 
comprise major 
income source for 
members’ 
households  
4 – 5 
       
TOTAL  Below 
40 
 40 – 
70 
 Above 
70 
 
General Levels of Development: 
 
Level 1:  Self Help Group (Score below 40) 
Level 2:  Entrepreneurial Farmers’ Organization (Score 40-70) 
Level 3:  Organization Practicing Social Entrepreneurship (Score above 70) 
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12.5.  Exchange Rates:  
     US Dollars to Philippine Peso (PhP) 
                     Selected Years, 1970-2012 
 
The following provides an indication of the exchange rate for one U.S. Dollar to Philippine peso 
(PhP), for selected years from 1970-2012, compiled from various sources. Data before 2005 are 
based mainly on the prevailing exchange rate as of December 31 of the indicated year. Data from 
2005-2011 are based on monthly average exchange rates while data for 2012 is the actual exchange 
rate as of January 18, 2012. 
  
 1970: PhP   6.44 
 1975: PhP   7.51 
 1980: PhP   7.60 
 1985: PhP 19.03 
 1990: PhP 28.00 
 1995: PhP 26.21 
2000: Php 44.14 
2001: Php 51.00 
2002: Php 51.58 
2003: Php 54.20 
2004: Php 56.04 
 2005: PhP 55.09 
 2006: PhP 51.31 
 2007: PhP 46.15 
 2008: PhP 44.48 
 2009: PhP 47.64 
 2010: PhP 45.11 
 2011:PhP  43.28 
            2012: PhP 43.69 
 
Sources of Data: 
http://intl.econ.cuhk.edu.hk/exchange_rate_regime/index.php?cid=1(1970-95); 
http://eofw.net/stats-and-facts/philippine-peso-us-dollar-exchange-rates-through-the-years/ 
(2000-2004);  
http://learninterestrates.com/monthly-average-exchange-rate-of-philippine-peso-and-us-dollar/ 
(2005-2011);  
http://www.bsp.gov.ph/statistics/sdds/exchrate.htm (Jan 18, 2012) 
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12.6. Key Informants for Case Research 
12.6.1. Alter Trade Group  
 
Agustin, Rommel.  15 February 2008, Quezon City, Philippines.  Agustin was 
Executive Director of Advocate of Philippine Fair Trade (APFTI). 
Atienza, Nike Rose.  27 January 2010, Bacolod City, Philippines. Atienza was 
formerly the Finance Manager and currently Chief of Finance and 
Administration of Alter Trade Corporation (ATC). 
Bendicio, Natividad. 26 January 2010, Bacolod City, Philippines. Bendicio was the 
Chairman of PARBMPC, an Alter Trade Group (ATG) Partner in Bago City, 
Negros Occidental. 
Bennet, Timothy.  6 March 2008,  Bacolod City, Philippines.  Bennet was President 
of the Hawaiian Philippine Corporation. 
Borje, Elvira.  11 March 2008,  Pasay City, Philippines.  Borje  was Officer-in-
Charge of the Natural Products Division of the Center for International Trade 
and Exposition Mission (CITEM). 
Caduya, Gilda.  8 March 2008, Bacolod City, Philippines. Caduya was the Past 
General Manager and currently Chief Executive Officer of ATC. 
Canoy, Reynaldo. 26 January 2010, Bacolod City, Philippines.  Canoy was the 
Chairman of Celina-92, an ATG Partner in La Castellana, Negros Occidental. 
Ceralbo, Dolores. 26 January 2010, Bacolod City, Philippines.  Ceralbo was 
President of PIBFA, an ATG Partner in Don Salvador Benedicto, Negros 
Occidental. 
David, Claribel.  11 February 2008, Quezon City, Philippines. David was Convenor 
of the Asia Fair Trade Forum. 
Demaisip, Virginia. 27 January 2010, Bacolod City, Philippines. Demaisip was 
formerly Treasurer and member of the Board of Directors and currently 
Production Manager of Alter Trade Manufacturing Corporation (ATMC), 
Bacolod City, 27 January 2010 
Diamante, Daniel. 26 January 2010, Bacolod City, Philippines. Diamante was 
Chairman of DAFWARBA, ATG Partner in La Castellana, Negros Occidental. 
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Estama, Lito.  26 January 2010, Bacolod City, Philippines. Estama was Manager of 
NARBA-MPC, ATG Partner in La Carlota City, Negros Occidental. 
Hilarbo, Jaime. 26 January 2010, Bacolod City, Philippines.  Hilarbo was  Chairman 
of STCMPC, ATG Partner in Murcia, Negros Occidental. 
Hotta, Masahiko.  23 February 2008, Makati City, Philippines.  Hotta was Founder of 
Alter Trade Japan. 
Jakosalem, Amy.  6 March 2008, Bacolod City, Philippines.  Jakosalem was former 
Executive Director of Alter Trade Foundation, Inc.  (ATFI). 
Jugue, Nelson. 26 January 2010, Bacolod City, Philippines.  Jugue was Chairman of 
HCARBOI, ATG partner in Talisay, Negros Occidental. 
Labrador, Nimfa. 26 January 2010, Bacolod City, Philippines.  Labrador was 
Chairperson of CAMFAWA, ATG Partner in La Castellana, Negros 
Occidental. 
Lagazo, Ronald.  31 March 2009, Quezon City, Philippines.  Lagazo was 
Coordinator of the Philippine Fair Trade Forum (PFTF). 
Lopez, Edwin.  27 January 2010/20 May 2011, Bacolod City/Quezon City, 
Philippines.  Lopez was Executive Director of Alter Trade Foundation, Inc. 
Mondejar, Elizabeth.  27 January 2010, Bacolod City, Philippines.  Mondejar was 
Marketing and Sales Manager of the ATC. 
Noble, Romualdo.  26 January 2010, Bacolod City, Philippines.  Noble was 
Chairman of AMANO,  ATG Partner in La Castellana, Negros Occidental. 
Nuriel, Vegaste.  26 January 2010, Bacolod City,  Philippines.  Nuriel was President 
of  MAGOFAWA, ATG Partner in La Castellana, Negros Occidental.  
Ohashi-Bodios, Seiko.  23 March 2008, Bacolod City, Philippines.  Ohashi-Bodios 
was Acting Secretary General of the Japan Committee for Negros Campaign 
(JCNC). 
Parreno, Earl.  8 February 2008/ 25 August 2009/20 May 2011, Quezon City, 
Philippines.  Parreno was Board Member and Coordinator of Alter Trade 
Group, and later became President of the Alter Trade Foundation Inc. 
Patricio, Mario. 26 January 2010, Bacolod City, Philippines.  Patricio was President 
of MIARBA, ATG Partner in La Castellana, Negros Occidental. 
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Sandrico, Cornelio. 26 January 2010, Bacolod City, Philippines.  Sandrico was 
Chairman of NARFWA, ATG Partner in Bago City, Negros Occidental. 
Serrano, Isagani. 30 May 2011. Quezon City.  Serrano was President of the 
Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement.  
Tenefrancia, Ray.  27 January 2010, Bacolod City, Philippines.  Tenefrancia was 
former Production Manager and currently Chief of Corporate Planning of the 
Alter Trade Group. 
Tomaro, Torjeco.  27 January 2010, Bacolod City, Philippines.  Tomaro was 
Chairman of STARFA, ATG Partner in Bago City, Negros Occidental. 
Torio, Alipio.  26 January 2010, Bacolod City, Philippines.  Torio was Vice 
Chairman of HHACATRIFWO, ATG Partner in La Castellana, Negros 
Occidental. 
12.6.2.  Upland Marketing Foundation Inc. 
 
Agustin, Rommel.  15 February 2008, Quezon City, Philippines.  Agustin was 
Executive Director of the Advocate of Philippine Fair Trade, Inc. (APFTI). 
Albo, Angel.  8 February 2010, Quezon City, Philippines.  Albo was Vice President 
of SALIKA, a UMFI Partner in Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro. 
Bicaldo, Miller.  8 February 2010, Quezon City, Philippines.  Bicaldo was General 
Manager of Pecuaria Development Cooperative, a UMFI partner in Camarines 
Sur. 
Capunan, Jathiel.  8 February 2010, Quezon City, Philippines.  Capunan was 
Chairman of Sto. Nino Cooperative, a UMFI partner in South Cotabato.   
Castaneda, Jun.  9 February 2010, Quezon City, Philippines.  Castaneda was 
President of SKMFMC, a UMFI Partner in Sultan Kudarat. 
David, Claribel.  11 February 2008, Quezon City, Philippines.  David was Convenor 
of the Asia Fair Trade Forum.  
Derige, Ramon.  23 September 2010, Quezon City, Philippines. Derige was      
           President of  Upland  Marketing Foundation Inc.   
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Evangelista, Ruben.  March 4, 2011, Pasig City, Philippines.  (Interview with 
Rosalinda Roy).  Evangelista was the Executive Director of the Upland 
Marketing Foundation, Inc. 
Fonollera, Mel. March 4, 2011, Pasig City, Philippines.  (Interview with Rosalinda 
Roy).  Fonollera was the Operations Manager of the Upland Marketing 
Foundation, Inc. 
Guarin, Rene.  28 July 2009, Quezon City, Philippines.  Guarin was Executive 
Director of Upland Marketing Foundation Inc. at the time of the interview. 
Ibanez, Norlito.  9 February 2010, Quezon City, Philippines.  Ibanez was Program 
Coordinator of Task Force Mapalad, a UMFI partner in La Castellana, Negros 
Occidental.   
Lagazo, Ronald.  31 March 2009, Quezon City, Philippines.  Lagazo was 
Coordinator of the Philippine Fair Trade Forum (PFTF). 
Palomo, Marlon (2011).  February 11, 2011, Quezon City, Philippines.  (Interview 
with Rosalinda Roy). Palomo was the Chair of the KOOL-Nueva Ecija, a 
partner community-based enterprise of the Upland Marketing Foundation, Inc. 
Tacuyog, Grace.  23 February 2010, Quezon City, Philippines. Tacuyog was Deputy 
Executive Director of Upland Marketing Foundation Inc. at the time of the 
interview.  
12.6.3.  National Federation of Cooperatives of Persons with        
     Disability (PWD Fed) 
 
Aranas, Pablo.  10 November 2009, Taytay, Rizal, Philippines.  Aranas was Officer 
in Charge of the PWD Fed. 
Banday, Mayta.  8 February 2010, Quezon City, Philippines.  Banday was 
Marketing/ Project Development Officer of the PWD Fed.   
Bayano, Acquilles, .25 February 2010, Quezon City, Philippines.  Acquilles was 
Vice Chair of the Board of Directors of SAFRA ADAP MPC, a PWD Fed 
member from Agusan del Sur. 
Dulay, Christopher.  25 February 2010, Quezon City, Philippines.  Dulay was             
Manager of the MAPALAD MPC, a PWD Fed member from Negros 
Occidental. 
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Hammerle, Peter.  23 February 2010/ 1 June 2011, Quezon City, Philippines. 
Hammerle was Consultant of the PWD Fed and Executive Director of the 
Foundation forTheseAbled Persons Inc.   
Labanon, Flerida.  16 July 2009, Quezon City, Philippines.  Labanon was Regional 
Program Coordinator of the National Council on Disability Affairs (NCDA). 
Maguigad, Lolita. 8 February 2010, Quezon City, Philippines.  Maguigad was HRD/ 
Planning Officer of the PWD Fed. 
Mendoza, Rodolfo.  25 February 2010, Quezon City, Philippines.  Mendoza was 
Manager of the NEAPWD, a PWD Fed member from Nueva Ecija. 
Pangan, Angela.   28 July 2009, Quezon City, Philippines.  Pangan was Chairperson 
of the NORFIL Foundation. 
Ravelo, Andy.  16 July 2009, Quezon City, Philippines.  Ravelo was National 
Program Coordinator of the NCDA. 
12.6.4.  Tahanang Walang Hagdanan (Tahanan) 
 
Baerts, Valeriana .  26 May 2011, Cainta, Rizal, Philippines. Baerts was Founder              
and Chairperson of the Board of Trustees, Tahanan.  
 
Caranog, Leon. 18 January 2010, Cainta, Rizal, Philippines. Caranog was a worker 
of Tahanan.   
Celso, Vanessa. 18 January 2010, Cainta, Rizal, Philippines. Celso was a worker of 
Tahanan. 
Garcia, Joy Cevallos.  6 November 2009; 18 January 2010; 26 May 2011, Cainta, 
Rizal, Philippines.  Garcia was Executive Vice President-Chief Operations 
Officer of Tahanan. 
Evangelista, Lita.  8 December 2009, Cainta, Rizal, Philippines.  Evangelista was       
          Director of the Sheltered Workshop Operations of Tahanan.   
 
Labanon, Flerida.  16 July 2009, Quezon City, Philippines.  Labanon was Regional 
Program Coordinator of the National Council on Disability Affairs (NCDA). 
Lagunero, Riza.  8 December 2009, Cainta, Rizal, Philippines.  Lagunero was 
Accounting Manager of Tahanan 
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Llenares, Claire.  8 December 2009, Cainta, Rizal, Philippines.  Llenares was Human 
Resource Manager of Tahanan 
Lloren, Tess.  8 December 2009, Cainta, Rizal, Philippines.  Lloren was Executive 
Assistant and Head, Special Projects of Tahanan 
Maekel, Lita. 18 January 2010, Cainta, Rizal, Philippines. Maekel was a worker of 
Tahanan 
Montilla, Virgie.  12 November 2009, Cainta, Rizal, Philippines.  Montilla was 
Social Director of Tahanan.   
Narciza, Rolando.  18 January 2010, Cainta, Rizal, Philippines. Narciza was a metal 
craft worker at Tahanan .18 January 2010 
Pangan, Angela.  28 July 2009, Quezon City, Philippines.  Pangan was Chairperson 
of the NORFIL Foundation. 
Ravelo, Andy.  16 July 2009, Quezon City, Philippines.  Ravelo was National 
Program Coordinator of the NCDA. 
Sta Ana, Loretta.   8 December 2009, Cainta, Rizal, Philippines.  Sta. Ana was 
Secretary to the Founding Chairperson of the TWH. 
Somayao,  Obet.  6 November 2009, Cainta, Rizal, Philippines.  Somayao was a 
worker (silk screening) of Tahanan. 
Tuazon, Lolita.  18 January 2010, Cainta, Rizal, Philippines.  Tuazon was     
Marketing Director of the TWH.  
Villafuerte, Angel.  12 November 2009, Cainta, Rizal, Philippines.  Villafuerte was 
PR and Resource Mobilization Director of the TWH. 
12.6.5.  Lamac MPC 
 
Alegado. Elizabeth.  1 December 2009, Pinamungajan, Cebu, Philippines.  Alegado 
was a housewife, married to a construction worker, who was a member of the 
Lamac MPC. 
Alfeche,Bernardita. 1 December 2009, Pinamungajan, Cebu, Philippines.  Alfeche 
was a micro-entrepreneur who was a member of the Lamac MPC. 
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Arcadio. 1 December 2009, Pinamungajan, Cebu, Philippines.  Arcadio was a driver 
who was a member of the Lamac MPC. 
Canillar, Emilio.  1 December 2009, Pinamungajan, Cebu, Philippines. Canillar was 
a farmer/ livestock raiser who was a member of the Lamac MPC. 
Canlaon, Merlinda. 1 December 2009, Pinamungajan, Cebu, Philippines.  Canlaon 
was a casual worker at the Lamac MPC’s Hidden Valley Resort and livestock 
raiser/ farmer who was a member of the Lamac MPC.   
Castillo, Mercedes.  3 August 2009 and 25 August 2009, Cebu City, Philippines.  
Castillo was CEO of VICTO National. 
De Guzman, Mario.  30 November 2009, Pinamungajan, Cebu, Philippines. De 
Guzman was Internal Audit Head of Lamac MPC.   
Detablan, Jose.  3 August 2009, Cebu City, Philippines. Detablan was SNB Head of 
VICTO National. 
Ferrer, Rosa.  1 December 2009, Pinamungajan, Cebu, Philippines.  Ferrer was a fish 
vendor/ micro-entrepreneur who was a member of Lamac MPC. 
Flores, Denis.  3 August 2009, Cebu City, Philippines. Flores was Executive Officer 
for Region 7 of VICTO National. 
Geyrozaga, Milagros.  30 November 2009, Pinamungajan, Cebu, Philippines.  
Geyrozaga was Head of the Accounting Department of Lamac MPC. 
Libay, Rose.  1 December 2009, Pinamungajan, Cebu, Philippines.  Libay was a 
micro-entrepreneur who was a member of Lamac MPC. 
Limocon, Ellen. 2 December 2009, Pinamungajan, Cebu, Philippines.  Limocon was 
General Manager of Lamac MPC. 
Lucero, Pablito. 2 December 2009, Pinamungajan, Cebu, Philippines.  Lucero was a 
Member of the Lamac MPC Board of Directors. 
Pantino, Edu.  30 November 2009, Pinamungajan, Cebu, Philippines.  Pantino was 
Head of the Institutional Development Department of Lamac MPC. 
Rosario, Danilo. 1 December 2009, Pinamungajan, Cebu, Philippines.  Rosario was a 
carpenter/ construction worker who was a member of the Lamac MPC.   
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Samson, Audie Joseph. 3 August 2009, Cebu City, Philippines.  Samson was Senior 
Consultant of the Office of the CEO of VICTO National. 
Tanodra, Digna. 1 December 2009, Pinamungajan, Cebu, Philippines.  Tanodra was a 
farmer/ handicraft maker who was a member of the Lamac MPC and Lamac 
MPC Coordinator. 
Tapales, Teofilo. 1 December 2009, Pinamungajan, Cebu, Philippines.  Tapales was 
a farmer and micro entrepreneur who was a member of the Lamac MPC. 
Tilbe, Jacinto. 3 August 2009, Cebu City, Philippines.  Tilbe was SDA Head of 
VICTO National.   
Tuquib, Delfin. 30 November 2009, Pinamungajan, Cebu, Philippines.  Tuquib was 
Chairman of the Board of Directors of Lamac MPC. 
Tuquib, Maribeth. 30 November 2009, Pinamungajan, Cebu, Philippines.  Tuquib 
was Area Manager of Lamac MPC. 
Ubaob, Teresita. 1 December 2009, Pinamungajan, Cebu, Philippines.  Ubaob was a 
livestock raiser and micro-entrepreneur who was a member of Lamac MPC. 
12.6.6.  Cordova MPC 
 
Baguio, Rosalia.  3 December 2009, Cebu, Philippines. Baguio was a sari-sari 
(variety) store owner who was a member of the Cordova MPC. 
Biongcog, Maribel.  3 December 2009, Cebu, Philippines. Biongcog was a dried fish 
dealer who was a member of the Cordova MPC.  
Castillo, Mercedes. 3 August 2009 and 25 August 2009, Cebu City, Philippines. 
Castillo was CEO of VICTO National. 
Detablan, Jose. 3 August 2009, Cebu City, Philippines. Detablan was SNB Head of 
VICTO National. 
De Ramayo, Aurea.  2 December 2009, Cebu, Philippines.  De Ramayo was General 
Manager of the Cordova MPC. 
Flores, Denis.  3 August 2009, Cebu City, Philippines.  Flores was Executive Officer 
for Region 7 of VICTO National. 
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Fuentes, Miriam.  3 December 2009, Cebu, Philippines.  Fuentes was a small 
entrepreneur who was a member of the Cordova MPC.   
Jumao-as, Rodrigo.  3 December 2009, Cebu, Philippines.  Jumao-as was Vice 
Mayor of the Municipality of Cordova, Cebu.  
Ompad, Nemeth.  3 December 2004, Cebu, Philippines.  Ompad was Administrative 
and Finance Officer of the Cordova MPC. 
Samson, Audie Joseph.  3 August 2009, Cebu City, Philippines. Samson was Senior 
Consultant of the Office of the CEO of VICTO National. 
Sentillas, Fe Gloria.  3 December 2004, Cebu, Philippines.  Sentillas was a shell 
picker/ micro entrepreneur who was a member of the Cordova MPC. 
Tajanlangit, Glenn Revalde.  3 December 2009, Cebu, Philippines. Tajanlangit was 
Chief Operations Officer of the Cordova MPC. 
Tajanlangit, Marissa.  3 December 2009, Cebu, Philippines.  Tajanlangit was 
Secretary of the Board of Directors of the Cordova MPC. 
Tampus, Delia.  3 December 2009, Cebu, Philippines.  Tampus was Branch Manager 
of the Cordova MPC. 
Tilbe, Jacinto.  3 August 2009, Cebu City, Philippines. Tilbe was SDA Head of 
VICTO National. 
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